

OECD PEER REVIEW 및 한국 ODA 정책발전을 위한 토론회



일 시 : 2013년 2월 20일(수) 오전 10:00 ~ 12:00

장 소 : 사회복지공동모금회 지하1층 대강당

주 최 : 국제개발협력민간협의회 **KCOC**

국제개발협력시민사회포럼 **KoFID**

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I. 프로그램

1. 배경 및 취지

지난 1월 30(수)일 **OECD 개발원조위원회(DAC)**가 한국개발협력에 대한 동료검토결과 보고서를 발표하고, 한국의 개발협력정책과 집행 개선을 위한 권고사항을 제시한 시점에서 국제개발협력민간협의회(KCOC)와 국제개발협력시민사회포럼(KoFID)는 DAC의 보고서를 한국 ODA개혁의 기준으로 삼고, 전향적인 개선방향을 논의하기 위해 오는 2월 20일 사회복지공동모금회 대강당에서 **《OECD Peer Review 토론회 및 한국 ODA 정책발전을 위한 토론회》**를 개최하고자 합니다.

본 토론회에서 발제자들은 시민사회의 지원과 역할, 역량강화 및 인도주의 지원 등에 있어서 DAC 동료검토 결과를 국내 ODA정책의 기준으로 적용하기 위해 개선할 점들과 ODA의 독립적 평가기관설립 및 시민사회를 통한 지원확대 등 주요사안을 실행하기 위해 시민사회가 나아가야 할 방향에 관해 발표할 예정입니다. 시민단체들의 다양한 의견을 듣고 종합하는 의미 있는 자리가 될 것입니다.

2. 일정안

TIME	내 용		진 행
9:40~10:00	등록 / 접수		
10:00~10:10	인사말		
10:10~11:00	발제	발제 1	황원규 교수 (강릉대학교)
		발제 2	이성훈 센터장 (KCOC 정책센터)
		발제 3	윤지영 팀장 (ODA Watch)
11:00~12:00	토론		좌장 : 남부원 사무총장 (KoFID) 토론 : 이성훈 센터장, 윤지영 팀장, 김은미 교수 (이화여자대학교) 김정인 대리(월드비전), 이미현 간사(참여연대) 외
12:00~12:10	폐회		

[발제1]

OECD-DAC 동료평가와 한국 국제개발협력의 과제

황원규

강릉원주대 사회과학대학장

OECD-DAC 동료평가와 한국 국제개발협력의 과제

황 원 규
(강릉원주대학교)

2012년 경제개발협력기구(OECD)의 개발협력위원회(DAC)는 한국에 대한 최초의 동료평가(Peer Review)를 실시하였다.¹⁾ 이를 통해 한국은 2010년 DAC회원국이 된 이래 법적기반(국제개발협력기본법 및 시행령)을 확충하였고, 지속적인 원조액 증액을 통해 국제사회의 개발에 공헌하기 위한 상당한 노력을 기울였다는 긍정적인 평가를 받았다. 또한 한국은 2011년 부산세계개발원조총회(HLF-4)를 성공적으로 개최하였고, 이를 기반으로 중국, 인도, 브라질 등 새로운 공여국들이 참여하는 Global Partnership의 발족에 중요한 매개체가 됨으로써 국제개발협력의 새로운 방향성을 확립하는데 큰 기여를 하였다는 평가를 받을 수 있었다.

그러나 한국의 개발협력은 아직도 일천한 역사 속에서 많은 개선의 여지가 있다는 점이 지적되었고, 원조의 구성, 조직, 집행방식, 효과성 등 여러 가지 측면에서 다양한 노력이 기울여져야 한다고 권고 받았다.

한편, OECD-DAC 동료평가 이후 한국에서는 다양한 주체들 간에 평가내용에 대한 해석이 분분하여 상당한 혼란이 야기되고 있다. 즉, 평가를 통해 제기된 문제점을 겸허하게 수용하고, 이를 통해 한국 국제개발협력을 개선하기 위한 방안을 모색하기 위한 노력이 기울여져야 함에도 불구하고 일각에서는 OECD-DAC 동료평가가 한국의 특수성에 정당성을 부여한 것처럼 과장 해석하고 있다.

이 글은 OECD-DAC 동료평가를 왜곡시키는 의도에 대해 경종을 울리고, 평가를 통해 제기된 문제점을 개선하기 위한 대안을 제시해 보고자 한다.

1) 한국은 2010년 OECD-DAC 회원국 가입을 앞두고 2008년 특별심사를 받은 바 있다.

1. OECD-DAC 동료평가의 해석에 대한 유의점

동료평가 보고서에 대한 구체적인 축조해석은 다른 분들의 발표에 미루기로 하고, 이곳에서는 평가보고서의 해석에 임하는 몇가지 사항을 제시해 보고자 한다.

첫째, OECD-DAC 동료평가 보고서는 학술적 연구보고서가 아닌 정책보고서이자 외교적 문서란 점이다. 즉, 현상에 대한 분석은 실증적 방법으로 사실규명(fact finding)에 노력하였으나, 그 결과를 전달하는 문서는 외교적 수사법으로 포장되어 있음을 잊지 말아야 한다. 따라서 '행간을 읽는(read between the lines)' 통찰력이 필요하다는 점이다.

둘째, 한국보고서만 읽지 말고, 비슷한 시기에 평가받은 다른 나라들(예: 2011년 덴마크에 대한 평가보고서)에 대한 평가보고서를 비교하여 우리의 부족함을 성찰하는 자세가 필요하다. 즉, 우리나라의 개선노력에 대한 정당한 평가에 대해서는 자부심을 가져도 좋으나 세계 일류 공여국들에 대한 국제사회의 평가와 비교해 볼 때 우리의 갈 길이 멀다는 점에 대해서 겸허하게 수용해야 한다는 점이다.

셋째, 외교적 완곡어법으로 모호하게 표현된 문장들을 자기에게 유리한 방향으로 왜곡하여 해석해서는 안되고, 이를 널리 홍보하는 유치함을 지양해야 한다. 지적된 현상은 그대로 겸허하게 받아들여야지 이를 정치적으로 확대해석하여 홍보하는 어리석음을 범하지 말 것을 당부 드린다. 곡해(曲解), 아전인수(我田引水), 견강부회(牽強附會), 자화자찬(自畫自讚) 같은 한자성어들이 생각나게 해서는 곤란하다는 점이다.

2. 한국 국제개발협력의 당면 과제

2012년 OECD-DAC 평가보고서는 한국 국제개발협력이 직면한 여러 과제들을 부드러운 표현으로 정확하게 지적하고 있다. 보고서에서 제기된 문제점들은 (1) 예산확충이 필요한 과제 등 장기적으로 추진해야 될 과제, (2) 부처간 업무조정 등 제도개혁이 필요한 중기적 과제, (3) 단기적으로 개선해야 될 과제들로 분류될 수 있을 것이다. 그 중에서도 일부 과제들은 2013년

한국의 정권교체기에 신속히 처리할 수 있거나, 혹은 이 때 처리되지 않으면 향후 개선이 매우 어려운 과제들도 있다고 생각된다.

이 글에서는 2013년초 신정권에서 신속히 처리해야만 할 몇가지 과제를 중심으로 한국 국제개발협력의 당면과제를 제시하고자 한다.²⁾

(1) 한국 ODA 추진체계 개편

21세기 들어 원조 선진국들은 국제사회에서 새롭게 대두되는 원조규범을 수용하여 효과적인 원조를 추진하기 위해 기존의 분절화되어 있던 개발협력 정책 및 집행기관을 통합하는 추세이다.³⁾

그러나 현재 한국의 ODA는 국제규범에 맞지 않는 분절화된 추진체계를 가지고 있다. 즉, 과거 일본처럼 기획재정부가 관할하는 유상원조와 외교통상부가 관할하는 무상원조로 이원화되어 있고, 이 뿐 아니라 35개 이상의 정부 부처/기관이 저마다 독자적인 예산을 확보하고 개발 사업에 참여하고 있는 '혼돈의 장(Field of Turbulence)'이 펼쳐지고 있다.

2006년부터 이러한 원조의 분절화(fragmentation)를 극복하기 위해 국무총리실 산하에 총괄 및 조정기구인 『국제개발협력위원회』를 설치운영하고 있으나 실무 부처 간의 이해관계를 조정하기에는 역부족이고, 향후 ODA의 질적 개선과 양적 확대에 대응하기에 한계가 있다.

이러한 한국 ODA 추진체계(ODA Architecture)가 파행적으로 운영되고 있는 보다 근본적인 원인은 기획과 예산에 재정/금융기능까지 통괄하는 막강한 힘을 가진 『기획재정부』가 원조사업을 직접 집행하고 있기 때문이다. 따라서 한국 ODA 추진체계 선진화의 관건은 “어떻게 『기획재정부』가 원조사업을 직접 집행하지 않고 본연의 국가발전을 위한 기획기능에 매진하게 하느냐?”하는 국가기능 재조정과 직접적인 관련이 있다.⁴⁾

중장기적으로 한국 ODA의 예산이 점차 증가하고 국제사회에서의 역할이 증대되고 있는 만큼 한국의 국제개발협력 추진체계는 OECD 회원국내에서도 가장 바람직한 국제개발협력 기구로 평가받고 있는 영국의 DFID (Department for International Development)와 같이 통합적이고 독립적인

2) 아래 내용은 2013년 초 시민사회의 이름으로 제18대 대통령직 인수위원회에 제출한 『한국 ODA 개혁을 위한 시민사회의 요구』의 일부 안건을 기반으로 하고 있다.

3) 예를 들면 영국의 개발협력부(DFID) 설립, 독일의 경제협력개발부(BMZ) 설립 및 집행기관 통합, 일본의 무상 통합원조기관(New JICA) 설립 등

4) 국제적으로 기획재정부가 ODA사업 집행에 직접 관여하고 있는 사례는 없음.

부처 신설을 지향해야 할 것이다.

그러나 아직은 한국의 현황에 선진적인 영국의 사례를 당장 적용하기에는 여러모로 많은 준비가 필요하기에 가장 시급하게 개선해야 할 과제로 아래와 같은 2가지의 기구개편을 추진할 것을 제안한다.

- (1) 기존의 무상원조 전담 시행기관인 한국국제협력단 (KOICA)과 유상 원조 전담 시행기관인 한국수출입은행 대외경제협력기금 (EDCF)을 통합하여 새로운 **무·유상 통합원조 집행기관 (가칭: KorAID) 설립.**
- (2) 국제개발협력 정책수립 및 조정기능을 강화하기 위해 현행 국무총리실에 설치되어 있는 『국제개발협력위원회』를 **대통령 직속 위원회로 격상.**

이를 통해 현재의 분절화로 인해 초래되는 국고예산 낭비를 막고, 수원국의 개발효과성을 제고할 수 있다고 판단됨.

(2) 국제사회에 약정한 원조 증액 실천 및 국제규범 준수

한국의 ODA는 국제사회에 대한 대한민국의 책무이자 동시에 해외시장에 의존하고 있는 개방형 국가의 생존전략이다. 그러나 바람직한 원조는 공여국의 필요나 주관적인 판단에 의해서 제공하는 것이 아니고, 수원국 현장에서의 필요와 국제규범에 준거하여 사업이 발굴되고, 집행되어야 한다.

국제사회는 지난 60년 동안의 시행착오를 통해 원조 효과성을 높이기 위한 각종 규범(예: 2005년 원조효과성을 위한 파리선언)을 마련하였다. 최근 한국은 국제개발협력의 새로운 규범제정을 선도하는 역할을 수행하고 있으나 정작 국내의 개발원조 정책 및 집행 실태는 여전히 후진성을 면치 못하고 있는 형편이다.

이러한 후진성은 3가지 점에서 발견되고 있는데 첫째, 한국의 국민소득 대비 원조비율은 현재 OECD-DAC 회원국 중 가장 낮음에도 불구하고, DAC 가입 당시 국제사회에 약정한 원조금액 증액목표(2015년까지 국민총소득의 0.25% 제공)를 달성하겠다는 정치적 의지가 점차 약해지고 있다. 둘째, 한국은 전 세계 원조 공여국 중에서 원조의 개발공헌도가 매우 낮은 나라 즉, 원조의 질(質)이 매우 낮은 것으로 평가받고 있다. 셋째, 한국형 개발원조라는 미명 하에 국제규범을 위반하는 것을 당연시하고 있으며, 그 배경에는 부처 이기주의가 잠복되어 있다.

따라서 차기 정부는 임기 내에 아래 제시된 것과 같이 국제규범 준수와 국제사회와의 약속을 적극적으로 이행해야 할 것이다.

- (1) 국제사회에 약속한 대로 2015년까지 **국민총소득 (GNI) 대비 0.25%의 ODA 지원을 이행할 것.** 아울러 전 세계 최빈국들의 선망의 대상인 한국의 국제사회에서의 위상제고를 위해 2015년 이후에도 지속적으로 ODA 예산을 증액할 것.
- (2) 보다 나은 원조를 위해 **국제규범에 부합되는 원조집행방식 (무상 원조 비율 확대, 비구속성 원조 확대, 최빈국 우선 지원, 통합집행 등) 추진.**

(3) 효과적이고 공정한 사업심사 및 평가를 위한 제도 개혁

현재 한국의 국제개발협력 사업은 분절화된 경쟁구조로 인해 중복적이고 소규모 단발성 행사로 그치는 경우가 많은 실정이다. 이로 인해 원조예산이 낭비될 뿐 아니라 지나치게 많은 한국의 정부부처 관계자들이 수원국 부처 및 원조총괄기관들을 직접 접촉하여 수원국 정부의 피로감과 행정부담을 증폭시키고 있다. 따라서 부처 주관 사업들 간의 중복성을 배제하고, 한국 국제개발협력 사업의 효과성을 제고하기 위한 방안으로 통합원조기관 내에 민간인 전문가들이 주도하는 독립적인 사업심사위원회를 설치하여 효과적이고 공정한 사업심사가 이루어질 수 있는 제도적 장치를 마련해야 한다. (예: 덴마크 DANIDA의 사업심사위원회와 국내 규제개혁위원회의 기능 참조)

아울러 한국 국제개발협력 사업에 대한 기존의 평가는 자체평가나 용역 형태로 주로 이루어지고 있어 독립적이고 객관적인 평가가 현실적으로 불가능하다. 따라서 보다 독립적이고 객관적인 원조효과성 평가를 위한 시스템을 구축해야 한다.

(4) 개발친화적 정책일관성(Policy Coherence for Development) 추진

한국의 국제개발협력은 아직까지 국내 정책과는 무관하게 단지 시혜적 측면에서 개발도상국에게 공적자금을 공여해 주는 단계에 머물고 있다. 이제는 개발도상국의 발전과 국제빈곤 해소에 실질적으로 기여할 수 있도록 개발친화적인 정책을 범부처에 걸쳐 일관성 있게 추진하여야 한다.

여기에는 개발도상국들이 우리의 시장으로 진출할 수 있는 특혜적 정책을 제공하고, 개발도상국 투자에 대한 지원, 개발도상국 인력고용에 대한 지원 등 다양한 정책이 개발되어야 한다. 아울러 이러한 정책 노력이 원조기관 및

해당 부처에 국한되지 않고 범부처적으로 참여하는 Whole of Government Approach가 적극 모색되어야 한다.

(5) 한국형 원조에 대한 자성

우리나라의 개발협력계는 지난 반세기의 경제개발 성과에 대한 지나친 자부심으로 우리나라의 경험과 가치가 세계 제일이라는 독선이 팽배해 있다. 이로 인해 국제규범을 무시하고 소위 ‘한국형 원조’라는 논리를 주장하면서 수원국의 개발목표나 우선순위를 무시한 독불장군형 원조를 추진하고 있다. 이러한 과정에서 ‘봉사형 원조’, ‘개발경험전수’ 등의 한국에서만 강조되는 특유한 기술협력사업이 지나치게 부각되고 있고, 국제사회의 보편적 개념을 한국적 고유사업으로 환원하여 추진(예: 새마을운동)하고 있다.

그러나 이러한 사업들의 실제 운용에는 많은 개선점이 내재되어 있다는 사실을 직시하고 우리 식 논리가 아니라 국제규범에 따라 수원국의 시스템(country system)을 활용하고, 주인의식(ownership)을 고양시켜 주며, 수원국의 개발목표와 일치(alignment)시키고, 국내는 물론 개발현장에서 다른 공여주체들과 조화(harmonization)롭게 협력하는 결과중심적(result-based management)이고, 책임성(accountable)있는 원조를 제공해야만 한다.

위와 같은 국제규범이 잘 준수되고 있는 기반 위에 이보다 한걸음 진일보한 개발친화적 개발협력을 제공할 수 있을 때만 우리는 이를 ‘한국형 원조’라고 칭할 수 있을 것이다.

이런 맥락에서 2012년 총리실 주관으로 구축한 ‘한국형 ODA모델’과 159개의 주요 개발협력 사업목록은 대내적 문서로만 활용하고 대외적 노출은 자제해야 할 것이다. 자칫 국제사회의 웃음거리가 되고, 수원국으로부터 혐오감을 불러일으킬 소지가 매우 높다고 판단된다.

(6) 시민사회와의 협력 강화

시민사회와의 긴밀한 협력은 개발효과성을 증대하기 위해서는 물론 국제사회에서 한국의 공공외교의 전략적 목표 실현을 위해서 필수적이다. 시민사회가 현장사업 실행단계에서의 협력 또는 지원 대상에 머무는 것이 아니라 정책 수립의 단계에서부터 사업 심사 및 평가에 이르기까지 모든 단계에 동등한 파트너로 참여할 수 있는 제도적 장치를 마련하여 이들의 기여를 증대시켜야 할 것이다.

첨부: “도마에 오른 국제개발협력예산 2조원”

한국일보 (2013년 2월 8일)

[한국일보 기고문] 도마에 오른 국제개발협력예산 2조원 - 2013.2.8

황원규 강릉원주대 사회과학대학장



한국의 국제개발협력 예산이 올해부터 연간 2조원을 넘어섰다. 이번 정권 내내 국가적 쟁점이 되었던 4대강 사업의 예산총액이 4년간 23조원이었음을 감안할 때 한 해 2조원의 예산지출은 적지 않다. 게다가 국제사회에 약정한 대로 실천할 경우 한국의 개발협력 예산은 2015년에는 국민총소득(GNI)의 0.25%에 해당되는 3조5,000억원으로 증가할 전망이다. 그러나 문제는 이렇듯 빠르게 증가하는 공적 자금을 둘러싼 부처간의 경쟁과 갈등이 점점 심화되어 예산이 낭비되고 있고 국제적인 비웃음을 사고 있다는 점이다.

대한민국의 모든 행정은 국민을 보위하고 국익을 증진시키기 위한 것이다. 그러나 유일한 예외가 있다. 국제개발협력예산이다. 이 돈은 세계에서 가장 어려운 처지에 놓여있는 개발도상국의 빈민들을 지원하는 대한민국 국민들의 성금이자, 세계 최빈국의 일원으로 빈곤의 함정에서 벗어나지 못했던 곤궁한 시절 우리를 도와준 국제사회에 대한 대한민국의 보은행위이다. 이렇듯 개발원조는 어느 예산보다 숭고한 이상으로 마련된 것이기에 그 집행에서도 국제적 규범을 따르고 효과성을 높이기 위해 노력해야 한다.

그러나 국제개발협력 예산을 둘러싼 부처간 경쟁은 마치 2조원의 눈먼 돈을 서로 차지하기 위한 공무원들의 거대한 잔치판 같다는 느낌이다. 개발정책자문사업에서 수자원 개발, 심지어는 대학생 논문 현상금에 이르기까지 부처간 예산낭비와 중복성은 도처에서 발견되고 있고 똑같은 사업을 서로 키우기 위해 경쟁적으로 예산을 늘리고 있다. 개발협력을 한다는 명목 하에 개도국 출장이 잦고, 원조를 받는 나라의 정부는 동일한 사업으로 한국의 다른 부처 담당자들이 찾아오는 이유를 의아해 하고 있다. 우리는 과연 개발도상국을 돕기 위해 개발협력예산을 쓰고 있는가, 아니면 공무원들의 후생복지를 위해 개발협력예산을 쓰고 있는가.

현재 한국의 국제개발협력체계는 크게 무상과 유상으로 나뉘어져 있고, 이를 외교통상부와 기획재정부가 관할하고 있다. 게다가 35개 이상의 정부부처 및 공공기관들이 독자적인 예산을 편성하여 개발협력사업을 추진하고 있는 형국이다. 이러한 분절화된 구조를 통합조정하기 위해 2006년부터 개발협력행정의 최고의사결정기구로서 총리실에 '국제개

발협력위원회'를 두고 있다. 그러나 국제개발협력위는 부처 이기주의가 횡행하고 있는 논란의 장이 되어 조정능력을 제대로 발휘하지 못하고 있다. 이러한 문제점의 근본에는 예산과 기획, 조직평가권까지 갖고 있는 막강한 권력을 가진 재정부가 개발협력까지 도맡아 하겠다는 과도한 욕심이 작용하기 때문이다.

개발협력예산은 현재 재정부와 외교부가 전체의 약 92%의 예산을 쓰고 있고, 부처별로는 100억원 미만을 집행하고 있을 뿐이다. 이 정도의 부처이익에도 불구하고 원조집행체계의 통합이라는 국제사회의 규범은 대한민국에서는 지켜지지 않고 있다. 이 때문에 대한민국 원조의 질은 전체 공여국 중 최하위 수준이다.

만약 5년 후 개발협력 전체 예산이 커지면서 부처별 예산이 1,000억원대에 이른다면 혁명적 조치가 아니라면 이를 개혁할 수 없게 될 것이다. 따라서 2013년 신정권 초기에 이 문제를 해결하지 못하면 국제규범에 합치되는 개발협력체계를 갖추는 것은 요원한 과제가 될 것이다. 개발협력체계 개편은 많은 개별 부처, 특히 재정부가 전문성 제고 및 한국적 원조라는 미명하에 국가별 고유성을 주장하고 있지만 사실은 정답이 존재한다. 국제사회의 규범을 따르면 된다. 새 정부는 우리 안의 내재적 오류를 세계의 보편성인 양 호도하는 부처들의 궤변논리에 현혹되지 말고 국제규범에 따라 개발협력체계를 인수위원회에서 신속히 개편해야만 한다. 세계 빈민들을 위해.

[발제2]

OECD Peer Review 최종 권고안에 대한 한국 시민사회의 평가

이성훈

국제개발협력민간협의회(KCOC) 정책센터장

OECD Peer Review 최종 권고안에 대한 한국 시민사회의 평가

2013.2.19

이성훈, 국제개발협력민간협의회(KCOC) 정책센터장

최종권고안에 대한 시민사회단체의 평가

- 지난 1월 30일 최종 권고안 발표 이후 한국의 시민사회의 개발 분야 여러 민간단체와 협의체는 입장을 발표하였음. (아래의 표 참조)
- 대부분의 시민사회단체는 권고안의 내용이 기대에 미치지 못해 아쉬웠지만 그래도 한국정부의 현재 ODA 정책의 구조적 문제를 적절히 지적했다고 평가
- 특히 권고안이 한국의 지난 3-4년간 ODA 정책이 질적으로 담보하고 있음을 지적하고 있다는 사실에 주목하고 이번 권고안을 계기로 국제수준에 부합하는 제도와 정책 개혁을 강력히 추진할 것을 촉구하였음.
- 특히 유상원조 비율과 비구속성 원조 비중 줄이고 투명성 제고, 원조 정책 전반에 대한 모니터와 평가 강화, 시민사회에 대한 실질적 지원 강화 등을 공통적으로 제기함.

표 1: 한국시민사회단체의 입장과 평가

단체	성명서 제목
ODA Watch (1.30)	한국 ODA, 규모만 키우지 말고 질적 성장 꾀하라 - 유상원조 비율 축소 및 비구속성 원조 비중 늘리고 투명하고 책임 있는 소통과 정보제공 확대해야 - 국제개발협력위원회 조정 권한 강화하여 통합적인 추진체계 구축해야 - 효율적 예산관리를 위해 평가와 감시 강화해야
ODA Watch OWL 74호 (2.5)	“지금보다 국격이 높은 때는 일찍이 우리 역사에서 없었다?” - 5년 전과 크게 다르지 않은 오늘, 아쉬움 많은 OECD DAC 동료검토 결과
참여연대 (2.4)	OECD DAC 동료평가 권고안 이행계획 조속히 마련하라 - 개도국 부담 가중시키는 유상원조, 구속성원조 비율 대폭 줄여야 - 원조 전략 마련하고 정보공개 대폭 확대해야
KoFID (2.4)	한국정부의 국제개발협력정책 담보하고 있다 - OECD의 동료평가결과에 따라 개선책 마련에 더욱 노력해야 - 새 정부의 개발협력정책 청사진은 어디에 있는가
KCOC (2.6)	시민사회에 대한 실질적 지원과 파트너십 강화해야

권고안의 의의와 이행 방향

- 시민사회의 입장에서 볼 때 이번 권고안은 지난 2008년 OECD DAC 가입 이전 시행된 동료 평가와 그 권고안에 비해 지난 3-4년간 한국정부의 ODA 정책의 성과와 한계 및 구조적 문제점에 대한 객관적 평가로 간주.
- 외교적 어법을 사용하고 있지만 Center for Global Development의 Commitment to Development Index (CDI)의 2012년 27개 평가 국가 중 최하위 성적을 받은 한국 ODA 정책에 대한 실질적인 종합진단이라고 할 수 있음.
- 따라서 비록 법적 구속력이 있는 문서는 아니지만 향후 한국 ODA 정책의 효과성을 증진하기 위한 중요한 규범적 준거로 삼아 동료평가가 '통과의례'가 아니라 국제수준에 부합하는 제도와 정책 개혁을 강력히 추진하는 계기로 삼아야 함.
- 이런 맥락에서 정부 일부 부처의 권고안에 대한 '아전인수'식 해석과 선별적 수용, 그리고 비판의 대상인 현행 일부 정책을 '정당화'하는 근거로 삼는 행태에 대해 매우 우려 (EDCF Issue Paper, 2013년 1월, Vol. 2, No 1).
- 이는 동료평가의 의의를 망각 또는 평가절하 하는 것으로 권고안에 대한 한국정부의 공식 평가와 이행계획 수립 시 지양해야 함.

권고안 이행 관련 한국정부에 대한 제안과 권고

- 한국정부는 보고서에 담긴 분석과 권고안에 대한 공개적 토론과 객관적 평가를 통해 종합적인 이행계획을 조속히 수립해야 함.
- 이 과정에서 시민사회의 비판적 목소리와 제안을 적극적으로 수용할 필요가 있음.

구체적으로 보고서의 6개 영역에서 시민사회의 관점에서 추가하고자 하는 정책 제안 (표 2) 가운데 몇 가지 강조하고자 함. (OECD의 권고안 (표3)에 구체적으로 언급되지 않은 내용을 중심으로).

1. 국제개발협력기본법 개정 (표 4)

부산파트너십과 OECD DAC의 기본 규범에 부합하도록 내용을 개정할 필요가 있음. 특히 부산에서 강조된 불평등, 인권, 민주적 거버넌스, 양질의 일자리, 생태적 지속가능성 등을 적극 반영할 필요가 있음. 그리고 한국의 비전과 철학을 담은 원조헌장을 제정하는 것을 고려하고 더 나아가 KSP 내용에 민주화, 민주적 거버넌스, 시민사회의 역할 반영하는 것이 필요함.

2. 26개 중점협력국가 (표 5)

현재 26개 중점협력 국가의 선정 기준은 모호하고 자원외교, 기업진출 등 이른바 '국익' 중심 패러다임에서 벗어나지 못하고 있음. 원조의 원래 목적에 충실할 수 있도록 최빈국 중심으로 재조정할 필요가 있음. 현재 26개 중 최빈국은 10개에 불과.

3. 부산파트너십의 체계적 이행

시민사회의 역할 관련 - 인권적 접근, 정책 advocacy, 현장 사업 - 부산 파트너십 제 22항은 개발 협력에서 시민사회의 역할에 대한 기준을 제시하고 있으며 시민사회 개발효과성을 위한 이스탄불 원칙의 자발적 이행이 중요. 이를 위해서 우호적 환경(enabling environment) 조성 관련 정부의 역할이 필수적. 이를 위해서는 민관협력팀을 구성하여 체계적인 이행 전략을 수립하고 특히 GPEDC의 관련 지표 작업을 공동으로 수행할 필요가 있음.

4. 국내 시민사회단체 사업 및 정책역량 강화

현재 전체 ODA의 2% 미만이 시민사회를 통해서 집행되고 있는데 이를 OECD DAC 평균인 8%로 대폭 증대할 필요가 있음. 시민사회의 적극 참여는 ODA의 정당성과 효과성 측면에서 중요하며 양적 증대와 함께 질적 제고가 수반되어야 함. 단순히 한국 개발 CSO의 소규모 현장 개발사업의 양적 증대 방식 중심에서 벗어나 규모의 경제를 키우고 현지 시민사회의 지원과 협력을 강화할 필요가 있음. 특히 정책 애드보커시 관련하여 전문 애드보커시 단체와 KCOC와 같은 개별단체 협의체를 전략적으로 지원할 필요가 있음. 특히 국제적 리더십 역할을 강화하기 위해서 협의체의 국제적 역량 강화는 필수적임. 이와 관련하여 ADA의 출범은 시기적절하고 적극 활용할 필요가 있음.

5. 국제시민사회 지원 및 파트너십 강화

부산 총회 주최국으로서 한국정부는 부산 세계시민사회포럼(BCSF) 지원에 이어 국제 시민사회 지원을 지속 강화해야 함. 올해부터 KOICA가 시작한 개도국의 시민사회 단체 지원 뿐만 아니라 LDCs Watch, ADA 등 국제 시민사회 네트워크 지원을 강화할 필요가 있음. 특히 Post 2015 과정을 적극적으로 활용할 필요가 있음.

