Program

The Second International Workshop for Peace and Disarmament

in the Asia-Pacific Region

The New Cold War in Northeast Asia

and the Civil Interpretation on 'Threat’

Shift from National Security towards Civil Safety

Session 1. New Arms Races and Re-Construction of Threats (1: 30~3: 45)

Moderator	Hyunback Chung / Co-Representative of PSPD(People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy), ROK

Presenter 1	The Fukushima Disaster and Its Implications to Nuclear and Security debates in the Asia-Pacific

Akira Kawasaki / Peace Boat, Japan

Presenter 2	Economic Crisis, Strategic Opportunity : implications for US Global Military Strategy in the Asia-Pacific

John Feffer / IPS(Institute for Policy Studies), US

Presenter 3	Fictitious Times : Naval Base in Jeju with the Imagined Threat and Security Dilemma

Taeho Lee / PSPD(People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy), ROK

Synthesis/Highlights	Francis Lee / Sungkonghoe University, ROK

Break (3: 45~4: 00)

Session 2. Reports and Updates : The Civic Initiatives for Peace and Disarmament in the Asia-Pacific Region (4: 00~6: 00)

Moderator	SeungHwan Lee / Co-Representative of Civil Peace Forum, ROK

Presenter 1	A Civic Proposal for a Peace System of Korea

Namjoo Lee / Sungkonghoe University, PSPD(People's Solidarity	for Participatory Democracy), ROK

Presenter 2	Japan's Initiatives for a Nuclear Weapon-Free Peaceful World and Northest Asia

Yayoi Tsuchida / Gensuikyo, Japan

Presenter 3	The civic challenges facing the Gangjeong naval base resistance

Matthew Hoey / International Coordinator The Save Jeju Island	Campaign, US

Synthesis/Highlights	Kiho Yi / Hanshin University, Nautilus ARI, ROK

Closing

Contents

The New Cold War in Northeast Asia

and the Civil Interpretation on 'Threat’

Shift from National Security towards Civil Safety

Session 1  New Arms Races and Re-Construction of Threats

Presenter 1	The Fukushima disaster and its implications to nuclear and security debates in the Asia-Pacific / Akira Kawasaki	7
Presenter 2	Economic Crisis, Strategic Opportunity : Implications for U.S. Global Military Strategy in the Asia-Pacific / John Feffer	14
Presenter 3	Fictitious Times : Naval Base in Jeju with the Imagined Threat and Security Region / Taeho Lee	22
Discussion		35

Session 2. Reports and Updates

: The Civic Initiatives for Peace and Disarmament in the Asia-Pacific Region

Presenter 1	A Civic Proposal for a Peace System of Korea / Namjoo Lee	39
Presenter 2	Japan's Initiatives for a Nuclear Weapon-Free Peaceful World and Northest Asia / Yayoi Tsuchida	46
Presenter 3	The civic challenges facing the Gangjeong naval base resistance / Matthew Hoey	54
Discussion		63

Biographies of the Presenters	65

2007. 3. 18

Nov 2 2011

The Second International Workshop for Peace and Disarmament in the Asia-Pacific Region

The Second International Workshop

for Peace and Disarmament in the Asia-Pacific Region

Session 1

New Arms Races and Re-Construction of Threats

	Presenter 1
	The Fukushima Disaster and Its Implications to Nuclear and Security Debates in the Asia-Pacific
	Akira Kawasaki / Peace Boat

☼

	Presenter 2
	Economic Crisis, Strategic Opportunity : Implications for US Global Military Strategy in the Asia-Pacific
	John Feffer / IPS(Institute for Policy Studies)

Until very recently, Pentagon spending was virtually untouchable in American politics. From the late 1970s, the Pentagon budget rose steadily with only a short break in the early 1990s, after the end of the Cold War in Europe. The George W. Bush administration increased U.S. military spending by an astounding 70 percent. Even the Obama administration, with its promise to withdraw troops from Iraq and focus on the U.S. domestic economy, continued to increase the military budget, albeit at a more modest rate than the previous administration.

But all of that might change. The economic crisis in the United States –and the related federal budget crisis – has created enormous pressure on Congress to slash federal spending. The interim budget deal reached over the summer included a cap on Pentagon spending (at $684 billion for FY 2011 and $686 billion for 2012). These are not cuts, of course but they would save an estimated $350 billion over previous projected increases.

But if the congressional committee tasked with finding $1.2 trillion of budget cuts cannot reach a deal by the end of November, more significant military cuts will go into effect: as much $600 billion over 10 years. Together this would total about $950 billion in savings. In the most optimistic scenario, overall national security spending would drop 15 percent and return to 2007 levels. These are not exactly major cuts. But the Pentagon is very, very worried. And if they go into effect, these cuts will violate a significant taboo. Moreover, there are voices in Congress that are calling for more significant changes in U.S. military posture. These proposed changes would have significant impact on U.S. forces in the Asia-Pacific region – and on U.S. alliances with South Korea, Japan, Australia, and Thailand.

Christopher Preble, "Military Spending and the Budget Deal," Cato, August 1, 2011; http://www.cato-at-liberty.org /military-spending-and-the-budget-deal/

Jobs and Overseas Bases

One major reason that military spending has been sacrosanct in the United States has been jobs. Military manufacturers have spread production around the United Statesso effectively that nearly every congressional district is dependent to some degree on defense contracting jobs. Even leaders of congressional campaigns to cut military spending – such as Barney Frank of Massachusetts – have voted in favor of unnecessary military allocations because these Pentagon program meant jobs in his district.

This link to jobs has meant that Congress is looking for ways to cut military spending that does not affect U.S. jobs. Even a lot of "waste" in the military budget employs Americans (for instance, in creating duplicate weapon systems or paying more than is necessary for military services). But one line item is relatively exempt from this jobs link: overseas military bases.It is no surprise, then, that after a first round of cuts in the immediate post-Cold War period, both Democrats and Republicans are beginning to take a second look at the cost of U.S. overseas bases.

Currently there are several Senate initiatives to examine the cost of overseas bases. Senators McCain, Webb, and Levin, for instance, have questioned the $28 billion price tag for the Pacific realignment plan. This complex realignment initiative includes a number of different aspects: closing the Futenma military base, relocating some of the U.S. Marines to expanded facilities in Guam, building a new Marine Air Force facility elsewhere in Okinawa, consolidating U.S. bases in South Korea, allowing U.S. soldiers in ROK to bring along their spouses, and so on.  Part of the concern of the three senators revolves around Okinawan opposition to the construction of a new military base. But they're primarily worried about the cost of the realignment. Although Japan has agreed to pay for much of the transfer of the Marines to Guam, cost overruns are expected, and the longer the move is delayed, the more expensive it will become.

David Lerman; "Levin, McCain Call for Rethinking U.S. Military Basing in Asia," Bloomberg, May 11, 2011;	http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-05-11/levin-mccain-call-for-rethinking-u-s-military-basing-in-asia.html

A potentially more dramatic initiative is a bipartisan effort in the Senate to set up a commission that would look into all overseas U.S. bases. This commission, proposed by Montana Democrat Jon Tester and Texas Republican Kay Bailey Hutchinson, would "scrutinize the necessity of the United States’ current overseas basing structure" and analyze the economic costs and benefits of closing these bases. Although the bulk of the bases to be scrutinized may well be in Europe, such a commission would also perform a much-needed review of all U.S. facilities in the Asia-Pacific region.

Leon Shane III, "Senators want commission to consider overseas base closings," Stars and Stripes, October 19, 2011; http://www.stripes.com/news/senators-want-commission-to-consider-overseas-base-closings-1.158192

The Pentagon will likely put up considerable resistance to such a commission and, if the body is launched, to its ultimate recommendations. But there won’t be the kind of political opposition to such a commission that arises whenever a particular weapons system is put on the cutting block. After all, the people in the countries that host U.S. bases don’t vote in U.S. elections or contribute to the campaigns of U.S. candidates.

The connection to the jobs issue is quite evident in the senators’ minds. "With today’s historic levels of debt, we need to move quickly to identify ways that we can bring our military training capabilities home, create American jobs in military construction and save taxpayer dollars without sacrificing the security needs of U.S. forces and the American people," said Hutchinson. Former Pentagon chief Robert Gates dismissed the notion that closing overseas bases would save money. "Overseas base reductions would require [military construction] here in the United States, so at least in the beginning it would be more expensive to bring them home than to leave them where they are," he said in June. But for Hutchinson, such expenses would be fine since they would create American jobs.

Leo Shane III, "Gates dismisses widespread overseas base closings," Stars and Stripes, June 16, 2011;
http://www.stripes.com/blogs/stripes-central/stripes-central-1.8040/gates-dismisses-widespread-overseas-base-closings-1.146745

Budget Cuts and Alliance Implications

Another result of the U.S. economic crisis is an increased emphasis on burden-sharing. The United States is already asking Japan, South Korea, and Australia to pull more of their own weight. The current agreement with South Korea, signed in 2009 and running through 2013, has annual amounts rising steadily (largely to anticipate the inflation rate). Japan, which agreed to cover $6 billion of the $10 billion estimated cost of the Marine relocation to Guam, has been asked to cover the cost over-runs as well. There are voices within the Pentagon and elsewhere calling for our allies to shoulder even more of the burden of U.S. troops.