표 2: KCOC 제안 및 권고

분야	핵심 권고안과 시민사회 제안
	1. 개발협력의 전반적 체계
1.1.한국의 개발협력 전략체계 완성	<p>권고: 한국은 현재의 확고한 법적·정책적 기반 위에 전략적 체계를 완성하여 확대되는 개발협력을 관리할 필요가 있다.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ① 국제개발협력기본법 개정 (표 4 참조) ② 원조헌장 제정 ③ 26개 중점협력국가 정책 비판적 재검토 (표 5 참조) ④ 기본법의 목표와 원칙에 인권, 성평등, 양질의 일자리, 환경적 지속가능성 등 명시적 반영 ⑤ KSP 내용에 민주화, 민주적 거버넌스, 시민사회의 역할 반영.
1.2 소통, 투명성 및 책임성 강화	<p>권고: 총리실, 외교부 및 기재부는 다음과 같이 투명성과 책임성을 지속적으로 제고해 나가야 한다.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ① 원조정보 공개에 관한 법제 강화 ② 원조백서 발간

2. 원조를 넘어선 개발	
2.1 '개발을 위한 정책일관성'의 전정부적 추진을 위한 정치적 의지 결집	<p>권고: 한국은 의사결정과정에서 다음과 같이 '개발을 위한 정책일관성'을 강화할 필요가 있다.</p> <p>① 시민사회단체의 조사연구 역량 강화 지원</p>
3. 원조규모와 배분	
3.1 목표 ODA 규모 달성방안	<p>권고: 한국은 최근의 원조규모 확대 추세를 계속 유지하여 2015년까지 GNI의 0.25%를 ODA로 제공하려는 목표를 달성하여야 한다. 동시에 한국은:</p> <p>① 원조증액을 법으로 규정 ② 시민사회를 통한 원조 대폭 증대 (최소 8% 수준) ③ 개도국 시민사회단체와 협의체 및 국제 CSO 직접 지원 강화</p>
4. 조직과 관리	
4.1 한국 ODA의 통합, 조율과 관리 개선	<p>권고: 개발협력전략을 성공적으로 실행하기 위해 한국은:</p> <p>① 유무상 통합 및 독립적이고 전문부처 설립을 위한 중장기 로드맵 수립 ② 시민사회단체 활동가의 역량과 전문성 강화 지원</p>
4.2 한국의 평가 절차 강화	<p>권고: 평가소위원회의 독립성과 절차 강화, 시행중인 사업에 대한 모니터링 개선, 사후 평가 개선, 평가역량강화 및 중요 평가 지원 권한의 현장조직(field units) 위임, 미래사업에 대한 평가의 교훈의 체계적 반영</p> <p>① 국회 산하에 독립적인 평가기관 설립</p>
5. 개발협력의 성과 제고	
5.1 원조 효과성에 대한 한국의 의지를 관행개선으로 실천	<p>권고: 원조 효과성을 지속적으로 개선하기 위해 한국은:</p> <p>① CPS 작성시 국내와 개도국의 시민사회 의견 적극 수렴 ② 시민사회의 역할 다변화와 정책 애드보커시 역량강화 지원 (표 6, 참조, 부산 파트너십 제22항, 이스탄불원칙 이행) ③ 12 Lessons from OECD DAC Peer Reviews on Partnering with Civil Society (OECD 2012) 실행 ④ 개발단체 협의체 (KCOC, KoFID 등)에 대한 전략적 지원강화와 국제적 리더십 역할 수행 지원 (예, CSO Partnership for Development Effectiveness (CPDE), 아시아개발연대 (Asia Development Alliance ADA))</p>
5.2 2015년까지 양자원조의 75% 비구속화를 위한 로드맵 이행	<p>권고: 한국 납세자들과 협력국의 관점에서 제공된 원조가 가치 있게 사용되도록 하기 위해서는:</p> <p>① GPEDC의 10개 지표 중 enabling environment에 대한 국내 지표 시민사회와 공동 개발 및 시행</p>
6. 인도적 지원 제고	
6.1 인도적 지원 확대 진전	<p>권고: 인도적 지원에 대한 명확한 전략적 비전을 제시하고, 인도주의적 원칙들의 일관된 적용과, 책임성·효율성 및 효과성 제고를 위해 한국은:</p> <p>① 시민사회와의 파트너십을 재단 예방 및 재난대응 역량 향상까지 확대</p>

표3: 영역별 OECD 핵심 권고안

분야	핵심 권고안
1. 개발협력의 전반적 체계	
1.1. 한국의 개발협력 전략체계 완성	<p>권고: 한국은 현재의 확고한 법적·정책적 기반 위에 전략적 체계를 완성하여 확대되는 개발협력을 관리할 필요가 있다. 구체적으로:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ 중점지원 분야별로 명확한 목적, 우선순위, 실행목표 및 의도하는 성과를 전략적 체계(전략문서)에 명시해야 한다 ○ 한국은 26개 중점협력국 각각에 대한 국가협력전략을 완성하여 공표하여야 한다. 동 전략들은 협력대상국의 개발전략과 일치를 이루어야 하고, 전정부적 지원 내용을 모두 포함하며, 유·무상 원조전략을 통합하고, 미래 지원 공약을 포함하며, 원조효과성 제고 계획과 달성목표를 반영하고, 각 협력국에 대한 한국의 지원목적을 계량화하여 정의해야 한다. ○ 한국은 계획중인 종합적 다자원조전략을 완성하여 공표해야 한다. ○ 한국의 모든 원조사업에 있어 양성평등, 여성권한 강화, 환경, 기후변화 등의 이슈를 주류화하기 위한 계획과 지침을 더욱 강화하여 전략체계에 포함시켜야 한다.
1.2 소통, 투명성 및 책임성 강화	<p>권고: 총리실, 외교부 및 기재부는 다음과 같이 투명성과 책임성을 지속적으로 제고해 나가야 한다.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ 한국의 개발협력에 관한 종합적인 정보를 - 특히, 개발협력정책, 전략, 절차, 예산(국별 및 분야별), 지원 프로그램 및 사업 관련 정보를 주요 이해당사자들(국회의원, 시민사회단체(CSO), 비정부기구(NGO), 민간부문, 연구소, 협력대상 개도국 및 일반 국민)이 - 접근하고 이해하기 용이한 방법으로 제공해야 한다.
2. 원조를 넘어서는 개발	
2.1 '개발을 위한 정책일관성'의 전정부적 추진을 위한 정치적 의지 결집	<p>권고: 한국은 의사결정과정에서 다음과 같이 '개발을 위한 정책일관성'을 강화할 필요가 있다.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ 국제개발협력위원회의 주관하에 범정부적인 의제를 수립한다. 개발친화적인 정책 달성을 위해 동 의제는 다음을 포함한다: (1) 가장 중요하게 처리해야 할 정책 비일관성들 (2) 이러한 비일관성 해소를 위한 조치사항과 담당자 (3) 실현해야 할 목표 (4) 이행시한 (5) 관계부처의 참여를 강화시키기 위한 절차 ○ 한국정부는 '개발을 위한 정책 일관성' 제고와 조율을 위한 충분한 기술적 및 정치적 역량을 확보해야 한다. ○ 한국의 대내외 정책이 개도국들에게 미치는 영향에 대한 기존의 분석과 보고를 활용한다. 현재까지 총리실과 외교부에서 진행해온 연구와 분석을 기반으로 현장으로부터의 환류와 분석, 부처간 원활한 정보교류, 대학·시민사회단체(CSO)·싱크탱크의 분석 정보 등을 수렴·활용해야 한다.
3. 원조규모와 배분	
3.1 목표 ODA 규모 달성방안	<p>권고: 한국은 최근의 원조규모 확대 추세를 계속 유지하여 2015년까지 GNI의 0.25%를 ODA로 제공하려는 목표를 달성하여야 한다. 동시에 한국은:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ 꾸준하고 예측 가능한 증가율을 유지할 수 있도록 원조규모 확대를 계획하고 관리하는 한편, 양·다자 채널과 유·무상 원조간 적절한 균형을 취하여야 한다. ○ 취약국 및 고채무빈곤국에 제공하는 유상원조 대비 무상원조 비율을

	<p>면밀히 평가하고 유상원조를 지원할 경우, 이들 국가의 경제 상황과 재정 지배구조를 신중히 고려하여 부채 상환 능력을 확보할 수 있도록 한다</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ 원조수단의 선택은 협력대상국의 개발 목표와 주인의식, 선호, 관리역량과 수요를 고려하여 결정 한다.
4. 조직과 관리	
4.1한국 ODA의 통합, 조율과 관리 개선	<p>권고: 개발협력전략을 성공적으로 실행하기 위해 한국은:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ (i) 국제개발협력위원회가 기획과 예산과정에서 최상위 의사결정기구로서 기능할 수 있도록 위임된 권한을 충분히 활용하도록 해야 하며, (ii) 관계기관협의회 (Inter-Agency Committee)는 협력국 내 ODA 협의체와 더불어 모든 원조활동을 처리 하는데 필요한 권한을 가져야 한다. ○ 총리실, 외교부, 기재부 및 양대 시행기관(KOICA, EDCF)의 인적자원강화를 위해 적절한 개발협력 경험을 보유한 우수한 인력을 채용·확보해야하며, 중점협력국 내 한국인직원과 현지직원의 역량 배양을 통해 프로그램 원조방식(PBA)과 같은 새로운 원조방식을 지원할 수 있는 능력을 갖추도록 해야 한다.
4.2한국의 평가 절차 강화	<p>권고: 평가소위원회의 독립성과 절차 강화, 시행중인 사업에 대한 모니터링 개선, 사후 평가 개선, 평가역량강화 및 중요 평가 지원 권한의 현장조직(field units) 위임, 미래사업에 대한 평가의 교훈의 체계적 반영</p>
5. 개발협력의 성과 제고	
5.1원조효과성에 대한 한국의 의지를 관행개선으로 실천	<p>권고: 원조 효과성을 지속적으로 개선하기 위해 한국은:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ 원조 효과성 원칙들과 국제적으로 합의된 목표들을 국가협력전략을 포함한 모든 개발협력 전략과 원조관리절차에 반영하고 ○ 한국은 다음과 같이 미비한 부분들에 대한 성과부터 집중적으로 개선해야 한다: 원조의 비구속화, 프로그램 원조(PBA), 중기 원조계획 예측가능성, 개도국 공공 재정 관리체계 활용
5.2 2015년까지 양자원조의 75% 비구속화를 위한 로드맵 이행	<p>권고: 한국 납세자들과 협력국의 관점에서 제공된 원조가 가치 있게 사용되도록 하기 위해서는:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ 2015년까지 전체 양자 ODA의 75% 비구속화 공약을 연도별 로드맵으로 전환하여 목표달성을 추진한다. ○ 비구속성 원조의 최대화를 규정한『OECD DAC 원조 비구속화 권고』, 아크라행동계획 및 부산 공약 이행에 집중한다. ○ 기술협력을 포함한 한국의 모든 ODA 구속화 현황을 보고한다.
6. 인도적 지원 제고	
6.1인도적 지원 확대 진전	<p>권고: 인도적 지원에 대한 명확한 전략적 비전을 제시하고, 인도주의적 원칙들의 일관된 적용과, 책임성·효율성 및 효과성 제고를 위해 한국은:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ 새로운 인도적 지원 정책을 완성하되, 재난복구와 같이 한국이 확실하게 영향력을 행사할 수 있는 소수 분야 및 목적에 집중하고 전정부적으로 이를 적용한다. ○ 누구에게, 무엇을, 어디에 지원할 것인지에 대한 명확한 기준을 마련하고 전파한다. ○ 양자(현물)원조가 항상 가장 효과적이며 적절한 대응임을 확인할 수 있는 셰이프가드를 도입한다. ○ 결과 보고 및 학습 과정의 체계화를 위한 관련 계획을 수립, 실행한다.

<표 1> 국제개발협력 기본법

제3조(기본정신 및 목표)

- ① 국제개발협력은 개발도상국의 빈곤감소, 여성과 아동의 인권향상 및 성평등 실현, 지속가능한 발전 및 인도주의를 실현하고 협력대상국과의 경제협력관계를 증진하며 국제사회의 평화와 번영을 추구하는 것을 기본정신으로 한다.
- ② 국제개발협력은 제1항의 기본정신을 추구하기 위하여 다음 각 호의 사항을 달성하는 것을 목표로 한다.
 1. 개발도상국의 빈곤감소 및 삶의 질 향상
 2. 개발도상국의 발전 및 이를 위한 제반 제도·조건의 개선
 3. 개발도상국과의 우호협력관계 및 상호교류 증진
 4. 국제개발협력과 관련된 범지구적 문제 해결에 대한 기여
5. 그 밖에 제1항의 기본정신을 달성하기 위하여 필요하다고 인정되는 사항

제4조(기본원칙)

- ① 국가, 지방자치단체, 그 밖의 시행기관(이하 “국가 등”이라 한다)은 국제개발협력을 실시함에 있어서 다음 각 호의 원칙과 우리나라의 대외정책을 종합적으로 고려하여 추진하여야 한다.
 1. 국제연합헌장의 제반 원칙 존중
 2. 협력대상국의 자조노력 및 능력 지원
 3. 협력대상국의 개발 필요 존중
 4. 개발경험 공유의 확대
 5. 국제사회와의 상호조화 및 협력 증진
- ② 국가 등은 양자간 개발협력과 다자간 개발협력 간의 연계성과 무상협력과 유상협력 간의 연계성을 강화하고, 국제개발협력정책을 일관성 있게 추진함으로써 국제개발협력의 효과가 극대화되도록 노력하여야 한다.

표 5 : 26개 중점협력국가

26개 중점협력국가

지역	국가 수 26	대상 국가 (<u>최빈국 LDCs, 10개국</u>)
아시아	11	베트남, 인도네시아, <u>캄보디아</u> , 필리핀, <u>방글라데시</u> , 몽골, 라오스, 스리랑카, <u>네팔</u> , 파키스탄, <u>동티모르</u>
아프리카	8	가나, <u>DR콩고</u> , 나이지리아, <u>에티오피아</u> , <u>모잠비크</u> , 카메룬, <u>르완다</u> , <u>우간다</u>
중남미	4	콜롬비아, 페루, 볼리비아, 파라과이
CIS	2	우즈베키스탄, 아제르바이잔
오세아니아	1	<u>솔로몬 군도</u>

표 6: 효과적인 개발협력을 위한 부산 파트너십 (BPEDC)
제22항 시민사회단체의 역할

22. **Civil society organisations(CSOs)** play a vital role in enabling people to claim their rights, in promoting rights-based approaches, in shaping development policies and partnerships, and in overseeing their implementation. They also provide services in areas that are complementary to those provided by states. Recognising this, we will:

- a) Implement fully our respective commitments to enable CSOs to exercise their roles as independent development actors, with a particular focus on an **enabling environment**, consistent with agreed international rights, that maximises the contributions of CSOs to development.
- b) Encourage CSOs to implement practices that strengthen their accountability and their contribution to development effectiveness, guided by the **Istanbul Principles and the International Framework for CSO Development Effectiveness**.

[발제3]

**시민사회에서 바라본 2012년 한국의
OECD DAC 동료검토**

윤지영

ODA Watch 정책기획팀장

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4. 맺으며

1. 들어가며

지난 1월 30일, 경제협력개발기구 개발원조위원회(이하 OECD DAC)은 한국의 개발협력 정책과 집행 전반에 대한 종합적인 평가 결과인 동료검토(Peer Review) 보고서를 발표했다. 한국은 OECD DAC에 가입하기 위해 2008년 3월 특별동료검토를 받은 바 있다. 금번 평가는 그로부터 2년 후인 2010년 한국이 공식적으로 DAC의 회원국으로 가입한 이후 처음으로 받은 정기 동료검토이다. 보고서가 발표되기까지 지난 1년간 정부는 동료검토 수검준비반을 꾸려 평가를 준비해왔다. 한국 시민사회 역시 정부의 대응과정을 관찰하면서 검토과정에 적극적으로 개입하기 위해 노력했다.

보고서 발표를 통해 드러난 한국 개발협력의 전반적인 현황을 살펴보면, 지난 2009년 6월, 한국의 DAC 가입 심사를 위해 방한했던 실사단이 시민사회와 가진 면담에서 던진 질문을 떠올리지 않을 수 없다. 당시 실사단은 특별동료검토 결과 보고서(2008.9월 발간)에서 DAC이 지적하고 권고했던 내용들이 얼마나 실질적으로 개선되었는가에 대

1) 이 원고는 발표자가 한국국제협력단 국제개발협력지 2013년 1호에 기고한 글입니다.

한 시민사회의 진솔한 의견을 청취하길 원했다. 카렌 요르겐슨(Karen Jorgensen) 실사 단장은 “한국이 개발협력 정책을 명확히 개선할 때까지 DAC 가입을 유보하도록 건의 하는 것이 좋을까, 아니면 우선 DAC에 가입하고 이후에 시한을 명시하여 개발협력 정책 전반에 실질적 개선이 있도록 하는 것이 좋을까?”라는 질문을 통해 현재 한국 개발 협력이 DAC 가입을 위한 외적 조건은 충족하고 있을지 모르나 여러 면에서 미비한 점이 많음을 우회적으로 시사하기도 했다.

안팎의 우려를 딛고 DAC에 가입한 한국은 그 이후 「국제개발협력기본법」 및 시행령 제정, 「국제개발협력 선진화 방안」 수립, ODA 규모 확대 공약 이행 등 DAC 회원국 으로서 갖춰야 할 조건을 충족시키기 위해 지금까지 부단히 노력해오고 있다.

금번 동료검토는 2008년 특별동료검토 이후 한국 정부가 노력한 구체적 성과와 개선사 항을 국제사회에 공유하고 한국 개발협력 정책과 집행, 제도적 거버넌스의 발전에 실 질적으로 도움이 되는 도전과제와 실현가능한 권고안을 도출할 수 있는 기회라는 점에 서 그 의의가 매우 높다. 비록 평가 결과와 권고사항이 이행을 강제하는 구속력은 없 지만 국제사회가 합의한, 특히 선진 공여국으로서 갖춰야 하는 최소한의 기준에 의한 공식적인 평가라는 점에서 향후 한국 국제개발협력의 개선을 위한 정책제언의 근거로 써 의미가 크다. 정부 또한 「2013년 국제개발협력종합시행계획」에서 동료검토 보고 서의 권고사항을 한국 개발협력의 새로운 도약을 위해 주요한 정책권고로 적극 활용할 것을 밝힌 바 있다. 정부는 지적사항을 겸허히 수용하여 이러한 의지가 선언에 그치지 않고 실현될 수 있도록 구체적인 이행계획을 마련하고 이행을 위한 노력을 지속해야 할 것이다. 시민사회 역시 정부의 이행을 관찰하고 독려할 뿐만 아니라 한국 개발협력 의 주요 행위자로서 질적 성장을 보완할 수 있는 역할을 다해야 할 것이다.

이에 이 글에서는 금번 동료검토 과정에 시민사회가 참여하며 관찰한 것을 중심으로 동료검토 결과에 대한 시민사회의 의견을 제시하고자 한다. 아직 동료검토 결과에 대 한 시민사회의 공동 평가나 논의가 이루어지지 않는 것으로 이 글에서 제시하는 내용 이 시민사회의 공식적인 의견이라고 보기는 어렵다. 그러나 여기서는 보고서 발표 이 후 시민사회단체들(ODA Watch, 참여연대, 국제개발협력시민사회포럼 KoFID)이 발표 한 논평의 내용을 적극적으로 원용하여 2012 한국 동료검토를 바라보는 시민사회의 시 선을 전하고자 한다.

2. 2012 OECD DAC 동료검토와 한국 시민사회

1) 동료검토 사전 준비과정과 시민사회의 참여

정부는 동료검토 준비를 위해 2012년 2월 범정부 수검준비반을 설치하고, 한국 개발협력의 정책과 성과, 현황 등을 기술한 메모랜덤을 제출했다.(2012.5) 이후 심사단의 한국 방문 실사, 협력국가 중 하나인 캄보디아 현장 실사를 거쳐 평가회의와 보고서 작성, 최종 종합 검토회의(2012.12)까지 약 1년간의 과정을 거쳐 동료검토가 이루어졌다. 정부는 이 과정에서 시민사회와의 협력을 피하고자 시민사회가 개최한 토론회(OECD Peer Review와 한국 ODA의 개선방안, 2012.5.23)²⁾에 참석하여 동료검토 준비현황을 공유하고 시민사회와 의견 교환의 시간을 가졌다. 당시 국무총리실 관계자는 정부가 DAC에 제출한 메모랜덤의 주요내용에 대한 설명과 함께 메모랜덤을 시민사회와 공유할 수 있게 된 점을 긍정적으로 피력했다. 하지만 메모랜덤 공개에 대한 시민사회의 요구에 정부는 동료검토 수검준비반이 꾸려지던 때부터 토론회 개최 직전까지도 이를 공개할 수 없다는 답변으로 일관해왔다. 이에 시민사회는 메모랜덤의 실제 작성 내용에 대한 정확한 검토 없이 시민사회가 동료검토에 협력하는 것은 부당하다는 의견을 정부 측 담당자에게 표명하기도 했다. 실제로 심사단은 한국 방문 실사 기간 중 시민사회 대표들과의 면담을 요청해왔는데 시민사회로서는 정부가 DAC에 제출한 내용을 파악하지 못한 상태에서 이들과의 면담을 가진다는 것은 합당하지 않다는 판단을 내릴 수밖에 없었다. 메모랜덤이 공개되지 않는 이유에 대해 여러 논란과 추측이 무성하던 중에 정부는 시민사회의 요구를 받아들여 상기 언급한 토론회 개최 직전에 공개 결정을 내렸다.

이에 대해 시민사회는 메모랜덤을 공개한 것은 환영할 만한 일이나 동료검토 준비과정에서 정부가 시민사회와의 협력을 일종의 요식 절차를 밟는 것으로 인식하는 것에 대한 아쉬움을 표명했다. 또한 메모랜덤 작성과정에 시민사회가 배제되고 작성 내용의 적합성에 문제가 있음을 제기했다. 실제로 토론회 당시 시민사회는 메모랜덤 내용의 일부가 사실과 다르게 과대 포장되어 있음을 지적하여 정부가 시민사회와 민간과의 협의 없이 일방적으로 작성한 것이 가질 수 있는 오류를 입증했다. 정부 측에서도 이를 인정하며 시민사회가 별도로 이면보고서(shadow report) 등을 DAC에 제출할 것을 제안하기도 했다.

2) 시민사회의 대응과 개입

한국의 개발협력 정책과 사업을 감시하고 정책제언 활동을 하는 시민단체인 ODA

2) ODA Watch, 한국해외원조단체협의회, 국제개발협력시민사회포럼(KoFID) 공동 주최

Watch는 2012년 5월, 동료검토를 앞두고 한국 개발협력의 현황과 개선과제에 대한 보고서³⁾를 발간하여 DAC에 제출했다. 정부가 제출한 메모랜덤에 대한 일종의 이면 보고서로써 한국 개발협력에 대한 시민사회의 시각을 제공하여 금번 동료검토가 내실 있는 평가가 될 수 있도록 돕기 위해서 작성되었다. 심사단은 한국 방문 실사 중 시민사회와 가진 면담에서 동 보고서가 사전 준비과정에 유의미한 참고자료로 활용되었음을 밝히며 한국 시민사회의 동료검토에 대한 적극적인 개입과 참여에 감사의 뜻을 전했다. 실제로 보고서 내용이 동료검토 결과 보고서에 인용되기도 했다.

시민사회의 적극적인 참여는 심사단 방한을 기점으로 보다 활발하게 이루어졌다. 방한 기간인 6월 11일~15일 간 두 차례에 걸쳐 심사단과 시민사회 대표들과의 면담이 개최되었다. 첫 번째는 인도적 지원 활동을 하는 NGO 대표들과의 면담(6.13)이었으며 두 번째는 보다 폭넓은 범위의 개발협력 분야 시민사회단체와 학계, 연구기관과의 면담으로 이어졌다. 두 면담을 준비하기 위해 시민사회에서는 사전 준비 모임을 가지고 심사단에 제시해야 할 시민사회의 의견을 전략적으로 준비하기도 했다.

인도적 지원 활동 단체들과의 면담에서는 한국 정부의 인도적 지원 정책 수립 미비, 근본적인 철학 부재, 시민사회와의 낮은 협력 수준 등에 대한 지적들이 활발히 논의되었다. 시민사회단체와 학계, 연구기관과의 면담에서는 한국 개발협력 정책의 전반적인 문제점과 개선과제에 대한 토론이 이어졌는데, 심사단은 그 중에서도 정부와 시민사회 간의 협력에 대한 관심을 가장 많이 나타냈다. 시민사회와의 협력 방법, 절차, 내용 등에 대한 집중적인 질의가 이어졌으며 한국 원조의 투명성과 책무성에 대한 시민사회의 평가 의견도 높은 관심을 보인 대목이었다. 시민사회와의 협력과 원조 투명성 및 책무성 항목에 대해 심사단이 시민사회와 나눈 의견은 실제로 결과 보고서에 인용되어 이에 대한 심사단의 높은 관심과 시민사회의 적극적인 개입이 잘 맞아 떨어졌음을 반증하고 있다.

심사단 방한 이후 시민사회에서는 국제개발협력민간협의회(KCOC)와 국제개발협력시민사회포럼(KoFID)이 후속적으로 한국 시민사회의 10대 권고사항⁴⁾을 담은 의견서를 제출하여 금번 동료검토에서 반드시 지적되어야 할 한국 개발협력의 핵심 과제를 제시하기도 했다. 동 문건 역시 동료검토 보고서에 참고문헌으로 활용되어 한국 시민사회의 의견을 대변하는 역할을 했음을 알 수 있다.

3) Parallel Report on Korea's International Development Cooperation, Submitted to the OECD DAC Peer Review Korea 2012 (2012.5)

4) Korea Civil Society's 10 Recommendations for the OECD Peer Review (2012.9)

3. 시민사회가 바라보는 2012 OECD DAC 동료검토 결과와 핵심 개선과제

최종 발표된 동료검토 결과에 대한 정부 보도자료⁵⁾를 보면 지난 5년간 한국은 ODA 규모를 세 배 이상 대폭 늘리고 「국제개발협력기본법」 제정 및 「국제개발협력선진화 방안」 수립 등을 통해 추진체계를 정비하고 개발협력 관련 국제 담론을 적극적으로 이끄는 등 놀라운 발전을 이룩했다. 하지만 아래 <표 1>과 같이 평가 대상인 총 6개 항목에 대한 DAC의 상세 평가 의견과 권고사항을 자세히 들여다보면 2008년 DAC 가입을 위해 받았던 특별동료검토 결과와 크게 다르지 않은 권고가 반복되고 있음을 알 수 있다.

이에 대해 ODA Watch 등 시민사회는 논평을 통해 한국의 국제개발협력정책이 담보하고 있으며 정부는 동료검토 권고사항을 겸허히 받아들이고 구체적인 실행계획을 마련하여 적극적으로 개선해야 함을 촉구했다. ⁶⁾

<표 1> OECD DAC의 한국 동료검토 권고사항

평가 항목	2008년 권고사항	2012년 권고사항
Strategic Orientation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● 개발협력 전반을 포괄하는 법적 기반 마련 ● 개발협력 정책 및 전략을 총괄하는 일원화된 원조체계 모색, 부처간 협력증진 필요 ● 종합적·중장기 전략 수립 필요 ● 개발협력에 대한 국민들의 인식 증진 ● 정부와 시민사회 간의 협력 증진 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● 보다 명확한 목적과 목표, 우선순위, 중점 지원분야 성과관리가 명시되도록 기수립한 개발협력 법적·제도적 틀 보완 ● 26개 중점협력국에 대해 파트너 국가의 개발전략과 일치하며 무·유상 원조 통합적인 국별협력전략 수립 완성 ● 계획되어 있는 포괄적·다자적 전략 수립 완성 ● 모든 프로그램에 성평등, 여성 권한 강화, 환경, 기후변화 등의 크로스 커팅 이슈의 주류화 ● 이해관계자들(국회, 시민사회, 기업,

5) 관계부처 합동(국무총리실, 기획재정부, 외교통상부) 작성, OECD DAC 개발협력 정책·집행 평가 결과 발표

6) ODA Watch(2013.1.30) 한국 ODA, 규모만 키우지 말고 질적 성장 피하라
 참여연대(2013.2.4) OECD DAC 동료평가 권고안 이행계획 조속히 마련하라
 국제개발협력시민사회포럼(2013.2.5) 한국정부의 국제개발협력정책 담보하고 있다

		연구기관 등)에게 개발협력 정책, 전략, 집행절차 및 예산, 사업 수행 전반에 관한 폭넓은 정보 제공 확대, 투명성과 책무성 제고
Development Beyond Aid	해당사항 없음	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● 범정부적 개발친화적 정책 수립을 통한 개발을 위한 정책일관성 강화 ● 대외 및 국내 정책이 개발도상국에 미치는 영향에 관해 시민사회 및 싱크탱크, 학계가 참여하는 분석 실시
ODA(Aid) Volumes, Channels and Allocations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● 원조규모 확대 목표 확정 및 이행 ● 원조규모 확대에 대한 국민적 지지 확보 ● 유상원조 비율 축소 및 무유상 원조의 최빈국/중저소득국 지원 비중 개선 ● 최빈국 관련 무상원조 또는 최소 증여율 요건 이행 ● 최빈국과 저소득국 지원 비율 증대 ● OECD/DAC 권고 사항에 맞는 중점협력국 축소를 통한 선택과 집중 ● 무유상원조 통합 단일 중점협력국 선정 ● 중점협력국 선정 기준 명확화 ● 개발정책일관성 관심 제고 ● 중점지원분야 축소 및 집중 ● 복잡한 원조 채널의 효율적인 정리 필요 ● 개발정책에 크로스커팅이슈 반영 점진적 확대 ● 민간참여 촉진 전략 수립 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● 2015년까지 ODA/GNI 0.25% 원조 규모 확대 이행 지속 ● 안정적이고 예측가능한 성장률 보장 ● 양자/다자원조 및 무상/유상원조간 적절한 균형 유지 ● 취약국 및 고채무빈국에 대한 유상원조 지원시 신중한 접근 필요, 유상원조 확대시 대상국의 경제상황 및 부채상환 능력에 대한 주의 요구 ● 수원국의 오너십과 개발 우선순위, 운영관리 역량과 수요를 최우선으로 반영

Organizations and Management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● 통합된 원조 시스템과 전략 수립 ● 국제개발협력 전문 인력의 체계적인 육성과 절대적인 인력의 확대 ● 모니터링 및 평가에서 평가의 객관성 확보 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● 기획예산수립 과정에서 국제개발협력위원회의 정책결정 및 조정 권한 전적 사용 보장 ● 주관부처/시행기관의 인적자원 및 수원국 현지 고용인력 역량강화 ● 국제개발협력 평가소위원회의 독립성 강화 ● 사업수행에 대한 전반적인 모니터링 및 사후평가 강화 ● 평가 결과 환류를 위한 시스템 구축
Aid Effectiveness and Results	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● 파리 선언에 합류하여 모니터링 서베이에 참여하기 ● 수원국의 국가 시스템에 원조 시스템 일치 시키기 ● 다른 공여국과의 공동 프로젝트 조정, 권한 위임에 적극 참여하기 ● 비구속성 원조 높이기 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● 국별협력전략에 원조효과성 원칙과 국제사회의 목표 반영 ● 프로그램형 원조(PBA) 확대 ● 중기 예측성 확대 ● 수원국 국가 시스템 사용 확대 ● 2015년까지 양자원조의 75% 비구속화 이행 ● 비구속성 원조에 대한 DAC 권고사항, 아크라행동계획, 부산 파트너십 공약 준수
Humanitarian Assistance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● 인도적 원조 기본정책수립 ● 인도적 원조 규모 증대 ● 국제사회의 인도적 지원 원칙 존중 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● 인도적 지원을 위한 명확한 전략적 비전 수립 ● 국제사회의 인도적 지원 원칙 준수 ● 인도적 지원을 위한 신정책 수립 완성 ● 인도적 지원 대상, 지원내용, 예산 출처에 대한 명확화 ● 체계적인 성과 학습 및 보고 실시

* 출처: 2008년 특별동료검토결과 보고서 및 2012년 동료검토결과 보고서 참고 필자 작성

여기에서는 금번 동료검토 결과 권고사항을 중심으로 한국 개발협력의 주요 과제를 짚어보고 동료검토에 대한 시민사회의 시선과 의견을 함께 기술하도록 하겠다.

1) 원조효과성 높이는 통합적인 추진체계 구축

위 <표 1>과 같이 6개 항목에 대한 평가결과와 권고사항은 지난 5년 동안 한국의 국제개발협력 선진화 노력이 DAC 가입과 주요 국제회의 개최 등 대외적으로 보이는 것과는 달리 국내적으로는 여전히 많은 과제를 담보하고 있음을 보여주고 있다. 특히 앞서 언급한 바와 같이 기본법 제정 및 선진화 방안을 통한 전략 수립 등 한국의 개발협력을 위한 법적/제도적 체계 구축 부분은 가장 큰 성과임에 틀림없다. 그러나 이를 뒷받침하는 정책과 전략 수립에 있어 핵심적인 역할을 해야 할 국제개발협력위원회에 대해 위원회가 본연의 정책총괄 및 조정 권한을 전적으로 활용할 것을 보장하라는 심사단의 권고는 그간의 성적이 좋지 않았음을 시사한다. 보고서는 무상·유상원조의 주관 부처인 외교통상부 및 기획재정부, 각각의 시행 전담기구인 KOICA와 한국수출입은행 EDCF 외에도 30여개 이상의 부처와 기구들이 제각각 ODA 사업을 수행하고 있는 점을 우려하며 2008년과 마찬가지로 통합된 원조 시스템과 전략을 수립하여 ODA가 수원국에서 효과적으로 사용될 수 있도록 강력히 조정할 것을 주요 도전과제로 제시하고 있다. 각 부처와 기구들의 사업이 효과적으로 이루어질 수 있도록 적합한 사업수행 역량을 보장하는 것도 주요과제이다.

관련하여 국제개발협력시민사회포럼을 비롯한 시민사회는 지난 10년간 원조 분절화 극복을 해소하기 위한 통합 추진체계를 구축하는 것이야말로 한국 개발협력의 선진화를 꾀하는 핵심 선결과제임을 여러 경로를 통해 피력한 바 있다. ODA Watch도 동료검토 사전에 DAC에 제출한 보고서를 통해 한국 ODA 개선 4대 핵심 과제 중 첫 번째로 원조 체계의 분절화 개선을 제시하며 국제개발협력위원회의 총괄 조정 기능 부족과 ODA 사업의 비효율성을 지적했다.

동 과제의 중요성을 재차 강조하며 시민사회는 심사단 방한 일정 중 국제개발협력 정책·집행기관 및 여타 정부와의 면담에서 동 항목에 대한 엄밀한 평가가 이루어지길 기대했다. 그러나 정부와의 면담은 비공개로 이루어졌으며, 그 결과도 알려지지 않아 한국 정부가 이에 대해 어떠한 보고와 설명을 제공했는지 알 수 없다. 그동안 한국 정부가 시민사회가 주장해온 통합원조 논의에 민감하게 반응해온 것을 감안할 때, 심사단 면담시 각 부처별 이해관계가 상충하는 의견들이 제시되었을 것이라는 예상이 가능하다.

그러나 동 항목에 대한 평가 결과를 살펴보면, 심사단이 시민사회가 생각하는 만큼의 주제의 민감성과 시급성을 충분히 표현하지 않아 다소 아쉬움이 남는다. 26개 중점협력국에 대한 무·유상 원조전략을 통합하고 국제개발협력위원회의 의사결정 권한을 강

화라는 권고를 통해 통합적인 추진체계를 구축할 것을 우회적으로 주문하고 있는 수준에 그치고 있다.

2) 투명하고 책임 있는 소통과 정보제공 확대

2008년에 이어 국내 이해관계자들과의 소통을 강화할 것을 주문한 점은 최근 한국 국제개발협력에 참여하는 행위자들의 다변화와 국민들의 관심 증진, 이에 따른 정보 공개 확대 요구를 반영하는 대목이다. 보고서는 한국이 최근 개발협력에 관한 투명성과 책무성을 높이기 위해 노력을 했지만 ODA 지출 상세내역이나 정책문서 등 주요 정보에 대한 접근성은 여전히 낮음을 지적하고 있다. 특히 외교통상부와 국무총리실이 국회에 보고하는 내용이 지나치게 상세하고 성과와 도전과제를 충분히 조명하지 못하고 있는 점을 핵심 관찰사항으로 제시하고 있어 흥미롭다. 또한 동 항목에 대한 2008년 권고사항에서 시민사회와의 협력을 강화할 것을 제안한 것에 나아가, 심사단은 금번 실사에서 한국 시민사회와 가진 면담 결과를 반영하여 지난 5년 간 동 항목이 충분히 개선되지 않았음을 우회적으로 표현하고 있다. 심지어 시민사회와의 정책 협의가 다분히 임시방편적이고 선별적이라 평하고 있다. 보고서는 향후 협의 과정이 투명하고 정책결정 과정의 초기 단계에서 이루어질 것을 보장하라는 제안과 함께 모든 참여 주체들이 논의 과정과 환류 결과를 알 수 있도록 하는 정책협의를 위한 가이드라인을 개발할 것을 주문하고 있다. 앞 장에서 언급했던 것처럼 투명성과 책무성에 대한 심사단의 높은 관심을 입증하는 대목이다.

보고서는 원조효과성 제고를 위한 개발성과 관리 부분에 있어서도 투명성과 책무성 증진을 위한 권고를 제시하여 재차 그 중요성을 강조하고 있다. 특히 통계와 평가결과를 온라인으로 공개할 것을 구체적으로 명시하며 그 결과는 국제개발협력위원회를 통해 국회에도 제공할 것을 당부하고 있다. 또한 한국의 성공적인 개발경험 뿐만 아니라 실패 경험까지 폭넓게 공유하고 이로부터 나온 교훈을 널리 학습할 것을 별도로 언급하고 있다. 특이한 점은 이것이 현재 한국 정부가 앞세우고 있는 KSP 프로그램과는 별개로 이루어져야 함을 언급하고 있는 점이다. 한국의 개발경험 전수, 특히 경제성장 위주의 개발경험이 수원국에 일방적으로 전수되는 것을 우려하고 실패경험으로부터의 교훈 또한 중요하게 되새길 것을 주문해온 시민사회의 목소리가 반영된 것 같아 반가운 지점이다.

동 항목 관련 ODA Watch는 심사단의 관찰 결과와 권고를 환영하며 논평을 통해 정부가 개발협력 정책과 전략 수립, 사업 수행과 예산 배분 결정 등 전반에 있어 시민사

회를 비롯한 이해관계자들에게 투명한 정보를 제공할 것과 파트너십에 기반한 소통을 강화해야 함을 촉구했다.

3) 원조를 넘어선 ‘개발을 위한 정책일관성’, 강화

2008년 특별동료검토 시에는 ‘개발을 위한 정책일관성’ 항목은 독립적인 평가 항목이 아닌 조직 및 관리 부분의 세부 항목이었다. 당시 국내에서 ‘개발을 위한 정책일관성’이라는 개념이 정립되지 않았고 널리 알려져 있지 않았기 때문이다. 하지만 금번 평가에서는 두 번째 평가 항목으로 도입되어 개발협력의 성과를 높이기 위해서는 다른 분야 정책들과 대외원조 정책의 일관성 있는 연계의 중요성을 강조하고 있다. 보고서는 ‘개발을 위한 정책일관성’을 증진시키기 위해서는 무엇보다 정책결정자의 정치적 의지가 담긴 공약이 중요함을 언급하고 있다. 이 때 공약은 빈곤문제 해결을 위해 국제적으로 합의된 개발목표와 반드시 연계되어야 한다. 하지만 한국 정부는 아직 이러한 공식적인 정치적 선언문을 공표한 적이 없다. 정치적 선언이 가능하려면 범정부적 합의와 지지가 있어야만 한다. 이에 보고서는 국무총리실이 기획재정부, 외교통상부와 함께 개발친화적 정책(development friendly policies)를 수립하여 범정부를 폭넓게 아우르는 의제를 설정해야 함을 권고하고 있다. 특히 국제개발협력위원회가 ‘개발을 위한 정책일관성’을 촉진하는 책임을 지고 정부 간 이해관계를 적극적으로 조율하여 궁극적으로 정책 조율 메커니즘으로써 기능해야 함을 강력히 제시하고 있다.

4) 원조 규모 확대와 질적 성장의 균형

ODA 규모 증대 부분은 한국 정부가 가장 자부심을 가질만한 대목이다. 최근의 세계 경제위기에도 불구하고 한국은 지난 5년 사이 ODA 지출 규모를 세 배 수준으로 늘렸다. OECD DAC에서도 한국의 원조 규모 확대 목표 이행을 긍정적으로 평가하고 있다. 그러나 2015년까지 ODA/GNI를 0.25%로 확대하기 위해서는 향후 3년간 현 수준(0.12%, 2011)의 두 배 이상을 늘려야 하므로 목표치를 달성하기 위해서는 예산 확대를 위한 철저한 이행 계획과 이를 뒷받침하는 국내적 지지를 얻는 노력이 부가되어야 한다.

그러나 상대적으로 급격히 증가하는 규모와 달리 질적 측면에서는 이를 따라가지 못하고 있는 점은 이번 평가결과에서 가장 안타까운 부분이다. 보고서는 한국 ODA의 규모가 지속적으로 증대되고 있다고는 하나 DAC 회원국과 비교했을 때는 터무니없이 적

은 양의 ODA를 현재 30여개가 넘는 부처와 기관이 파편적으로 시행하고 있는 것에 대해 다시 한 번 우려를 표하고 있다. 나아가 앞서 언급한 분절적 원조 체계가 개선되지 않는다면 향후 원조 규모가 커졌을 때는 더욱 심각한 문제가 될 수 있음을 시사하고 있다.

또한 ▲ 양자원조 비율이 높아 다자원조 비율이 DAC 회원국 평균이 28%인데 반해 한국은 17%에 불과한 점, ▲ 양자원조 중 3%만이 PBA(Programme based approaches) 형태로 지원된 점, ▲ 대부분의 회원국들이 유상원조를 지양하고 있는 것과 달리 한국의 유상원조 비율이 40%나 되는 점, ▲ 고채무빈국에 대한 유상원조 비율이 18%에 이르고 ▲ 최빈국에 대한 비구속성 원조 비율이 27%에 불과한 점 ▲ 시민사회와 민간을 통해 지원한 ODA가 2%에 불과한 점 등은 2008년 지적 받았던 사항들이 다시 지적된 부분으로 지난 4~5년간의 이행 실적이 저조했음을 보여준다. 양자원조의 대부분(75%)이 종래의 소규모의 개별적(stand-alone) 성향의 프로젝트형으로 과다하게 이루어지고 있는 점도 개선 과제이다.

이에 대해 ODA Watch와 참여연대는 DAC 회원국들이 최빈국 혹은 취약국보다 주로 중소득국에 유상원조를 제공하고 있는 것에 반해 한국의 경우 전체 유상원조의 39%를 최빈국에, 41%를 취약국에 제공하여 오히려 중소득국(38%) 보다 많은 유상원조를 제공한 것을 강조하여 지적했다. 한국 유상원조 제공 현황에 대한 재검토가 시급히 필요한 부분이다.

상기 항목들의 지속적인 개선을 위해 보고서는 양자·다자간 및 무상·유상 간의 적절한 균형을 유지하고, 선택과 집중에 의한 26개 중점협력국 지원 확대, 최빈국에 대한 지원 확대, 고채무빈국 및 취약국에 대한 유상원조 제공시 대상국의 경제적 거버넌스와 부채상환 역량을 고려한 신중한 접근을 기할 것을 권고했다.

5) 원조효과성 제고를 위한 실천 강화

한국은 2011년 부산 세계개발원조총회의 개최국이자 부의장국으로 기존의 DAC 회원 국가들과 BRICS(브라질, 러시아, 인도, 중국, 남아공) 국가들 사이에서 교량 역할을 함으로써 부산 글로벌 파트너십의 형성에 기여했다. 그 성과에 힘입어 부산 글로벌 파트너십의 운영을 위한 집행위원회에 공여국 대표로 참여하게 되었다. 이에 한국의 원조 효과성 제고 노력에 대한 국내외 관심이 높을 수밖에 없으며 한국 정부는 마땅히 성실한 이행으로 책임을 다해야 한다. 이와 관련 동료검토 평가 항목에서 세 번에 걸친 파

리선언 모니터링 서베이 참여(2007, 2008, 2011), 수원국의 개발우선순위 반영 등이 상당한 진전을 나타낸 부분이나 동 항목에 대한 전반적인 평가 결과는 저조한 것으로 나타났다. 보고서는 한국이 이제 공약 선언에 그치지 않고 이를 실질적으로 관행 및 실행의 변화로 실천해야 할 단계임을 강조하고 있다. 법적·제도적 기반 구축을 발판 삼아 한국 개발협력의 효과성을 높이기 위한 구체적인 행동들이 따라야 한다는 것이다.

참여연대와 국제개발협력시민사회포럼은 이에 대해 부산 세계개발원조총회를 주최하고 주도한 당사국이 원조효과성 원칙을 국내적으로 충분히 실천하지 못하고 있는 현실을 지적하며 향후 정부의 원조효과성 제고를 위한 보다 적극적인 조치를 주문했다.

OECD DAC은 이에 대해 2008년 권고사항과 마찬가지로 원조효과성 원칙을 준수할 것과 이것이 국가협력전략을 포함한 모든 개발협력 관리 절차에 통합적으로 반영되어야 함을 권고하고 있다. 특히 2015년까지 비구속성 원조 비율을 75%로 확대하기 위해 노력할 것과 프로그램형 원조 지원 확대, 중장기 원조 예측성과 수원국 공공재정관리시스템 사용을 확대해야 한다는 권고를 구체적으로 강조하고 있다.

6) 인도적 지원에 대한 명확한 전략적 비전 제시

평가의 마지막 항목인 인도적 지원에 대해 심사단은 한국이 인도적 지원을 위한 범정부적 정책을 아직 마련하지 못한 점에 대해 아쉬움을 표명하며 관련 정책을 수립할 것을 권고하고 있다. 또한 최근 정부가 제시한 인도적 지원 예산 확대 공약이 정책에 반영되어야 하며, 규모 확대에만 치중하지 않고 늘어난 예산을 보다 효과적으로 사용할 수 있도록 명확한 목적 설정과 성과 관리를 위한 정책 및 전략 수립이 뒷받침 되어야 함을 당부하고 있다. 게다가 인도적 지원 예산 배분에 있어서 재난의 규모나 형태면에서 성과를 보여주기 쉬운 것에 치중하기 보다는 수요에 기반하여 재해 국가의 재건 및 위기 극복 역량, 다른 공여자들의 지원 여부 등도 고려해야 함을 제안하고 있다. 아울러 현재 인도적 지원 예산 배분의 결과가 수원국에 명확하게 알려지지 않고 있는 점에 대한 우려를 표하며, 국제사회가 제공하는 인도적 지원 원칙을 일관되게 적용하여 예산 지원 대상과 내용을 명확히 하고 수원국과 적극적으로 소통할 것을 권고하고 있다. 의사결정 및 집행 과정의 투명성과 책무성이 다시 한 번 강조되는 부분이다.

4. 맺으며

지금까지 살펴본 것처럼 이번 동료검토 결과를 상세히 들여다보면 한국의 개발협력이 지난 5년간 외적으로 성장한 것에 비해 내적으로는 여전히 개선할 과제가 많음을 알 수 있다. 시민사회는 이번 동료검토 결과를 정부가 겸허히 받아들이고 향후 개선을 위한 일종의 당근과 채찍으로서 적극적으로 검토해줄 것을 바라고 있다. 무엇보다 DAC이 제시하는 규범은 개발협력의 본래 목적 달성을 위한 최소한의 기준이자 요건이지 최선의 기준이 아니므로 현재 우리의 현황이 이조차도 제대로 갖추지 못하고 있음에 대한 엄밀한 직시와 성찰이 요구된다.

OECD DAC 동료검토는 DAC이 만들어낸 평가 체계를 바탕으로 회원국들이 자체 검열하는 과정으로써, OECD를 비롯한 국제기구가 가지고 있는 한계, 즉 담론만 형성하고 실질적인 행동의 변화가 뒤따르지 않는다는 기존의 한계를 극복하기 위한 노력이 담긴 체계라는 의미를 지닌다. 이에 한국은 동료검토 평가 결과의 실질적인 이행과 개선으로 최소한의 DAC 회원국으로서의 면모를 갖추나가야 한다.

시민사회는 이번 동료검토가 한국 개발협력 전반에 대한 현황과 정보를 집대성하고 그 진행 절차를 공개하는 과정을 통해 한국 개발협력 전반의 투명성을 제고하는 주요 장치(메커니즘)이자 계기로 인식하고 있다. 이에 정부 또한 동료검토를 한국의 ODA를 국제사회와 국민들에게 알리는 홍보 기회로서 활용할 뿐만 아니라 개선을 위한 중간점검 장치이자 투명성 제고를 위한 주요 장치로 인식하는 것이 요구된다. 비단 개발협력을 관장하는 국무총리실, 외교통상부, 기획재정부와 소수의 시행기관 뿐만 아니라 범정부적인 관심과 이행을 위한 정치적 의지가 필요하다.

불과 약 20년간의 짧은 역사를 가진 한국의 개발협력이 단기간 내에 많은 진전을 이룬 것은 분명하다. 신흥 공여국(Emerging Donor)으로서 부산 글로벌 파트너십의 이행과 Post 2015에 대한 적극적인 대응 요구에 직면하고 있는 지금, 지구촌의 빈곤 문제를 해결하고 지속가능한 발전에 대한 한국의 책임과 역할이 더욱 요구되고 있는 상황이다. 게다가 많은 파트너 국가로부터 한국의 성공적인 개발경험, 즉 원조를 받던 나라에서 주는 나라로 변모한 소중한 경험을 나누어 줄 것을 요구받고 있다. 그렇기 때문에 수많은 도전과제들을 직면하는 이 시점에서 국제사회가 제시하는 규범과 기준을 충분히 받아들이고 학습하여 국내적 실천으로 반영하는 것은 매우 중요한 일이 아닐 수 없다.

한국 시민사회는 국제개발협력의 일반적인 국익을 위한 행정 영역이 아닌 지구촌의 가난한 사람들과의 연대의 약속이자 실천이며 높아진 한국 정부의 위상과 책무를 실천하

는 길임을 강조하고 있다.⁷⁾ 이에 한국 정부가 이번 동료검토를 진정한 지구촌 연대를 위한 방안으로써 한국 국제개발협력을 재구상하는 계기로 삼기를 바라며 권고사항을 착실히 이행해 나갈 것을 당부한다.

7) 국제개발협력시민사회포럼(2013.2.5) 한국정부의 국제개발협력정책 담보하고 있다

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[참고자료1]

OECD Peer Review 결과보고서

(OECD DAC, 2012)

KOREA

Development Assistance Committee (DAC)
PEER REVIEW 2012



ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT

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The Peer Review Process

The DAC conducts periodic reviews of the individual development co-operation efforts of DAC members. The policies and programmes of each member are critically examined approximately once every four or five years. Five members are examined annually. The OECD's Development Co-operation Directorate provides analytical support and is responsible for developing and maintaining the conceptual framework within which the Peer Reviews are undertaken.

The Peer Review is prepared by a team, consisting of representatives of the Secretariat working with officials from two DAC members who are designated as "examiners". The country under review provides a memorandum setting out the main developments in its policies and programmes. Then the Secretariat and the examiners visit the capital to interview officials, parliamentarians, as well as civil society and NGO representatives of the donor country to obtain a first-hand insight into current issues surrounding the development co-operation efforts of the member concerned. Field visits assess how members are implementing the major DAC policies, principles and concerns, and review operations in recipient countries, particularly with regard to poverty reduction, sustainability, gender equality and other aspects of participatory development, and local aid co-ordination.

The Secretariat then prepares a draft report on the member's development co-operation which is the basis for the DAC review meeting at the OECD. At this meeting senior officials from the member under review respond to questions formulated by the Secretariat in association with the examiners.

This review contains the Main Findings and Recommendations of the Development Assistance Committee and the report of the Secretariat. It was prepared with examiners from Australia and Germany for the Peer Review of Korea on 11 December 2012.

In order to achieve its aims the OECD has set up a number of specialised committees. One of these is the **Development Assistance Committee**, whose members have agreed to secure an expansion of aggregate volume of resources made available to developing countries and to improve their effectiveness. To this end, members periodically review together both the amount and the nature of their contributions to aid programmes, bilateral and multilateral, and consult each other on all other relevant aspects of their development assistance policies.

The members of the Development Assistance Committee are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union.

Korea's aid at a glance

KOREA

Gross Bilateral ODA, 2009-10 average, unless otherwise shown


Net ODA	2009	2010	2011	Change 2010/11
Current (USD m)	816	1 174	1 325	12.9%
Constant (2010 USD m)	933	1 174	1 245	6.1%
In Won (billion)	1 040	1 356	1 467	8.2%
ODA/GNI	0.10%	0.12%	0.12%	
Bilateral share	71%	77%	75%	

P. Preliminary data.


Top Ten Recipients of Gross ODA (USD million)	
1 Vietnam	82
2 Afghanistan	59
3 Mongolia	36
4 Bangladesh	36
5 Sri Lanka	34
6 Indonesia	30
7 Cambodia	27
8 Philippines	27
9 Laos	26
10 Angola	24
Memo: Share of gross bilateral ODA	
Top 5 recipients	32%
Top 10 recipients	49%
Top 20 recipients	68%

By Income Group (USD m)

Clockwise from top



By Region (USD m)



By Sector




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List of acronyms

ADB	Asian Development Bank
ADF	Asian Development Fund
AfDB	African Development Bank
ARF	Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BRICs	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CAP	Consolidated Appeals Process
CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund
CIDC	Committee for International Development Cooperation
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CSOs	Civil society organisations
CSR	Corporate social responsibility
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DANIDA	Danish International Development Agency
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DRR	Disaster risk reduction
EACP	East Asia Climate Partnership
EAS	East Asia Summit
EDCF	Economic Development Cooperation Fund
ERF	Emergency Response Fund
FSO	Fund for Special Operations
GAVI	Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization
GHD	Good humanitarian donorship
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
GNI	Gross national income
HIPCs	Heavily indebted poor countries
HLF	High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness
IATI	International Aid Transparency Initiative
ICT	Information and communications technology
IDA	International Development Association
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
IFC	International Finance Corporation
INSARAG	International Search and Rescue Advisory Group
JBIC	Japan Bank for International Cooperation
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
KOICA	Korea International Cooperation Agency
Korea Eximbank	Export-Import Bank of Korea

KDI	Korea Development Institute
KSP	Knowledge Sharing Program
LDCs	Least developed countries
MDBs	Multilateral development banks
MDGs	Millennium development goals
MICs	Middle income countries
MOFAT	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
MOPAN	Multilateral Organization Performance Assessment Network
MOPAS	Ministry of Public Administration and Security
MOSF	Ministry of Strategy and Finance
NGOs	Non-governmental organisations
ODA	Official development assistance
PCD	Policy coherence for development
PMO	Prime Minister's Office
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
PSG	Peacebuilding and statebuilding goals
RBM	Result-based management
SAR	Search and Rescue
TSI	Transitional Solutions Initiative
TWG	Technical Working Group
UN	United Nations
UNDAC	United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WB	World Bank
WFK	World Friends Korea
WFP	World Food Program
WTO	World Trade Organization

The DAC'S main findings and recommendations

Overview

Since joining the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in January 2010, Korea has worked hard to strengthen its aid and to contribute to global development efforts. Korea's DAC membership followed an extensive accession process and a special session of the DAC on 25 November 2009. At this meeting, members expressed genuine admiration for Korea's success in transforming itself from an aid recipient (as recently as 1995) to an important aid donor in such a short space of time. Korea is now seen by developing countries, particularly those in East Asia, as a source of knowledge and ideas on development drawn from actual experience. This is an area of particular comparative advantage relative to other DAC members.

This is Korea's first peer review – an important milestone both for the country and for the DAC. It illustrates how rapidly Korea has advanced and the lessons and experience it brings to the table in international debates and development activities. Korean development co-operation is overseen by the Prime Minister's Office (PMO), Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) and Ministry of Strategy and Finance (MOSF). In the last two years Korea has strengthened the framework for its development co-operation by putting in place a *Framework Act* and *Presidential Decree on International Development Co-operation* (Framework Act). The Framework Act provides the legal basis for a more integrated system with a clear focus on reducing poverty in developing countries. In addition to strengthening its own development assistance, Korea has been active in international debates and global processes. The country played a leading role in hosting and facilitating the *Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness* at Busan at the end of 2011 and helped pave the way for the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation by serving as a bridge between DAC members and the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). Korea's interventions have consistently ensured support from the BRICS for the governance structure and monitoring framework for the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation. It has also played a leading role in the G20 development agenda.

Overall framework for development co-operation

Completing the strategic framework for Korea's development co-operation

Key findings: Korea's new aid legislation and strategic planning provide greater clarity for developing and managing its development budget: delivered as both grants and loans. The new legal and strategic framework for Korean aid is not yet supported by sufficient or transparent decision-making criteria or by thematic and country strategies. This is constraining its processes and public accountability and limiting discussions with key stakeholders, including parliament and civil society.

Recommendations: Korea should build on its solid legal and policy foundations by completing the strategic framework to guide its growing development co-operation. Specifically:

- The framework should set out clear aims, priorities, objectives and intended outcomes for Korea's thematic focus areas.
- Korea should complete and publish the country partnership strategies planned for each of its 26 priority partner countries: these should be aligned to partner countries' development strategies; cover all Korea government's support; unify strategies for grants and loans; include forward expenditure commitments; incorporate plans and targets for aid effectiveness; and define in measurable terms the objectives of Korea's contribution to each partner country.
- Korea should complete and publish its planned comprehensive multilateral ODA strategy.
- The framework should include stronger guidance and plans for mainstreaming gender equality, women's empowerment, environment and climate change across all of Korea's programmes.

The legal framework is complemented by Korea's *Strategic Plan for International Development Co-operation* and its *Mid-term ODA Policy for 2011-2015*. The main purpose of Korea's legal and strategic framework is to improve the management of Korea's aid-funded grants and loans, particularly by strengthening the Committee for International Development Co-operation (CIDC). The framework also establishes the basic principles underpinning Korea's development co-operation system, including a poverty focus, respect for human rights, gender equality, sustainable development and support for peace and prosperity in the international community. These principles have been disseminated across the Korean government and have helped to raise the profile of the country's official development assistance (ODA). They should now be fully reflected in all of Korea's development co-operation strategies and programmes.

Korea is starting to focus its assistance on a smaller set of sectors, multilateral entities and countries; this new approach to development co-operation should now be reflected in the thematic, multilateral and country partnership strategies Korea is currently developing. This more focused approach needs also to be translated into clear thematic objectives and unified country partnership strategies and programmes, creating stronger synergies between grant and loan portfolios. Korea is focusing its grant-funded assistance

on education, health, governance, agriculture, fisheries, industry and energy. Korea's concessional loans are targeted at basic infrastructure for economic growth. While these themes are wide-ranging, Korea will focus on only two or three of them in each of its priority partner countries. Strategy documents for each of the thematic priorities for grants have been written by the Korea International Co-operation Agency (KOICA); the CIDC could build on these to develop and approve government-wide objectives for each thematic area. KOICA has also developed guidelines for mainstreaming gender equality and women's empowerment and these too could have a wider application across Korea's development co-operation system. The Korean agency responsible for loans – the Economic Development Co-operation Fund (EDCF) – has put in place environment and climate change safeguards that could also be adapted for use by KOICA and other agencies.

Strengthening communication, transparency and accountability

Key findings: *Korea has made efforts to improve the transparency and accountability of its development co-operation. However, there is no budget or supplementary documentation which clearly sets out Korea's aid expenditure in each country and sector, and which is easily accessible to stakeholders. In addition, ODA reporting by MOFAT and PMO to Korea's parliament is too detailed, and does not focus enough on the results of Korea's aid and the challenges faced. The PMO's annual report on Korean ODA, introduced in 2012, is an opportunity to tackle some of these weaknesses.*

Recommendation: PMO, MOFAT and MOSF should continue to increase transparency and accountability by:

- Providing comprehensive information on Korea's development co-operation - in particular, they should disclose information on development co-operation policy, strategy, procedures, budget (countries and sectors), programmes and projects in a way that is easy for key stakeholders – parliamentarians, civil society organisations (CSOs), non-government organisations (NGOs), private sector, research institutes, developing country partners and the general public – to access and understand.

According to representatives of Korean civil society and research institutions, only limited information on Korea's ODA grants and loans is available to the public. Korean CSOs and NGOs also consider that their consultations with government officials on development do not reflect the objectives and requirements of the Framework Act. They would like these consultations to be invigorated, particularly their discussions on policy. Given Korea's plans to rapidly increase its ODA (see below) it will need to explain the value of its development co-operation if it is to maintain parliamentary and public support. In the context of its *Annual Integrated Plan for ODA Public Relations* and the joint task force led by the PMO, Korea needs a coherent set of messages tailored for specific target audiences, which stress Korea's role in recent achievements, such as reducing poverty and making progress towards the MDGs.

Promoting development beyond aid

Garnering strong political will to drive a government-wide approach to policy coherence for development

Key findings: Korea has established policy co-ordination mechanisms. The CIDC has the mandate and potential to facilitate development-friendly policies. Nevertheless, like other DAC members, Korea has yet to show that the development impacts (potential and actual) of relevant policies are being considered.

Recommendation: Korea needs to give policy coherence for development sufficient weight in decision making by:

- Creating a government-wide agenda to achieve development-friendly policies, overseen by CIDC. This agenda should include: (1) the most important incoherencies to be tackled; (2) the steps to be taken to tackle them and by whom; (3) the targets to be achieved; (4) a timeline for action; and (5) a stronger process for involving the relevant government departments;
- Ensuring that the government of Korea has sufficient technical and political capacity to co-ordinate and enhance policy coherence for development;
- Strengthening existing analysis of and reporting on how Korea's foreign and domestic policies affect developing countries. This should build on PMO and MOFAT research and analysis to date, and should be informed by feedback and analysis from the field; better information flows among government departments in Seoul; and analysis by universities, CSOs and think tanks.

Korea has begun ensuring that its policies all pull together to support development; the first steps have been to develop political commitment; policy coordination mechanisms; and monitoring, analysis and reporting systems. A key lesson from other DAC peer reviews is to embed the concept of development-friendly policies throughout the Korean government, principally by getting all relevant departments to sign up to a clearly-prioritised and time-bound agenda which establishes cross-governmental objectives and a plan for achieving them. While this has proved challenging for Korea – as for many other DAC members – some elements of a potential agenda may be found in the government-wide *Green Growth Strategy*, with its emphasis on Korea “performing its responsibilities and roles earnestly as a member of international society.” MOFAT also identified a number of other possible areas in its analysis and research on policy coherence for development in 2011. Developing and communicating the results of this research could be a good way to increase awareness among government officials and could help shape a set of objectives for the entire government.

While the CIDC is responsible for facilitating policy coherence for development across government, its secretariat (the PMO) could also give higher priority to this aspect in its work. For example, the PMO could develop a plan for achieving development-friendly policies in consultation with a range of relevant government departments and by building on the *Green Growth Strategy* and MOFAT research. It could also engage with

other ministries to highlight the impact of their policies on development, identify statistical and analytical knowledge gaps and opportunities to act, and brief the CIDC.

Aid volume and allocation

Ensuring Korea achieves its ODA volume target

Key findings: *Between 2006 and 2011 Korea's ODA disbursements almost tripled. These increases allowed Korea to give additional support to low-income countries, particularly in East Asia, and generally to strengthen its role in development co-operation. Korea has committed to double its ODA/GNI ratio over the next three years. This presents both opportunities for strengthening, as well as challenges for managing, its development co-operation.*

Recommendation: Korea should sustain its recent increases in aid volumes to achieve its target of giving 0.25% of its gross national income (GNI) as ODA by 2015. At the same time, Korea should:

- Plan and manage the aid increase to ensure a steady and predictable rate of growth while striking manageable and appropriate balances between bilateral and multilateral channels and grants and loans;
- Assess carefully the ratio of grants to loans for fragile states and heavily-indebted poor countries (HIPC) and when extending loans consider carefully the economic context and financial governance of these countries to ensure debt sustainability; and
- Ensure that the choice of aid instrument reflects development objectives and partner country ownership, preferences, management capacity and need.

Several years of steady growth saw Korea's ODA reach USD 1 325 million in 2011, equivalent to 0.12% of its gross national income (GNI), compared to USD 455 million and 0.05% of its GNI in 2006. Korea's ODA disbursements in 2011 were 6% greater, in volume terms, than 2010, when Korea's aid surpassed USD 1 billion for the first time. However, Korea's ODA/GNI ratio in 2011 was unchanged from 2010 and below its 0.13% target for the year. Korea has committed to scale up its aid to achieve an ODA/GNI ratio of 0.25% by 2015. The country's ODA volume was the 17th largest within the DAC in 2011, up one place from 2010.

Korea faces two major challenges in achieving its 0.25% target ODA/GNI ratio by 2015:

- It must more than double its ODA/GNI ratio over the next three years; and,
- It must manage the steep aid increase effectively.

In light of Korea's expected rate of economic growth over the medium term (3-3.5% per year), there would appear to be ample financial scope for the planned increases in its aid volume. The peer review team estimates that Korea's ODA volume would need to be approximately USD 3 200 million by 2015 to achieve its ODA/GNI target of 0.25%. Therefore, Korea will need to increase its aid by an average annual rate of 25% in 2012,

2013, 2014 and 2015. This is a little higher than its rate of increase since 2006 and a steeper trajectory for these years than the Korean government envisaged in 2009.

Korea's allocations through its two main channels have varied from a ratio of 83:17 (bilateral: multilateral) in 2006 to 75:25 in 2011. Korea's target ratio of bilateral to multilateral funding is 70:30, to be achieved from 2012. The aim is to mirror as closely as possible the DAC average multilateral aid share, which was 28% in 2011. Given the major increases planned in Korea's ODA over the next three years, however, it may be appropriate to adopt a more flexible approach. Some DAC members in the last decade have found it easier to grow their ODA through increased contributions to the multilateral channel. Korea is commended for giving 70% of its multilateral contributions as core funding.

Korea has the highest level (91%) of country programmable aid (CPA) of any DAC member (DAC average 55%), but, as with its bilateral ODA more generally, it is not sufficiently focused on its 26 priority partner countries. Nevertheless, Korea has concentrated its bilateral funds on its priority partner countries: in 2009 it allocated 47% of its total bilateral aid to 24 priority partners; 55% went to those same 24 priority partners in 2010. This concentration is set to increase further, as it is now geared to allocate 70% of its bilateral resources (grants and loans) on the now 26 countries from 2012. Further rationalisation of Korean ODA, if co-ordinated effectively with other development partners, could contribute to a better global donor division of labour.

As part of its commitment to the Paris Declaration principles and also as a means to scale up its aid, Korea is planning to incorporate new aid modalities in its bilateral programming for both loans and grants. In addition to these new modalities, MOFAT, MOSF and KOICA are also looking at how they might strengthen and increase their partnerships with civil society organisations (CSOs) and the private sector in accordance with the Busan Declaration. There is considerable scope for Korea to develop its partnerships with CSOs and the private sector as barely 2% of Korea's ODA was channelled through these in 2010.

The division between grants and loans has been a subject of debate among MOFAT, MOSF and PMO. There is now a policy which targets a 60:40 (grants: loans) ratio for Korea's bilateral ODA net disbursements. In 2010, the ratio was 61:39 (grants: loans). Only a few DAC members use loans to any real extent. Korea's greater emphasis on loans can be explained by its own positive experience as a recipient of this kind of aid in the past. There is a profound belief among some of its political leaders and aid managers that loans impose essential fiscal discipline on the recipient country.

Loans are a valid instrument for financing development in the right circumstances, but Korea should continue to pay careful attention to the impact of its loan programme on the recipient country's level of debt, particularly in the least developed countries (LDCs), fragile states and those countries rated as in debt distress or at risk of debt distress. Sustainable levels of debt are a precondition for development, and so concessional loans are mostly given by DAC members to middle-income countries (MICs) rather than to LDCs and fragile states. While this is also Korea's policy, in 2010 there was little difference between Korea's use of loans in MICs (38% of its total support), LDCs (39%) and fragile states (41%). The Government of Korea reported to the Committee that 61% of its total support to MICs in 2011 was provided in the form of loans. Korea's ratio of grants to loans in HIPC countries in 2010 was 82:18, a much higher ratio than in other country groups. While Korea meets the criteria of the *DAC Recommendation on the Terms and Conditions of Aid*, it should ensure that in each case its loans are only given when (1) they

are the best means of addressing the development need of a particular partner country; and (2) they meet specific objectives in a partner country's development strategy.

Organisation and management

Improving the integration, co-ordination and management of Korea's ODA

Key findings: Korea's aid system is based on two main pillars: grants and loans. The former are managed by MOFAT and its agency KOICA, while the latter are managed by MOSF and its agency EDCF. In addition, more than 30 other ministries and agencies are engaged in ODA-funded activities. As Korea's ODA increases, three main challenges arise from this set-up: (1) how to integrate all grants (from all agencies) and loans into a unified strategy; (2) how to co-ordinate aid effectively, particularly in partner countries; and (3) how to ensure there is adequate capacity available for effective implementation of strategy.

Recommendation: To implement its development co-operation strategy successfully, Korea should:

- Ensure that (i) the CIDC uses its powers fully to become the ultimate decision-making body in planning and budgeting processes; and (ii) the Inter-Agency Committees, together with the ODA Councils at partner country level, have the necessary authority to ensure that all aid-funded activities are processed through them;
- Strengthen further the human resources of PMO, MOFAT and MOSF, together with the main agencies (KOICA and EDCF), by attracting and retaining quality people with the right kind of development experience, and build the capacity of Korean and locally engaged employees in priority partner countries, particularly to equip these with the necessary skills to support new aid modalities, such as programme based approaches.

Korea has worked hard to improve the management of its ODA over the last five years; in particular, since joining the DAC it has established solid foundations for improved integration and co-ordination of its assistance. The Framework Act provides the legal and political foundation for Korea's development co-operation and makes clear the various roles and responsibilities of the different actors involved. Building on the existing frequent consultation between ministries that is part of the Korean government's mode of working, the Framework Act supports ODA policy co-ordination and reduces fragmentation by establishing formal decision-making structures and processes. These structures and processes can be built on and strengthened still further.

At the centre of Korea's aid system is the high-level Committee for International Development Co-operation (CIDC). The CIDC was established in 2006 as the country's highest decision-making body – an “ODA control tower” – to oversee and strengthen policy co-ordination and the strategic aspects of Korean ODA. It is chaired by the Prime Minister, with the PMO acting as its secretariat. It comprises 15 ministers, the heads of KOICA and the Export-Import Bank of Korea, as well as seven civilian experts appointed by the Prime Minister. The Framework Act confirms these responsibilities; under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister, the CIDC has *de facto* authority to direct all ministries as decreed by the President. Two committees – the Inter-Agency Grants

Committee and the Inter-Agency EDCF Committee – co-ordinate and approve the government's grant and concessional loan activities and report up to the CIDC. In each of its priority partner countries Korea has established ODA Councils to co-ordinate development co-operation in the field. These are chaired by the Korean Ambassador.

While Korea has taken steps to strengthen the co-ordination of its aid, many challenges remain, particularly in making its co-ordination mechanisms work as intended and in ensuring there is sufficient capacity to support them. MOFAT serves as the Executive Secretary to the Inter-Agency Grants Committee; MOSF plays the same role for the Inter-Agency EDCF Committee. In principle, other ministries and agencies must consult with and receive approvals from these committees for their own ODA activities in order to ensure a consistent approach across the government. However, several ministries have been able to develop and implement ODA-funded activities without the approval or even knowledge of the ODA Council in partner countries, or of the Inter-Agency Committees and CIDC. Korea's aid co-ordination mechanisms should be further strengthened to achieve greater consistency of programmes, more effective delivery of Korea's aid and greater integration among loans and grants.

Staffing will become a major issue for Korea as its aid programme expands. While Korea has a well-established set of people dedicated to development in its three principal ministries and main agencies, staff are under increasing pressure to manage larger amounts of ODA in more complex ways and contexts. The Committee was informed that by 2015 KOICA will increase its staff by 105 positions and EDCF will increase its staff by 50%. Korea is planning to deliver its programmes through new ways of working and it is clear that increases in the aid programme will have to be accompanied by a careful assessment of the skills, training and resources needed to manage a high quality, growing programme. While this situation does create an obvious tension, Korea can manage this by: streamlining its procedures; concentrating its resources on fewer countries (particularly by concentrating KOICA and EDCF field offices on Korea's priority partner countries); further consolidating its ODA management, in the way that it has recently done for its volunteers programme; and supporting fewer but much larger programmes, particularly through programme based approaches, sector budget support and co-financing arrangements with other development partners.

Strengthening Korea's evaluation procedures

Key findings: *All evaluation procedures – from planning to dissemination and feedback – are now overseen by the Sub-Committee for Evaluation, created under the CIDC in December 2009. The Sub-Committee lacks adequate tools and authority and its independence needs stronger protection. More certainty over budget allocations for evaluation would enable Korea to plan its evaluation work and staff requirements better.*

Recommendation: Strengthen the independence and procedures of the Sub-Committee on Evaluation; improve ongoing monitoring during project implementation; improve *ex-post* evaluation; strengthen capacities and delegate authority to support critical evaluation in field units; and systematically integrate lessons from evaluations into future programmes.