Associated Press, "US Asks Japan to Pay More for Guam Move", July 5, 2010; http://www.military.com/news /article/us-asks-japan-to-pay-more-for-guam-move.html

At a time of Pentagon contraction, U.S. policy has been to boost overseas military exports to cushion the adjustment for U.S. defense contractors who will be seeing fewer Pentagon contracts. The amount of proposed arms sales in 2010 was four times higher than the average over the last decade. The total, $102 billion, is higher than the previous record of $75 billion in 2008. Although much of this amount was slated for the Middle East, arms sales to Asia have also been picking up. The United States has been following through on a Bush era arms package deal for Taiwan. Sales to South Korea in 2010 increased by about 15 percent. Both Korea and Japan are increasingly tied into U.S. missile defense network.

Xiaodon Liang, "Proposed U.S. Arms Sales Reach New Heights," Arms Control Today, March 2011; http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2011_03/US_Arms_Sales

A third strategy, in addition to burden sharing and increased military exports, has been to rely on allies to build their own bases. The Jeju Island naval base is a prime example. Conceived under the Roh Moo Hyun administration, the Jeju facility would be a South Korean base, built by South Korean corporations with South Korean government funding. It would play host to South Korea's new Aegis-equipped destroyers, three of which have already been built at a cost of $1 billion apiece. But because of alliance commitments, U.S. ships and personnel would have access to the base. And it would be fully integrated into the U.S. war-planning and war-fighting scenarios.

Changing U.S. Strategic Vision

Since the emergence of the "revolution in military affairs" (RMA), the Pentagon has been reevaluating and realigning U.S. force posture around the world. The emphasis has shifted from fixed positions to more mobile, flexible, rapid-response units. U.S. force posture in the Asia-Pacific region has been perhaps the slowest to respond to RMA. The Pentagon still prepares scenarios on the Korean peninsula and the Taiwan Strait that, although updated to reflect technological advances, obey old-fashioned war gaming against large national armies. Another factor that has delayed the transformation of U.S.force structure has been inter-service rivalry, with the Marine Corps, for instance, reluctant to give up a dedicated base and lose out in the competition for scarce resources.

The reduction of U.S. personnel in the Pacific theater and the closure/consolidation of bases could mesh with the overall transformation of U.S. military doctrine. Simply put, the Pentagon doesn't need as many soldiers or bases to respond to post-Cold War threats. But those who defend the current U.S.-Japan deal over Futenma, which would retain several thousand U.S. Marines at a new facility in Okinawa, argue that the "tyranny of distance" requires a robust presence on the Japanese island. If a conflict were to break out on the Korean peninsula or across the Taiwan Strait, the United States would need to get Marines to those "contingencies" as quickly as possible.

The continued Cold War in Asia, in other words, requires a continuation of Cold War military structures.

For those opposed to U.S. military bases in the Asia-Pacific region, the U.S. economic crisis combined with the evolving U.S. military strategy presents several opportunities and challenges. On the positive side, there is a tremendous political opportunity to push through a new U.S.-Japan deal that would close Futenma and not involve the construction of a new base. Although some of the alternatives present their own problems – Okinawans are not happy about a possible expansion of Kadena to accommodate the Futenma capabilities – there is nevertheless finally some political traction in Washington for base closure. South Korean activists, too, might find support for a greater reduction of the U.S. military footprint in Korea.

The challenges, however, are considerable. Activists in the Pacific islands of Guam, Samoa, and elsewhere are already facing the likelihood of an expanded U.S. military presence as personnel are relocated from Northeast Asia. The scenario of pulling back from "forward-based defense" to an "over the horizon" position, although good news for people in Japan and South Korea, a net reduction of U.S. military presence overall, and a potentially cost-saving maneuver for the United States,  places the burden of adjustment on Pacific islanders.

Of equal concern is the impact of "abandonment" on the military and foreign policies of Northeast Asian countries. South Korea has already embarked on an ambitious modernization of its forces that was begun by a progressive administration worried that a deteriorating relationship with the United States would translate into a substantially smaller U.S. security commitment. Japanese conservatives, and now even some liberals, want to break out of the remaining constraints of the country's "peace constitution," which could mean more military spending and a more aggressive military posture (already hinted at by the 2010 National Defense Program Guidelines emphasis on a more "dynamic" security posture). Both China and Russia, meanwhile, are in the midst of their own expensive military modernizations. Reductions in U.S. military spending are not being matched by reductions in northeast Asia.

John Feffer, "Ploughshares into Swords," Korea Economic Institute, February 18, 2009; http://www.keia.com /Publications/AcademicPaperSeries/2009/APS-Feffer.pdf

Another challenge is dealing with the shift from mobilizing against primarily U.S. facilities to protesting facilities that are primarily national (albeit integrated into the larger alliance structures). The former can rely on undercurrents of nationalism; the latter must challenge the national pride that accompanies the construction of, for instance, an indigenous destroyer and the new naval base that can accommodate it.

U.S. military cuts and the shift to an "over the horizon" posture are not in the immediate future. But if a base commission goes forward, the Pentagon might not be able to halt the political momentum behind trimming U.S. overseas presence. Anti-base movements in the region may soon be able to claim important victories. But, equally, they will have to tackle the above-mentioned challenges. Only by addressing the underlying mechanisms of militarism –and particularly the government spending that sustains this militarism – can we together ensure that Northeast Asiabecomes a more peaceful and stable region. ☼

	Presenter 3
	Fictitious Times : Naval Base in Jeju with the Imagined Threat and Security Dilemma a summarized translation
	Taeho Lee / PSPD

Ⅰ. Introduction

This report reviews the US maritime strategy and its impact to the construction of Jeju naval base, and also traces the reorganization of the ROK-US alliance between the Roh Moo-hyun government and Lee Myung-bak’s, focusing on the increasing regional role given to the alliance and China’s reaction to it. The report also addresses the problems caused by the Jeju naval base, especially the possibility and cost of its use by the US forces.

Ⅱ. The US Maritime Strategy in the Asia-Pacific Region

The US Defense Secretary Clinton has been recently advocating a strategic return to the Asia-Pacific region.This means forward deployment of the US Navy and strengthened regional military cooperation, as the most important part of her ‘forward deployment’ diplomacy. Her rational for it is two-fold. The post-war growth and future prosperity of South Korea and Japan are depended on security provided by the US, and the recent increase in maritime disputes and threats, and damages caused by natural disasters require a sustainable force posture equipped with expanded, flexible operation capability. The new force posture includes enhanced military base system of the allies and expansion of the US forces presence in the region. This strategy is a continuation from the War on Terror time, but with a new focus on re-affirming the US presence and influence in the region in view of the economic rise of China and India.

HILLARY CLINTON, ‘America's Pacific Century’, Foreign Policy, November 2011

"ASIA'S REMARKABLE ECONOMIC growth over the past decade and its potential for continued growth in the future depend on the security and stability that has long been guaranteed by the U.S. military, including more than 50,000 American servicemen and servicewomen serving in Japan and South Korea. The challenges of today's rapidly changing region -- from territorial and maritime disputes to new threats to freedom of navigation to the heightened impact of natural disasters -- require that the United States pursue a more geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable force posture. ... But even more than our military might or the size of our economy, our most potent asset as a nation is the power of our values -- in particular, our steadfast support for democracy and human rights. This speaks to our deepest national character and is at the heart of our foreign policy, including our strategic turn to the Asia-Pacific region."

A. Sea Power 21, PSI and RMSI

The way ahead : from On the Sea to From the Sea

During the Cold War, the US Navy aimed to seek control ‘on the sea’ in countering the USSR naval forces. Under the ‘Maritime Strategy’ formulated in 1986, the focus of the naval strategy of the US shifts to coastal seas around the world, known as ‘the way ahead’. This was to focus more on the regional conflicts. The new targets were rogue states or terrorist groups. The important event that gave rise to the new strategic concept was the first Gulf War (1991). The concept of ‘forward deployment from the sea’ was born in those years.

Sea Power 21

The decisive change towards the current maritime strategy occurred after the 9.11. A new US naval strategy was announced in 2002 as ‘Sea Power 21: Projecting Decisive Joint Capabilities’. This was to counter threats from rogue states or asymmetric threat posed by terrorism at any sea in the world. Sea Power 21 has three strategic components – Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea Basing.

Sea Strikes means capabilities to collect information of hostile states, to conduct axis-strikes including preemptive nuclear strikes, to land forces, to seize and dismantle WMDs, and of integrated command and control. Sea Shield basically means missile defense capability. Sea Basing means turning all corners of the sear into maritime bases by forward deployment of mobile task forces of carriers, AEGIES and nuclear submarines without having fixed naval and air force bases.

For this strategy, allies are required to provide the minimum supplies and use of local naval bases. This is why the US recently demands allies to open more ports for use rather than building more overseas naval bases.

PSI (Proliferation Security Initiative)

Started in 2003 in response to 9.11, PSI is to stop proliferation of WMDs through US-led maritime network of cooperation that includes search, seize, and interception of transport. PSI is not grounded by an international treaty, but is of the nature of ‘coalition of the willing.’ PSI pose several problems with international maritime laws and with the double-standards and unilateralism of the US. Especially in Asia, it is said to have lost its credibility because key countries such as China, India, Indonesia and Malaysia refused to participate in it. ROK, however, joined it in 2009.

RMSI : Regional Maritime Security Initiative (2004)

UNCLOS : United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sear III (1994)

ReCAAP : Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (2006)

HACGA : Heads of Asian Coast Guard Agencies Meeting (2004)

B. Global Maritime Partnership (GMP)

The concept of 1,000-Ship Navy and Global Maritime Partnership

Proposed in 2005 and put into practice from 2007 by Admiral Michael Mullen, this is to build global maritime partnership among the navy, maritime police and other maritime agencies of the US allies and the US, so that the combined forces can counter their target objectives as a joint, international force of 1,000 ships. Its official title is A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower. This is a reflection of the difficulty faced by the US forces to address the need of forward deployment in an expanded operation radius while maintaining its global maritime control. The US exercises the command authority in this combined force, the Combined Forces Maritime Component Command (CFMCC). This strategy includes the  activities and objectives stated in the previous PSI, CSI, and RMSI. The missions given to the forward deployment are; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR); ballistic missile defense (BMD); and nuclear offense.

Global Maritime Partnership debate, Asia

The four strategic regions for the US forward deployment are European-Atlantic, the Gulf of Aden and the surrounding region of the Persian Gulf, Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia. Three of the four regions are in Asia. GMP is actively practiced in and around the Persian Gulf region. The US attempt to expand it to the West Pacific regions has not been so successful yet. China, India and other key countries are reluctant to participate in GMP, while Thailand and the Philippines also showed stance of conditional cooperation. However, currently the US Pacific Fleet has the capability of mobilizing almost two thirds of its naval force.

US maritime strategy and ROK Navy

ROK and Japan provide permanent military bases for the US forces and actively participate in all maritime strategies of the US.

In particular, ROK agreed with the US to recognize strategic flexibility of the US Forces in Korea, which would allow US and ROK forces to operate beyond the Korean borders. Lee Myung-bak came to announce strategic alliance with the US in his 2008 US-ROK Summit, promising to jointly counter ‘regional and global security demands’, from which maritime cooperation of the two countries is deepening.

Below are the most notable military exercises and operations jointly conducted by the US and ROK navies, in countering conventional military threats, threats of proliferation of WMDs and maritime security threats.

<Military Exercise>

Key Resolve/Foal Eagle

Counter Special Operations Forces Exercise, CSOFEX

Ulchi Guardian Freedom, UGF

Hokuk

Rim of the Pacific, RIMPAC

Pacific Reach

Cobra Gold

<Military Operation>

PSI (Proliferation Security Initiative)

CMF (Combined Maritime Force)

Ⅲ. Reorganization of ROK-US Alliance from Roh Moo-hyun  to Lee Myung-bak

A. Strategic Flexibility of the ROK-US Alliance

First raised in 1999, studied from 1995, and officially discussed by two sides since 2003, it was first recognized for its importanceat the defense minister level in 2003 and 2004. It was announced as agreed in 2006. It has two important impacts to the alliance.

Reorganization of the bilateral alliance into a regional alliance: the existing alliance agreements formulated during the Cold War time rather strictly limits duties, roles and radius of operation, and are seen as setting obstacles for strategic flexibility of the overseas US forces. Since the end of the Cold War, the US has been revising alliance agreements with Japan (1996) and NATO (1999), so that its radius and flexibility of military operation are expanded to wider region.

Flexibility : the new arrangement is to give increased ‘flexibility’ in all of the following areas - in movement of forces and equipments, in use of military bases, and in the requirement for consultation before US forces activities.

B. Dispute over the proposed role of regional balancer in Northeast Asia of ROK

The clash between strategic flexibility and Roh’s plan for Northeast Asia

The NSC documents of 2004-5 show that the National Security Council (NSC) of ROK was keen by then on the implications and dangers of strategic flexibility - the danger of being pulled into regional conflicts and USFK bases becoming targets of aggression by China. It appears that Roh’s government tried to place safeguards against such dangers such as mandatory consultation before action. The two governments did not come to agree on this safeguard measure, but had the US recognize the ROK concern by inserting the following in the 2006 joint statement of high-level strategic talks: “In the implementation of strategic flexibility, the U.S. respects the ROK position that it shall not be involved in a regional conflict in Northeast Asia against the will of the Korean people.”

The Northeast Asia regional balancer and three principles of national defense of Roh’s government

Roh’s government had three principles for national defense – strengthened role of ROK forces as a regional balancer, non-involvement in regional conflicts, regaining the military operation command by 2012. On the concept of regional balancer, Roh announced in 2005 that ROK forces will keep peace in the region as in independent force and regional balance in Northeast Asia. It is said that the US reacted quite negatively and cynically to the idea of regional balancer role for ROK. Then the tone of voice changed in Roh’s government on the issue of regional balancer, to say that the idea was still firmly based on the role and function of the ROK-US alliance and that it was the alliance to mediate regional conflicts. Though ending in an anticlimax, the idea of regional balancer did reflect of Roh’s concern over the strategic flexibility, expressed ROK’s will to stay out of regional conflicts.

C. Lee Myung-bak’s pursuit of ROK-US alliance and the new cold war in Northeast Asia

Globalizing and making ROK-US alliance more offensive

Soon after inauguration to Presidency, Lee Myong-bak met George W. Bush at Camp David and name the ROK-US alliance a strategic alliance. The joint statement declared bilateral agreement to develop the alliance into a strategic alliance of the 21st century in order to counter new security demands. Bush expressed that recognizing the need of constructively engaging in China was a highly important matter for a 21st century alliance. Then followed in ROK studies and reports about closer cooperation and coordination of military and security polices between two countries. In 2009, Lee and Obama agreed on the joint vision statement of the alliance, which stated that two countries will build a comprehensive strategic alliance of regional and global scope.

Lee promised in 2009 and carried out second dispatch of troops to Afghanistan in 2010. At the same time, he sent a naval unit comprising a destroyer the Combined Forces Maritime Component Command led by the US 5th Fleet. The name of the unit was Cheong-hae Budae or Blue Sea Navy. The blue in the Korean name refers to only color, but its English translation means navy of the ocean. The navy for the ocean promoted by the ROK Navy is now clearly a adjunct to the US maritime forces and a part of the US maritime hegemony.

Taking opportunity of North Korea’s missile/satellite test launch, Lee’s government officially joined PSI, thus nullifying Roh’s previous stance of non-participation. Joining of PSI signifies higher convergence of the power and strategies and also higher exclusive nature of the two navies in the region. The military operation plans of ROK have also become sharply offensive under Lee’s time. This was carried out under the heading of ‘plans for emergencies in North Korea’.

Cheonanham and Yonpyongdo incidents and militarization of Northeast Asian seas

The sinking of Cheonanham incident happened during the 2010 Key Resolve/Foal Eagle exercise (in March) in the West Sea, and the shelling exchange at Yonpyongdo incident occurred during Hokuk exercise in November of the same year. ROK and US governments took opportunity of these incidents to make their joint exercises more offensive and globalized.

Lee’s government decided to postpone the regaining of military operation command to 2015, after the Cheonanham incident, dispatched troops to Afghanistan, took part in the US-led sanction against Iran, extended the period of diversion for the use of ROK’s contribution of the USFK expenses, and made addition concessions in the free-trade agreement conditions with the US. In addition, Lee’s government made a series of economic and military sanctions against North Korea, known as May 24th measures, and revoked ROK-DPRK agreement that allowed North Korean ships to travel through the inland sea of ROK north of Jeju Island.

In October 2010, the defense ministers of the two countries decided to (1) mention ‘North Korean emergencies’ as an objective of joint actions, (2) establish ‘proliferation deterrence policy committee’ to strengthen nuclear umbrella, missile defense, and other deterrence measures, (3) promote ROK-US cooperation to address a wide range of global security challenges. The strategic plan guidelines that the meeting has issues contains new military operation plan No.5015. Though its content is not known to public, it is understood to contain comprehensive measures to counter asymmetric threat, local warfare and all-out warfare from North Korea. It also includes operation plan No. 5029 which is to counter emergencies in North Korea, including stabilizing operations and WMD seize and dismantling operations.