Korea has made progress in establishing the policy, guidelines and capacity for evaluating its development programmes, but more needs to be done. The Sub-Committee for Evaluation, created under the CIDC in December 2009, is chaired by the Deputy

Minister for National Agenda of the PMO. Its role is primarily to review and approve the annual evaluation plans drafted by ODA executing bodies. The Sub-Committee has 13 members, comprised of the four principal actors of Korean ODA and experts from outside the government, with PMO providing the secretariat services. To ensure evaluations influence Korea's aid management and learning, it is important that the Sub-Committee has adequate tools and authority, and that its independence is protected.

On average, the Sub-Committee reviews 20 self-evaluation reports and conducts (commissions) three thematic evaluations every year. However, ensuring the quality of these evaluations is a challenge. In particular, the self-evaluations carried out by ministries and agencies are of varying and often low quality, and do not follow the common evaluation guidelines and benchmarks established by the CIDC. The Sub-Committee has commissioned a meta-evaluation of Korea's ODA evaluation system to identify how the quality of aid evaluations can be improved. These efforts by Korea to look critically at how to improve its evaluation function are commendable. In addition, KOICA has translated the DAC *Quality Standards for Development Evaluation* into Korean. KOICA and EDCF are responsible for the majority of ODA-related evaluations and each agency has its own evaluation manuals, both of which reflect the five DAC evaluation criteria (*i.e.* relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability). In order to apply evaluation findings systematically to future policy and programme decisions, Korea has set up internal feedback mechanisms in each relevant agency. However, these mechanisms do not yet ensure that the lessons from implementation inform the design of new policy and strategy. For this to happen the implementing agencies will need to also be involved in developing policy and strategy to some extent.

Improving the impact of development co-operation

Translating Korea's commitment to aid effectiveness into better practice

Key findings: Korea has made progress in aligning its support with partner country priorities, providing its aid through common arrangements and carrying out joint analytical work. Surveys of donors' progress towards meeting the Paris Declaration commitments since 2005 show that Korea (along with other DAC members) is lagging behind in implementing the aid effectiveness principles, particularly those on aid predictability and use of partner country systems. Part of the reason is that the principles are not sufficiently embedded in Korea's procedures and strategies.

Recommendation: In continuing to make its aid more effective, Korea should:

- Integrate the aid effectiveness principles and the internationally-agreed targets into all development co-operation strategies – particularly country partnership strategies – and aid management procedures; and
- Improve its performance in areas where Korea is lagging the most: untying its aid, use of programme-based approaches, medium-term predictability and use of country systems.

Korea has made progress in some important aspects of effective aid, such as aligning its support to partner country priorities and working with other donors on joint analysis and evaluations. However, further progress is needed to meet its commitments under the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action. KOICA has

done some work to implement the principles, but overall these have not been more widely integrated into Korea’s aid management procedures. Most of Korea’s bilateral aid is delivered in the form of conventional grant or loan-funded projects and technical assistance which are generally ‘stand alone’ and not part of broader programmes supported by other development partners. KOICA and EDCF are in the process of formulating guidelines and new instruments for programme based approaches, sector budget support and co-financing arrangements in recognition of the need to support fewer, larger and more harmonised programmes in the future. A particular weakness is the unpredictability of Korea’s aid, which can compromise its ability to align to partner countries’ planning and budgeting systems. Korea should publish its bilateral country programme estimates at least on KOICA’s and EDCF’s contributions – on an annual and medium-term basis. This would allow its priority partner countries in particular to plan with confidence.

Implementing a roadmap to untie 75% of bilateral aid by 2015

Key findings: As part of its accession to the DAC and its commitment to the Paris Declaration principles and the Accra Agenda for Action, in 2009 Korea put a timetable in place to increase the untied portion of its bilateral ODA to 75% by 2015. However, Korea has made no progress towards this aim. In fact, the untied proportion of Korea’s total aid was lower in 2010 (at 32%) than in 2009 (44%).

Recommendation: To provide developing country partners and Korean taxpayers with even better value for money Korea should:

- Translate the commitment to untie 75% of its total bilateral ODA by 2015 into a year-on-year roadmap that drives progress towards its goal;
- Maintain focus on meeting the DAC Recommendation on Untying and the Accra and Busan commitments to untie aid to the maximum extent; and
- Report the tying status of all Korean ODA, including technical co-operation.

In 2009 the DAC commended Korea for the commitment it made to untie 75% of its bilateral aid by 2015. Korea’s share of untied aid (as defined by the *OECD DAC Recommendation on Untying ODA to the Least Developed Countries*) decreased from 37% in 2009 to 27% in 2010. This was much lower than the DAC average of 88% in 2010. When total aid to all developing countries (not just LDCs) is taken into account, Korea’s proportion of total untied aid was 32% in 2010, compared to 44% in 2009. This drop in performance will constrain Korea’s ability to meet the DAC Recommendation, as well as its Accra, Busan and DAC Accession commitments. Korea is encouraged to go further in its efforts to untie its aid and to make use of every opportunity to regain its lost momentum and to meet its targets. Korea informed the Committee that the proportion of its bilateral aid that is untied has increased in 2011; this is a welcome step.

Towards better humanitarian donorship

Building on solid progress to scale up the humanitarian programme

Key findings: While Korea now has a legislative mandate for its humanitarian action, it still lacks a cross-government policy to focus and guide its humanitarian programme. It needs a policy which builds on its strong history in disaster response, and which takes into account its commitment to scale up the humanitarian assistance budget. Once finalised, the policy will increase opportunities for consultation and collaboration on humanitarian issues, both with partners and across government, and provide greater predictability in future funding intentions, as well as promoting the consistent application of the Good Humanitarian Donorship principles.

Recommendation: To provide a clear strategic vision for the humanitarian programme; to ensure that humanitarian principles are consistently applied; and to promote accountability, efficiency and effectiveness Korea should:

- Finalise the new humanitarian assistance policy, ensuring that it focuses on a limited number of objectives in areas where Korea can have solid impact – such as disaster response – and that it is applicable across government;
- Determine and communicate clear criteria guiding whom, what and where to fund;
- Put in place safeguards to ensure that its bilateral (in-kind) aid is always the most effective and appropriate response; and
- Implement plans to make learning and reporting of results more systematic.

Korea has committed to a significant increase in its humanitarian budget over the next three years, potentially 800% from a low starting point. As Korea scales up its humanitarian programme, it will need to think about how it can most effectively use these additional resources. In particular, it will need to make decisions about the overall objectives and expected results of its humanitarian programme, the role of bilateral aid and the role of partners. It will also need to determine what modifications need to be made to its systems, resources and staffing to ensure that they remain fit for purpose in this new environment.

Firstly, Korea will need clear strategic directions to help prioritise funding allocations under its growing humanitarian programme. This will include mapping out the optimal mix of bilateral aid, UN agencies and NGOs in its future humanitarian portfolio. In particular, Korea will need to take care to ensure that its funding allocations are needs-based and not driven by visibility objectives. This is in line with the humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality and independence. Currently it remains unclear how Korea ensures that its bilateral – in-kind – disaster aid is the most appropriate form of response, and also how it ensures that this aid actually reaches those most in need.

Secondly, Korea will need to define the scope of its humanitarian programme, particularly how (or if) it will support post-crisis recovery and build the preparedness and resilience of partner countries and at-risk communities. So far, Korea has taken a

pragmatic approach to post-crisis recovery and transition by funding the recovery activities of UN agencies, and by supporting development projects in fragile and post-conflict countries. However, recovery and preparedness are not yet a systematic part of Korea's humanitarian programme.

Thirdly, Korea can now capitalise on the good progress it has made in strengthening humanitarian partnerships. Humanitarian budget allocations to UN agencies increased from 7% of the total budget in 2006 to 63% in 2010, and Korea continues to play an active role on UN agency boards. There has also been good progress towards more strategic partnerships with NGOs. In this light, Korea's plans to improve consultation with this important group are welcomed. These consultations might also be used to reduce the administrative burden for partners – especially NGOs.

Finally, Korea recognises that more systematic learning and evaluation processes could help improve future programme design and delivery. It plans to make this a priority area in the future. Publishing the results of the humanitarian programme is also important, as this demonstrates to taxpayers and legislators how well their money has been spent.

Chapter 1

Strategic Orientations

Korea became a DAC member only in 2010 but has already built a strong reputation as a development co-operation actor. In this first chapter of Korea's first ever peer review we look at the legal basis, strategic framework, political commitment and current vision underpinning its development co-operation. We also discuss the accountability arrangements for Korea's aid, in particular its efforts to improve the quality and quantity of the information it provides about its development assistance. The chapter outlines some of the current challenges facing Korea's development work, which include completing a unified strategic framework for its development co-operation; strengthening efforts to increase accountability; and strengthening consultation, communication and engagement with parliament, civil society and development institutions.

Korea is working hard and building a strong reputation in development co-operation

Korea joined the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in January 2010. Korea's membership followed an extensive accession process (OECD, 2009a) and a special session of the DAC on 25th November 2009. At this meeting, members expressed genuine admiration for Korea's success in transforming itself from an aid recipient (as recently as 1995) to an important aid donor in such a short space of time. Korea is now seen by developing countries as a source of knowledge and ideas on development drawn from actual experience. This is an area of particular comparative advantage relative to other DAC members. This is Korea's first peer review – an important milestone both for the country and for the DAC. It illustrates how rapidly Korea has advanced and the lessons and experience it brings to the table in international debates and development activities.

Korea has worked hard to strengthen its development co-operation while also engaging in OECD and other international development activities. For example, besides making great strides with its aid programme, Korea played a leading role in hosting and facilitating the *Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness* at Busan at the end of 2011. Korea has also played a leading role in the G20 development agenda, working closely with the OECD and often serving as a bridge between DAC members and the BRICs countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). Korea's interventions have consistently ensured support from the BRICs for the governance structure and global monitoring framework for the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation. In addition to these major contributions to the international aid architecture, Korea has also supported global efforts towards green growth; supported OECD and G20 efforts to increase and improve North-South, South-South and triangular co-operation; helped developing countries to build capacity in statistics through voluntary contributions to OECD work in this area; and promoted gender equality in global processes, such as the DAC subsidiary body on Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment, and by championing this issue at Busan.


Korea is reforming its aid and establishing strong foundations

Since joining the DAC, Korea has improved its framework for its development co-operation (Figure 1.1). This provides the legal basis for a more integrated ODA system, clearly focused on reducing poverty in developing countries.¹

A strengthened legal framework for Korea's development co-operation

Korea's new framework, with its five basic principles, unites all of its development co-operation towards the common purpose of alleviating poverty and achieving internationally agreed development goals, particularly the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). This common purpose is important because Korea's ODA system is divided into two pillars, grants and loans, each managed by different bodies. Grants are managed mostly by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT), while the Ministry of Strategy and Finance (MOSF) is responsible for Korea's loan portfolio. A new single plan (GoK, 2010) and mid-term ODA policy (MOFAT, 2010b and MOSF, 2010) mean that for the first time Korea's grants and loans are integrated into a single set of strategic documents. Partnership strategies, integrating grants and loans, are being developed for Korea's 26 priority partner countries (Figure 1.2).

Figure 1.1. Korea's development co-operation framework



Source: GOK (2012b), Memorandum for the DAC Peer Review Republic of Korea, Government of Korea, Seoul

Korea's unified vision for its development assistance is being translated into policy, strategy and programmes under the auspices of its Committee for International Development Co-operation (CIDC), chaired by Korea's Prime Minister. The CIDC's mandate has been strengthened by the *Framework Act on International Development Co-operation* (National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, 2010a) and the *Presidential Decree on International Development Co-operation* (Prime Minister's Office, 2010). This new legislation defines CIDC's role and responsibilities more clearly, which include overseeing ODA policy, strategy, co-ordination, evaluation and other development-related issues. The Prime Minister's Office (PMO) shares responsibility for managing Korea's ODA with MOFAT and MOSF and is responsible for co-ordinating Korea's development co-operation (Chapter 4). Korea's development co-operation is carried out largely by two agencies: grants are managed by the Korea International Co-operation Agency (KOICA) under supervision of MOFAT; and loans are the responsibility of the Economic Development Co-operation Fund (EDCF) under the supervision of MOSF.

It will take time for the impact of Korea's new legislation to be felt fully but it is already evident that the act and decree provide greater clarity for developing and managing the ODA budget. The act's five principles (Figure 1.1) form a strengthened framework for managing Korea's grants (by all its government departments) and loans (from MOSF) for the purpose of poverty reduction. This is particularly important at a time when Korea plans to double the volume of its ODA. Korea's framework is generally in line with good practice for aid legislation (OECD, 2009b).

Korea's development co-operation: a key foreign policy component

Development co-operation is a well-established part of Korea's foreign policy (Office of the President, 2009). Since 2009, Korea's foreign policy has focused on: "contributing to global peace and development under a broader vision and a more proactive approach to interacting with the international community (Office of the President, 2009)." This policy has been translated by MOFAT into four key diplomatic tasks as follows (MOFAT, 2012):

- Security diplomacy, particularly on the Korean peninsula.
- Diplomacy that contributes to global co-prosperity.
- Diplomacy that secures engines for future growth, particularly through trade and co-operation in the fields of energy and resources.
- Diplomacy that serves the public, particularly the needs of Koreans abroad.

Korea's aid is a core component of the second of these key diplomatic tasks – making a contribution to global co-prosperity. Korea's aid reforms, its support for the multilateral system and its membership of the DAC, are important aspects of its foreign policy, the development component of which focuses on shifting the paradigm from aid to development, advancing the system of development co-operation, and providing partner country-specific support.

Challenges ahead

Korea's new legal and strategic framework for its aid is a major step forward and it should be built on so that the country can make an even greater contribution to global development. Korea's political leaders and senior aid officials appreciate the challenges ahead as they carry out the government's development assistance legislation, particularly

in the light of their commitment to substantially increase the volume of ODA and advance the Paris Declaration principles. These challenges include narrowing Korea's geographical and thematic focus; continuing to integrate grants and loans within unified strategies; adopting a whole of government approach, particularly in fragile states; and ensuring all aid delivery channels are pulling in the same direction. These challenges are each discussed in the sections below.

Korea is narrowing its thematic focus, but it needs to go further for greater impact


Korea is focusing its grant-funded development co-operation on the thematic priorities of education, health, governance, agriculture and fisheries, industry and energy.² Korea's concessional loans are targeted at building the basic infrastructure for economic growth in partner countries (MOSF, 2010). Korea's latest country partnership strategies (CPS), which integrate grants and loans, identify only two or three focus sectors for each priority partner country. This is a welcome departure from Korea's previous practice, in which its assistance was spread across more sectors in each of its partner countries. The new approach provides opportunities for loans and grants to support the same sectors.

While Korea's thematic priorities are in line with the principles of its Framework Act and support the achievement of the MDGs, they are quite broad and need to be more focused. In addition, the CIDC should ensure that the priorities are owned and supported by the whole of the Korean government and publicised so that parliament, civil society, the media and the general public are aware of them. Doing so would enable more predictable and focused programming and decision making as ODA increases, while also facilitating structured discussions with key stakeholders, including partners and the National Assembly. Greater focus could be achieved by setting clear objectives for each thematic area – this would also provide a framework for stronger cross-government accountability. KOICA has developed strategies for each of the thematic priorities – the goal now should be to consult on, finalise and disseminate these. While these strategies are currently only for KOICA's use, Korea could build on them to develop government-wide objectives for each thematic area. It should also clarify the roles of the Korean government agencies involved in each theme, reflecting each one's comparative advantage and listing the results expected.



Korea should continue to concentrate its bilateral efforts on its priority partner countries

The impact of Korea's new legislation and policies is also evident in its integration and prioritisation of its list of partner countries. Previously, Korea had two unpublished lists of priority partner countries: one for MOFAT and its implementing agency (KOICA); and another for MOSF and its agency (EDCF). Prior to joining the DAC, Korea integrated the two lists to form a single list of 26 priority partner countries (see Figures 1.2 and 3.4 in Chapter 3). This has been published and Korea is now concentrating its grant and loan assistance on these countries.

Figure 1.2. Korea's priority partner countries and lead ministries, 2012

Source: Information presented to the peer review by the Government of Korea

While links to the MDGs are clear in Korea's thematic priorities, they are less apparent in its selection of priority partner countries. Out of the 26 selected, **more than half are middle income** and on-track for achieving the MDGs. Korea reports that it chose 26 as an optimum number of priority partner countries and took into account the development needs of the countries, their capacity to use aid effectively and their alignment with Korean foreign policy priorities. Korea also took into consideration how development co-operation work is shared internationally, by referring to DAC analysis of aid statistics. **Nevertheless, it has not focused its assistance on aid "orphans"**. Korea intends to increase its efforts to co-ordinate and harmonise with other donors in the 26 countries as it scales up its aid. The country selections and lead ministries are subject to periodic review.

The peer review team considers that **26 priority partner countries will be a challenge for Korea to support**, even with an increased ODA volume in future years. In addition, Korea and its priority partner countries would benefit from a clearly expressed rationale for each country's inclusion in the list. Such clarity might assist in making future adjustments to the list of countries and help demonstrate how Korea's allocations are aligned with its highest priority partners. At the next periodic review of its priority partner countries **Korea should take account of up-to-date information on the countries' progress towards MDG achievement**, the extent to which its assistance can have real impact and the kind of aid instrument that is most appropriate for each country. Most importantly, Korea should ensure that its assistance to a partner country is not predicated on a pre-selected instrument. Given that other, much larger, DAC members consider the optimum number of priority partner countries to be less than 26 Korea should also reflect on whether a smaller number of priority partner countries would enable it to get more out of its assistance.

Korea's selection of instruments should continue to reflect partner country preferences

The peer review team commends Korea for narrowing its thematic and geographical focus. It is also pleased to note that in the case of Cambodia Korea's sectoral priorities already reflect the national development objectives of its partner country, in line with the aid effectiveness principle of alignment. In completing its partnership strategies for its other priority countries, Korea should ensure that **thematic areas are always chosen based on full consultation with the partner country government and other development partners**. The strategies should also be clear about the rationale behind the choice of themes and aid instruments. Korea's approach in each of its partner countries should be tailored to the specific development challenge and context to ensure ownership by the partner country. This will ensure that the collaboration is not instrument led. Korea's use of grants and loans should continue to reflect its partner countries' preferences.

Make country partnership strategies whole-of-government and transparent

Korea's country partnership strategy template was adopted in 2009 and is to be used for its 26 priority partner countries - this is the first template to attempt to integrate loans and grants and is a major improvement on the country assistance strategy format that preceded it, and on the separate strategies that operated previously. Korea has prepared nine country partnership strategies to date (for Azerbaijan, Bolivia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Indonesia, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka and Vietnam) in consultation with the countries concerned. Korea aims to consult on, complete and publish new strategies for all its priority partner countries by mid-2013. While the new template is a considerable improvement on Korea's previous country strategy formats, the nine documents produced so far **have some omissions compared to similar papers prepared by other DAC members**:

- they do not cover all of the Korean government's development support for the partner country;
- they do not include forward expenditure commitments;
- while they do refer to the aid effectiveness principles, they do not set out a plan or targets for advancing them; and
- they do not systematically define, in measurable terms, the development objectives to be achieved – this will make it difficult to report on the results of Korean supported efforts.

Building Korea's own development experience into capacity-building efforts

Developing countries are interested in Korea's own successful development history; this is a comparative advantage for Korea, one that it is trying to make more use of through its various knowledge sharing activities. Experience and research suggest that successful knowledge sharing in development co-operation involves extended learning processes rather than simple communication processes, as ideas related to development and innovation need to be made locally applicable with the adaptation being done by the local people responsible for development (World Bank, 2003). Korea shares its development experience mainly through two initiatives: the Knowledge Sharing Programme (KSP) managed by MOSF and implemented by the Korea Development Institute (KDI) and the Development Experience Exchange Partnership

Programme (DEEP) managed by MOFAT with KOICA that was launched in 2012. Also in 2012, the PMO introduced the Action Plan of Korea's Development Experience Sharing which consists of 159 modules in four fields of development – these will be used as resources for a broad range of development co-operation activities.

While its Knowledge Sharing Programme and Development Experience Exchange Partnership Programme are useful innovations, Korea could respond more effectively to its partners' interest in its own development experience by making its lessons a core component of its capacity building efforts – when appropriate. The Knowledge Sharing Programme involves joint policy research, workshops, training, field trips and dissemination seminars on applying Korea's knowledge to local circumstances and is focused mainly on economic development lessons. **Civil society representatives have encouraged MOSF to include social development experience, such as democratisation, democratic governance and the role of civil society in the programme (KCOC and KoFID, 2012).** The Development Experience Exchange Partnership Programme is intended to cover various thematic issues of social development as well as Korea's own experience of implementing ODA funded activities. The various approaches and resources Korea is using to share its experiences with its partners could also be used, where appropriate, in the context of its broader efforts to support capacity building through its grants and loans.

Ensure Korea's support to fragile states is guided by up-to-date and relevant policy

Korea includes 12 fragile states³ among its 26 priority partner countries and KOICA has recently developed guidelines for working in these challenging contexts (KOICA, 2012a). KOICA's guidelines follow international guidance for support to fragile states. They also outline how KOICA plans to carry out the recommendations of the *New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States* (G7+, 2011), anticipating Korea's official endorsement of this international agreement.⁴ Korea has signalled its intention to endorse the New Deal, recognising that it will benefit from participating in dialogue on this and that it can contribute lessons from its growing experience in fragile states to this forum. MOFAT could build on KOICA's guidelines, and on lessons from Korea's experience in these difficult contexts, as it develops cross-government and implementation guidance for working effectively in these situations. This will be particularly important for its policy towards lending to fragile states – discussed further in Chapter 3.

Ensure that all Korea's aid delivery channels support a common vision

Korea's strengthened legislative and strategic framework applies to all of its aid delivery channels (Figure 1.1) – not just the bilateral programmes managed by MOFAT, MOSF and other Korean ministries and agencies, but also multilateral, civil society organisations (CSOs), humanitarian assistance and the private sector. As Korea increases its ODA volume, it needs to ensure that the contributions of these different channels are aligned with its new policies and strategic framework.

Korea's support to the multilateral system is strong, but should be more strategic

Korea's *Mid-term ODA Policy for 2011-2015* (MOSF, 2010) includes separate strategies for the multilateral development banks (MDBs), supervised by MOSF; and for the UN and other multilateral organisations, supervised by MOFAT (Figure 1.1). Most of

the relationships between Korea and the multilateral organisations it supports are regulated by framework agreements that cover the important aspects of the partnership.

Korea views the multilateral system as complementary to its bilateral efforts, particularly in tackling cross-national issues such as climate change, food security and humanitarian issues; it has a policy of ensuring that 30% of its ODA is multilateral. Given that Korea intends to increase its ODA rapidly over the next few years, this 30% policy means that the multilateral channel will also increase swiftly. Korea supports the current UN reform to achieve consistency across all the UN development agencies. Korea's contribution to the work of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund is also significant.

Korea intends to develop a comprehensive multilateral strategy; this is an opportunity to decide how its increased contributions are to be allocated to the Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs), the UN and other multilateral organisations. In developing this strategy Korea should:

- take account of all its contributions to the multilateral system;
- confirm the rationale for its choice of organisations;
- specify its objectives for each multilateral agency it supports;
- outline its plans for allocations to the selected entities over the medium term; and
- explain how it will work with other donors to monitor agency performance.

Korea should continue to make use of and, where possible, contribute to joint evaluations for assessing the relevance, effectiveness and need for reform of multilateral entities, particularly through its membership of the Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN). Korea has been a member of MOPAN since 2008.

Korea works through a whole-of government approach involving MOFAT, MOSF, PMO and other relevant Korean ministries to influence multilateral aid policies, strategies and programmes and to monitor performance. It does so mainly through engagement in the governance structures of the organisations it supports and the use of earmarked funds, such as its World Bank Trust Fund for technical and advisory services on financial market development. Some DAC members, such as Canada, UK and the Netherlands, have found it useful to develop institutional strategies for each of the main multilateral organisations that they are supporting. These DAC members' institutional strategies are shared with the concerned multilateral organisations and the documents have helped these partners to reach a common understanding about priorities and issues. In the context of its planned comprehensive multilateral strategy, Korea might find this approach useful also.

Increasing and strengthening partnerships with civil society organisations

As a proportion of its total ODA Korea makes relatively little use of civil society organisations (CSOs) in delivering its programmes and does not yet have a policy or strategy for working with them. Korea's *Mid-term ODA Policy for 2011-2015* does, however, recognise civil society as equal partners and encourages their participation in broader-based development co-operation; it acts on this through activities such as its *Development Alliance* launched in 2012 as part of its efforts to implement the commitments of the Busan Global Partnership. The Development Alliance brings together 107 agencies and organisations from the private and government sectors for the purpose of information exchange and joint working. KOICA has developed its own *Mid-*

term CSOs and Private Sector Partnership Strategy for 2011-2015 (KOICA, 2011e) and has increased its budget for working with CSOs. It also has an *Implementation Plan for Partnership with Civil Society in the Humanitarian Assistance Sector* (KOICA, 2011a).

Korea has opportunities for engaging with the private sector

Korea's foreign and aid policies (MOFAT, 2010b and MOSF, 2010) present opportunities for it to engage with the private sector (in Korea and in partner countries), particularly for using ODA to leverage and catalyse private resources for development. As it develops programmes in this area, Korea should keep in mind the Busan outcome document with its emphasis on partner country ownership, and carefully manage collaborations with the private sector to ensure that partner country-led development objectives are adequately reflected. MOSF in particular is looking at opportunities for the Korean private sector to engage in development co-operation. The initial focus is on expanding public-private partnerships to enhance Korea's aid and help promote private investment in partner countries. In 2012 MOSF launched its *Global Infra Development Forum* where relevant ministries, agencies, private sector, other donors and partner countries discussed how to promote Public Private Partnerships (PPP) models for development. As it develops its strategy in this area, Korea should learn from other DAC members' engagement with the private sector – of particular relevance are Denmark's recent *Synthesis of Evaluations on Support to Business Development* (DANIDA, 2012) and the World Bank's *Lessons from Evaluation: Private Sector Development in a Changing World* (World Bank, 2012).

Korea needs to strengthen its approach for mainstreaming cross-cutting issues

Korea's *Mid-term ODA Policy for 2011-2015* focuses on five cross-cutting issues: environment, gender equality, human rights, information and communication technology (ICT), and democracy. These issues were chosen because they are critical elements of Korea's thematic priorities as well as necessary conditions for success in priority partner countries. Korea is trying to raise aid managers' awareness in these areas. The issues apply to all Korean international assistance programming: KOICA takes the lead in integrating them across the grant-funded programmes, while EDCF leads on the loan-funded activities.

KOICA has put guidelines in place for gender equality and women's empowerment

Of all Korea's development bodies, KOICA has done the most to mainstream gender equality and women's empowerment in its programmes; however it is too early to assess the impact of its efforts. In 2011 KOICA published its *Gender Mainstreaming Guideline* (KOICA, 2011f), which is being used to inform Korea's country partnership and sector strategies. KOICA and EDCF should learn from other agencies' experiences and good practice in mainstreaming gender equality over the past decade. These have been summarised in a recent report (African Development Bank, 2011). Korea has made a broader contribution to gender equality issues by: (1) championing the full integration of gender equality and women's empowerment throughout the High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan; (2) contributing funds to UN Women; and (3) making intellectual contributions to the DAC's Gender Network.

Korea prioritises environmental sustainability and climate change issues

Korea is committed to aid for environment and climate change; international co-operation for green growth is an integral part of Korea's 5-year Green Growth Strategy (Presidential Committee on Green Growth, 2009). In 2008 Korea launched its "East Asia Climate Partnership", a scheme to support developing countries in tackling climate change. Furthermore, Korea has a target to increase its "Green ODA" to 30% by 2020 (Box 3.1). These international commitments are reflected in the practices of both KOICA and EDCF. The latter agency has environmental safeguard mechanisms in place to minimise or prevent its development interventions having a negative impact on the environment and society. EDCF's environmental safeguards are based on those of the Asian Development Bank and are being enforced. KOICA also has environmental mainstreaming guidelines that were put in place in 2012 on a pilot basis – these guidelines will be revised in the light of the pilot for application across all of the Agency's programmes. Nonetheless, independent environmental agencies and CSOs in Korea have advocated that more emphasis is needed on climate change adaptation and mitigation and that KOICA and EDCF should undertake more rigorous analysis of proposed policies and programmes for climate risks and opportunities.

Communication and transparency should be strengthened

Since joining the DAC Korea has made efforts to improve the transparency of its development co-operation. However, **more needs to be done**. Korea has increased the information available on its ODA Korea website (www.odakorea.go.kr) and through other media, such as KOICA's and EDCF's annual reports. All of Korea's main ODA policies and strategies are accessible. Nevertheless, MOFAT and MOSF in particular could communicate the results of Korea's aid more effectively, especially to the Foreign Affairs, Trade & Unification Committee and the Strategy and Finance Committee of the National Assembly.⁵ **There is no budget or supplemental documentation that clearly sets out Korea's aid expenditure in each country and sector that stakeholders can easily access**. In addition, according to members of the National Assembly they would prefer to receive reports from MOFAT/KOICA and MOSF/EDCF that are shorter on detail and more focused on the results of Korea's aid and the challenges faced. The planned annual report on Korean ODA, to be introduced by the PMO from 2012 (to be published in early 2013), is an opportunity to tackle some of these weaknesses. It is also the case that only basic data on Korea's ODA are easily accessible. According to representatives of civil society and research institutions, only limited information on ODA grants and loans is available to the public (PSPD, 2011; ODA Watch, 2012).

Korean CSOs and NGOs also consider that their consultations with government officials on development fall short of the objectives and requirements of the Framework Act in this regard. They would like them to be invigorated, particularly policy dialogue (PSPD, 2011; ODA Watch, 2012). Consultation and policy dialogue with civil society and other stakeholders is *ad hoc* and selective. **MOFAT and MOSF in particular should ensure that consultation on policy is transparent and that it occurs early in the process, which would make it more meaningful**. In this regard it would be helpful if the government of Korea could develop and publish guidelines for policy consultation so that all participants know how these exercises will be carried out and what they can expect in terms of process and feedback. In addition, MOFAT and MOSF should stimulate more robust debates on development co-operation policy and related issues – such as the role of civil society and scaling up ODA. **These debates should occur within and between these**

two organisations, as well as with their respective agencies, across government and with universities, research institutes, think tanks and civil society.

Public opinion surveys commissioned by the Government of Korea since 2005 show an increase in public awareness of and support for international development co-operation (PMO, 2005; MOFAT, 2008; Korea Institute of International Economic Policy, 2011). In the latest survey, almost 90% of respondents confirmed their support for Korea's aid programme (Korea Institute of International Economic Policy, 2011). With Korea's ODA set to increase rapidly, a plan for explaining its development co-operation will be necessary to sustain public support. In the context of its *Annual Integrated Plan for ODA Public Relations* and joint task force led by the PMO, Korea needs to develop a coherent set of messages for target audiences stressing recent achievements and Korea's role, such as in reducing poverty and progress towards the MDGs. The PMO's *Public Awareness Enhancement Plan* (PMO, 2009), updated in 2012, will help to further increase and sustain public awareness. Adequate programming resources will also need to be dedicated to this purpose (currently 90% of Korea's communication budget is with KOICA), along with stronger relationships among PMO, MOFAT, MOSF and development CSOs. Important communication areas, such as development education in Korea's schools, also require more support. Korea could learn from the practices of DAC members such as Ireland and Finland.

Future considerations

- To provide a clear strategic vision for its programmes, Korea should build on the solid legal and policy foundations it has put in place by completing the framework to guide its increasing development co-operation. This requires clear aims and objectives for its thematic focus areas; country partnership strategies for each of its 26 priority partner countries; whole-of-government guidance and plans for working in fragile states; a comprehensive multilateral ODA strategy; and stronger guidance and plans for mainstreaming gender equality and women's empowerment; and environment and climate change across all of programmes, grants and loans.
- To increase transparency and accountability, PMO, MOFAT and MOSF should strengthen their efforts to make comprehensive information about Korea's development co-operation available. In particular, PMO, MOFAT and MOSF should disclose information on development co-operation policy, strategy, procedures, budget (countries and sectors), programmes and projects in a way that is easy for key stakeholders – parliamentarians, CSOs, NGOs, private sector, research institutes, partners and the general public – to access and understand.
- To increase public awareness with a view to creating broad support and using the rich expertise available, PMO, MOFAT and MOSF should strengthen consultation, communication and engagement. This could be done by: developing a public engagement strategy; making more efforts to consult on policy; targeting resources and appropriate methods to key audiences, particularly the Korean public; and engaging with the Korean parliament, civil society, development institutions, scholars and think tanks both at the policy and programming levels.

Notes

1. Key documents as part of this framework include those by the: National Assembly of the Republic of Korea (2010a); Prime Minister's Office (2010); Government of Korea (2010); Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2010b); and the Ministry of Strategy and Finance (2010).
2. As specified in the Mid-term ODA Policy for 2011-2015 (MOFAT, 2010b), and in annual implementation plans for 2011 and 2012.
3. Nepal, Bangladesh, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Timor-Leste, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Uganda, Cameroon, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) are all considered fragile states by the OECD (OECD, 2011c).
4. At the Fourth High-level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan, Korea in 2011, over 40 countries and organisations endorsed the New Deal, which agrees five peacebuilding and statebuilding goals (PSG).
5. This is the parliamentary body responsible for overseeing Korea's development co-operation, which has been re-constituted following a general election in 2012.

Chapter 2

Development Beyond Aid

Aid is only one factor in development; its impact depends on how well Korea and its partners combine it with other policies and leverage other resources for the benefit of developing countries. This chapter looks at the extent to which Korea has established the building blocks for policy coherence for development: (1) a political commitment that clearly specifies policy objectives; (2) policy co-ordination mechanisms; and (3) monitoring, analysis and reporting systems to provide the evidence for accountability and for well-informed policymaking and politics. The chapter also considers Korea's progress in implementing whole-of-government approaches to ensure a coherent approach to development. The chapter concludes with some recommendations for further strengthening its approach to development beyond aid: having a stronger commitment to policy coherence for development; developing sufficient capacity to co-ordinate the elimination of policy incoherence; strengthening the analysis of Korea's policies to determine their impacts on developing countries; and going further to adopt whole-of-government approaches in Korea's 26 priority partner countries.

Putting in place the building blocks for policy coherence for development

In an increasingly interconnected global economy, neglecting the impact of Korea's non-aid policies on developing countries can undermine its development objectives and the effectiveness of its aid. "Policy coherence for development" (PCD) means eliminating inconsistencies among Korea's foreign and domestic policies and the objectives of its aid policies. The ideal end point would be for all of Korea's non-aid policies to be at least neutral in their effect on developing countries. To achieve this will mean altering any of Korea's policies that have demonstrably negative impacts on developing countries.