In the joint maritime exercise conducted in response to the Cheonanham incident, the US mobilized its nuclear submarine of Ohio class. In the next exercise conducted in response to Yonpyongdo incident, the US mobilized USS George Washington Carrier that has operation radius of 1,000 km. China showed a strong reaction against this. In another joint maritime exercise in the East Sea, four officers of the Japanese Self-Defense Force participated. In 2011, ROK and Japan agreed to promote military cooperation by planning for mutual military supplies support agreement and military classified information agreement.

The ROK-US-Japan triangular military cooperation is the key of the US military strategy in Asia in general and Northeast Asia in particular. The main objectives of this cooperation are to secure joint counter capability, higher support capacity for military supplies, and expansion of BMD range. The 2011 October meeting of the two defense ministers made further decisions along this line, taking further steps towards MD and outer-space military cooperation. The joint statement also included combined counter capability near the NLL and border islands in the West Sea. This was a breakaway from the tradition of the US not mentioning NLL in their military statements. According to ROK defense minister Kim Gwan-jin, a dispute at NLL will be first countered by ROK forces and next by US forces that include the full force of the artillery power of USFK and marine and air force powers of USFJ.

As the result, the three main principles of Roh’s government are all put into review. Non-intervention in regional conflicts and regional balancer role have been abandoned by ROK government. The new strategic alliance between two countries is now leading a new cold war in the region. The return of the military operation command has been postponed. The nature of the ROK-US alliance has been changed to an offensive, conflict-provoking one that includes plans of seize and occupation of North Korea assuming a possible collapse.

Aggravation of China-ROK relations and new cold war structure

China has been reacting to these developments in a sensitive manner. On May 27, 2008, the spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC criticized the idea of strategic alliance of ROK and the US as a legacy of the past history and warned against the attempts of the two countries in addressing regional issues with outdated ideas. This was unusual in China’s customary, toned-down voice in foreign affairs. Renmin Daily and Jiefang Daily put opinion columns criticizing Lee for not managing state affairs as a CEO because of his Cold-War mentality. China also expressed unease and warning against newly strengthened ROK-US military exercises at the West Sea. Some of the critics came as a direct face-to-face warning, as in the case of defense ministers meeting in Beijing in July, 2011. China is also raising concerns over the US-led combined forces exercises in the South China Sea, calling for prudence of the US in its words and actions. When the US sent nuclear submarines of Ohio class to Subic Bay in the Philippines, Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, and Pusan in ROK, the maneuver was seen to everyone as a containment of China, and the media in China and the US reported it accordingly. In response, China conducted test run of the former USSR aircraft carrier Varyag that it had purchased.

Ⅳ. Summary and Conclusion

What we have recently seen in the region through the US unilateral maritime strategy is the reoccurrence of typical security dilemma that aggravates military conflict between China and the US and provoke more militarization. In sum, the ‘maritime security’ promoted by the ROK Navy is a plan closed connected to the global, hegemonic maritime strategy of the US, and thus a fictitious security discourse that will, when implemented, trigger conflict over maritime control with other neighboring countries by rapidly militarizing the sea, rather than contributing to expanded maritime safety and cooperation. Lacking sensitive reading of the international debates and reactions to maritime hegemony, it is none other than a habitual imitation and following of the US hegemonic maritime strategy.

From the late 1990s to early 2000, Jeju Island has elevated itself to a place free of Cold War and militarism. With Gorbachev’s and Jiang’s visits and meetings at the island, Jeju has become the scene of normalization of relationship between ROK and former belligerent powers. The first defense ministers’ meeting of two Koreas was also held here, and the future venue for the next inter-Korean summit was also proposed to be here. These developments led to Roh officially announcing Jeju as the Island of Peace.

The increased ‘regional role’ of the ROK Navy in the name of ‘maritime security’ or ‘protection of maritime routes’ means formation of ROK-US combined naval force in response to China’s naval activities. This implies inevitable involvement in military conflicts with China. Despite the ROK Navy’s denial, the Jeju naval base now under construction can always used by the US navy in its operations to check China, and will have the capacity of calling the US AEGIES equipped with ABMD, nuclear carriers and nuclear submarines. In response to such critiques, the ROK Navy now changed the rational to the need of deterring North Korean naval provocations and the need of having general sea power to protect ROK’s own maritime territory.

However, the danger of forward deployment by the US and ROK naval forces has risen higher today than in Roh’s time. At least, Roh’s government took guard against ROK-US alliance becoming a regional/global force and getting involved in a regional conflict, and stressed for autonomous control of ROK’s forces as a defense principle.

However, Lee’s government took the reverse by strengthening the regional and global role of the alliance and justifying forward deployment of the US offensive forces, especially the sea power, in the pretext of North Korea’s asymmetric threat. As a result, maritime conflicts between the US and China have gone serious around Korea, fortifying the new cold war structure. The gravity of the problem is added by the rapid rise of China’s economic power and the reverse of the US, which is fueling more hegemonic competition between the two. Now the balance between strategic cooperation and strategic competition between the two turning more towards competition, the US attempts to exercise exclusive maritime control in the west pacific sea would limit China’s tolerance towards their front sea and might trigger her to engage in new hegemonic conflicts.

As some experts say, “With its deepening economic interdependence with China, ROK may face a serious dilemma if the US one day asks ROK to join its China containment as a member of the ROK-US alliance.” Traditionally siding with the US alone, ROK may face a deep crisis of foreign relations more quickly than habitually thought, in these not-so traditional times.

The geopolitical danger of the Jeju naval base and the US and ROK forces using it together is greater than ever before. Its construction must be re-examined from the beginning. But, it is not only the base in Jeju. The whole sum of regionalization of the alliance and offensive military reforms and operation plans, now carried out in the name of ROK-US Alliance for the 21st Century, must be re-examined from the base. ☼

	Discussion

The Second International Workshop for Peace and Disarmament

in the Asia-Pacific Region

Session 2

The Civic Initiatives for Peace and Disarmament in the Asia-Pacific Region

	Presenter 1
	A Civic Proposal for a Peace System of Korea
	Namjoo Lee / Sungkonghoe University, PSPD

Since 2010, the Center for Peace and Disarmament of PSPD (CPD-PSPD) has made efforts to design and propose a peace system of Korea or a peace system in and around Korea, from a civic perspective. In April this year, CPD-PSPD held a forum to announce its draft proposal and listened to various opinions and reviews given to it. At the moment, the proposal is in its last stage of revision and complementation.

The reasons why PSPD wants to design and propose a peace system of Korea are three-fold.

First, in order to guarantee permanent peace in Korea, it is necessary to transform the cease-fire system born from the 1953 armistice agreement into a peace system. The cease-fire situation has not put an end to the hostility among the former belligerent powers of the Korean War, resulting in a constant threat to peace. It was under the armistice that small and large military clashes rather repeatedly occurred between North and South Koreas and between North Korea and the US. Several of them were in fact potential crises of all-out war. The cease-fire system has further weakened since the demise of the global Cold-War system. It is because the Korean situation has gone more unstable when the previous military balance of the Cold War that has allowed a relative stability in the cease-fire system collapsed. The root of the North Korean nuclear crisis can also be found in the mismatch between the demise of the global Cold-War system and the contrary in the Korean peninsula. Thus, a peaceful settlement of the conflict in Korea is not possible without ending the hostility among the former belligerent powers and transforming the cease-fire system into a peace system.

Second, the North policy of the Lee Myung-bak government, to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue through pressure, has resulted in heightening the tension in Korea. Before that, since the government of Kim Dae-jung, the North policy has been for reconciliation and cooperation with North Korea, which contributed to the lessening of the military tension and creating basic frames for peace-building in Korea. Lee Myung-bak, however, denounced such an approach, practically halted humanitarian assistance to the north, raised possibility of sudden change in North Korea, and conducted repeated military exercises, giving an impression that his government may be pursuing a reunification of Korea by absorption. According to the information leaked through the WikiLeaks, the Minster of Unification, the chief foreign affairs and security aid to the President and other officials of current ROK government gave to their US counterparts their expectation of forthcoming surrender or collapse of North Korea through increased pressure. Since the end of the Cold War, a variety of North Korea collapse theories have been put forward, but so far only to self-contradict. Worse than the failure of predicting is that such Cold-War style approach and total denunciation of North Korea deepened the existing tension. The heightened military tension since Lee Myung-bak came to power is also an outcome this mechanism. Therefore, we need more than any time a vision of peace in Korea that sets a frame of solving problems through dialogue and cooperation and replaces the unrealistic theory of North Korea’s collapse.

Third, it is citizens who should be the subject of peace building in Korea. The long cease-fire system has created a mentality of thinking of security only in terms of national security. The paradox is the situation where the logic of national security actually threatens the real life and safety of citizens. Both North and South Koreas are dominated by, with a varying degree, extreme ideologies and militarist culture that inhibit democracy or democratic consolidation and sacrifice people’s welfare. It is also due to this failure of transforming national security system into citizen’s security system that whenever two Korean governments lowered tension and expanded dialogues, such progress was repeatedly and easily reversed later. The dominant structure of division created mutually dependent, antagonistic co-existence, which in turn created power groups that benefit from the antagonism. Those privileged power groups in this system do not want peace in Korea. Without transforming this system, peace-building in Korea remains remote. Thus, it is necessary to build civic subject who can plan a role and work for peace system in Korea from citizens’ perspective. The main objective of building such a peace system is to provide humane livelihood as top priority to the peoples in and around Korea.