Enhancing policy coherence for development has been a priority for the DAC and a key focus of peer reviews for many years. It has been given greater impetus through the OECD's *Strategy on Development*, approved by the Council of Ministers in May 2012 (OECD, 2012e). The OECD emphasises that policy coherence for development involves three building blocks (OECD, 2009c):

- 1) a political commitment to development friendly policies that clearly specifies policy objectives;
- 2) policy co-ordination mechanisms; and
- 3) monitoring, analysis and reporting systems to provide the evidence for accountability and for well-informed policymaking and politics.

Korea is beginning the process of ensuring that its policies all pull together in pursuit of development objectives by establishing the three institutional building blocks. However, while important, these institutional aspects are not sufficient – it is also crucial to recognise the essential role of greater knowledge sharing with developing countries so that Korea can better understand the impacts of its policies on them. There is already a relatively high level of understanding of the issues among the principal development co-operation ministries (PMO, MOFAT and MOSF) and Korea has begun to tackle certain areas of its policy that have been highlighted as problematic by the compilers of the Commitment to Development Index.¹ These include trade policy, especially increasing access to Korean markets for specific goods from least developed countries, where much needs to be done; and employing foreign workers in Korea (Government of Korea, 2012b). Korea has also promoted coherent policies among the G20 nations (Box 2.1).

Box 2.1. Korea's support for policy coherence for development within the G20

Korea seized the opportunity of chairing the G20 in 2010 to bring development issues to the forefront of global economic policy discussions. It targeted policy coherence for development issues which required G20 member policy or political will to shift, such as green growth and trade. Korea also served as a bridge between the developing and developed worlds through its own experience and expertise. Korea's leadership of the G20 summit and its participation in the UN Millennium Development Goals summit in September 2010 were other opportunities to stimulate a recommitment to the MDGs as the globally-agreed framework for development to 2015. The impact of these efforts has been to give a higher profile to development issues in these important global fora.

Source: GOK (2012b) *Memorandum for the DAC Peer Review Republic of Korea*, GOK, Seoul

On the basis of analysis and the recommendations of peer reviews, the OECD/DAC has drawn out common lessons for those members keen to make further and faster

progress on policy coherence for development (OECD, 2009c). These lessons and Korea's progress to date imply the following changes for the country in establishing the three building blocks:

- greater political promotion of and commitment to policy coherence for development at a high level, for example from the Prime Minister, Minister of Strategy and Finance and Minister of Foreign Affairs;
- a *requirement* for all concerned government departments to consider this dimension of policy;
- a set of cross-government objectives for policy coherence for development prepared by the PMO;
- strengthened policy co-ordination mechanisms; and
- a better understanding of development by the relevant government ministries, as well as greater capacity to facilitate the policy coherence for development agenda.

Towards building block 1: Greater political commitment and clear policy objectives

A key lesson from other peer reviews is that progress depends on public commitment to policy coherence for development at the highest political level, along with clear links to poverty reduction and internationally-agreed development goals. Since joining the DAC, Korea has not issued such a high-level political statement. Raising the level of political awareness and commitment can ensure that the policy coherence for development agenda is owned by all government departments. Commitment and support from the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Minister of Strategy and Finance will be vital to ensure that cabinet and all Korean government actors put development impacts on their agendas. Further progress towards policy coherence for development will be greatly assisted by the commitment of these leaders; and it is a necessary condition for establishing the first building block.

Another key step learned from other peer reviews is to embed the concept of development friendly policies within Korea's various ministries, principally by getting all departments to sign up to a clearly-prioritised and time-bound agenda which establishes cross-governmental objectives and a plan for achieving them (OECD, 2009c). This has proved challenging for many DAC members, but some elements of a potential agenda may be found in Korea's *Green Growth Strategy* (Presidential Committee on Green Growth, 2009). A number of other possible areas have been identified through analysis and research on policy coherence for development carried out in 2011 by MOFAT (Box 2.2). This research could be a good way to increase the awareness of government officials and could help shape a set of objectives for the whole of the government.

Box 2.2. Research into policy coherence for development in Korea

In 2011 MOFAT, through KOICA, commissioned analysis of policy coherence for development issues by Kyunghee University. A seminar for government officials was held in March 2012 to discuss the results. Following the seminar, MOFAT and KOICA developed a research project to further enhance the general understanding of the impact of Korea's policies on developing countries within the Korean government. The research project will be taken forward by Kyunghee University and will include analysis on development and immigration; green growth; natural resources and trade. In addition to these areas, MOFAT is already engaged in inter-departmental work on the private sector, including the promotion of corporate social responsibility among Korean businesses operating in developing countries.

Source: Information provided to the peer review team by the Government of Korea

Building on existing policy and MOFAT's research project, the PMO could facilitate relevant inter-ministerial groups to tackle instances of policy incoherence. These activities could then be promoted jointly at higher levels of government, such as the Committee for International Development Co-operation (CIDC) and the cabinet, as an agenda for action. Once adopted, Korea should set and prioritise specific objectives and a cross-governmental approach for each of the areas of action. However, this approach should not preclude other opportunities for tackling incoherence that may arise. Greater political will, policy statements and an agreed set of objectives will all help ensure that the first policy coherence for development building block is established in Korea.

Towards building block 2: policy co-ordination mechanisms

Korea's existing efforts towards eliminating policy incoherence mainly involve co-ordination mechanisms such as cross-departmental committees; this is a sensible way forward. The highest level committee is the Cabinet, of which the ministers of Foreign Affairs and Strategy and Finance are full members. One level below Cabinet is the CIDC. Korea is a signatory of the 2008 *OECD Ministerial Declaration on Policy Coherence for Development* (OECD, 2008c). This requires the Korean cabinet to:

- involve appropriate departments and other relevant bodies in the policymaking process and to ensure that their voices are heard; and
- ensure that information is gathered on the development impact of policies so that it can influence Korean policy and its interactions with the developing world.

This in turn requires CIDC and ultimately the cabinet to be informed by the various departments about the possible impact of their policy decisions on development. Crucial to the success of these mechanisms is the role of the Prime Minister and the PMO as chair and facilitator respectively of both the cabinet and the CIDC.

With its high-level chair and strong legal foundation, the CIDC has potential as a policy co-ordination mechanism. Lessons from peer reviews emphasise the importance of the development agency playing an active role in discussions about policy co-ordination and, in Korea's case, the CIDC is well-placed for this. The CIDC has been strengthened by the Framework Act and the Presidential Decree on International Development Co-operation and its terms of reference include a clear mandate for co-ordinating policy coherence for development across all the main ministries. To fulfil its potential the CIDC will need to develop and agree:

- a set of procedures for co-ordinating policy; and
- mechanisms for carrying them out.

This will involve working out how incoherent policies identified, such as those highlighted in Box 2.2, can be modified so as to maximise synergies and minimise incoherence. Strengthening the CIDC in this way would be an important step towards the second building block.

Towards building block 3: Increasing understanding and monitoring of policy coherence for development

If a broader range of government departments bought into the development friendly policy agenda this would enable a systematic screening of all relevant legislative proposals for their impact on developing countries. A first step towards this condition is for PMO, MOFAT and MOSF to promote awareness of the development-related consequences of incoherent policies among concerned government departments. Understanding of development issues is strongest in the government offices that have been working with MOFAT and MOSF on global concerns. For example, the Ministry of Employment and Labour is working with them to make its Employment Permit System (targeted at bringing workers to Korea from 15 developing countries) more development friendly.

As mentioned above, the CIDC is responsible for facilitating policy coherence for development across the Korean government, but its secretariat (the PMO) could give higher priority to this aspect of its work so that it can engage with other ministries to highlight the impact of their policies on development; make use of available research; identify statistical and analytical knowledge gaps and opportunities to act; and prepare briefs for the CIDC. While the PMO does not have a dedicated unit for policy coherence for development, members of its ODA Policy Bureau work closely with other PMO and other government ministries on specific coherence issues. Each ministry has an international co-operation unit or division for such liaison. However, it is equally important to increase understanding of how Korea's national policies affect developing countries outside these units – among other relevant teams in these ministries. This can be done through training and dialogue. In addition, the PMO's Policy Planning Co-ordination Bureau plays a role in achieving general policy coherence across government, not just for development.

Korea is not yet monitoring, analysing and reporting on policy coherence for development in a systematic way and thus has some way to go in establishing the third building block. Korea's *Annual Implementation Plan for Development Co-operation 2012* (GoK, 2012a) outlines plans for research on policy incoherence. These plans will build on the 2011 analyses of policy coherence for development by the PMO and MOFAT/KOICA, as well as on existing programmes, such as the previously mentioned work on trade with LDCs and Korea's employment permit system. Korea's plans do not yet include developing performance indicators of policy coherence for development, so developing these would be a logical next step. In addition, Korea could make further progress by taking into account the lessons identified by the OECD on monitoring, analysing and reporting on policy coherence for development (OECD, 2009c):

- **Monitoring:** CIDC has the potential to strengthen monitoring of policy coherence for development. In the field, Korea makes only limited use of its embassies to monitor the impact of relevant Korean policies on partner countries' development.
- **Analysis:** A prioritised coherence agenda shaped by the PMO would allow analysis to target a select number of important issues. The resources of PMO, MOFAT, MOSF and other key ministries could be complemented by drawing on the expertise of civil society and research institutes.
- **Reporting:** From 2012, reporting to the public on how Korea's policies contribute to development could become a regular feature of the PMO's planned annual report on Korea's development co-operation. The reporting should be focused on the prioritised coherence agenda, as suggested above.

Korea is increasing its use of whole-of-government approaches

A whole-of-government approach involves government ministries and agencies working with each other to achieve a shared development vision and an integrated government response to particular development issues. Working approaches can be both formal and informal, and are usually focused on policy development, programme management and aid delivery. In its latest *Annual Implementation Plan* for development co-operation (GoK, 2012a), Korea commits itself to making more use of whole-of-government approaches to carry out the policy intentions of its *Mid-term ODA Policy for 2011-2015*. In taking this forward Korea will be able to build on its experience of implementing a whole-of-government approach in some areas of its development co-operation, such as engaging with multilateral organisations, and its support in certain fragile states, particularly in Afghanistan. In addition, the Framework Act and Presidential Decree, together with the strengthened role of the CIDC, have helped to raise the profile of development and ODA within the government and to improve the quality of inter-departmental working on development issues.

In Afghanistan Korea operates a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) that involves officials from a number of Korean departments: MOFAT (the leading ministry), the Ministry of National Defence, the National Intelligence Service, the National Police Agency and KOICA. Representatives of these departments meet regularly at headquarters and in the field to discuss and co-ordinate their support to Afghanistan.

Joined-up approaches in fragile states

Remaining challenges for Korea in carrying out whole-of-government approaches in fragile states include:

- continuously updating Korea's overall joint strategy for each country and shaping guidelines for fragile states (see Chapter 1);
- arranging more cross-postings among the three principal ministries – development, defence and foreign affairs – to increase policy and programming links; and
- achieving greater synergy between development and peacekeeping/security efforts as their activities are separate in most cases.

As suggested in Chapter 1, Korea's responses to these challenges in Afghanistan and other fragile states should follow the *New Deal* endorsed in Busan (G7+, 2011) and should also build on the lessons that it, and other DAC members, have learned in recent years:

- effective whole-of-government approaches require a high level of political commitment, plus clear and strong leadership;
- an investment of time and energy is needed from the start to define and agree on common, or at least complementary, objectives among participating departments and then to discuss strategy and resources; and
- whole-of-government approaches will only be effective if resources can be mobilised around jointly-agreed strategies. Without this condition being met, such approaches will consist of little more than co-ordination for co-ordination's sake. Korea has learned in Afghanistan that once resources have been mobilised, it is essential that sufficiently high level co-ordinating mechanisms are put in place to provide the necessary inter-departmental oversight and ensure that decisions are made in a timely and informed manner.

Future considerations

- To strengthen Korea's commitment to policy coherence for development, PMO, along with MOSF and MOFAT, should create a government-wide agenda or plan to achieve development-friendly policies. This plan should set out the most important incoherencies to be tackled and the steps to be taken to address these issues.
- Taking its direction from the CIDC, the PMO should lead efforts to build sufficient technical and political capacity to co-ordinate and enhance policy coherence for development within the government of Korea.
- A key objective for PMO and MOFAT should be to strengthen analysis of how Korea's foreign and domestic policies affect developing countries. This analysis should inform Korea's monitoring, reporting and policies and incorporate the views of its diplomatic and development missions in the field; appropriate government departments in Seoul; relevant Korean universities, CSOs and think tanks.
- To maximise the impact of Korea's development assistance and building on its experience and that of other DAC members, PMO, MOFAT and MOSF should ensure that Korea's future support for its priority partner countries incorporates whole-of-government approaches.

Notes

1. The Commitment to Development Index (CDI) ranks 22 of the world's richest countries according to their dedication to policies that benefit the five billion people living in poorer nations. Moving beyond standard comparisons of foreign aid volumes, the CDI quantifies a range of rich country policies that affect poor people in developing countries (Center for Global Development, 2011).

Chapter 3

Aid volumes, channels and allocations

Korea has set targets and undertaken international commitments for the level of its aid. This chapter looks at Korea's official development assistance (ODA) figures, including the overall volume and components of its aid, its approach to bilateral and multilateral aid channels, the use of grants and loans and geographic and sector allocations. The chapter uses data to track Korea's performance against its national and international commitments; reviews changes in aid levels as well as plans for meeting its targets; how closely allocations reflect Korea's stated policy; and looks at how bilateral and multilateral budgeting processes and policies support the effectiveness of the overall system. The chapter concludes with some future considerations that are designed to build on Korea's achievements since joining the DAC to strengthen further its performance in respect of ODA volume, its approach to bilateral and multilateral aid channels and the geographic and sector allocations of its aid.

Korea needs to sustain increases in its ODA volume

Several years of steady growth saw Korea's ODA reach USD 1,325 million in 2011, equivalent to 0.12% of its gross national income (GNI). This was an increase of almost 6% in volume terms from 2010, when Korea's aid surpassed USD 1 billion for the first time. However, Korea's ODA/GNI ratio in 2011 remained the same as that for 2010 and below its 0.13% target for the year (MOSF, 2008). Korea has committed to scale up its aid to achieve an ODA/GNI ratio of 0.25% by 2015 (GOK, 2010). Korea is not a small donor: its ODA volume was the 17th largest within the DAC in 2011, up one place from 2010, and its commitment to increase ODA could bring it up to 15th position by 2015 (Graph AI, Annex A).


Korea faces two major challenges in achieving its target ODA/GNI ratio by 2015:

- First, it must more than double its ODA/GNI ratio over the next three years; and,
- second, it has to manage the aid increase effectively, particularly to ensure a steady and predictable rate of growth while striking a manageable and appropriate balance between bilateral and multilateral channels and grants and loans.

In light of Korea's expected rate of economic growth over the medium term of 3-3.5% (OECD, 2012a), there would appear to be ample financial scope for the planned increases in its aid volume. The peer review team estimates that Korea's ODA volume would need to be approximately USD 3,200 million by 2015 to achieve its ODA/GNI target of 0.25%. Therefore, Korea will need to increase its aid by an average annual rate of 25% for the years 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015 (Figure 3.1), a little higher than the rate of increase experienced since 2006 and a steeper trajectory for these years than the Korean government envisaged in 2009.

Figure 3.1. Korea's official development assistance, 2006-2015

(disbursement, current prices USD millions)




Sources: OECD statistics and peer review team estimates; MOSF (Ministry of Strategy and Finance of the Republic of Korea) (2008) *Korea's ODA and the MOSF*, MOSF, Seoul; GOK (2010) *Strategic Plan for International Development Co-operation*, GOK, Seoul

As for the second challenge, **Korea should think about how it can most effectively distribute the increased money across the various channels** (bilateral and multilateral aid), instruments (grants and loans), countries, sectors, modes of delivery (projects, programmes, budget support) and partnerships (such as civil society and the private sector). Several other DAC members (Australia, Finland and the UK) have rapidly increased their aid in recent years and have each adopted different strategies with varying degrees of success. If Korea can finance and manage the planned increases in its aid programme and then build on this in the years that follow, its development effort ultimately should reflect its position as the world's 13th largest economy.

Korea has a relatively concentrated aid system, but **coordination remains a challenge**

Korea's system for managing aid is more concentrated than most DAC members, but fragmentation is becoming an issue. In 2011, 88% of Korea's ODA was concentrated in two ministries: MOFAT (and its agency, KOICA); and MOSF (and its agency, EDCF), see Figure 3.2. While there were **more than 30 Korean authorities involved with ODA in 2011, these accounted for only 12% of the total**. However, as the volume of Korean ODA is set to more than double over the next three years, **fragmentation may become more of an issue, especially if the planning and budgeting issues referred to below (Section 3.3) are not fixed**.

Figure 3.2. Korean ODA by government department, 2011



Source: Data provided to the peer review team by EDCF


Korea's planning and budgeting process for its ODA should be strengthened

Korea has a potentially effective planning and budgeting process for its ODA (Figure 3.3), but it is not yet ensuring that all areas of the aid programme are consistent with its strategy, particularly those being supported by ministries other than MOFAT and MOSF. In addition, the project approval process is sometimes unpredictable, with several proposed projects ultimately rejected each year even though they have been approved by the responsible Inter-Agency Committees within Korea's system. To tackle these weaknesses, all line ministries should be accountable to the Inter-Agency Grants

Committee or the Inter-Agency EDCF Committee (depending on whether grants or loans are being considered) and CIDC for their ODA-funded activities (see Chapter 4 and Figure 4.1). The CIDC is the main decision maker about Korea's aid budget; however, its mandate is constrained by two main factors:

- MOSF's Budget Office has a separate veto on grants and loans that it considers do not meet its own project approval criteria – this has resulted in several projects and programmes being rejected after they have been approved by the respective Inter-Agency Committees for grants and loans and endorsed by the CIDC through Korea's annual ODA plan.
- Korean line ministries often bypass the Inter-Agency Grants Committee and request and receive project approvals directly from the MOSF Budget Office for ODA-funded activities.

Figure 3.3. Korea's ODA planning and budgeting process, 2012



Source: Information presented to the peer review team by the Government of Korea

Budget Office approvals of ODA-funded activities that are developed by line ministries outside of Korea's ODA planning and budgeting process could undermine the effectiveness of its aid, increase the transaction costs of its partners and can weaken partner country ownership. In Cambodia, for example, Korea's Ministry of Health developed an ODA-funded programme with the Cambodian Ministry of Health without sufficient reference to Korea's ODA planning and budgeting process or the central government body in Cambodia responsible for co-ordinating aid. Given that project preparation takes time and that the expectations of partners are raised, it is important that Korea's approval process is predictable. In 2010 and 2011 Korea reported that its ODA budget execution performance against allocations was 87% and 84% respectively, indicating the need for improvement to the budget and planning process to improve execution rates.

To improve the performance of Korea's aid system, three changes should be considered:

- The Budget Office's project approval criteria should be clear ex ante and discussed in the CIDC with regard to their appropriateness for ODA funded operations.
- The Budget Office's views on projects and programmes should be sought much earlier in the planning and budgeting process, preferably before they reach the respective Inter-Agency Committees for grants and loans.
- The Budget Office should not consider or approve any ODA-funded activity that is proposed outside the established ODA planning and budgeting process.


Allocations: Korea has target ratios for bilateral and multilateral ODA, grants and loans

When making its allocations, Korea first divides its ODA between the bilateral and multilateral channels. The second division is then between grants and loans within the bilateral channel. The remainder of this chapter follows these divisions of Korea's ODA: we begin with an analysis of Korea's bilateral ODA and, within this, the use of grants and loans, geographical and thematic concentration and cross-cutting issues; this is followed by analysis of Korea's multilateral ODA.

Korea's allocations to its two main channels have varied from a ratio of 83:17 (bilateral: multilateral) in 2006 to 75:25 in 2011. Korea has set a target ratio of bilateral to multilateral funding of 70:30 to be achieved from 2012 to mirror as closely as possible the DAC average multilateral aid share, this average was 28% in 2011. Given the major increases planned in Korea's ODA over the next three years, however, it may be appropriate to adopt a more flexible approach. Some DAC members have found it easier to grow their ODA through increased contributions to the multilateral channel.

Bilateral aid

It is good practice for DAC members to make the most of their aid by focusing it on their geographical and thematic priorities. While Korea's aid flows are focused on its thematic priorities, they are not yet sufficiently aligned to its 26 priority partner countries (Figure 3.4). Korea is above the DAC average in terms of the proportion of a DAC member's total bilateral ODA that is spent on its top 10 and 20 aid recipients. In 2009/10 Korea's top 10 recipients accounted for 49% of its bilateral aid and its top 20 recipients received 68%, compared to the DAC averages of 39% and 52% respectively (Table A.4, Annex A). However, only 12 of Korea's top 20 recipients are among its 26 priority partner countries. This indicates that Korea has more to do to achieve its aim of focusing 70% of its bilateral resources on these geographical priorities.

Figure 3.4. Korea's 26 priority partner countries, 2012

Source: information presented to the peer review team by the Government of Korea

Korea's concentration on its priority partner countries has increased from 47% of its total bilateral aid to 24 priority partners in 2009 to 55% to 25 priority partners in 2010.¹ The proportion of bilateral aid that Korea concentrates on its priority partners should increase further as its allocation process is now geared to focus 70% of its bilateral aid (grants and loans) on these 26 countries from 2012 (GOK, 2012b). It is important to note that 13% (USD 98 million) of Korea's bilateral ODA was not allocated to countries in 2010; this is a relatively low proportion compared to other DAC members, but it affects the picture to a certain extent. Only taking into account Korea's bilateral ODA actually allocated to countries, the percentage of this spent in its top 20 recipients in 2010 was much higher: 78% (Table A4, Annex A). Korea is among the top five donors in only three of its 26 priority partner countries (Laos, Mongolia and Uzbekistan) and among the top 10 in just four others (Paraguay, Philippines, Sri Lanka and Vietnam). This is probably due to the relatively low ODA volume of Korea, but it also indicates that it needs to increase its concentration efforts (see Section 3.4.3). Further rationalisation of Korean ODA, if co-ordinated effectively with other development partners, could contribute to a better global donor division of labour.

Korea has increased the amount of aid it gives to the poorest countries


Over the last five years Korea has been increasing its aid to least developed countries (LDCs) and other low-income countries (LICs), particularly heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC); it should sustain this trend. In 2010 Korea allocated 61% of its gross bilateral ODA to the first two groups of countries, which is above the DAC average of 53% (Table A3, Annex A) and up from only 38% in 2006. Korea is committed to its policies to increase its aid for LDCs and heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) in particular; it should therefore continue to maintain these positive trends. While most of Korea's assistance goes to Asia, it doubled its support to Africa between 2005 and 2008 through its *Initiative for Africa's Development*. This initiative came to an end in 2008; Korea announced a second programme of assistance at the Korea-Africa Forum in November 2009 (GOK, 2012b). In 2010 Korea allocated 14% of its gross bilateral ODA to sub-Saharan Africa, compared to 11% of a much smaller total in 2006.

The level of Korea's country programmable aid is high, but it is spread thinly

Korea has the highest level of country programmable aid (CPA) of any DAC member, but, as with its bilateral ODA more generally, it is not sufficiently focused on its 26 priority partner countries. Country programmable aid is a measure of a donor's contribution to the “core” development programmes of its partner countries; it is spent in the partner country and is normally reflected in government-to-government agreements, such as memoranda of understanding. Korea's CPA amounted to USD 848 million in 2010 (Figure 3.5), equivalent to 91% of its gross bilateral ODA. This is much greater than the DAC average of 55%. Korea's high CPA figure is caused mainly by its low levels of other bilateral costs, such as in-donor costs, humanitarian assistance and debt relief. Debt relief amounts to only 0.3% of Korea's gross bilateral ODA (Figures 3.5 and 3.6). However, Korea's stock of debt with ODA-recipient countries is growing and it is already in touch with the Paris Club and participating in dialogue regarding debt-rescheduling as and when necessary. As noted above, the proportion of Korea's bilateral ODA that is allocated to countries (87%) is also higher than other DAC members and this is associated with above average levels of CPA.

While Korea had high levels of CPA in 2010, this was spread thinly across 79 recipient countries (10 more than in 2009), of which 25 were priority partner countries in that year. This made Korea one of the least concentrated DAC members in 2010. As indicated above it has some way to go to achieve its stated aim of concentrating its bilateral ODA (most of which is CPA) on its 26 priority partner countries. These received 60% of all Korea's CPA in 2010. That same year it was a significant donor in 28 out of 79 countries who received its CPA – a lower CPA concentration ratio (35%) than the average of 54% for DAC members. Moreover, only 12 of the 28 countries in which Korea is significant are among its priority partner countries. The average CPA in Korea's priority partner countries for 2010 was USD 20 million *versus* USD 6 million in its other partner countries. The main message from this analysis is, therefore, that Korea should continue to concentrate its ODA on its priority partner countries and, as suggested in Chapter 1, consider reducing the number of these so that it can become a significant donor in more of them.

Figure 3.5. Composition of Korea's bilateral ODA, 2010



Source: OECD statistics


A need for greater focus within Korea's wide-ranging thematic priorities

Korea spends most of its money on support to education, health and basic infrastructure, particularly transport (Table A.5, Annex A). These allocations are in line with Korea's policies and strategies, but, as discussed in Chapter 1, the sectors supported are wide ranging and there is a need to focus within these on key priorities in consultation with partner countries.

An over-reliance on project aid

As part of its commitment to the Paris Declaration principles and also as a means to scale up its aid, Korea is planning to incorporate new aid modalities in its programming for both loans and grants. However, in 2010 Korea allocated only 3% of its total bilateral ODA through programme-based approaches (PBAs) or pooled funds. Most of Korea's bilateral aid (86%) was delivered in the form of conventional grant or loan-funded projects and technical assistance (Figure 3.6), mainly stand-alone in nature. The average size of Korea's projects is USD 1 million for grants and USD 30 million for loans.

KOICA is in the process of formulating guidelines and new instruments for programme-based approaches and, together with EDCF, is engaged in a pilot sector budget support programme in Vietnam. The senior managers of KOICA and EDCF appreciate that in order to increase participation in programmes it will be necessary for these agencies to also develop sufficient capacity in the field to engage in policy dialogue and manage a broader set of issues, such as governance and public financial management. The two agencies' parent ministries, MOFAT and MOSF, also appreciate that to scale up Korea's aid successfully they have to move away from their current reliance on small-scale conventional projects to deliver their assistance. This will also involve a shift towards multi-year ODA plans for countries and programmes. While Korea's system is based on annual budgeting, the Korean Budget Office has confirmed that this is not a constraint to the development and publishing of multi-year assistance plans (this is already happening with Korea's humanitarian assistance; Chapter 6).

Figure 3.6. Korea's bilateral ODA by type of aid, 2010

Source: OECD statistics

Korea should ensure that its loans are the most appropriate responses to its partners' needs

The division between grants and loans has been a subject of debate among MOFAT, MOSF and PMO and there is now a policy governing this ratio (GoK, 2012b). This policy targets a 60:40 (grants: loans) ratio for Korea's bilateral ODA net disbursements. In 2010, the ratio was 61:39 (grants: loans). Only a few DAC members use loans to any real extent: in 2010, two of these – France and Germany – had a loan component equal to 27% of their bilateral aid portfolios; while Japan had a ratio of grants to loans of 46:54. Korea's emphasis on loans can be explained by its own positive experience as a recipient of this kind of aid in the past and the profoundly held belief among some of its political leaders and aid managers that loans impose essential fiscal discipline on the recipient country.

Loans continue to be a valid instrument for financing development in the right circumstances, but Korea should pay careful attention to the impact of its loan programme on the recipient's debt sustainability in the medium term – a pre-condition for development – particularly in LDCs and fragile states and those countries rated as in debt distress or at risk of debt distress (UN, 2012). Generally, debt sustainability issues mean that concessional loans would mostly be given by a DAC member to middle income countries (MICs) rather than to LDCs and fragile states; this is also Korea's policy. However, in 2010 there was little difference between Korea's use of loans in MICs (38% of its total support), LDCs (39%) and fragile states (41%). Korea's ratio of grants to loans in HIPC countries in 2010 was 82:18, a much higher ratio than in other country groups. For Korea's 25 priority partner countries in 2010, the ratio was 48:52.

With more favourable terms in operation since 2008 Korea has met the provisions of the *DAC Recommendation on the Terms and Conditions of Aid* (OECD, 1978). The recommendation states that ODA to LDCs "should essentially be in the form of grants, and as a minimum, the average grant element of all commitments from a given donor should either be at least 86% to each Least Developed Country over a period of three

years, or at least 90% annually” as a group.² In order to meet these provisions Korea changed the terms of its concessional lending in July 2008. It increased the repayment period for LDCs from 30 to 40 years and the grace period from 10 to 15 years, and reduced the interest rate from 0.5% to between 0.01% and 0.1% (Table 3.2).

Table 3.1. Grant element of Korean ODA loans by category of country

Countries	Grant Element since July 2008 (%)
Category 1: LDCs	78.9 - 91.1*
Category 2: > \$935 per capita GNI	84.6 - 91.0
Category 3: > \$1785 per capita GNI	70.4 - 88.8
Category 4: > \$3705 per capita GNI	59.2 - 87.6
Category 5: > \$6465 per capita GNI	85.4 - 90.8

*A small number of Korea’s loans to LDCs after July 2008 were made on terms that were previously agreed with the recipient governments with grant elements below 90.


Source: information presented to the peer review team by EDCF.

As a result, the average grant element of Korea’s assistance to LDCs from 2009 to 2010 was 89.4% and 91% in 2010.³ Korea therefore met both the 90% mark under the Recommendation for LDCs overall and the 86% minimum for each individual LDC in 2010. Korea is monitoring its overall loan portfolio to ensure that the potential hardening of terms for one group of middle income countries (Category 3 in Table 3.2) does not reduce the overall grant element of its total ODA to below 86%.

While Korea meets the criteria of the Recommendation, it should ensure that in each case its loans are given only when (1) they are the best means of addressing the development need of a particular partner country; and (2) they meet specific objectives in a partner country’s development strategy. It is also important to note that loans have a drawback: the negative entries required when loans are eventually repaid may make it more difficult for Korea to meet its medium-term targets for net ODA. Korea’s heavy reliance on loans will require it to plan carefully over the medium to long term to ensure that repayments are fully taken into account in its plans for scaling up its ODA.

Increased spending on cross-cutting issues: gender equality and the environment


Korea committed a low proportion of its sector allocable ODA to gender equality and women’s empowerment in 2010 (a little under 8%, or USD 132 million), which is less than most other DAC members. However, this is an increase over the amount of ODA Korea devoted to this activity in previous years (Figure 3.7).

Figure 3.7. Korea's ODA in support of gender equality and women's empowerment, 2007-10 (2009 USD millions)

Source: OECD statistics

It is good that in 2011 KOICA established a Gender Mainstreaming Guideline; through this it is expected that 10% of the budget for each project supported by the agency will be allocated to activities for gender equality (KOICA, 2011f).

Korea's contribution to environment and climate change-related activities increased to 14.1% of its bilateral ODA in 2010 from 1.7% in 2007 (Figure 3.8).

Figure 3.8. Korea's ODA to the objectives of the Rio Conventions, 2007-2010

Source: OECD statistics

Korea aims to increase its “green ODA” to 30% by 2020 (Box 3.1). It committed almost USD 250 million of its ODA in 2010 to climate change adaptation, including USD 27.5 million to the Global Environment Facility for the period 2010 to 2014; and USD 20 million to the Asian Development Bank's Future Carbon Fund for the period 2010 to 2013. Korea should ensure that its draft definition of “green ODA” is consistent with the DAC's Creditor Reporting System's environment marker so that data are internationally comparable and credible.

Box 3.1. Korea's green ODA and global development initiatives

Greening ODA is one of Korea's key agendas. In 2008 the government established the USD 200 million East Asia Climate Partnership (EACP) Initiative, covering 2008 to 2012. The EACP includes 29 projects in 5 areas of green growth: water management, low-carbon energy, low-carbon cities, waste treatment, and forestation and biomass. Through the EACP, the proportion of Korea's green ODA increased from 11.3% of total bilateral ODA in 2007 to 13.6% in 2010. Korea has also increased its contributions to various green multilateral funds.

On the technical co-operation front, Korea led the establishment of the Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI) in 2010 with headquarters in Seoul and offices in Copenhagen, Abu Dhabi and London. This research centre shares knowledge of good practice on green growth and assists developing countries in building sustainable green growth models that integrate economic, environmental and social development objectives. So far, the organisation has attracted Australia, Denmark, Japan and the UAE as major donors and has been working on green growth planning in developing economies such as Brazil, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, the Philippines and Thailand. As of 18 October, GGGI was officially launched as an international organisation.


Source: OECD (2012b), Development Co-operation Report 2012, OECD, Paris

Increasing Korea's engagement with civil society and the private sector

The volume of aid that Korea channels to and through CSOs and NGOs increased from USD 11 million in 2009 to USD 18 million in 2010, but this channel remains one of the smallest components of Korea's development assistance (less than 2% of its total ODA in 2010). This reflects the lack of a clear strategy for working with civil society. KOICA has increased amounts for NGOs and CSOs in its 2012 budget, in accordance with its agency strategy for working with civil society and the private sector (KOICA, 2011a). Korea could consider increasing both the scale of overall support that it channels through CSOs as well as the size of individual funding agreements to improve effectiveness and efficiency. In developing its work with civil society, Korea should take into account the lessons of other DAC members in this area, recently summarised in *12 Lessons from DAC Peer Reviews on Partnering with Civil Society* (OECD, 2012f).

Multilateral aid

Korea increased its core contributions to the multilateral system in 2010 and 2011 and it plans to strengthen its support in the future. These increases are in line with its policy of allocating 30% of its total ODA to the multilateral channel. In 2010, Korea provided USD 273 million in multilateral ODA (as "core" funding), representing 23% of its net ODA. This was supplemented by an additional USD 45 million through multilateral organisations in the form of non-core contributions to fund specific earmarked activities (referred to as multi-bi). These core and non-core contributions made a total of USD 318 million channelled to and through the multilateral system (Figure 3.9). In 2011 Korea's multilateral ODA amounted to USD 337.4 million (in current prices), an increase of 16% over 2010 in real terms. In terms of volume, Korea was the 20th largest DAC contributor of multilateral ODA in 2010.

Figure 3.9. Korea's core and non-core multilateral aid, 2010 (USD million)

Source: OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS)

Korea's support is provided in a way that is generally welcomed by its multilateral partners, although some would prefer Korea to make multi-year commitments for its core contributions. In 2010 most of Korea's multilateral ODA was concentrated on the World Bank Group (41%), followed by the UN agencies (24%), the Asian Development Bank (16%), other regional development banks (8%) and UN Funds and Programmes (4%). In the same year Korea's largest non-core contributions went to the UN Funds and Programmes (USD 14 million), other UN institutions (USD 12 million) and regional development banks (USD 11 million); 12% of Korea's non-core contributions were humanitarian aid.

Korea aims to make the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank Group and UN system stronger and more effective and contributes to capital, special funds, trust funds and global initiatives for this purpose. Korea backs up its financial contribution by participating in the governance structures of the multilateral organisations it supports. Responsibility for this is shared between MOFAT and MOSF. Korea is the 18th largest shareholder of the IMF and the 17th largest of the World Bank Group, which stated to the peer review team their appreciation of Korea's reasonably high level of core contributions and its positive engagement in the governance of their organisations through board meetings. Korea has actively supported and engaged in the *Delivering as One* approach being piloted by the United Nations system at the country level. Korea's leadership during its G20 Presidency and its high-level support for gender equality and green growth also reflect its willingness to promote effective aid architecture and complementarities across international organisations.

Non-ODA flows

In recent years, there has been a growing recognition of the importance of non-ODA financing in the development finance picture. Many DAC members give developing countries other official finance (OOF) that does not qualify as ODA – either because the operations are clearly not development-motivated (*e.g.* export-related) or because the finance is extended at non-concessional terms (*e.g.* non-concessional loans from bilateral development finance institutions). Since last year, the DAC has been implementing a

special workstream to improve DAC statistics on these types of finance⁴ (this includes a study of private financing leveraged by public interventions).

Statistical reviews carried out by the OECD's Development Co-operation Directorate highlighted that Korea's reporting on non-ODA flows is only partial. While Korea has two active export credit agencies – Kexim and K-Sure – only Kexim's direct lending operations have been included in its DAC statistics. All guaranteed export credits, reportable to the DAC under private flows, are also missing. This issue has already been discussed between OECD and Korea and it is hoped that coverage will improve in future.

According to DAC figures (Annex B, Table B.1), Korea's other official flows to developing countries have been on average USD 1.3 billion a year since 2007. Korea's private investors have also provided substantial flows in this period (an average of USD 7.9 billion), with a slight dip following the financial crisis of 2008. However, Korea's private flows at market terms to developing countries in 2010 were USD 8.7 billion (excluding export credits, see paragraph above), which is not far from the level reached in 2007 (USD 9.8 billion). In addition, Korea's net private grants for developing countries amounted to USD 49.2 million in 2010 and were substantially lower than the two previous years. As part of its focus on sustainable economic growth, Korea aims to use its ODA to help create the right kind of conditions for investment so as to leverage private sector investment in its partner countries, principally through the activities discussed in Chapter 1.

Future considerations

- Korea should make all effort to continue its recent increases in aid volumes so as to achieve its target ODA/GNI ratio of 0.25% by 2015.
- As its ODA continues to grow, Korea should allocate the increased aid resources: (1) through manageable balances between bilateral and multilateral channels and between grants and loans; (2) guided by clear strategies for thematic priorities and engaging with civil society and the private sector; while (3) strengthening the ODA planning and budgeting process to ensure consistency of approach across all Korean development co-operation.
- To make the most of its bilateral assistance, Korea should continue to concentrate its bilateral programming resources on the 26 priority partner countries, particularly the LDCs, while also maintaining the policy of no more than two or three thematic priorities in each country.
- To ensure debt sustainability, Korea should assess carefully the ratio of grants to loans for fragile states and HIPC countries and when extending loans consider carefully the economic context and financial governance of these countries. Korea should also ensure that its choice of aid instrument reflects development objectives and partner country ownership.
- Korea should continue to concentrate its multilateral ODA on a small number of entities and link its support more closely to agency performance (supporting and making use of MOPAN to measure this) and Korea's priorities.

Notes

1. Korea had 24 priority partner countries in 2009 and added Cameroon and the Solomon Islands to the list in 2010, bringing the total to 26.
2. The “grant element” is the difference between the face value of a financial loan commitment and the discounted present value (using a 10% discount rate) of the service payments to be made by the borrower during the lifetime of the loan, expressed as a percentage of face value.
3. The Recommendation also states that “Members should endeavour fully to maintain or achieve as soon as possible an average grant element in their ODA commitments of at least 86 per cent” and that “Countries whose ODA commitments as a percentage of GNI are significantly below the DAC average will not be considered as having met this term’s target”. Korea’s grant element in 2010 was 93.6% of its ODA commitment, so it meets the first element of the Recommendation. However, Korea’s ODA commitment (0.25%) as a percentage of its GNI is significantly below the 2010 DAC average of 0.37%, meaning that it does not meet the associated volume test. “Significantly below” is traditionally interpreted as meaning more than 25% below, so only countries with less than 0.28% ODA/GNI commitments in 2010 fail it. Three other DAC members – Greece, Italy and the United States – also did not meet the volume test in 2010.
4. So far, two major statistical reviews have been carried out (on export credits and DFIs’ operations). These highlight a number of issues to be solved, such as the coverage (incomplete for both series), the classification (to better reflect the variety of financial instruments) and the measurement (net vs. gross disbursement for further valorising financing beyond traditional ODA).

Chapter 4

Organisation and management

The DAC requires Korea (and all DAC members) to put in place sound organisational management structures, including appropriate institutional frameworks with sufficient ability and operational capacity; a system to monitor performance; and an impartial and independent evaluation system. This chapter assesses whether Korea's aid administration and organisation are appropriate to meet its development goals and objectives; whether it has the appropriate capacities; and what efforts it is making to ensure the system delivers aid effectively. It describes how Korea's aid system is based on two main pillars: grants and loans, the former managed by MOFAT and the latter by MOSF. Major recent steps forward include (1) the strengthened role of the Committee for International Development Co-operation (CIDC) as the central body responsible for aid policy and co-ordination; and (2) the introduction of country partnership strategies (CPS) that, for the first time, bring together Korea's grants and loans into one document. Remaining challenges include achieving greater synergies between loans and grants; strengthening co-ordination mechanisms, especially the CIDC; making the Budget Office more proactive; increasing staff capacity; and improving evaluation.

Korea's development co-operation system: two pillars and two main challenges

Korea's aid system is based on two main pillars: grants and loans (see Figure 1.1 in Chapter 1), the former managed by MOFAT and the latter by MOSF (Figure 4.1). Most of Korea's ODA (88% in 2011) is concentrated in these two ministries (Chapter 3). In addition, over 30 other ministries, agencies and municipalities provide small amounts of grant aid (mostly in the form of technical co-operation) for different purposes to more than 70 developing countries.¹

The division of labour between the two principal ministries and their respective agencies is clear and appears to be working well generally. Under the first pillar (grant-based aid), MOFAT sets the grant aid policies and KOICA carries them out with a high level of decentralised authority once projects have been approved. KOICA has a limited role in policymaking by providing input into the decisions of the Ministry. Under the second pillar (loan-based aid), MOSF sets policy directions and oversees the Eximbank's execution of the EDCF including the approval of its loans. MOSF chairs the Fund Management Council, which is responsible for the EDCF's operation and management. While the amount, terms and conditions of the loans are determined by MOSF, once approved, EDCF has the authority to enter into the loan agreement with the partner country and make operational decisions. EDCF is also the agency responsible for collecting and managing Korea's ODA statistics and its participation in the DAC's Working Party on Statistics.

What challenges arise from this set-up?

1. **How to integrate all grants (from all agencies) and loans into a unified strategy; and,**
2. **How to co-ordinate aid effectively, particularly at country level.**

These challenges are becoming more important given Korea's planned ODA increases and its commitment to the Paris Declaration aid effectiveness principles (Chapter 5), and are the subject of the sections that follow.


Korea has improved the integration and co-ordination of its aid

The Framework Act provides the legal and political foundation for Korea's development co-operation and makes clear the various roles and responsibilities of the different actors involved.² Building on the existing good consultation between ministries that is part of the Korean government's mode of working, the Framework Act supports ODA policy co-ordination and addresses fragmentation through establishing formal structures and processes for decision making. These structures and processes can be built on and strengthened still further, as discussed in the following sections.

At the centre of Korea's aid system (Figure 4.1) is the strengthened and high-level Committee for International Development Co-operation (CIDC). CIDC is chaired by the Prime Minister and comprises 15 ministers,³ the heads of KOICA and Eximbank, and seven civilian experts appointed by the Prime Minister.⁴ The CIDC was established in 2006 as the country's highest decision-making body – an “ODA control tower” – to oversee and strengthen policy co-ordination and the strategic aspects of Korean ODA. The Framework Act confirms these responsibilities, and under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister, the CIDC has *de facto* authority to direct all ministries as decreed by the President. The CIDC has met on average thrice a year (13 times as of November 2012) since the enactment of the Framework Act and has made some important decisions,

particularly to promote an integrated approach to Korea's development co-operation. The agenda and the key decisions of the CIDC meetings are made public on the Korea ODA website. At the policy level, the CIDC is supported by a Working Committee chaired by the Vice Minister for Government Policy of PMO which meets at bureau-chief level and includes seven civilian experts as members. The Working Committee is responsible for setting the agenda for deliberations by the CIDC.

Figure 4.1. Korea's aid management architecture



Source: Adapted from GOK (2012b) Memorandum for the DAC Peer Review Republic of Korea, GOK, Seoul

While Korea has strengthened the co-ordination of its aid, many challenges remain, particularly in making co-ordination mechanisms work as intended and to ensure there is sufficient capacity to support them. MOFAT serves as the Executive Secretary to the Inter-Agency Grants Committee while MOSF plays the same role for the Inter-Agency EDCF Committee. These committees co-ordinate the government's grant and concessional loan activities and report upwards to the CIDC. As discussed in Chapter 3, in principle, **other ministries and agencies must consult with and receive approvals from these committees for their own ODA activities in order to ensure a consistent approach across the government.** In addition, the Inter-Agency EDCF Committee also promotes better synergies between EDCF and other ministries through developing joint projects, including co-financing.⁵ However, as suggested in Chapter 3 these co-ordination mechanisms need strengthening to achieve greater consistency of programmes, more effective delivery of Korea's aid and greater integration between Korea's loans and grants.

Achieve greater synergies between loans and grants

A good first step would be more dialogue between the two inter-agency committees and the two ministries and agencies from the earliest stages of programming. For example, all requests for EDCF loans are transmitted through Korea's diplomatic channel (*i.e.* the embassy and MOFAT) to MOSF. But **at no stage is there a joint discussion between MOFAT and MOSF on how best to respond to these requests and with what mix of instruments.** The views of partner countries also appear to be missing in these forums. In addition, Korea's **project approval process could be improved by strengthening the Inter-Agency Grants Committee as central authority with decision-making power** to co-ordinate and ensure that all grant aid policies and activities fit into a coherent whole. Additionally, while co-ordination **between KOICA and EDCF appears to be taking place, there is an absence of a robust forum** for achieving greater synergies between loans and grants. At present, integration efforts are largely project based and not at a strategic level. The two Inter-Agency Committees for grants and EDCF should co-ordinate with each other to achieve synergies and make the whole of Korea's aid more effective. Improved co-ordination will also result in reduced transaction costs for Korea's partners

Strengthen co-ordination mechanisms and capacities, especially the CIDC

The CIDC also provides a good foundation for promoting greater synergies between grant aid and loans and for ensuring that the most appropriate of these instruments is chosen in each case to support partner country development objectives. The CIDC is an important oversight body for managing Korea's expanding aid programme. Its inter-ministerial mechanisms allow for different branches of the government – all with varying institutional interests – to exchange information and to adhere to common policies and goals as they implement ODA-funded activities. It is also a good mechanism to introduce longer-term planning and for better co-ordination across ministries. For example, the decision by the CIDC to formulate a single, integrated medium-term partnership strategy for each country is an important step towards bringing all elements of Korea's aid system in partner countries under one strategic umbrella.

The 2009 DAC Accession Review (OECD, 2009a) highlighted the need for a staffed secretariat to augment the capacity of the CIDC. Korea acted on this by creating the ODA Policy Bureau within the PMO. The bureau is the main conduit for co-ordinating Korea's ODA policy and planning within the Korean government. The Strategic Plan (GOK, 2010), which sets out the overarching vision and strategies for Korea's ODA (both grants and loans), was prepared by the bureau, in close collaboration with other ministries. It is also responsible for co-ordinating and preparing the CIDC's agenda for the Working Committee's approval.

The ODA Policy Bureau, in itself, is a microcosm of inter-ministerial policy coherence in practice, staffed by officials assembled from PMO, MOSF, MOFAT, KOICA and the Eximbank to facilitate greater co-ordination and execution of Korea's aid policies in a comprehensive and systematic manner. The peer review team noted that the relatively substantial amount of resources devoted to the ODA Policy Bureau is an indication of the strong commitment of Korea towards effective co-ordination of its ODA. Nonetheless Korea's aid machinery remains somewhat organisationally fragmented and there is scope for improving the co-ordination of Korea's grants in particular at country level.⁶ In addition, policy is divorced from implementation in Korea's system. In principle, the CIDC determines policy and implementing agencies execute it. While the CIDC has potential for further improving the effectiveness of ODA

policies and strategies, it needs to make full use of its legislative mandate as stipulated in the Framework Act and fulfil its role as the top co-ordinating and decision-making body in the context of the planning and budgeting processes.

Bring the Budget Office into the picture at an earlier stage in the process

As discussed in Chapter 3, Korea does not have a consolidated ODA budget or an overall strategy for guiding all of its aid allocations. Individual ministries still hold the decision-making power to plan and execute their own ODA-funded activities, subject to the approval of the Budget Office, outside the established ODA planning and budget process. Therefore, under the current arrangement, responsibility for making policy decisions is separated from the accountability for delivering them, which can lead to problems.⁷ Korea could improve its aid management by reforming its budgeting and planning processes, particularly bringing the Budget Office's role in clearing projects to an earlier stage in the cycle.

Building on a system that is partly decentralised

Korea's development programmes are well managed in the field by Korean implementing agency staff, including KOICA with its overseas offices in 44 partner countries. These field-based KOICA teams have authority to make all decisions once a project or programme has been approved. EDCF teams in headquarters and in the field also have high levels of delegated authority once projects have been approved. Together, these features allow a greater role for the field in identifying and consulting on priorities for country programmes. These processes can be built on and strengthened even further by delegating more decision-making power, including financial authority and management, to the field and ensuring that there are sufficient people with the right skills in the field to support this delegation.

Strong support for field orientation through the ODA Councils

Korea's Framework Act and Strategic Plan clearly support the concept of field orientation. In addition to introducing the country partnership strategies for its 26 priority partner countries (see Chapter 1), Korea has also increased field orientation by establishing ODA Councils in these countries. Korea's 26 ODA Councils are each chaired by the Korean ambassador and comprise Korean embassy staff in charge of ODA; KOICA and EDCF field office representatives and other members of public agencies; and private contractors implementing aid projects. The ODA Councils work with headquarters to ensure coherent ODA policies in the field and to develop whole-of-government country partnership strategies. They meet regularly to exchange information and report on members' respective aid activities, both ongoing and planned.

The establishment of ODA Councils in Korea's priority partner countries is an important step towards better co-ordination of Korea's bilateral development co-operation. This could be built on by, for example, KOICA and EDCF assuming increased authorities within approved country partnership strategies to make more decisions locally, allowing Korea's supervising ministries to concentrate on strategic issues and co-ordination in headquarters. Currently all decisions for fragile partner countries are made in Seoul (Chapters 1 and 6). Further decentralisation of decision-making responsibilities, with accompanying resources, would improve the oversight of Korea's aid and could help address some partners' concerns about delays in processing decisions and approvals. This is particularly relevant for fragile partner countries and would help Korea adjust its

programmes and adapt to what can be rapidly evolving environments. An increased field presence and more delegation of responsibility would also help to maximise collaboration with other development partners, including local non-governmental and civil society organisations.

The Councils also provide a forum for bringing Korea's two main implementing agencies (KOICA and EDCF) together at country level. The peer review team learned, for example, how in Cambodia the co-ordination of KOICA and EDCF activities has been greatly improved through these more regular interactions in the Council. Korea's ODA Councils should ensure consultation, not only among Korean stakeholders, but also with partner countries and local civil society – currently the Councils do not always include civil society representation, something which should be rectified in due course. Korea's partners should have the benefit of a united and effective Korea country team supported by the ODA Council. With some further improvements and strengthening of their facilitator role, together with enhanced capacity in Korea's embassies to support this, ODA Councils in partner countries could make a positive difference to the effective delivery of Korea's aid.

Ensuring Korea has sufficient, appropriate development co-operation staff for scaling up

Staffing will become a major issue for Korea as its aid programme expands. While Korea has a well-established set of people dedicated to development (Table 4.1), staff are under increasing pressure to manage larger amounts of ODA in more complex ways and contexts. Korea is planning to deliver its programmes through new ways of working and it is clear that increases in the aid programme will have to be accompanied by a careful assessment of the skills and resources needed to manage a high quality, growing programme. While this situation does create an obvious tension, Korea can manage this by:

- streamlining its procedures;
- concentrating its resources on fewer countries (particularly by concentrating KOICA and EDCF field offices on Korea's priority partner countries);
- further consolidating its ODA management, in the way that it has recently done for its volunteers programme; and
- supporting fewer but much larger programmes.

Table 4.1. Development co-operation staff, May 2012

Ministry/agency	Numbers of staff
PMO staff working on development co-operation (Seoul)	12
MOFAT staff working on development co-operation (Seoul)	33
MOSF staff working on development co-operation (Seoul)	23
KOICA total staff	247
(KOICA headquarters staff)	(165)
(KOICA field staff)	(82)
EDCF total staff	84
(EDCF headquarters staff)	(73)
(EDCF field staff)	(11)
Total	399

Source: GOK (2012b) OECD-DAC Special Peer Review Memorandum of the Republic of Korea, GOK, Seoul

The staffing challenges facing KOICA

KOICA's organisational capacity and resources appeared to be particularly stretched. Its programmable budget has more than doubled since 2005 to reach USD 432 million in 2012, while its number of staff has remained the same. Although KOICA has augmented its capacity by recruiting and dispatching contract-based sector specialists to the field, its staff are still under pressure both in the field and in headquarters. For example, a large proportion of KOICA's field management resources appear to be consumed by its volunteer programme, the World Friends Korea (WFK). In Cambodia, seven (four Korean and three locally-engaged) of the 25 KOICA staff are fully devoted to servicing the more than 80 volunteers active in the country. The costs of managing this programme should be at least commensurate with the developmental benefits and results that are being achieved. Korea should therefore evaluate the impact and results of World Friends Korea and, as part of this, consider whether the costs of programme management could be reduced, perhaps by contracting this function out. If KOICA could be spared these management responsibilities it would create more space for strategic analysis, programme development, networking, field visits and engagement in policy dialogue.

Salaries are another major concern for KOICA staff. Contrary to the rising importance (and profile) of KOICA as one of the country's primary agencies devoted to ODA, its salary levels rank among the lowest in the government. Salaries are estimated to be around 70% of the average for the 250 Korean government agencies. This is affecting staff morale, especially for those at the mid-career level. In the context of rapidly increasing aid volume, the recruitment and retention of development professionals in both agencies will be crucial for Korea to deliver an effective aid programme.

Build more staff capacity

Korea should ensure its development co-operation personnel have the capacity and resources needed to deliver on Korea's commitments, particularly the Paris Declaration and Strategic Plan. For example, awareness of the fragile states principles, and of the different approaches that can be applied to working in these difficult environments, could be broadened. Korea has a small core group of staff who have a good understanding of working in fragile contexts, but outside of this group awareness levels are limited. Staff

training on this topic would be useful, given the high number of Korea's partner countries which are fragile states – 12 out of the total 26.

Capacity within the PMO (ODA Policy Bureau) will especially need to be strengthened as it brings together all the various ODA activities being carried out by numerous ministries and agencies. Staff rotations seem to occur more frequently than in most DAC member countries – many people return to their ministries of origin after only one or two years (on average). This is partly due to greater interest among government officials in working on development co-operation. This raises issues of stability and continuity. Furthermore, those making key decisions on aid policies and allocations often lack development knowledge and experience, while those with the necessary knowledge are not part of the decision-making process. With the changes in Korea's development co-operation placing even more responsibility on the PMO, there is a critical need to review career specialisation in development and the stability of staff.

Focus more on human resources in the field

KOICA has embarked on a five-year decentralisation plan (2011-2015) to become more field-oriented; this commitment should drive its human resources policies and plans. KOICA has so far devolved authority for some 35% of issues to the field (52 out of 148 issues), and plans to bring the proportion of its staff in the field up to 41% (143 staff) of its total workforce by 2015. KOICA also undertook a major reorganisation in early 2011, shifting from sector-based to region or country-based planning and operation, in order to strengthen its geographical focus in line with the country strategy approach. These changes should be reflected in the agency's human resources policies and plans, with increased emphasis on preparing field-based staff for these additional responsibilities.

With only eight field offices, EDCF does not always have the capacity on the ground to participate fully in policy dialogues with its partners and other donors. This is currently the case in Cambodia (see Annex B). In these cases, some EDCF functions are often supported by embassy staff as part of their ODA Council tasks. Although it does not have any specific operational guidance for decentralisation, EDCF recognises the need for increased field-orientation and, in accordance with the Framework Act, plans to increase the proportion of its staff stationed in the field from 11 in 2012 up to 23 by 2015. It also plans to open six additional resident missions, including in Cambodia from late 2012. The peer review team welcomes EDCF's plans to place more of its staff in the field. This will further strengthen Korea's management of its loan portfolio in partner countries. However, rather than opening separate EDCF missions, Korea should take this opportunity to bring all of its main development actors together under 'one roof', something that is already being considered in Cambodia. Having KOICA and EDCF based together would ensure greater integration of these two pillars of Korean assistance, lead to more efficient operations and help to present a coherent Korea programme to its partners. This should be actively considered, firstly in the six countries where EDCF is posting its new field-based staff and, secondly, in the 11 countries where separate EDCF and KOICA offices are already working.

While posting more staff to the field is central to Korea's field orientation strategy, locally-engaged personnel are also an important part of Korean development co-operation. At KOICA, their number has doubled in the last three years – increasingly such employees possess masters' degrees or have several years' experience in development co-operation. KOICA's decentralisation strategy includes a plan to increase

the number of local staff from 130 in 2011 to 195 by 2015. Accordingly KOICA will need to make more use of its highly competent locally-engaged staff, particularly those working in Korea's 26 priority partner countries. EDCF currently employs few local staff (it opened its first resident mission in Vietnam only in 2007), but this number is likely to increase as it increases its field presence.

In Cambodia, local project employees were satisfied working in a Korean team environment and with their relative job security (contracts are for one year and appear to be renewed every year); they expressed an interest in taking on greater responsibilities. To enable local staff to play stronger roles and to climb the career ladder, Korea needs to support their capacity development. Currently, such development appears to be limited by the lack of systematic training and the fact that some training, guidance and other important documents are available only in Korean.

Concentrate field-based resources

As part of its efforts to streamline and focus its resources, KOICA is also reviewing its 44 overseas offices; this is an opportunity to rationalise its operations. As part of this review, KOICA is concentrating on Korea's 26 priority partner countries and, as a first step, closing offices in China and Kazakhstan in 2012. But at the same time, KOICA intends to open seven new overseas offices by 2015 and is considering turning some of them into larger regional offices to oversee activities across multiple countries. However, KOICA should consider the experience of other DAC members with regional offices – most have not been successful and a regional office is not a viable substitute for country offices. As mentioned above, given its human resource constraints, Korea should concentrate its field-based resources (KOICA, EDCF and other Korean agencies) on fewer countries and bring the staff of at least the two main agencies together in the field to improve efficiency and co-ordination.

Korea is building a stronger evaluation system

Korea has made progress in establishing policy, guidelines and capacity for evaluating its development programmes. Previously the evaluation of Korea's development co-operation was fragmented – the evaluation activities of each aid agency were regulated by its respective supervising ministries. Today all evaluation procedures – from planning to dissemination and feedback – are now overseen by the Sub-Committee for Evaluation, created under the CIDC in December 2009. The Sub-Committee is chaired by the Deputy Minister for National Agenda of PMO (Figure 4.1); its role is primarily to review and approve the annual evaluation plans drafted by ODA executing bodies. It has 15 members, comprised of the four principal actors of Korean ODA and experts from outside the government, with PMO providing the secretariat services.⁸ To ensure evaluation becomes a good quality mechanism for managing and learning, it is important that the Sub-Committee has adequate tools and authority, and that its independence is protected. Korean ODA is also scrutinised by the Korean Board of Audit and Investigation (BAI). Together these activities are helping to develop a stronger evaluation culture within the Korean development co-operation system, which in turn increases internal demand for evaluations.

Common evaluation guidelines

CIDC has established common evaluation guidelines – the *Guidelines on Evaluation of International Development Co-operation* – and a single evaluation manual for all

ministries and agencies involved in Korean ODA. Based on these guidelines, the Sub-Committee reviews self-evaluations submitted by Korean aid agencies, and also commissions annual evaluations directly⁹ on selected issues or themes. Each agency is required to report to the Sub-Committee on how it plans to reflect evaluation findings in its future aid activities; both KOICA and EDCF have internal feedback mechanisms for this purpose. On average, the Sub-Committee reviews 20 self-evaluation reports and conducts (commissions) 3 thematic evaluations every year.

One challenge highlighted by the Korean government is the varied and often low quality of self-evaluations carried out by ministries. The Sub-Committee has commissioned a meta-evaluation of Korea's ODA-related evaluations in order to assess the current evaluation system and identify how the quality of aid evaluation systems can be improved. These efforts by Korea to look critically at how to improve its evaluation function are commendable. KOICA has translated the DAC Quality Standards for Development Evaluation into Korean. This is a valuable contribution to building evaluation capacity and facilitating joint work such as that by the Ministry of Agriculture, which conducted a joint evaluation with KOICA in Cambodia as an attempt to enhance the capacity and the quality of its evaluation. In addition, CIDC has recently put in place an integrated ODA monitoring system – a one-stop-shop database for monitoring the implementation of all Korean ODA projects. Over time this should generate better monitoring and results data to serve as the basis for evaluation. Korea should share lessons from these experiences with its development partners.

A system for feeding evaluation results back into practice

KOICA and EDCF are responsible for the majority of ODA-related evaluations. Each agency has its own evaluation manuals, both of which reflect the five DAC evaluation criteria (*i.e.* relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability). In order to apply evaluation results systematically to future policy and programme decisions, Korea has set up internal feedback mechanisms. Every year KOICA's Evaluation Office identifies feasible recommendations to be followed up by the relevant operational departments – though it is not clear how these recommendations are prioritised or selected and whether actions taken actually improve effectiveness. EDCF has a numerical scoring system to assess the overall success of a project in achieving agreed objectives. For transparency and accountability purposes, both agencies publish evaluation results on their websites and produce annual evaluation reports.

In order for the lessons of implementation to inform the design of new policy and strategy, the implementing agencies need to be involved in developing policy and strategy to some extent. In EDCF, the evaluation function is within the Operational Services and Evaluations Department. While it is separated from operational, policy and strategy teams, Korea should examine whether the current location of the internal evaluation function in the Eximbank ensures its independence, credibility and usefulness for organisational learning. KOICA's Evaluation Office has been set up as a separate entity and reports directly to the KOICA President. It might explore ways to link lessons from evaluations to programme design, management and learning across the organisation, while preserving their credibility and independence, for example by involving programme staff in selecting evaluation topics.

Strengthening evaluation capacity

There is an increasing level of public and parliamentary interest in Korean ODA, which will only continue as stakeholders seek more credible information on the results of Korea's expanding aid programme. This heightens the importance of and demand for evaluation still further. In addition, attention should be paid to improving staff capacities and incentives to more openly and critically assess Korea's contribution to development and to use evaluation findings to improve future aid programmes.

Korea has conducted some joint evaluations with partner governments (*e.g.* EDCF carried out a joint evaluation with Cambodia in 2011), and is considering doing more. Such evaluations offer greater potential for lessons to be learnt by both parties and are a good way to also build evaluation capacities on both sides. Korea is carrying out a small number of impact evaluations as pilots but these are still in the early stages. It would be useful to examine ways to better design, monitor and evaluate Korea's contribution to wider outcomes and impacts beyond immediate project results that are directly attributable to Korean aid. KOICA and EDCF should both aim to keep an adequately staffed evaluation unit.

Three other considerations will be important: first, more certainty over budget allocations for evaluation would enable Korea to plan its evaluation work and staff requirements better. Second, staff capacity development is also crucial. The evaluation units in each agency provide training for internal evaluation staff and external consultants to keep pace with the latest tools and methodologies. Third, more of the monitoring and evaluation work could be delegated to Korea's field offices, particularly at the project design and programming stage. Currently, it appears that most decisions on evaluations are made in Seoul and that staff in the field are somewhat constrained from initiating and using evaluations in ways that would directly inform their planning and management activities.

Future considerations

- To implement its development co-operation strategy successfully, Korea will need to ensure that the CIDC uses its powers fully to become the ultimate decision-making body in ODA planning and budgeting processes. The Inter-Agency Committees should have the necessary authority to ensure that all aid-funded activities are processed through them.
- A well-coordinated aid system and more unified country strategies will increase the coherence, efficiency and potential impact of Korean development activities. To achieve this aim, Korea should use country partnership strategies to (1) develop integrated implementation plans for all Korean aid agencies in a priority partner country; and (2) increase field orientation and empower country teams with adequate capacity and authority.
- As Korea's ODA increases its principal ministries, PMO, MOFAT and MOSF, together with its main agencies (KOICA and EDCF) will need to strengthen their human resources further by attracting and retaining quality people with the right kind of development experience, and especially to build the capacity of locally-engaged employees.
- A key objective for Korea is to improve its evaluation and results reporting and to achieve this aim PMO, MOFAT and MOSF should strengthen the independence and

procedures of the Sub-Committee on Evaluation. This will require: improved ongoing monitoring during project implementation; improved *ex-post* evaluation; strengthened capacities and delegated authority to support critical evaluation in field units; and systematically integrating lessons from evaluations into future programmes.

Notes

1. The Framework Act recognises technical ministries and local government as implementing agencies; the Presidential Decree allows them to participate as “members of the CIDC and executing bodies of ODA programme...to administer international development co-operation” (GOK, 2012b: 33). Technical ministries have particular expertise and some prefer to maintain their own aid budgets for ensuring “predictability” (as opposed to relying on KOICA for project implementation).
2. The Framework Act mandates the Prime Minister’s Office (the CIDC secretariat) to co-ordinate Korean development co-operation. It does so in close co-operation with MOFAT and MOSF.
3. Ministers from: the Prime Minister’s Office; Foreign Affairs and Trade; Strategy and Finance; Education, Science and Technology; Justice; Public Administration and Security; Culture, Sports and Tourism; Food, Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries; Knowledge and Economy; Health and Welfare; Environment; Employment and Labour; Gender Equality and Family; Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs; and the Chairperson of The Korea Communications Commission.
4. The incumbent civilian experts include heads of Korean think-tanks, university professors, and heads of locally-based non-governmental and humanitarian organisations and a private consultancy firm.
5. Since its establishment, the Inter-Agency EDCF Committee has helped to realise a total of 25 collaborated projects between EDCF and ten ministries and agencies covering 18 countries (as of May 2012).
6. The problem of fragmentation was evident in Cambodia (Annex C). Several Korean implementing agencies – namely the Korea Development Institute, the Korean Foundation for International Health Care and the Ministry of Agriculture – have opted to deliver projects directly to Cambodian partners with limited and often no involvement of the embassy and KOICA.
7. The review team was informed that policy decisions taken by the CIDC sometimes get “lost in translation” as they filter down to the level of individual ministries, reflecting their respective views and resulting in inconsistent execution of these decisions.
8. The Sub-Committee currently has seven civilian experts including professors from various universities in Seoul, an economic research institute, a Korean NGO umbrella group and a former senior KOICA staff.
9. Each year, the CIDC selects a number of themes for evaluation by the Sub-Committee (which are then contracted out to external consultants).

Chapter 5

Aid effectiveness and results

The effectiveness of development co-operation is guided by three important agreements: the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, the 2008 Accra Agenda for Action and the Global Partnership for Development, adopted at Busan in 2011. In this chapter Korea's efforts are assessed in the context of all of these international commitments to aid effectiveness. The chapter describes Korea's strong commitment to the aid effectiveness agenda and assesses its performance against the Paris Declaration principles and indicators. It is making progress in several of the areas covered by the global monitoring framework of the Paris Declaration, especially in aligning its support to partner country priorities, providing its aid through common arrangements and carrying out joint analytical work. Integrating the necessary steps for implementing the Paris Declaration and the Busan commitments into its sector and country strategies would help Korea to further advance and focus its efforts on areas where it needs to make the most improvement, especially untying aid, more predictable aid and use of country systems.

Korea is committed to aid effectiveness and is trying to improve its performance

Korea is strongly committed to increasing the effectiveness of its aid and endorsed both the Paris Declaration and the follow-up Accra Agenda for Action before it became a member of the DAC. Since joining the DAC Korea has played an instrumental role in the aid effectiveness agenda – as a leading member of the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness (WP-EFF) and by hosting the Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness. Korea has also played an important role in strengthening partnerships with key providers of development co-operation outside the DAC during and after the negotiation of the Busan Partnership agreement.

As discussed in Chapters 1 and 4, Korea has made progress in reforming its aid system; the Framework Act and Presidential Decree should help increase the effectiveness of its development assistance. Korea's strategic plan for its development co-operation declares that aid effectiveness principles and actions agreed in Paris and Accra are a cornerstone of its approach (GOK, 2010). As an important oversight body for managing Korea's expanding aid programme, the Committee for International Development Co-operation (CIDC) has potential to further improve the effectiveness of Korean ODA policies and strategies and thus strengthening efforts for achieving the MDGs.

The need for a roadmap to translate commitments into practice

Korea is in the process of translating its strong commitments to aid effectiveness into changed behaviour and practice across its development co-operation system. As discussed in earlier chapters, Korea has built a solid legal and strategic foundation for its development co-operation and it is now in a strong position to further improve the effectiveness of its aid. There are also high levels of decentralisation within Korea's aid system, particularly in KOICA and EDCF, another factor which should increase effectiveness. Despite these positive signs, Korea still faces challenges in carrying out some of the aid effectiveness principles.

One challenge is the absence of a clear strategy to ensure that aid effectiveness principles are addressed in programming and implementation, and that targets are met, particularly in partner countries. Therefore all Korea's strategies, particularly its country partnership strategies, should incorporate plans and targets for making its aid more effective and should be government-wide in scope. In addition, Korea should ensure that the aid effectiveness principles are integrated within all of its aid management procedures, particularly those of KOICA and EDCF. In the light of the commitments made in Busan, Korea should review its strategic approach to aid effectiveness including the new global partnership objectives (Table 5.1).