Below are the principles and key points of the PSPD’s plan and proposal for a peace system in Korea.

First, it is to keep the principles of pacifism – to build peace through peaceful means. War cannot be justified under any objectives. We know by the experience of the past history that giving priority in military supremacy in the name of national security leads to neither peace nor increased security of citizens. Peace is not just an objective, but its means of achieving a safe and humane livelihood. Beliefs and approaches to attain a peaceful situation based on superiority of force such as increased armament must be abandoned. In particular, ROK’s aggressive military operation plans and exercises that are being conducted in the pretext of preparing for sudden change in North Korea must be stopped.

Second, building a peace system of Korea must start from respecting and implementing the agreements signed by North and South Koreas and neighboring countries. It is urgent to restore the north-south relations and restart the exchanges by respecting and observing the existing agreements between two Koreas such as the Basic Agreement, the June 15th Joint Statement, and the October 4th Summit Statement. The process to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue must also restart based on the existing international agreements such as the September 19th Joint Statement.

In implementing the existing agreements, we stress the importance of demonstrating the principle of reciprocity, by which one side takes the initiatives of carrying out the agreement duties. In fact, a formalistic reciprocity such as the current practices of demanding the other side to carry out the agreement first makes both sides unable to escape from the security dilemma. As we have recently witnessed, such an approach can easily turn the north-south relations into a chicken game. An escape from the security dilemma would be pacifist, leading actions by one side first that can induce similar actions to the other side.

The most important objective in this process is to agree on denuclearization of Korea and to sign a peace treaty between two Koreas. As stated earlier, the North Korean nuclear problem has its root in the continuing antagonism among the former belligerent parties of the Korean War. Thus, the two problems have to be solved in parallel, the ending of the war and nuclear programmes. Peacefully resolving the current conflict between two Koreas can create a favorable environment for signing a peace treaty. If two Koreas could carry out the already agreed West Sea Peace and Cooperation Zone Plan and resolve the NLL (Northern Limit Line) issue peacefully, they may create a turning point towards signing a peace treaty. In this respect, the peaceful resolution of the NLL issue could become a making of peace treaty in a small scale.

Furthermore, this objective goes beyond north-south relations, because it would have direct impact to clearing up the Cold War legacy and developing a multilateral body of security cooperation in the region. The denuclearization of Korea should expand to that of Northeast Asia while the peace system of Korea should expand to that of Northeast Asia too. With a varying degree, countries in this region show signs of rapidly developing civil society where conditions are maturing for discussing regional peace beyond the narrow frame of national interest. Communication and cooperation among such civil society actors will take more and more importance.

Third, the peace system of Korea is oriented towards a unified Korea. A peace system requires mutual respect for the other political and economic system, institutionalizing a North-South Korean Union as a peace-making, cooperative and transitional body. The starting point of this institutionalization would be regular summit meetings. If the current distrustful and confrontational system of division continues, permanent and sustainable peace-building would not be possible. The system of division provided a fertile ground for mistrust, clashes, various forms of division-related violence, arms build-up and confrontation in Korea and the region. In Korea, peace and unification are the two sides of the same coin.

Aiming to achieve a unified, single state along the nationalist logic may not contribute to peace making very much. The transformation of the division system in Korea must go based on recognition of the reality where two very different systems have emerged across the border and towards realizing core values for the shared future such as peace, welfare and ecological sustainability. For this, the most appropriate transitional body for unification would be North-South Union, a union of two independent states that recognize each other and work towards a unified state formation in a gradual and peaceful way. This would be an institutionalization of political cooperation and joint management of threats to peace, reconciliation and cooperation between two Koreas.

This process will increase the role played by civic actors in inter-Korea exchanges and cooperation, strengthening the basis for peace. In promoting the North-South Union, we may need to include a civilian body of cooperation and participation in the institutions of the Union. A proposal to install a special zone for youth exchange has already been made with regard to peace-making in the West Sea.

Fourth, we need measures to guarantee citizens participation in the peace system. In particular, security related information and interpretation must not be confined to the state: they must be open to public and a new environment must be created so that citizens can communicate and discuss different views on safety. The first step is to strengthen democratic control over the security policy- and decision-making. The parliamentary authority and control must be substantiated over the use of military force and overseas dispatch. In order to prevent the misuse of authority for classification of information, the criteria of classification and management must be strictly limited and civil society participation in the deliberation of armament expenditure must be institutionalized.

The formation of peace system of Korea will ultimately depend on people’s and civil servants’ capacity for peaceful conflict resolution. For this, the central and local governments should develop conflict resolution programmes, establish such special agencies and increase their role in the field. The current governmental efforts to expand collective security training for youth invite deep concerns. The government must shift its focus to developing and distributing peace-sensitizing educational programmes.

Fifth, the peace system of Korea will be established by respecting and further enhancing international legal norms. The making of a peace system in Korea will have international political implications to the countries in Northeast Asia. It is from highlighting the merit of shifting the current deterrence-oriented policies towards conflict prevention-oriented ones. The peace system of Korea will rest on the principles of minimum armament for defense, ban of use of military force in international conflicts, peaceful resolution of conflict, and mutual respect and tolerance. With those principles, and by respecting and realizing the norms enshrined in the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other internationally agreed conventions, the making of peace system of Korea should contribute to peace-building in the world.

The ‘Proposal for a Peace System of Korea’ of PSPD is not in its final form. It is merely to propose the starting point for having such a plan whereby citizens become the subject of peace-building. Through more discussions with and participation of larger public, we hope that it will be supplemented and revised with more developed ideas and more practical contributions to become the citizen’s proposal for a peace system of Korea. ☼

	Presenter 2
	Japan's Initiatives for a Nuclear Weapon-Free Peaceful World and Northest Asia
	Yayoi Tsuchida / Gensuikyo

First of all, let me express my gratitude to the organizers for inviting me to this important conference and allowing me to speak before you.

Introduction of Gensuikyo

My organization, Japan Council against A and H Bombs (Gensuikyo), was founded in September 1955, after Japan suffered from Hiroshima, Nagasaki and the damage of US H-bomb test at Bikini Atoll in the Pacific. The Bikini incident triggered the mounting nationwide protest against the H-bomb damage and more than 32 million signatures for a ban on A and H bombs were collected in a short time. This led to the holding of the 1st World Conference against A and H Bombs and the founding of my organization. Since the founding, we have developed many forms of actions to reach the three basic goals of 1) the prevention of nuclear war, 2) a ban and the elimination of nuclear weapons, and 3) the support and solidarity with the Hibakusha (A-bomb sufferers). They include the annual World Conference in every August, signature campaigns for a ban on nuclear weapons, the nationwide peace march and activities with the Hibakusha (A-bomb survivors) to make known the damage and effects of the A-bombings to general public.

Threats to humanity

Before I enter my theme, I want to touch upon threats to humanity. If I am asked to redefine threats to humanity, I will define that they are nuclear weapons, nuclear energy and economy of neo-liberalism. I don’t want a national security policy based on threats. And I think that now people’s awareness of these threats is growing.

Abolition of nuclear weapons

First of all, about the abolition of nuclear weapons, our main task.  Now, more than 66 years since the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, we have a new opportunity before us to open a road to our common goal: a nuclear weapon-free, peaceful and just world. On May 1 last year, on the eve of the opening of the 2010 NPT Review Conference in New York, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon appeared before us, people assembled from many countries, and said, "What I see on the horizon is a world free of nuclear weapons". He thus encouraged the peace movements to continue its important work.

The 2010 NPT Review Conference produced historic outcome: It agreed that "to achieve the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons" was a goal and principle, and that all states need to make "special effort" to establish the "necessary framework"to achieve the goal. It further noted as part of the action plan to the proposal of Secretary General Ban Ki-moon on the need for a convention banning nuclear weapons.

Start of negotiations on a Nuclear Weapon Convention is Possible Even Now!

We have pursued the elimination of nuclear weapons by legally banning these weapons. Achieving the abolition may take some time, but banning nuclear weapons does not. The reality under NPT (Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty)is giving an evidence. Of the 190 members to NPT, as many as 185 parties are already banning themselves from acquiring or developing nuclear weapons. Moreover, China, a nuclear weapon state, India and Pakistan, two non-NPT members having nuclear weapons, and even North Korea voted last December in the UN General Assembly in support of the start of negotiations leading to a nuclear weapons convention.