Table 5.1. Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation: Indicators

Indicator 1.	Development co-operation is focused on results that meet developing countries' priorities
Indicator 2.	Civil society operates within an environment which maximises its engagement in and contribution to development
Indicator 3.	Engagement and contribution of the private sector to development
Indicator 4.	Transparency: Information on development co-operation is publicly available
Indicator 5.	Development co-operation is more predictable
Indicator 6.	Aid is on budgets which are subject to parliamentary scrutiny
Indicator 7.	Mutual accountability among development co-operation actors is strengthened through inclusive reviews
Indicator 8.	Gender equality and women's empowerment
Indicator 9.	Effective institutions: Developing countries' systems are strengthened and used
Indicator 10.	Aid is untied

Source:

www.aideffectiveness.org/busanhlf4/images/stories/Indicators_targets_and_process_for_global_monitoring.pdf

Integrating the necessary steps for implementing the Paris Declaration and the Busan commitments into its sector and country strategies would help Korea to further advance and focus its efforts on areas where it needs to make the most improvement, especially unttying aid, more predictable aid and use of country systems (see Section 5.3).

Korea has made progress in most aid effectiveness areas

Korea has participated in all three of the Paris Declaration Monitoring Surveys (OECD, 2007; OECD, 2008d; OECD, 2011a). While Korea's performance against the illustrative international targets is weaker than most DAC members (Table 5.2), it is making progress in several of the areas covered by the global monitoring framework. In particular, Korea has made considerable progress in aligning its support to partner country priorities, providing its aid through common arrangements and carrying out joint analytical work. These areas are discussed in more detail below.

Table 5.2. Korea's progress in selected partner countries in meeting the Paris Declaration indicators

Paris Declaration Indicator	Indicator values				All donors 2010 Actual	Illustrative 2010 Targets for Korea
	2005	2007	2010			
	32 countries	32 countries	32 countries	All countries		
3 Aid flows are aligned on national priorities	11%	34%	46%	38%	41%	85%
4 Strengthen capacity by co-ordinated support	74%	79%	11%	43%	57%	50%
5a Use of country public financial managemnet systems	45%	10%	0%	10%	48%	26%
5b Use of country procurement systems	0%	5%	37%	36%	44%	--
6 Avoid parallel implementation structures	0	11	4	11	1,158	0
7 Aid is more predictable	11%	19%	32%	20%	43%	56%
8 Aid is untied	--	21%	47%	44%	86%	--
9 Use of common arrangements or procedures	0%	1%	42%	29%	45%	66%
10a Joint missions	0%	15%	8%	5%	19%	40%
10b Joint country analytic work	--	0%	50%	50%	43%	66%

Note: The 2005 column is based on data reported by 3 countries of the 32 participating in both the 2006 and 2011 surveys, reflecting 6% of Korea's programmed aid in 2005. The 2007 column is based on data from 9 countries of the 32 participating in both the 2006 and 2011 surveys, reflecting 27% of Korea's programmed aid in 2007. The 2010 column is based on data reported by 26 of the 78 countries participating in the 2011 survey, reflecting 59% of Korea's programmed aid in 2009.

Source: OECD (2011a)

Aligning aid to partner country priorities, but better on-budget support required

Korea is mostly aligning its support to partner country priorities and should make further progress through its use of country partnership strategies for each of its 26 priority partner countries. The nine country partnership strategies produced so far (Chapter 1) do reflect the priorities stated in the partner governments' national development or poverty reduction plans. Korea's drafting process for these strategies has also involved consultation with partner countries, facilitated by Korean ODA Councils to ensure alignment with country priorities (see Chapter 4). These country strategies are also a step towards streamlining Korea's aid programme, focusing its assistance on its priority partner countries and priority sectors and strengthening the strategic and operational links between loans and grants. They can also help reduce transaction and co-ordination costs for partner governments and should be encouraged, especially in those priority partner countries where Korea is one of many donors.

Korea's process for developing its country partnership strategies, based on its experiences with the five completed thus far, has also enhanced country ownership of the development programme. In most cases, country ownership is ensured through the demand-led nature of Korea's system, in which all projects and programmes are developed in response to requests made by partner governments (Figure 3.3). The fact that a large share of Korean ODA is considered by the DAC to be country programmable aid tends to support this finding (see Chapter 3). This system was evident in Cambodia during the peer review team's visit (Annex B). While Korea's progress on alignment is commendable, less than half of its support is included in its partner countries' budgets. Korea should continue to work with partner country governments to ensure that its bilateral aid is provided in a way that ensures closer alignment with national planning, budgeting and accountability processes.

Make more use of programme-based approaches

As part of its commitment to the aid effectiveness principles and also as a means to scale up its aid, Korea is planning to incorporate new aid modalities in its programming for both its loans and grant assistance. In particular, Korea is trying to shift from its mostly stand-alone, project-based approach (see Chapter 3) towards broader programme-based approaches (PBAs) for both loans and grants. KOICA is strengthening its expertise in this area, but concedes that it needs greater capacity to use a broader range of aid modalities. It plans to carry out pilot programmes using programme based approaches in 2014. The peer review team encourages Korea to integrate targets within its country strategies to guide the greater use of programme based approaches at country level. In all of Korea's priority partner countries there are opportunities to participate in joint programmes with other development partners using common arrangements (*e.g.* pooled funds) and, on the loan side, through co-financing with multilateral development banks.¹ EDCF has set a target of achieving 20% of total concessional lending through co-financing by 2015 (GOK, 2012b). It has also introduced its first budget support programme – the *Support Programme to Respond to Climate Change* – in Vietnam in 2011 and is considering a similar approach in the Cambodian health sector. The peer review team encourages Korea to continue to actively look for options to implement programme based approaches. Korea is also examining how it can also make more use of such programme loans in the form of general budget support in the medium to long term.

Better harmonisation and co-ordination with other donors

Korea is trying to increase the level of its engagement and harmonisation with other development partners at country level, though the scope and depth of its engagement tends to vary across sectors and countries. In Cambodia, donors welcomed the recent increase in Korea's engagement in the aid management architecture, particularly for health and infrastructure sectors. EDCF has also joined the "Six Banks Initiative" in Vietnam to improve harmonisation and alignment of aid to that country. Korean aid agencies have long established working relations with their Japanese counterparts and the two countries are moving towards stronger co-ordination of ODA in certain countries. KOICA has signed memoranda of understanding (MOU) with other development agencies, including the Japan International Co-operation Agency (JICA), Germany's *Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit* (GIZ), the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), the Turkish International Co-operation Agency (TIKA), US Agency for International Development, Brazil's *Agência Brasileira de Cooperação* (ABC), the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and, most recently, France's *Agence Française de Développement* (AFD). EDCF has also concluded MOUs with JICA and AFD, and signed an aid-memoire with Germany's *Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau* (KfW). Korea is also engaging more in bilateral policy dialogue with other DAC and non-DAC donors and signing co-operation agreements with them.

While Korea has made progress on harmonisation since joining the DAC, it does not yet co-ordinate nor co-operate extensively with other donors. Korea could do more to harmonise on a practical level, such as through engaging in more joint missions and assessments. One limitation Korea faces in these efforts is a shortage of staff, especially embassy staff with extensive development experience. KOICA is getting around this through the use of contracted specialists in the field. The Paris Declaration survey indicates that Korea has made considerable progress in undertaking joint country analytic work with other donors (Table 5.1). However, joint missions seem to have fallen from 15% in 2007 to 8% in 2010 in the 32 countries covered – a trend Korea should seek to reverse. Korea should spell out in each of its country strategies how it intends to harmonise its activities with those of other donors.

Further progress is needed to meet Korea's aid effectiveness commitments

As mentioned above, Korea still faces challenges in untying its aid, making its aid more predictable and using country systems. These and other issues are discussed below.

Implement its roadmap to untie 75% of Korea's ODA by 2015


As a signatory to the Accra Agenda for Action, which commits donors to untie their aid as much as possible, the Korean government has established a roadmap to increase the untied portion of its bilateral ODA to 75% by 2015. Korea put this timetable in place in 2009 as part of its accession to the DAC and it includes targets for untying both grants and loans (Table 5.3).

Table 5.3. Korea's implementation timeline for untying grant aid

Phase 1 (2009-2012)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reaching the 2012 target of 100% untying aid to LDCs and HIPC • Implementing international competitive bidding (ICB) in partner countries and streamlining the untying system • Implementing ICB using e-procurement system
Phase 2 (2013-2015)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Expanding untied aid to 100% of all partner countries by 2015 • Increasing untied ratio by introducing local procurement and using partner countries' procurement system

Source: OECD (2011g), *Implementing the 2001 DAC Recommendation on Untying Aid: 2010-2011 Review*, OECD, Paris.

According to this timeline, all of Korea's grants and 50% of its ODA-funded loans should be untied by 2015, but this will only be possible if its performance improves. In line with the DAC Recommendation on untying aid (OECD, 2008e) Korea has prioritised the LDCs and other HIPC, setting the target of untying 100% of its grants and 80% of its concessional lending to these groups of countries by 2015. These targets are incorporated in *Korea's Strategic Plan for its International Development Co-operation* (GOK, 2010). However, on the basis of data reported by Korea to the DAC/CRS, 27% of Korea's bilateral ODA covered by the DAC Recommendation was untied in 2010, compared to 37% in 2009 (Figure 5.1). More generally (including all bilateral aid for all partner countries), 32% of Korean aid was untied in 2010 compared to 44% in 2009. This drop in performance will constrain Korea's ability to meet its DAC Recommendation and Accra commitments.

Figure 5.1. Share of Korea's bilateral ODA untied under the DAC Recommendation, 2002-2010 %

Source: DAC

Korea should seek to reverse this trend and progressively increase the proportion of its untied aid so as to stick to its roadmap. The expected growth in Korea's ODA over the next three years could present an opportunity for it to make faster progress on untying, as there is some evidence from other DAC members that it is easier to increase the untied proportion of an expanding – as opposed to a contracting – aid programme. Korea should exploit this opportunity to regain its lost momentum and set out clearly the steps and timeline (post-2012) necessary for untying more of its aid in order to meet its targets.

Achieve predictable medium-term aid flows

Paris Declaration survey data suggest that Korea fares reasonably well on short-term (or in-year) predictability; in 2010, Korea disbursed approximately 5% more aid for the government sector across the 12 countries surveyed than it had scheduled for disbursement at the beginning of the year (OECD, 2011a). Ensuring that Korean aid disbursements were recorded in partner country systems has proven to be more challenging, explaining the lower score on this Paris Declaration indicator (Table 5.1).

Medium-term, or multi-year, predictability also appears to be challenging for Korea, as it is for many DAC members. It is unable to provide its agents and partner country governments with adequate information on future funding. As discussed in Chapter 3, Korea's budgeting process for its ODA appears to hamper the budget execution performance of its aid agencies, potentially undermining aid predictability for Korea's partner countries. However, Korean aid agencies are working to improve predictability. For example, while the country partnership strategies produced so far do not include indicative commitments, such information is currently provided to partners on an informal basis in country.² Moreover, as noted earlier in this report, the MOSF Budget Office has confirmed that its annual budgeting system is not a barrier to Korea making and publishing multi-year ODA plans – this is already happening for Korean humanitarian assistance (Chapter 6).

Other efforts are also underway. For its grants, Korea plans to increase its own and its partners' ability to forecast expenditures through a multi-year rolling plan which will include aid volumes, priority sectors, and project and programmes (OECD, 2011e). These tools are useful for sharing indicative figures with partners in addition to formally agreed disbursement schedules. For its loan projects, which typically run over several years, EDCF has concluded a single comprehensive programme and budget framework, called a framework arrangement, with some of its priority partner countries (12 so far). It contains, among other things, a three to five-year operational plan with total project portfolio and a multi-year disbursement plan, giving predictability for the duration of the project. EDCF plans to sign these framework arrangements with all its priority partner countries by 2013. As suggested in Chapter 1, in order to underpin aid predictability and enable both Korea's agents and partners to plan with more certainty, country strategies should include a medium-term spending plan encompassing the whole-of-Korea's development co-operation and these should be shared formally with its partners. This will also enhance the transparency and accountability of Korea's development co-operation.

Make more use of partner country systems

Korea uses partner country systems much less than the DAC average and the international target level (Table 5.1). Despite its progress in making more use of its partner countries' procurement systems, Korea provides only a small amount of its aid in this way. To improve its performance in this area Korea needs to channel more of its aid, including its grants and technical co-operation, through partner country systems. At the same time, Korea could help maximise the impact of its assistance by engaging in and supporting country-level reform processes. By historically not engaging in policy debate within partner countries, Korea may not be taking full advantage of the credibility it has from its recent and successful development experience.

Improve the quality of capacity development support

Korea fully appreciates the key role of capacity building in development, a view that is deeply rooted in its own development experience. It sees capacity development as crucial for allowing partner countries to take full responsibility for their development. As such, Korea's underlying development philosophy stresses the sharing of its own experience and knowledge. Korea's own development experience distinguishes it from other donors, but it could do more to make this accessible to its partners. Korea should integrate relevant lessons from its own experience into its capacity building efforts more broadly – currently this is done through the implementation of its designated programme, the KSP. In sharing its lessons more broadly, Korea will need to place greater emphasis on people-to-people transfer of skills and technology. The Paris Declaration survey suggests that Korea could do more to co-ordinate its technical co-operation with country programmes (Table 5.1).

Accountability and management for results

Korea's development projects are designed and monitored using a logical framework and project performance indicators that are focused on results. Korea's project indicators are established in consultation with partner countries but are used only by its own agencies. The use of indicators is crucial in results reporting as indicators specify how expected results have been measured and also define the data to be collected. They are used to monitor progress at the mid-term and completion stages of a project's life and also for evaluations after projects have ended.

EDCF's system has the ability to adjust when projects are going off-track and key targets are being missed. It has also established a set of standardised performance indicators for seven sectors: education, roads, water resource management, railways, communications, power transmission and distribution, and health.

KOICA is considering introducing standardised sector indicators in its results-based management system.

Both agencies have also begun piloting impact evaluations. However, the two agencies should work towards adopting existing partner government indicators as far as possible, at least for key dimensions of their support. More also needs to be done to use joint performance indicators.

Transparency and accountability have been strengthened by Korea publishing statistics and evaluation results online and in annual reports. This information is also provided to the National Assembly via the CIDC. Korea is upgrading its official Korea ODA website to include English language pages. As part of a wider effort to create a learning culture, Korea should establish a system of knowledge management, identifying lessons and good practice in its development co-operation (and from other sources) to help staff improve future results (see also Section 4.5 on evaluation). The emphasis should be placed on learning from failures as well as successes. This is quite distinct from the lessons and good practice from Korea's own development experience compiled as part of its Knowledge Sharing Programme (KSP), but there would clearly be a link between these two pools of knowledge.

Future considerations

- To translate its commitments into practice, Korea should integrate the aid effectiveness principles and the internationally-agreed targets into all its development co-operation strategies, particularly country partnership strategies, and aid management procedures.
- To improve its performance against aid effectiveness targets, Korea should focus its efforts on areas where it needs to make the most improvement: untying, programme-based approaches, medium-term predictability and use of country systems.
- Building on its experience in countries such as Cambodia, Korea should raise its profile in country-level aid co-ordination forums by proactively sharing its relevant expertise and experience; and engaging and, where possible, leading in policy-level dialogue with partners, particularly within those sectors where it has the greatest engagement and experience to tackle some long-standing issues such as sustaining project achievements.
- To achieve better value for money, Korea should translate its commitment to untie 75% of its total ODA by 2015 into a year-on-year plan that drives progress towards its goal. As part of this Korea should maintain its focus on meeting the DAC Recommendation on untying and the Accra commitment to untie aid to the maximum extent. It should also report the tying status of all Korean ODA, including technical co-operation.
- Korea should make capacity building a central aim of all its development co-operation and co-ordinate its support for this with other development partners. In addition, Korea should respond to partner countries' interest in its own development experience by making relevant lessons a core component of capacity-building efforts.

Notes

1. A dedicated MDBs Co-financing Team was created in January 2011 for this purpose.
2. For example, in Cambodia Korea is strengthening its approach to aid predictability and preparing for increased volumes of ODA by setting out the budget growth path for KOICA and EDCF internally, and sharing this information informally with the Cambodian government.

Chapter 6

Humanitarian assistance

Korea has made good progress towards better humanitarian donorship since joining the DAC in 2010. This chapter discusses Korea's humanitarian assistance, taking into account Korea's commitment to scale up the funds available for its humanitarian programme over the next three years – potentially an 800% increase – putting Korea in the same league as other DAC donors such as Belgium, Finland and Switzerland.

A number of challenges that Korea will face as it scales up the humanitarian programme are discussed in the chapter. The current broad humanitarian mandate is reviewed, as is the need for Korea to set out its overall humanitarian objectives and expected results in a cross-government policy. Korea's current and future roles in post-crisis recovery and disaster preparedness are assessed, as are the criteria that Korea uses to decide who, what and where to fund, and where to deliver in-kind aid and rescue teams. The chapter also sets out changes to systems and resources that will be required to ensure that Korea's humanitarian programme remains fit for purpose in the new budget environment.

Significant progress in humanitarian work since joining the DAC

Korea has made good progress towards good humanitarian donorship since joining the DAC, including preparing a draft policy paper as a first step towards a formal policy on humanitarian assistance. Korea has also altered the mix of its funding portfolio by substantially increasing its allocations to multilateral agencies to ensure that funding allocations are within the framework of a co-ordinated international response.

Korea has committed to a significant increase – potentially 800% – in its humanitarian budget over the next three years. It has committed to increase the share of the ODA budget allocated to humanitarian assistance to 6% by 2015. This could result in an additional USD 165.7 million being allocated to the annual humanitarian programme. As Korea scales up its humanitarian programme, it will need to think about how it can most effectively use these additional resources. In particular, it will need to make decisions about the overall objectives and expected results of its humanitarian programme, the role of bilateral aid and the role of partners, and determine what modifications need to be made to its systems, resources and staffing to ensure that they remain fit for purpose. All these points are discussed in the sections which follow.

Increasing strategic focus will help manage a broad humanitarian mandate


Korea currently allocates around USD 22.7 million to humanitarian assistance each year, which is 1.25% of the country's total ODA (Box 6.1). This budget share is currently much lower than the DAC average; however the commitment to increase the share to 6% will bring Korea more or less in line with other DAC donors.

Box 6.1. Korea's humanitarian assistance

Mandate: Korea's humanitarian assistance is set within the *Framework Act on International Development Cooperation* (National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, 2010a); *Overseas Emergency Relief Act* (GOK 2007, updated 2011); *Strategic Plan for International Development Cooperation* (2011); *Plan for Advancement of Overseas Emergency Relief* (MOFAT 2010a); and the draft policy paper on Humanitarian Assistance (2008).

Division of labour: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Humanitarian Assistance Division manages the humanitarian budget and leads co-ordination across government. KOICA provides logistics and specialists for bilateral responses. The Ministry of Defense, National Rescue Service and Ministry of Health and Welfare provide disaster response teams and logistics.

Korea's humanitarian partners (2011)



Funding sources: One annual budget allocation to MOFAT. Can be topped up for major crisis.

Funding volume: 2012: Budget allocation of USD 22.7 million – 1.25% of ODA.

Partnership agreements: eight

Korean NGOs (including the Korean Red Cross Society) each receive a USD 200 000 annual emergency response envelope (including rapid drawdown procedures) through the new Emergency Fund.

Sources: GOK (2012b) *Memorandum for the DAC Peer Review Republic of Korea*, GOK, Seoul; and discussions with MOFAT staff

Making a broad humanitarian mandate more specific

While Korea now has a legislative mandate for its humanitarian action, it does not yet have a cross-government policy to focus and guide its humanitarian programme. Korea's *Framework Act on International Development Co-operation* (National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, 2010a) recognises that humanitarian assistance is an integral part of its development co-operation programme. Humanitarian assistance is also outlined as one of the six objectives of Korea's *Strategic Plan for International Development Cooperation* (GOK, 2010). However these documents only authorise Korea's humanitarian programme, they do not provide a specific focus or objectives to guide its implementation.

Korea has a strong history in the disaster response aspects of humanitarian assistance – and its mandate in this area is also more robust. The updated *Overseas Emergency Relief Act* (GOK, 2007, updated 2011), and the *Plan for the Advancement of Overseas Emergency Relief* (MOFAT, 2010a), have created a solid cross-government framework

for disaster response based on lessons learnt from the Korean response to the 2010 earthquake in Haiti (see Section 6.3.3), and this is to be commended.

To ensure a consistent Korean response that respects the good humanitarian donorship principles¹ (GHD, 2003), Korea now needs to finalise and publish a broadly agreed cross-government humanitarian policy – based on the areas where it has clear comparative advantage, and building on its experience in disaster response. This policy will also increase opportunities for consultation and collaboration on humanitarian issues, both with partners and across government, and provide greater predictability of future funding intentions. The policy will need to take into account Korea's commitment to scale up the humanitarian assistance budget, and thus encompass plans for spending the additional funds. A first draft policy paper was circulated for comment in 2008, but this document probably now needs updating before being sent to major stakeholders for further consultation.

Supporting post-crisis recovery through development projects

Korea has taken a pragmatic approach to post-crisis recovery and transition by funding the recovery activities of UN agencies, and by supporting development projects in fragile and post-conflict countries. Korea is justifiably proud of its own successful transition from conflict to stability, and is eager to share its experience with other states who are working through this difficult period in their history. To do this, Korea carries out post-crisis and transition projects in a number of its development partner countries using development funds. MOFAT's humanitarian team is systematically consulted when the country programme strategies for these countries are being designed; this consultation is good practice and should continue.

The humanitarian budget also funds some multilateral recovery initiatives – but recovery is not yet a systematic part of Korea's humanitarian programme. For example, Korea is considering funding the joint UNDP/UNHCR Transitional Solutions Initiative to provide durable solutions for displaced people, returnees and local populations.² However, there is not yet a recovery component to Korea's disaster response programmes – and this might be a useful area to consider as Korea finalises its humanitarian policy.

The growing role of disaster risk reduction as a development concern

Disaster risk reduction is another area that Korea – rightly – mostly funds from its development budget. Korea has a number of disaster-prone partner countries, and is now including major disaster risk factors in its development country programme strategies. Disaster risk factors have already been included in Korea's latest country partnership strategies for its programmes in Indonesia and Sri Lanka. Korea is encouraged to make the analysis and integration of disaster risk reduction a systematic part of all country partnership strategies as it puts these documents in place in each of its 26 priority partner countries (Chapters 1 and 3).

Korea's approach to disaster preparedness focuses mostly on ensuring that its own civil protection teams are ready and equipped to respond to disasters overseas. In addition to this, some early warning programmes are also being funded in partner countries through development budgets. Korea should review its role in emergency preparedness – particularly how (or if) it will support the preparedness and resilience of partner countries and at-risk communities – as the new humanitarian policy takes shape.

Prioritising for a growing programme

Korea's commitments to increase the overall volume of its ODA, including the share allocated to humanitarian assistance, will see Korea's humanitarian programme grow to about the same size as the programmes of DAC members such as Belgium, Finland and Switzerland.³ A clear strategic direction is now needed to help Korea target this extra aid more effectively. Korea will also have to decide which partners will help it best deliver this assistance – and map out the optimal mix of bilateral aid, UN agencies, and NGOs in its future humanitarian portfolio.

Clear criteria for who, what and where to fund will be crucial for the major budget scale-up

Korea has committed to increasing its humanitarian budget share to 6% of ODA by 2015, which could lead to an additional USD 165.7 million (KRW 189.5 billion) each year;⁴ Overall, the total humanitarian assistance budget would reach USD 188 million – up from USD 22.7 million in 2012 – in the space of just three years. This budget growth will allow for a major expansion of the humanitarian programme.

Since 2007, the humanitarian base budget has been supplemented by an innovative air ticket solidarity levy – which collected around USD 15 million between 2007 and 2012. These funds, managed by MOFAT's humanitarian team, have been granted to international agencies such as GAVI and UNITAID, and to 11 Korean NGOs and KOICA, to counter pandemic disease in sub-Saharan Africa. Each partner is provided with multi-annual funding, increasing the flexibility and predictability of their programmes. This is the only example of multi-annual funding in Korea's humanitarian programme and has recently been renewed by the Korean National Assembly.

Korea will need to take care to ensure that its funding allocations are needs-based and not driven by visibility objectives. Korean officials use a table to guide their allocation decisions, based on the scale of the crisis and type of needs. Other factors, including the capacity of the affected country to cope with the crisis, and the funding intentions of other donors, are also taken into account. However, to partners at least, Korea's funding allocation criteria are not always clear. If Korea is to demonstrate that funding decisions are based on humanitarian principles (Box 6.2), it will need to set and communicate clear criteria for determining who, what and where to fund, and demonstrate how those criteria have been applied to actual grant decisions each year. This would also help make funding allocations more predictable for partners.

Box 6.2. The principled approach to humanitarian funding decisions

Good Humanitarian Donorship Principle 2 states that, “Humanitarian action should be guided by the humanitarian principles of humanity, meaning the centrality of saving human lives and alleviating suffering wherever it is found; impartiality, meaning the implementation of actions solely on the basis of need, without discrimination between or within affected populations; neutrality, meaning that humanitarian action must not favour any side in an armed conflict or other dispute where such action is carried out; and independence, meaning the autonomy of humanitarian objectives from the political, economic, military or other objectives that any actor may hold with regard to areas where humanitarian action is being implemented.”

Source: GHD (2003), *The Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship*

Good progress towards more strategic partnerships with UN agencies and NGOs

Korea has made good progress in strengthening its humanitarian partnerships with UN agencies. It increased its humanitarian budget allocations to UN agencies from 7% of the total budget in 2006 to 63% in 2010. A formal funding agreement with the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and the Korean Red Cross was also concluded in June, 2012, reflecting the key role of the Red Cross family in disaster response. Korean officials also continue to play an active role on UN agency boards.⁵

There has also been good progress toward more strategic partnerships with NGOs; in this light, Korea’s plans to improve consultation with this important group are welcomed. Building on the lessons from the 2010 Haiti earthquake response, eight major Korean NGOs now have partnership agreements allowing them access to rapid response funds for emergency situations. This new emergency fund provides an annual envelope of USD 200 000 for each NGO. It is likely to improve both the timeliness and the predictability of the overall Korean response. The emergency funding window, launched in 2012, is planned for an initial period of two years, when it will be reviewed. Korea is encouraged to continue this good funding practice. Korea is also encouraged to engage in formal and regular consultation with Korean NGOs on wider humanitarian issues, and as it finalises the humanitarian strategy.

Since the 2007 Korean hostage crisis in Afghanistan, the Korean Government has prohibited its nationals from traveling to countries that fall under Category Four (travel prohibited). These restrictions could prevent NGO workers who are Korean nationals from providing humanitarian assistance in any country at a high security risk, thereby contravening humanitarian principles – especially the principle of *humanity*, meaning the centrality of saving human lives and alleviating suffering wherever it is found (GHD principle 2; box 6.2). However, MOFAT can grant special travel permissions to NGO workers for these category four countries, and is encouraged to do this systematically.

A comprehensive disaster response toolkit

Korea reviewed its response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake, which highlighted the need to make faster decisions, to deploy the search and rescue team earlier, to strengthen partnerships with civil society actors and to provide education and training in emergency response for Korean staff. This has led to a revised emergency response system and a comprehensive rapid response toolkit. The toolkit now contains a number of response funding options:

UN and pooled funds: funding for the UN's Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) global emergency response fund (2012: USD 4 million); and funding country-specific emergency response funds (known as ERRFs) – from 2012 onwards.

Through NGOs: The new emergency fund (new in 2012) has a rapid drawdown facility up to USD 200 000 for seven Korean NGOs and the Korean Red Cross.

Bilateral aid: Korea is a member of the United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) disaster response system,⁶ and has five UNDAC-trained personnel. Other options include the Korean National Disaster Relief teams (Box 6.3), including an INSARAG-⁷certified international search and rescue team, and medical personnel, usually deployed within 72 hours. Korea also provides in-kind aid – some already stocked in the World Food Program's humanitarian response depots in Panama and Dubai – with the deployment of teams and goods supported by KOICA and Korean military transport logistics.

Box 6.3. Korea's Disaster Relief Team

The Korea Disaster Relief Team was created in 2007 and is registered with the international Urban Search and Rescue roster. The team is composed of search and rescue, and medical experts, with 60 team members and 4 rescue dogs. Team members come from the National 119 rescue service (Korea's civil protection agency) but also from KOICA, the Ministry of Health and Welfare, the Ministry of Defence and other agencies. Regular domestic and international training for team members is provided.

The following agencies support the deployment of a disaster relief team according to a clear division of labour:

- MOFAT plans, handles and improves the overall relief effort, and provides the budget allocation;
- The Ministry of Defense arranges transport by military aircraft and provides documentation, on request;
- The Ministry of Health and Welfare selects and trains medical teams and provides medical supplies;
- The National Rescue Service maintains and trains a deployment-ready rescue team and related equipment; and
- KOICA prepares and manages supplies and provides support through its offices in the affected country.

The team has been deployed four times since 2008 – to Myanmar for epidemic prevention after the cyclone in 2008, to Indonesia after the 2009 earthquake, to Haiti after the 2010 earthquake and to Japan after the 2011 earthquake and tsunami.

Source: <http://rescue.go.kr> and presentation by the Korea Disaster Relief Team

The cross-government emergency response system has also been strengthened, with leadership now clearly assigned to MOFAT. Under the updated *Overseas Emergency Relief Act* (GOK, 2007a) MOFAT is mandated to call an inter-ministerial public-private committee,⁸ usually within 24 hours of a disaster, to decide whether to respond and what form the response should take. Co-ordination is facilitated by the existence of a single budget line for humanitarian response – as MOFAT holds the purse strings its leadership role is clear.

A major issue, however, is how Korea ensures that its bilateral – in-kind – disaster aid is the most appropriate form of response, and also how it ensures that this aid actually reaches those most in need. Korean officials interviewed for the peer review were well aware of the types of questions that a donor should ask before sending in-kind aid,⁹ but it is not so clear how these criteria are applied in practice. In addition, the monitoring of the use of in-kind aid is also unclear – Korea mostly supplies its aid directly to the affected government, and there is limited, if any, tracking of how the goods were distributed and/or whether they were effective. Korea could now consider other methods of planning and distributing its in-kind aid – perhaps by setting up a specialised team within KOICA, or by relying on other disaster response mechanisms, such as members of the wider Red Cross Red Crescent family.

Military assets – transport logistics and medical teams – can complement Korea’s civilian response following a request from the inter-ministerial committee, although there is not yet a formal directive to ensure that the use of the military is guided by humanitarian principles or value for money. As MOFAT must pay for the use of military assets, it could do more to ensure that the use of military hardware is always the best value for money. Korea should also look at formally recognising the international guidance for the use of military assets¹⁰ in its upcoming humanitarian policy, to ensure that future deployments do not contravene humanitarian principles. The policy should also spell out what criteria Korea will use to determine when a situation of “last resort”, as defined under international guidance, has been reached, and state which minister will make that decision, to ensure accountability is clear.

Ensuring the humanitarian system remains “fit for purpose”

Officials and partners interviewed for this peer review noted that the current humanitarian system – both within MOFAT and outside – appeared to be struggling to cope with the volume of activities. This problem will only become worse as Korea scales up its humanitarian programme. With the budget expected to grow by up to 800% over the next three years, there are currently no plans to expand the number of staff allocated to managing the humanitarian programme. As the success of the future programme depends largely on the people who design and carry it out, Korea will need to look closely at its programme orientations and staffing profile to ensure that there are enough adequately-skilled staff in place – both now and during the planned major scale-up.

There are also some anomalies in the accountability required from partners, especially from NGOs, that may need to be reviewed. NGOs are required to provide originals or copies of receipts to MOFAT as part of the grant close-out process. Other donors use different methods, such as independent audits of NGOs, which may be more appropriate, especially in disaster response. The requirement to translate all proposals and reports into Korean could also be reviewed, as this adds an unnecessary additional administrative burden to partners, and may reduce the timeliness and quality of reporting.

Improving monitoring and performance reporting

Korea recognises that more systematic learning and evaluation processes could help improve future programme design and delivery, and plans to make this a priority area. So far, learning has been rather *ad hoc* – such as after the Haiti earthquake deployment – though it has provided useful information for Korea’s future programme directions. Making this learning more systematic would be even more useful, especially as Korea

enlarges its humanitarian programme. Korea's intention to start annual evaluations is therefore welcomed.

Likewise, publishing the results of the humanitarian programme is important, as this demonstrates to taxpayers and legislators how well their money has been spent. If Korea set out clear and measurable objectives in its updated strategy it could then hold both itself, and its partners, accountable for achieving these goals. Korea's intention to set up a humanitarian webpage, showing the results of its humanitarian programme against the objectives set out in its upcoming humanitarian strategy, is a good first step towards greater accountability.

Future considerations:

- To provide a clear strategic vision for the humanitarian programme, Korea should finalise the new humanitarian assistance policy, ensuring that it focuses on a limited number of objectives in areas where Korea can make a solid impact, such as disaster response. The objectives should be accompanied by measurable indicators. The policy should be applicable across government, and Korea should consult widely with staff from other concerned ministries, as well as with major partners.
- Korea should define its role in supporting post-crisis recovery programmes and set out how (or if) it will support the preparedness and resilience of at-risk communities through the humanitarian budget, so that it ensures that humanitarian programming also strengthens the resilience of vulnerable populations to future shocks, and thus reduces overall risks to life and livelihood.
- Korea should ensure that funding decisions are predictable and transparent, and that the core humanitarian principles are respected, by determining and communicating clear criteria for who, what and where to fund.
- Korea should, as planned, consult more regularly with key stakeholders, including NGOs, determine how best to distribute and monitor in-kind aid, formally recognise the international guidance on the use of military assets and ensure that Korea has enough sufficiently-skilled humanitarian staff.
- To capitalise on existing and future experience, and promote accountability, efficiency and effectiveness, Korea should implement plans to make learning and reporting of results more systematic.