There are even more new developments in the current session of the UNGA. Norway, Mexico and Austria together put forward a new resolution, proposing that work for a world without nuclear weapons be sought under the UNGA.  Even ambassadors of U.K. and Russia admitted in response to our question that a convention would become necessary to achieve a nuclear weapon-free world, though, they added, it would be "at a final state". All these indicate that the start of actions to ban on nuclear weapons is possible right now, if only a handful of nuclear weapon states make up their mind.

Action of Civil Society is the Key

To turn these positive conditions into reality, the action of civil society is the key. On Oct. 3, Mr. Sergio Duarte, UN High Representative for Disarmament Affaris, said something bold at the opening session of the Fist Committee.  Referring the signatures presented to the 2010 NPT review conference, including 1 million by Mayors for Peace and our 7 million signatures, he said,"@"As we consider these facts,… it is possible to observe two reinforcing trends… The first is the trend associated with the democratic revolution now sweeping the world, not just the Middle East.  Evidence that democracy is coming to disarmament is indisputable in the actions I have just cited… And as democracy is coming to disarmament, so too is the rule of law."

On February 15 this year, we issued an appeal calling for a total ban on nuclear weapons, and started a new signature campaign in support of this appeal. The campaign obtained support from extensive range of people in Japanand overseas, including the UN.  The aim is to mobilize public opinion in support of the ongoing sincere efforts in international politics for the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

On Oct. 5 this month, we submitted the first achievement of the campaign, the 1,029,031 signatures, to the First Committee of the UNGA. The signatures included 766 mayors, who represent about 44 percent of all Japanese municipalities. These signatures were collected overcoming difficulties: After the March 11 huge earthquake, tsunami and nuclear power plant accident, the mood of the people changed. Yet, our campaign did not stop even in the disaster afflicted areas. We promoted the abolition campaign and the urgent rescue actions as a set of inseparable tasks. This activity was welcomed by local governments and people in the disaster struck areas, increasing their support for abolition of nuclear weapons.

With the start of a new NPT process and the planned international conference on the Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction in 2012 in sight, we will carry on this campaign to build up momentum and develop movements to put pressure on governments, in particular nuclear weapon states, so that the abolition of nuclear weapons can be accelerated. This is our global initiative and I call on you to support and join this campaign to create a world without nuclear weapons, which I am sure will help resolve the nuclear issue of Northeast Asia.

For a nuclear weapon-free peaceful Northeast Asia

In order to create a nuclear weapon-free peaceful Northeast Asia, first of all, we call on North Korea to renounce its nuclear development, and on all parties concerned to pursue and achieve denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula through the framework of the six party talks.

At the same time, I want to point out that in promoting a nuclear weapon-free world, as well as peace in Northeast Asia, the Japanese Government has a special responsibility and role to play as a government of both the only country to have suffered from the calamity of nuclear attacks and the country that has the peaceful Constitution of renouncing war, based on the serious reflection of its past war of aggression against Asian countries.

In reality, however, the Japanese government has responded to North Korea’s nuclear and missile development by building up the "Missile Defense" network, the Japan-US joint operations and the reinforcement of the US military bases in Japan. Underlying this is Japan’s deep dependency on the military alliance with the US, including and among others on the US "nuclear umbrella". But Japan’s call for the elimination of nuclear weapons, or even call on North Korea to abandon nuclear program sounds hollow, if Japan itself keeps staying under the "nuclear umbrella".

The 21st century, however, should no longer be time where the world relies in its security on force or military alliance or on the threat of nuclear weapons. Actually, East Asia has seen rich initiatives such as ASEAN regional forum and Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free zone to develop dialogue and cooperation to prevent or resolve conflicts through talks. The Japanese government should join in this development. In this regard, too, we urge the Japanese government to take the initiative in pursuing a convention banning nuclear weapons, and as a token of its sincerity we urge it to renounce the secret nuclear agreements with the US, break away from the "nuclear umbrella" and declare that Japan is a nuclear weapon-free country.

Another Reality of Japan

Our second initiative is to change the policy of the Japanese government.  Even in this task, action of civil society is the key.  While rushing to meet US demands, the Japanese government is still in deep trouble and contradiction, because of firm and strong public support for nuclear free and Article 9 of the peace Constitution.

In these past years, our struggles for peace and non-nuclear weapons have shaken Japan’s politics."@We drove Prime Minister Abe into resignation over his attempt to revise Article 9 of the Constitution, and did the same to Prime Minister Aso over his remark of Japan’s nuclear armament.  After the change of government, failure of Hatoyama over the US Futenma base resulted in his resignation.

I think that as a bottom effort leading to these changes, there is our daily activity of overcoming the "threat of North Korea". The threat of North Korea has been propagated by the government and through mass media, making the best use of North Korea’s abduction of Japanese people and the development of nuclear weapons and missiles, etc. In substance, it was used for justifying and promoting Japan’s military buildup and keeping itself under the US nuclear umbrella. As a result, Japanese people have uneasiness about North Korea, fearing it might attack Japan with nuclear weapons and missiles. Whenever we take to streets to collect signatures for a total ban on nuclear weapons, we receive such worry from people. But after having a dialogue with us, they change and support our petition. From our experience, we are confident that nobody wants a nuclear exchange over the sky of Japan and the Korean Peninsula.

The reality of Okinawa also presents the same lesson. Despite the heavy pressures, few believe that the US bases in Okinawa are for their interest.  Okinawa people are more firmly determined and united than ever before not to allow the relocation of Futenma marine base to Henoko. When the Noda government is trying to achieve the relocation as a top priority and is trying to join TPP negotiations to meet the US economic demands while spending huge amount of money for military and the US forces at the sacrifice of the people’s livelihood, we are going to hold the Japan Peace Conference in Okinawa on Nov. 24-27 to wage a big fight-back from Asia-Pacific to create a nuclear weapon-free, peaceful Asia-Pacific without military bases. Activists from Guam, the Philippines, Hawaii, Palau will gather in the Conference. We want to invite a representative from Jeju Island to the Conference and strengthen solidarity with their struggle, because we know that their fight is our fight.

Fukushima nuclear disaster and Gensuikyo

After the Fukushima nuclear disaster, while keeping our focus on nuclear weapons, my organization clearly put forward to work for the decommissioning of nuclear energy and a shift to renewable energy sources. As the movement that originates from the tragedies of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and calls for the abolition of nuclear weapons, we made firm determination to work for no more radiation damage anywhere on earth.

Though we had the experience of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Fukushima disaster is the incident that turned Japanese people unable to be indifferent to the risk of radiation in such a big scale. People’s anger is pouring out at TEPCO and the government for their failure of settling the accident and giving correct and enough information about radiation contamination and safety. Being unable to trust the government, they are getting to rise in action themselves to measure and remove radiation contamination, and urge local and national governments to take necessary measures to defend people, living, safety of food and environment.

Together with helping such people’s action for rehabilitation from radiation damage, we want to organize the anti-nuclear sentiment and energy of people to the direction to creating a world without nuclear danger, posed either by nuclear power or nuclear weapons.

When the majority, either people or governments, takes action, a change will happen.  This is the lesson we learned from the past changes occurred in the 21st century. With this conviction, we are determined to fulfill our responsibility in the task of abolition of nuclear weapons.

Before concluding, I want to express my hope that the cooperation between NGOs acting in and around Northeast Asiawill further develop in getting rid of nuclear weapons, peace, protecting life and living of the working people, as well as protecting environment based on sustainable energy. Thank you. ☼

	Presenter 3
	The civic challenges facing the Gangjeong naval base resistance
	Matthew Hoey / International Coordinator The Save Jeju Island Campaign

My name is Matthew Hoey and I would like to tell you a little bit about me before I begin. I am an international security analyst who has consulted on matters of military technology and threat forecasting for private industry, NGOs and the United States intelligence community. I have also worked in marketing, public relations and political organizing on local, state and national political campaigns in the United States. Though my heart is in peace work. Currently I serve as the international coordinator of the Save Jeju Island campaign. I feel that with my unique background I can offer an honest perspective on where we are and what we need to do to win.

The Jeju Island naval base construction site is in my opinion the front line in the battle for international peace and increasingly so in the minds of colleagues and leading scholars. The Gangjeong villagers have been waging a tireless and highly effective fight that stands in stark contrast to what has been for the most part in my personal opinion an unsuccessful international peace movement that all to often lacks focus, unity and realistic goals. Looking back over our collective history the initiation of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) was last measurable success in the face of US militarism. Since then wars have been the constant, global military spending has increased dramatically and even the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) is falling short of our hopes.

The Jeju Island naval base project is highly symbolic and could serve as the catalyst for change in the abysmal trend of failed ventures. For international peace activists the Save Jeju Island campaign is what many have been waiting years for - that being entirely an winnable cause for peace with significant international implications. A victory in Gangjeong village could be the first shot across the bow of the military industrial complex. A Gangjeong victory could serve as a model that can be scaled up and applied to the next fight for peace – while our momentum and size will surely grow. Though how do we get there, what needs to be done and what are the challenges to achieve this first and all important victory?

First, I would like to provide you with a short overview of where we stand in Gangjeong at this very moment from what I have observed. I will also highlight the key issues on the ground and in the international press. I would like to emphasize that these opinions are my own and I do not speak on behalf of the Gangjeong village council. These observations will then be combined with my experiences conducting international outreach and the challenges I have personally faced – my successes as well. In the end I hope that this talk serves as a prescription for the road ahead. At the very least it may fuel discussions and strategic planning.

The villagers are now in their fifth year of waging the struggle to halt construction of the naval base and at this point there can be no doubt that they are at their most powerful. The peace activists and residents are waging a 24-hour, seven day a week, 365 day per year fight for peace. Each and everyday in Gangjeong they tireless efforts generate events that are worthy of media attention. Though because of the isolation of the village and language barriers with international activists and media for the first four and a half years their efforts resided in what I refer to as the “Jeju bubble.” For example, colleagues of mine in the United States who are known as Korean security and nuclear experts where completely unaware of what was taking place. In fact some did not even known where Jeju Island was located. Today that has changed and we have though the hard work many people – some here today placed the Save Jeju Island campaign in media outlets around the world. Such as Al Jazeera, MSNBC, The Washington Times and the New York Times.

We in the peace community are very fortunate that the villagers have a highly sound, logical and undeniable argument against the base that stands on documented evidence, rooted in facts and science. This alone has removed many challenges that plague some peace campaigns. We are winning over new people from all areas of the political spectrum daily around the world. Though this process relies heavily on international press coverage and outreach efforts. When the entire argument is presented I have found that even the most hawkish of my colleagues, including current and former military are disturbed by the location of the base. As an example, if an individual is in favor of increasing the US military presence in the Asia Pacific region the environmental dimensions of the argument against the base appeal to them. I have not found a single person during my day-to-day interactions. So when we talk about civic challenges there are not as many as one would think - at least not in the traditional sense.

The case against the naval base is divided into four categories: (1) International Security (2) Human Rights (3) Environmental/Cultural (4) Legal. These categories provide abundant opportunities for outreach.

National, regional and international security | Located less than 400miles from China, the simple presence of the Jeju Island naval base alone will undermine China’s national security and strategic nuclear deterrent. This ability to undermine grows exponentially when we take into consideration the presence of Aegis destroyers outfitted with a missile defense platform. Currently up to three Aegis Destroyers will be present on the base site – that number could rise to six -even higher with occasional visits for US Aegis ships that should be expected. Many world-renowned experts and missile defense analysts have stated that this base is completely ineffective at addressing the true threat to ROK security. That being the missile threat from North Korea since the Aegis system cannot target DPRK ballistic missiles as a result of their likely flight trajectory and altitude. The location of the base does on the other hand serve as a prime location for the intercept of DF-3 and DF-4 ballistic missiles located in South East China that could in theory be used to target Japan. The base also is expected to serve as a temporary port for US submarines and carriers such as the USS George Washington which has been involved in war-gaming exercises with the ROKN. It is especially concerning when the depth of the planned Gangjeong is studied, which suggests that it is more than appropriate to host nuclear armed US Trident submarines (SSBN). It is not far fetched to imagines a Cuba Missile style crisis. The temporary basing of an SSBN carrying nuclear weapons during a time of extreme tension between the US and China would provide an unparalleled first strike ability. For this and many reasons China is and will increasingly be concerned about the Jeju Island naval base. Simply put this military venture stands to benefit US national and economic security policy and not that of the ROK. The base will create far more problems than it will solve. At this time I have filed multiple Freedom of Information Act requests with the US Missile Defense Agency (MDA), the US Department of Defense and the US Navy with no success. In the case of the MDA, an agency that openly touts the ROK-US MD partnership, they stated that they have no records whatsoever that reflect collaboration between the two nations on MD. This is absurd to say the least and serves as a challenge. Fortunate I have filed an appeal via the office of a notable US Congressman. It is my hope that in the coming months I will have additional evidence to connect the US military to the Jeju base project. At the moment we are already in possession of scientific evidence suggesting this.

The second dimension to the Jeju base argument is human rights. Gangjeong villagers are being targeted by police for their political beliefs.  The police have fined, imprisoned and held innocent villagers for legally standing up for peace in Gangjeong village. The tool for their oppression is referred to as Article 314. For those of you here in Korea you may recognize this law as a tool commonly used for pressuring trade unions and cracking down on public assembly. The police even monitor Twitter, to find people who post the most and forcefully investigate them. At the same time IP addresses that tie back to the security services have been seen perusing the primary English language website looking though videos and pictures from peace rallies. This is to be expected but is unacceptable in light of a recent wave of the police calling innocent citizens in for questioning by detectives. Recently 200 villagers were called in for questioning. These people have committed no crime and are no affiliated with any criminal enterprises. If these targeted villagers and activists do not arrive for questioning they are hit with crushing monetary penalties and can even be arrested. This is just the tip of the iceberg. At the moment we are presenting this evidence to leading international human rights organizations.

The third argument includes a combination of cultural and environmental sensitivities - with three key focal points. Focal point one is the indisputable archeological significance of the Gangjeong naval base construction site. Historic relics from the Chosun dynasty have been recently discovered there along with human remains. At this moment the Navy is racing as fast as possible to build the base before more relics are discovered – demolishing what may be land parcels that are culturally and historically significant. The second focal point in this catagory lies in the past and is cultural. The last time a military base was located on Jeju Island more than 30,000 people were killed in genocide that is known as Sasam. We can guarantee that this naval base will deliver more trauma, pain and death to the people in Jeju at some point in the future – this is an absolute certainty. Maybe not in one year, many not in ten years, but that day will come if Jeju is militarized. With the trauma that the senior members of Jeju endured the idea of militarizing the island should temporarily suspended and a vote held. The people of Jeju have the right to choose their destiny and not be subject to a massive military presence once again. The third argument is the many environmental and cultural designations on Jeju. Those who have traveled to Jeju Island know that it is one of the more idyllic locations on the planet. The efforts of the South Korean government to promote it as such in an internation competition referred to as the New 7 Wonders attests to the beauty of the island. Jeju is also internationally recognized as the Island of World Peace a claim that is impossible to maintain with a US carrier and 20 destroyers sitting in port for any duration of time. Even the nearest large city to the base, that being Seogwipo is know officially as the City of Peace and Hope. The three UNESCO World Natural Heritage Sites, a designation that must be reviewed at timed intervals by an offical committee may be jeopardized by militarization as well. The nearest UNESCO site to the base is approximately 2 kilometers away.  There are also nine UNESCO Geoparks. Compromising the status of any of these could be a hit to an island deeply reliant on tourism. The island is also know as a Global Biosphere Reserve because of the diversity of it plants and animals.

The fourth component is the legal dimension – specifically referring to the process that led to the approval of the base construction in the first place. At the face value the base construction approval process seems to have been approved by a democratic vote. This is the claim the ROK military on a regular basis. The truth is that only 87 people, some of whom were bribed, out of 1800 residents had an opportunity to cast a vote on this matter. The remaining 1,700 in the village had no voice and no say in the discussion contrary to what is claimed by the military. There was no paper trail to provide transparency into this sham vote, because the votes were not cast on paper but were cast by applause – by clapping. What is most disturbing is that a local media outlet announced that the base construction project was approved before the voting process was even completed. When the village held their own re-vote that fairly included the entire community 94% of all villagers opposed the military base – yet the government and military refused to recognize the results. The people of Gangjeong above all their demands are simply requesting a new fair referendum that ensures all people in the village have a voice. This is not an extreme or radical demand. A new referendum will end the protests and this five-year battle that has disrupted a community, left residents in prison and compromised the local economy. At this moment the democratically elected Mayor of Gangjeong who oversaw the new 94% vote is currently in prison for standing against these affronts to democracy. He is being held without bail.

These four dimensions, the arguments contained within them and even more key point that I have not listed present an unprecedented opportunity for the international NGO community to assist the Gangjeong villagers in this noble fight. This is a very well targeted and refined campaign, rooted in facts. This fight is entirely winnable. So why is construction still continuing? Why has victory not arrived?

There are critical hurdles which offer an answer as to why we have not won this fight already. Firstly, the opinion of the Gangjeong people on this matter means very little if anything to the key government and military officials who can stop this base project. Especially with so few people on the Korean mainland involved. This fight is taking place behind a curtain. If not for the those few in the Korean civil society groups that are devoutly assisting Gangjeong villagers, a handful of non-profits in the international community, religious leaders in Korea and brave media outlets like the Hankyoreh few people outside of Jeju island would even know that this fight is taking place.

In the Jeju bubbles the military is running the show with this project and illegalities can go unquestioned. Recently Jeju Provincial government leaders demanded that the base project be halted. The military ignored the calls. One does not have to look far to see the frustration that people have with the political process in Korea. The important victory of Park Won Soon who belongs to no political party reflects this. As long as NGOs and civil society groups do not work to call attention to what is happening on Gangjeong then there can be no accountability. In all reality there are no hurdles that we cannot remove and all it will take is dedicated Korean and international activists to join the people of Gangjeong.

We can help to save the day. Many of you here and around the world are working tirelessly to call attention to the Jeju Island naval base project. Though it is quite simply not enough – more people are needed to trigger more press coverage and social networking (SNS) outreach.

As I have said, the Gangjeong people are waging an incredible campaign and it is being executed quite flawlessly. They are delivering the tools of victory to the international NGO community on a silver platter – an NGO community that has gone too long without a victory. Imagine the Gangjeong struggle as a relay race where the first group of runners are the Gangjeong people. When they complete their leg of the race and go to hand off the batton there are not enough people to receive it. The energy of the Gangjeong people is being squandered. We must plead with our colleagues around the world to rise up and join us arm and arm in this struggle.

But where do we go once we have received the batton? Where to we run to? The answer is the internet. The same place that delivered victory to Park Won Soon, the same outlet that will deliver the parliamentary elections to opposition democrats and the same place that will deliver an opposition president to the people of Korea. SNS and the web is changing the world, it will soon change Korea – it is already. Moreover, in the fight against the naval base the government will not respond to the people on Jeju, but they will respond to the web, they will respond to international media coverage and they will respond to international pressure. The web will shine light in the injustices being placed upon the Island of World Peace.

We must challenge our NGO brothers and sisters begin writing articles, letters to editors and messages to their friends on SNS. We need NGOs and civil society groups to allocate interns and staff to carry out these tasks as well. We must rule the web and the media. For four and a half years the people of Gangjeong received no international media coverage. It was not until we international partners took to the web in partnership with Gangjeong activists and reached out to the press. We built an English language website, created newsletters, blogs and the message is spreading. Our responsibility is to wage a fight in the media and online. Gangjeong will provide us with everything we need.

Forgive me for saying this, but inaction by civil society groups and NGOs is the singular hurdle. We are needed in Gangjeong, we can make a difference. This is where we can shine.

If you look to the recent example of popular uprisings around the world in Tunisa, Egypt and Syria the people alone cannot be victorious against a government is simply ignoring their requests and thumbs their nose to the democratic process. It was not until people around the world triggered a global movement on the web. Now of course, Jeju is not as big as the Tunisian uprising or what we witnessed Libya – and that is why we can win. This our chance to set into motion a global movement against US militarization. Jeju will be the first in a series of victories. We cannot squander this opportunity.

Let us leave this conference with our batteries recharged. This is a victory on the horizon and we must seize it together. With an increase in our efforts in support of Gangjeong villagers and the help of our international partners we can help to prevent the militarization of the Island of World Peace.

The stakes could not be higher and the clock is ticking. Let’s get to work. ☼

	Discussion

▣  Biographies of the Presenters  ▣

◯ Akira KAWASAKI / Japan

Mr. Akira Kawasaki is an Executive Committee member of the Tokyo-based NGO Peace Boat <>. Having worked with a Japanese NGO Peace Depot in 1998-2002, he advocates for nuclear disarmament currently as a Vice Chair of International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) and a Coordinating Committee member of Abolition 2000. Since 2008, Kawasaki coordinates “Global Voyage for a Nuclear-Free World: Peace Boat Hibakusha Project” that the atomic-bomb survivors travel around the world to raise public awareness on nuclear danger. In 2009 he served as an NGO Advisor to Co-Chairs of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (ICNND). He has played a leading role in peace movement in Japan, including organizing Global Article 9 Conference to Abolish War in May 2008.

kawasaki@peaceboat.gr.jp.

◯ John FEFFER / US

John Feffer is the co-director of Foreign Policy in Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington, DC. He is the author of several books including North Korea, South Korea: U.S. Policy at a Time of Crisis and Shock Waves: Eastern Europe after the Revolutions. His forthcoming book is Crusade 2.0. He is also the editor of Power Trip: U.S. Unilateralism and Global Strategy after September 11and, with Richard Caplan, Europe’s New Nationalism. His articles have appeared in The New York Times, Washington Post, Boston Globe, Christian Science Monitor, The American Prospect, Salon, Tom Dispatch, and many other publications. He has been a Pan Tech fellow in Korean Studies at Stanford University, an associate editor of World Policy Journal, and an international affairs representative for the American Friends Service Committee in both Europe and Asia.

◯ Taeho LEE / South Korea

Taeho Lee is the Secretary General of PSPD and a member for Executive Committee of the Center for Peace and Disarmament of PSPD. He is also Chairperson of the Execuitive Committee National Network of Korean Civil Society for Opposing to the Naval Base in Jeju Island and a policy committee member of the South Korean Committee for the Implementation of the June 15 South- North Joint Declaration since 2005. He was a visiting researcher at the Columbia University. As becoming a coordinator of PSPD in 1995, he was responsible for anti-corruption movement and especially protection of whistle blowers who disclosed corruption of the arms contract. With establishing the Center for Peace and Disarmament of PSPD in 2003, he has organized various projects concerning disarmament and the democratic control of the security power. His efforts for peace and disarmament are campaign against War on Iraq and Afghanistan(2003-), campaign against development of the Korean helicopter, movement against the establishment of the naval base in Jeju Island, and movement against the legislation of the anti-terrorism and anti-money laundry for terrorism while proposing civil alternatives for the military reform and raising questions on the sinking of the Cheonan warship investigation. He is the author of several books including '2008 Civil White Paper of Peace'(co-author, 2008), '2010 Civil White Paper of Peace'(co-author, 2010), 'Raise Questions on the Cheonan Warship'(co-author, 2010), 'The Sealed Truth of the Cheonan Warship'(co-author, 2010). He also wrote many articles including 'Movement against War on Iraq and the Civil Society of Korea'(2006, 世界), 'The Major Six Problems of the Military Reform'(parliamentary report, 2006), 'The Problems of the legislations of anti-money laundry for terrorism'(parliamentary report, 2007), 'Making a Peace State and Civil movement'(Citizen and the World, 2007), 'War against terrorism and US civil movement'(reserch paper for the POSCO Foundation, 2009).

◯ Namjoo LEE / South Korea

Namjoo Lee graduated from the Seoul National University, major in Economic in 1984, and have the doctoral degree in Politics at the Pecking University in China. He is a professor at the Sungkonghoe University, teaching Chinese Studies, an editor at the Changbi Publishers, a director at the Segyo Institute and a director at Center for the Peace and Disarmament of the PSPD(People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy). He has written several books including 'the Civil Society in Asia : Present and Prospect'(2004), 'The Order of the East Asia : from Imperialism toward Community'(2005), 'The Formation and Characteristics of the Chinese civil Society'(2007), 'Theory on the Double Task'(2009) and so on.

◯ Yayoi Tsuchida / Japan

Yayoi Tsuchida was born in Ehime prefecture, Japan. She graduated from the law faculty of Ryukoku University, Kyoto. She studied the issues of Asia, Africa and Latin America at AALA  Institute. She worked as a secretary at Tokyo office of Arab League and South Yemen Embassy. After that, she worked as a translator at Japan Press Service, news agency. Since 1989 to present, she has been working at Japan Council against A and H Bombs (Gensuikyo). Since 2002, she is a National Council member and National Executive board member of Gensuikyo and since 2006, she serves as assistant general secretary in charge of international section. She is also a Steering Committee member, Organizing Committee of the World Conference against A and H Bombs which is held every August in Hiroshima and Nagasaki since 1955. Since 2003, she is a Steering Committee member of the International Peace Bureau.  Since 2005, she is a member of the Abolition 2000 Global Council.

◯ Matthew Hoey / US

Matthew Hoey is a former senior research associate at the Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies (IDDS), a United Nations Non-Governmental research organization that was located in Cambridge, Massachusetts. At IDDS Hoey worked under the guidance of renowned arms control expert Dr. Randall Forsberg. From 2003 to 2006, Hoey also served IDDS as a contributing editor to the Arms Control Reporter, for which he wrote on international security issues such as nuclear forces, missile defense, military space systems and dual-use technologies. Hoey’s research has been featured by the Council on Foreign Relations, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, The Space Review, The Nuclear Threat Initiative, The Center for Defense Information, The Washington Times, The WEU Interparliamentary European Security and Defense Assembly, The New York Times and The Institute for Policy Studies among others. Hoey has also lectured at Boston University, The Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and at the MIT Science, Technology and Global Security Working Group. In 2008 he was employed as a contract consultant to the US Government and provided forecasting related to space and emerging military technologies. That same year, he founded The Military Space Transparency Project (MSTP) with the mission to reveal the efforts, policies and innovations that could culminate in the research, development and deployment of space warfare technologies. More recently, Hoey provided military technology forecasting and international security analysis to Kurzweil Technologies Inc. (KTI). In 2010 he was named an advisor to the Global Network Against Weapons and Nuclear Power in Space. In 2011 he was named International Coordinator of the Global Campaign to Save Jeju Island.