Notes

1. Korea signed up to the Principles and Practices of Good Humanitarian Donorship in 2009.
2. Further information on this initiative can be found at www.unhcr.org/4e27e2f06.html.
3. In 2009 these programmes were as follows: Belgium USD 204.6 million; Finland USD 154.5 million; and Switzerland USD 183.7 million (OECD, 2011h).
4. This is based on the assumption that Korea will need to grow its aid by 20% in real volume each year to reach its target of 0.25% ODA/GNI. The calculation is as follows:

$$1.25\% \text{ share of ODA} = \text{KRW } 26 \text{ billion in } 2012 \times 120\% = \text{KRW } 31.2 \text{ billion in } 2013$$

$$\times 120\% = \text{KRW } 37.44 \text{ billion in } 2014 \times 120\% = \text{KRW } 44.9 \text{ billion in } 2015$$

 To increase to a 6% share of ODA: $\text{KRW } 44.9 \text{ billion in } 2015 \times (6/1.25) = \text{KRW } 215.5 \text{ billion}$ (USD 188 million at current exchange rates)

 The difference between this projected figure and the 2012 budget is $(\text{KRW } 215.5 \text{ billion} - \text{KRW } 26 \text{ billion}) = \text{KRW } 189.5 \text{ billion}$ (USD 165.7 million) – an increase of over 800%.
5. An up-to-date list of Korean UN agency board membership can be found at: <http://un.mofat.go.kr/english/am/un/bilateral/un/index.jsp>.
6. More on UNDAC at www.unocha.org/what-we-do/coordination-tools/undac/overview
7. INSARAG is the International Search and Rescue Advisory Group. Korea is classified as a “heavy team” See www.unocha.org/what-we-do/coordination-tools/insarag/overview.
8. The Public-Private Joint Committee on Overseas Emergency Relief.
9. According to Towards Better Humanitarian Donorship: 12 lessons from DAC peer reviews (OECD, 2012c), donors should ask the following questions before sending “in-kind” aid: are the goods appropriate for the local climate, culture and religion? Does the affected population actually need the goods? Could the goods be purchased locally? Is the cost of transport good value for money? Will the people receiving the goods be able to afford to fix the donated item? If the answer to any of these questions is “no”, or if there is significant risk that an influx of donated goods will clog ports and logistics channels, then the donor should probably provide cash to a credible humanitarian actor instead.
10. The principles and practices of good humanitarian donorship require signatories to apply the Oslo Guidelines (Guidelines On The Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets In Disaster Relief, Updated November 2006 and revised November 2007) in natural disasters and the MCDA guidelines (Guidelines On The Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets To Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies, March 2003) in complex emergency situations.

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Annex A

OECD/DAC Standard Suite of Tables

Table A.1 Total financial flows

USD million at current prices and exchange rates

Korea	Net disbursements						
	1996-2000	2001-2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Total official flows	- 74	630	1 479	1 701	2 705	1 268	3 069
Official development assistance	211	417	455	696	802	816	1 174
Bilateral	124	284	376	491	539	581	901
Multilateral	87	133	79	206	263	235	273
Other official flows	- 286	213	1 023	1 005	1 903	452	1 895
Bilateral	- 286	213	1 023	1 005	1 903	452	1 895
Multilateral	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Net Private Grants	17	60	101	54	131	156	49
Private flows at market terms	1 184	1 670	4 934	9 827	7 863	5 018	8 716
Bilateral: <i>of which</i>	1 184	1 670	4 934	9 827	7 863	5 018	8 716
Direct investment	1 184	1 670	4 934	9 827	7 863	5 018	8 712
Export credits	-	-	-	-	-	-	5
Multilateral	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total flows	1 126	2 360	6 514	11 582	10 700	6 442	11 834
<i>for reference:</i>							
ODA (at constant 2010 USD million)	269	480	423	618	827	933	1 174
ODA (as a % of GNI)	0.04	0.07	0.05	0.07	0.09	0.10	0.12
Total flows (as a % of GNI) (a)	0.24	0.38	0.73	1.19	1.14	0.77	1.17
ODA to and channelled through NGOs							
- In USD million	1	3	5	7	10	11	18
- In percentage of total net ODA	0	1	1	1	1	1	2
- DAC countries' average % of total net ODA	6	9	7	7	7	8	10

a. To countries eligible for ODA.

ODA net disbursements
At constant 2010 prices and exchange rates and as a share of GNI




Table A.2 ODA by main categories

Disbursements											
Korea	Constant 2010 USD million					Per cent share of gross disbursements					Total DAC 2010%
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	
Gross Bilateral ODA	373	467	596	704	933	78	72	69	72	77	73
General budget support	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
Core support to national NGOs	5	6	9	8	1	1	1	1	1	0	1
Investment projects	175	233	288	419	640	37	36	33	43	53	13
Debt relief grants	-	-	11	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	3
Administrative costs	24	28	32	32	38	5	4	4	3	3	4
Other in-donor expenditures	2	4	4	6	5	0	1	0	1	0	3
Gross Multilateral ODA	104	183	271	269	273	22	28	31	28	23	27
UN agencies	40	42	48	64	77	8	7	6	7	6	5
EU institutions	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9
World Bank group	1	77	81	107	111	0	12	9	11	9	6
Regional development banks	50	50	130	79	67	11	8	15	8	6	2
Other multilateral	13	13	12	20	18	3	2	1	2	2	4
Total gross ODA	476	649	868	973	1 206	100	100	100	100	100	100
Repayments and debt cancellation	- 54	- 31	- 41	- 40	- 33						
Total net ODA	423	618	827	933	1 174	Contributions to UN Agencies (2009-10 Average)					
For reference:						WHO- assessed 13%					
Free standing technical co-operation	108	146	187	164	195						
Net debt relief	-	-	11	-	2						
Imputed student cost	1	1	-	-	-						
Refugees in donor countries	-	-	-	-	-						





Contributions to UN Agencies
(2009-10 Average)Contributions to Regional Development
Banks (2009-10 Average)

Table A.3 Bilateral ODA allocable by region and income group

Gross disbursements											
Korea	Constant 2010 USD million					Per cent share					Total DAC 2010%
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	
Africa	48	66	110	111	143	14	15	21	18	16	40
Sub-Saharan Africa	38	49	91	87	119	11	11	17	14	14	35
North Africa	10	11	18	17	16	3	3	3	3	2	4
Asia	162	229	291	365	578	49	54	56	58	67	34
South and Central Asia	73	69	77	124	296	22	16	15	20	34	20
Far East	88	155	202	233	276	26	36	39	37	32	14
America	25	49	73	66	66	7	12	14	10	8	13
North and Central America	12	22	46	43	32	4	5	9	7	4	7
South America	12	27	26	22	34	4	6	5	3	4	5
Middle East	67	63	32	25	35	20	15	6	4	4	7
Oceania	2	4	3	2	6	0	1	1	0	1	2
Europe	30	16	15	56	42	9	4	3	9	5	4
Total bilateral allocable by region	333	427	524	625	869	100	100	100	100	100	100
Least developed	88	110	153	189	338	26	27	30	32	40	40
Other low-income	40	41	81	98	177	12	10	16	17	21	13
Lower middle-income	194	243	236	254	295	58	59	47	43	35	37
Upper middle-income	10	20	33	49	27	3	5	7	8	3	9
More advanced developing countries	0	0	-	-	-	0	0	-	-	-	-
Total bilateral allocable by income	331	414	503	589	837	100	100	100	100	100	100
For reference:											
Total bilateral	373	467	596	704	933	100	100	100	100	100	100
of which: Unallocated by region	39	40	72	79	65	11	9	12	11	7	24
of which: Unallocated by income	42	53	93	115	96	11	11	16	16	10	30



1. Each region includes regional amounts which cannot be allocated by sub-region. The sum of the sub-regional amounts may therefore fall short of the regional total.

Table A.4 Main recipients of bilateral ODA

Korea	1999-2003 average				2004-08 average				2009-10 average				Gross disbursements			
	Current USD million	Constant 2010 USD mln	Per cent share	Memor: DAC countries' average %	Current USD million	Constant 2010 USD mln	Per cent share	Memor: DAC countries' average %	Current USD million	Constant 2010 USD mln	Per cent share	Memor: DAC countries' average %	Current USD million	Constant 2010 USD mln	Per cent share	Memor: DAC countries' average %
China	21	27	11		68	68	15		82	86	11		82	86	11	
Vietnam	20	26	11		31	31	7		59	61	8		59	61	8	
Indonesia	16	21	9		27	26	6		36	38	5		36	38	5	
Sri Lanka	14	18	7		25	25	5		36	37	5		36	37	5	
Uzbekistan	10	13	5		23	22	5		34	36	4		34	36	4	
Top 5 recipients	80	105	43	26	174	172	37	32	247	258	32	27	247	258	32	27
Iraq	8	10	4		20	20	4		30	32	4		30	32	4	
Cambodia	7	9	4		20	20	4		27	28	4		27	28	4	
Croatia	7	9	4		17	16	4		27	28	3		27	28	3	
Bangladesh	7	8	4		11	11	2		26	28	3		26	28	3	
Mongolia	6	8	3		11	10	2		24	26	3		24	26	3	
Top 10 recipients	115	150	62	40	252	250	54	44	381	401	49	39	381	401	49	39
Afghanistan	5	6	3		9	9	2		22	22	3		22	22	3	
Myanmar	5	6	3		8	8	2		20	21	3		20	21	3	
Philippines	5	6	3		7	7	2		20	21	3		20	21	3	
Tunisia	4	6	2		7	6	1		18	20	2		18	20	2	
Panama	4	5	2		7	7	1		15	16	2		15	16	2	
Top 15 recipients	138	179	75	50	289	287	62	52	475	501	61	46	475	501	61	46
Kazakhstan	3	4	2		7	7	1		11	11	1		11	11	1	
Kyrgyz Republic	3	4	2		6	6	1		10	11	1		10	11	1	
Ghana	3	3	1		6	6	1		10	11	1		10	11	1	
Nepal	3	3	1		5	5	1		9	10	1		9	10	1	
Angola	2	2	1		5	5	1		8	9	1		8	9	1	
Top 20 recipients	152	196	82	57	318	315	68	59	524	552	68	52	524	552	68	52
Total (141 recipients)	174	226	94		419	414	90		676	713	87		676	713	87	
Unallocated	11	14	6	22	48	48	10	24	98	106	13	32	98	106	13	32
Total bilateral gross	186	240	100	100	467	462	100	100	775	819	100	100	775	819	100	100

Table A.5 Bilateral ODA by major purposes

at current prices and exchange rates

Korea	1999-2003 average		2004-08 average		2009-10 average		2009-10 Total DAC per cent
	2010 USD million	Per cent	2010 USD million	Per cent	2010 USD million	Per cent	
Social infrastructure & services	158	49	441	52	683	40	41
Education	51	16	103	12	242	14	9
of which: basic education	1	0	4	1	11	1	2
Health	63	20	106	13	152	9	5
of which: basic health	23	7	74	9	71	4	3
Population & reproductive health	0	0	5	1	5	0	7
Water supply & sanitation	20	6	122	14	182	11	5
Government & civil society	18	6	77	9	92	5	13
of which: Conflict, peace & security	-	-	1	0	43	3	3
Other social infrastructure & services	6	2	29	3	12	1	3
Economic infrastructure & services	119	37	269	32	806	47	16
Transport & storage	54	17	145	17	552	32	7
Communications	41	13	68	8	90	5	0
Energy	24	7	54	6	161	9	5
Banking & financial services	0	0	1	0	2	0	2
Business & other services	0	0	1	0	2	0	1
Production sectors	16	5	59	7	83	5	7
Agriculture, forestry & fishing	12	4	42	5	67	4	5
Industry, mining & construction	3	1	12	1	13	1	1
Trade & tourism	1	0	5	1	2	0	1
Multisector	11	3	14	2	93	5	11
Commodity and programme aid	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
Action relating to debt	-	-	3	0	1	0	3
Humanitarian aid	4	1	33	4	18	1	9
Administrative costs of donors	12	4	25	3	35	2	5
Refugees in donor countries	-	-	-	-	-	-	3
Total bilateral allocable	321	100	843	100	1 720	100	100
<i>For reference:</i>							
Total bilateral	324	71	852	79	1 734	81	85
of which: Unallocated	4	1	9	1	14	1	43
Total multilateral	133	29	232	21	396	19	15
Total ODA	457	100	1 084	100	2 130	100	100




Table A.6 Comparative aid performance

Official development assistance					Net disbursements				
2010			2003-04 to 08-09 Average annual % change in real terms	Grant element of ODA (commitments) 2010	Share of multilateral aid			ODA to LDC's Bilateral and through multilateral agencies 2010	
USD million	% of GNI	% (a)			% of ODA (b)	% of GNI (c)	% of ODA (b)	% of GNI (c)	
Australia	3 826	0.32	8.4	99.6	15.3	0.05	30.3	0.10	
Austria	1 208	0.32	-2.5	100.0	49.3	0.16	38.0	0.12	
Belgium	3 004	0.64	6.5	99.3	31.7	0.20	48.2	0.31	
Canada	5 202	0.34	2.4	100.0	24.6	0.08	44.1	0.15	
Denmark	2 871	0.91	2.4	100.0	26.5	0.24	39.2	0.36	
Finland	1 333	0.55	7.0	100.0	37.1	0.20	35.9	0.20	
France	12 915	0.50	2.9	83.7	39.7	0.20	28.5	0.14	
Germany	12 985	0.39	4.3	88.6	38.1	0.15	28.1	0.11	
Greece	508	0.17	4.8	100.0	58.3	0.10	21.0	0.04	
Ireland	895	0.52	5.6	97.8	34.6	0.18	55.6	0.29	
Italy	2 996	0.15	-7.2	81.5	74.7	0.11	39.6	0.06	
Japan	11 054	0.20	-4.2	99.0	33.7	0.07	40.8	0.08	
Korea	1 174	0.12	11.5	100.0	23.3	0.03	38.3	0.04	
Luxembourg	403	1.05	5.1	100.0	34.9	0.37	38.4	0.40	
Netherlands	6 357	0.81	3.1	100.0	26.9	0.22	29.2	0.24	
New Zealand	342	0.26	3.5	100.0	20.7	0.05	29.5	0.08	
Norway	4 580	1.10	5.5	98.9	22.2	0.24	30.7	0.34	
Portugal	649	0.29	-7.3	74.4	39.0	0.11	44.1	0.13	
Spain	5 949	0.43	13.2	100.0	32.8	0.14	27.2	0.12	
Sweden	4 533	0.97	6.1	100.0	35.7	0.35	31.1	0.30	
Switzerland	2 300	0.40	2.0	100.0	25.6	0.10	26.9	0.11	
United Kingdom	13 053	0.57	6.1	100.0	38.6	0.22	35.9	0.21	
United States	30 353	0.21	2.1	87.9	12.4	0.03	35.5	0.07	
Total DAC	128 492	0.32	2.8	100.0	29.4	0.09	34.2	0.11	
Memo: Average country effort		0.49							

Notes:


a. Excluding debt reorganisation.

b. Including EU institutions.

c. Excluding EU institutions.

.. Data not available.

Figure A.1 Net ODA from DAC countries in 2010



Annex B

Field visit to Cambodia

The peer review team visited Cambodia in June 2012. The team was made up of four examiners – two from Australia and two from Germany – plus one observer from Chile, and two members of the DAC Secretariat. The team held meetings with:

- Korean embassy staff and staff of KOICA Cambodia Office.
- Officials from the Cambodian Government, including the Council for the Development of Cambodia, the Ministry of Economy and Finance, the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Public Works and Transport.
- Members of the National Assembly of Cambodia and the local government.
- Cambodian and Korean civil society organisations.
- Other development partners, including both bilateral and multilateral donors and organisations.

Information gathered during this field visit is used throughout this report to illustrate specific issues. This annex provides further detail, basic information on the country context (Table B.1) and an overview of international development co-operation in Cambodia. It focuses on: 1) Korea's aid priorities in Cambodia; 2) how Korea delivers its aid in the country; 3) how Korea adds value in Cambodia; and 4) how Korea works at country level in the context of the decentralisation process.

Country context

Cambodia had a gross national income (GNI) of USD 830 per capita in 2011 and is classified by the United Nations as one of the world's 48 least-developed countries (LDCs).¹ Of the other Southeast Asian countries, only Myanmar has a lower per capita income (USD 742).² Cambodia has a population of 13.4 million (2008 census) and more than one-quarter of the population (30.1% in 2007) live below the national poverty line.³ It was ranked 139th out of 187 countries on the most recent UN Human Development Index (UNDP, 2011). For example, its life expectancy at birth in 2011 was 63.1 years, the lowest of the ten ASEAN member countries, placing it at 148th out of 194 countries, just above Timor-Leste (62.5).⁴ Endemic corruption is also a challenge in Cambodia, impeding inclusive development. The watchdog group Transparency International ranks Cambodia 164th out of 183 countries in terms of perceptions of clean governance.⁵ Cambodia also ranks low (138th out of 183 countries) in terms of ease of doing business⁶ and is found in the bottom quartile for most of the World Bank's governance indicators.⁷

Despite these shortcomings, Cambodia has achieved impressive overall economic growth over the last decade, albeit starting from a very low base. The establishment of peace and political stability in the late 1990s coincided with a favourable external environment, namely the rapid growth of global trade.⁸ Its economy grew at almost 10% per year between 1998 and 2008.⁹ This rapid economic growth created employment opportunities, which in turn contributed to the decline in poverty incidence from 36.1% in 1997 to 30.1% in 2007.¹⁰ Geography has also played an influential part in Cambodia's growth, as it shares borders with two regional economic engines (Thailand and Vietnam). Although Cambodia was heavily affected by the 2008/09 global economic downturn with its growth rate falling sharply to 0.1% in 2009 it staged a strong recovery in 2010 and 2011,

with real GDP growth of 6% and 6.9% (estimate) respectively.¹¹ The IMF estimates that this growth trajectory will continue in the medium-term at an average growth rate of 6.9% between 2012 and 2016 (IMF, 2012).¹² Oil deposits found beneath Cambodia's territorial waters in 2005 also represent a potential revenue stream for the government when commercial extraction begins.

Cambodia's strategy for tackling development challenges

The Cambodian government is addressing the country's many pressing needs (Box B.1) through its *Rectangular Strategy for Growth, Equity and Efficiency* (the strategy to alleviate poverty and achieve the MDGs); and the five-year development plan, known as the *National Strategic Development Plan* (NSDP). The Cambodian government has put good governance at the core of its development strategy, recognising its importance in attaining the MDGs. The Rectangular Strategy is currently in its second phase (2009-2013) and has identified four priority areas, each with detailed actions: 1) the enhancement of agricultural sector; 2) further rehabilitation and construction of physical infrastructure; 3) private sector development and employment generation; and 4) capacity building and human resources development. NSDP provides the roadmap for implementing these priority policies outlined and is linked to the budget via the country's Medium-Term Expenditure Framework. It was updated in 2010 to synchronise with the term of the Fourth Legislature of the National Assembly (2009-2013) and to take into account the potential impact of the global economic downturn on the Cambodian economy. Through the implementation of the Rectangular Strategy and the NSDP, the Cambodian government aims to achieve the following goals:

- sustainability, peace, political stability, security and social order to promote rule of law and protect human rights and dignity and multi-party democracy;
- sustainable long-term broad-based economic growth (at a rate of 7% a year) and more competitive capacity in the context of one-digit inflation;
- poverty reduction at a rate of over 1% a year, and improvement in the main social indicators, especially education, health and gender equity; and
- increased outreach, effectiveness, quality and credibility of public services.

Box B.1. Cambodia's MDGs

Cambodia's progress is mixed in meeting the Cambodia Millennium Development Goals (CMDGs which include a ninth goal on mine clearance). Cambodia estimates that it is on track to achieve its targets for reducing child mortality (goal 4) and combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases (goal 6) by 2015. Progress has been lagging in other areas, namely attaining universal primary education (goal 2); gender equality (goal 3); and de-mining unexploded ordnance and providing victim assistance (goal 9). Cambodia is unlikely to achieve by 2015 the targets for poverty and hunger (goal 1); improving maternal health (goal 5); and ensuring environmental sustainability (goal 7).

Source: Royal Government of Cambodia (2011), *Achieving Cambodia's Millennium Development Goals, Update 2010*, Royal Government of Cambodia, Ministry of Planning, available at <http://www.un.org.kh/undp/media/files/CMDG%20Report%202010.pdf>

Development co-operation in Cambodia

Official development assistance (ODA) is a fundamental source of funding for Cambodia's development programmes and is contributing towards achieving the NSDP objectives and CMDGs. Between 2007 and 2010, net ODA averaged 7.5% of Cambodia's gross national income (GNI) and 75% of its public expenditure.¹³ While its dependence on

foreign aid has declined since the early 2000s,¹⁴ mainly as a result of its growing national income, Cambodia remains among the most aid-dependent countries in Asia. Total aid provided to Cambodia amounted to approximately USD 7.4 billion over the last decade (2000-2010) alone, or roughly USD 711 million every year for the past five years (2006-2010).¹⁵ Net ODA to Cambodia in 2010 totalled USD 737 million. Per capita aid received by Cambodia in 2010 was USD 51.9, about average for low-income countries (USD 51.4).¹⁶

Support from development partners has steadily increased since the signing of the peace agreement in 1991. Today Cambodia receives four times more aid than it did two decades ago. Bilateral ODA represents almost 70% of all aid to Cambodia. Of the 45 donors¹⁷ that provide aid to Cambodia, Japan is the largest, giving around 18% of all aid. The five main donors (*i.e.* Japan, the Asian Development Bank, the United States, the Global Fund and Australia) provide more than half of Cambodia's aid. Korea is the 11th largest donor overall, providing USD 27.2 million in 2009/10. Although not reported in the OECD Creditor Reporting System, China has rapidly risen to be one of the most important sources of development finance for Cambodia. According to Cambodia's own ODA data, China was the second largest provider (after Japan) of development assistance, disbursing USD 138 million in 2010 (RGC, 2011). Chinese aid to Cambodia is estimated to increase to USD 211 million in 2011, making it the largest single donor (*ibid*).

Donor co-ordination

The Cambodian government's policy on aid management is outlined in the *Strategic Framework for Development Co-operation Management*. Within the government, the Cambodian Rehabilitation and Development Board (CRDB) of the Council for the Development of Cambodia (CDC) is responsible for the co-ordination and management of donor aid. The Cambodia Development Co-operation Forum (CDCF) is the principal forum for high-level government-donor consultation. CDCF, which replaced the Consultative Group mechanism in 2007, is chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister and attended by ministers and high-level government and donor officials. It is held every 18 months to discuss a range of development issues and challenges, and assess financing needs for future development programmes related to the implementation of NSDP. CDCF has met three times since it was launched in 2007.

The CDCF is supplemented by an in-country donor co-ordination mechanism called the Government-Development Partner Co-ordination Committee (GDCC). GDCC, which meets two or three times a year, is a forum for co-ordination, dialogue and information sharing on policies and matters of key concern and importance for Cambodia's socio-economic development. Korea is represented both by the Embassy and the KOICA Cambodia Office. GDCC works towards aid harmonisation and effectiveness in line with the Paris Declaration. GDCC is supported by 19 technical working groups (TWGs) for aid co-ordination at the sector level. TWGs are organised around themes or sectors linked to NSDP priorities and are responsible for implementing, monitoring and reporting on progress related to the Harmonisation, Alignment and Results Action Plan and the Joint Monitoring Indicators of their respective sectors. GDCC ensures co-ordination among the TWGs, provides policy guidance, sets priorities and proposes measures to solve problems raised by TWGs.

Korean development co-operation in Cambodia

Cambodia is one of Korea's 26 priority partner countries. Korea has been engaged in Cambodia since it restored full diplomatic relations in 1997. The bilateral relationship


between the two countries is stable and friendly. Around 350 000 Korean tourists visit Cambodia each year. Cambodia sends the highest number of migrant workers to Korea (a total of 16,000 migrant workers since 2008). In terms of ODA, Korea provided an average of USD 27 million annually in 2009 and 2010 – just under 4% of the net ODA Cambodia received in that period. In 2010, Korea was the seventh largest bilateral donor for Cambodia. Cambodia, in turn, was the seventh largest recipient of Korea's aid that year.

Korea's aid priorities in Cambodia

Korea has recently published its Country Partnership Strategy for Cambodia, which sets out the strategic direction for 2012-2015 with four areas of focus: 1) agricultural and rural development; 2) transport and green energy infrastructure; 3) human resources development, including vocational training; and 4) health and medical services. Korea's Country Partnership Strategy was developed in response to Cambodia's national priorities, as spelled out in the country's NSDP (Figure B.2). The four priority areas have been selected in consultation with the Cambodian government, taking into account:

- Cambodia's NSDP and other sectoral strategies;
- Korea's comparative advantage; as well as
- other development partners active in those sectors.

Cross-cutting development issues, such as gender, poverty reduction and climate change, are mainstreamed across all priority area programmes. Korea plans to allocate at least 70% of its assistance to Cambodia to these four priority areas. However, the Country Partnership Strategy does not clearly define in measurable terms the expected outcomes of Korea's contribution in the four priority areas, including the cross-cutting issues. This will make future evaluation and reporting on the results of Korea's efforts difficult and Korea should look critically at how to improve its Strategy in this respect. At the time of the peer review team's visit, the final draft of the Country Partnership Strategy had been submitted to the Cambodian government for comment.

Figure B.1. Summary of Korea's Partnership Strategy for Cambodia, 2012-2015

Source: GOK (2012), Country Partnership Strategy for Cambodia 2012-2015

How Korea delivers its aid in Cambodia

Under the umbrella of its Country Partnership Strategy, Korea's ODA policies and programmes in the field are supported by the ODA Council. The organisations represented in the Council are the Korean Embassy, KOICA, ten other Korean public agencies (*e.g.* Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency), as well as eight Korean private contractors operating in the field. The Council meets regularly to exchange information and report on members' respective aid activities, both ongoing and planned. These meetings perform a helpful field-level co-ordination function. However, fragmentation within the grant component of Korea's support remains an issue in Cambodia and more effort is needed to address it. For example, the peer review team learned that several Korean implementing agencies, namely the Korea Development Institute, the Korean Foundation for International Health Care and the Ministry of Agriculture, were using different procedures and delivering projects directly to their Cambodian partners with limited and often no involvement of the embassy (ODA Council) or KOICA or the central aid coordination body of the Cambodian government. While the Country Partnership Strategy has the potential to promote a whole-of-government approach to Korea's development co-operation in Cambodia, it now needs to be made operational. Korea should produce a truly comprehensive Country Partnership Strategy that captures all Korean supported aid activities in the country, including those funded and carried out by other Korean ministries and agencies. This will also require the

ODA Council to be equipped with the necessary authority to ensure that all aid-funded activities in Cambodia are processed through the embassy.

Korea uses a mix of grants, technical co-operation and concessional lending in Cambodia and largely delivers project-type assistance. It is involved in a number of sectors, though its spending is, without doubt, the highest in the area of economic infrastructure. Korea is among the largest supporters of infrastructure development in Cambodia, behind China and Japan. Its country programme involves a small number of large infrastructure projects, typically funded through EDCF loans, alongside a greater number of smaller grant and technical co-operation projects in a range of sectors implemented by KOICA. Between 2007 and 2011, Korea disbursed some 63% of its aid as concessional loans and another 25% as project aid, while the rest came in the forms of Korea's overseas volunteers (8%), training (3%) and NGO programmes (1%). Korea is making efforts to increase synergies between grants and loans in the field – for example, KOICA sometimes carries out the feasibility study for EDCF loans – but co-operation between Korea's managers of grants and loans appears to be limited. Korea's engagement in infrastructure has the potential for further strengthening this links between grants and loans, thus increasing the impact of Korea's investments in Cambodia. Moreover, in order to meet its untying targets, Korea should set out clearly the steps and timeline necessary for untying all (100%) of its grants and at least 80% of its loans to Cambodia by 2015.

How Korea adds value in Cambodia

Korea's decade-long engagement in Cambodia is valued by its partners as a reliable, long-term development partner. Cambodia's designation as one of Korea's 26 priority partner countries has triggered an increase in ODA, from a yearly average of USD 12.7 million between 1998 and 2007 to more than USD 37 million in 2010. Korea's field team has established effective working relations with their counterparts in the Cambodian government and the TWGs. Stakeholders agree that Korea has made a positive contribution to Cambodia's development; infrastructure, agriculture and rural development were most often highlighted as areas where it has added particular value. Korea's activities in Cambodia also demonstrate its willingness to align its projects with government priorities, for example EDCF's support for infrastructure development. Indeed there is wide appreciation within the Cambodian government of Korea's efforts to increase its ODA and to focus it on the four priority sectors reflecting Cambodia's own priorities in its NSDP. This augurs well for the success of Korea's development co-operation in Cambodia in the years ahead.

The Cambodian government and other donors also welcome the recent increase in Korea's engagement in the aid management architecture. Korea takes part in three TWGs (agriculture, health and infrastructure) and plans to increase its engagement in other TWGs (e.g. agriculture, food security, and private sector development). China also participates in the TWG for infrastructure. Korea is a particularly active participant in the TWGs for health and infrastructure where it has contributed to the discussion. That being said, Korea has only recently started to make its voice heard in these forums. It has so far under-used the potential these forums offer for sharing Korea's relevant expertise and experience. Korea should continue to engage and cement its position within the donor community by making its voice heard more clearly in all the aid co-ordination forums in which it participates, and also by tackling some long-standing issues that have constrained the effectiveness of its aid, such as the sustainability of project achievements. Korea could also have more of an impact by closer engagement in policy-level issues most relevant to the donors group, such as regulatory reform or governance issues, and by sharing its

perspectives based on its own development experience. Its engagement in broader dialogue on policy issues will provide an opportunity to lift Korea's profile further. Korea should elaborate in the Country Partnership Strategy how it intends to strengthen such engagement in Cambodia.

How is Korea's decentralisation process working?

As discussed in Chapter 4, Korea's ODA is well managed in the field by decentralised Korean implementing agency staff, with the Korean Embassy playing an important supporting role as the chair of the ODA Council. Links between headquarters and the field are good and supported by strong project management systems. The embassy currently has only one staff member, a career diplomat, covering various aspects of development co-operation, including loans (in the absence of an EDCF field office), he is ably supported by KOICA's large in-country team (13 Korean and 6 local project staff) who manage the country programme and is responsible for co-ordinating the formulation of Korea's Country Partnership Strategy for Cambodia.

KOICA's Cambodia Office is one of the 20 overseas offices that have benefited from the agency's decentralisation reform. It already has delegated powers, within agreed allocation ceilings, to execute project budgets. The division of labour between the main Korean actors in the field is also clear. The embassy supports policy-setting, KOICA implements grants and EDCF manages Korea's loan portfolio (from Seoul). The Korean Embassy represents Korea to the Cambodian government and in aid co-ordination groups, and agrees to the overall strategy. KOICA staff liaise closely with government counterparts on specific projects and are more engaged in co-ordination groups at the sector level. Korea's management of its loan portfolio will be strengthened by the posting of an EDCF officer to Cambodia by the end of 2012. EDCF should consider locating its new field office in the same building as KOICA's at the least (*i.e.* under the one roof) as this would facilitate joint working between the two agencies and ensure greater integration of grants and loans at the field level.

In the context of an expanding aid programme for Cambodia, Korea's field team will need to become more efficient in how it operates and delivers aid in order to absorb large allocation increases. For example, a large part of KOICA's field team's resources (7 full-time staff and 16% of its budget) appear to be consumed by managing its volunteer programme. Some of these field management functions could be contracted out. Korea can also improve efficiency in managing its ODA by supporting fewer and much larger programmes and by engaging more in partnerships with other bilateral and multilateral donors as well as with NGOs. Korea's move towards a programme-based approach in the Cambodian health sector is an example of an opportunity to improve the scale and effectiveness of Korean ODA within Cambodia.

Korea will also need to make more use of its highly competent locally-engaged staff. KOICA has been able to recruit high calibre local staff to play an important role in the delivery of its assistance. Some are also able to progress their careers within the organisation. However, Cambodian staff still face challenges, since many documents and training opportunities are only available in Korean. Career development, equal training opportunities, and appropriate incentives for both Korean specialists and all locally-engaged staff would ensure continued quality support to programmes.

Notes

1. Source: World Bank World Development Indicators, available at <http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do?Step=12&id=4&CNO=2> [accessed 29 August 2012]
2. Information from the *World Economic Outlook Database* of the International Monetary Fund: www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2012/01/weodata/index.aspx [accessed 29 August 2012]
3. Source: World Bank World Development Indicators, available at <http://data.worldbank.org/country/cambodia> [accessed 29 August 2012]
4. Information from UNDP's Human Development Indicators, available at <http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/69206.html> [accessed 29 August 2012]
5. Transparency International corruption by country map, at www.transparency.org/country#KHM [accessed 29 August 2012]
6. Source: Doing Business 2012 data for Cambodia, available at www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/cambodia/ [accessed 29 August 2012]
7. Source: The World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators, available at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/sc_chart.asp [accessed 29 August 2012]
8. Cambodia became a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1999 and the World Trade Organization in 2004.
9. According to ADB, Cambodia's growth performance for 1998-2007 ranks sixth in the world: <http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/cps-cam-2011-2013-pa.pdf> [accessed 30 August 2012]
10. Source: World Bank World Development Indicators, available at <http://data.worldbank.org/country/cambodia> [accessed 29 August 2012]
11. Source: World Bank World Development Indicators, available at <http://data.worldbank.org/country/cambodia>
12. <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/cambodia/overview> [accessed 29 August 2012]
13. Source: World Bank World Development Indicators, available at <http://data.worldbank.org/country/cambodia>.
14. ODA represented more than 11% of its GNI in 2002.
15. DAC 2a Table, <http://dotstat.oecd.org/Index.aspx> [accessed 31 August 2012]
16. Source: World Bank World Development Indicators, available at <http://data.worldbank.org/country/cambodia>.
17. This does not include other providers of development assistance, such as China and NGOs that do not report their aid activities to the OECD Creditor Reporting System.

Description of key terms

The following brief descriptions of the main development co-operation terms used in this publication are provided for general background information

ACCRA AGENDA FOR ACTION (AAA): In 2008, three years after the 2005 PARIS DECLARATION ON AID EFFECTIVENESS, the Third High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Accra, Ghana took stock of progress and built on the Paris Declaration to accelerate the pace of change. The AAA, adopted in Accra on 4 September 2008, reflects the international commitment to support the reforms needed to accelerate an effective use of development assistance and helps ensure the achievement of the MDGs by 2015.

AID: The words “aid” and “assistance” in this publication refer only to flows which qualify as OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE (ODA).

AID EFFECTIVENESS: The efforts of the development community to improve the delivery of AID to maximise its impact on development.

AMORTISATION: Repayments of principal on a LOAN. Does not include interest payments.

ASSOCIATED FINANCING: The combination of OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE, whether GRANTS or LOANS, with other official or private funds to form finance packages. Associated financing packages are subject to the same criteria of concessionality, developmental relevance and recipient country eligibility as TIED AID credits.

BILATERAL: See TOTAL RECEIPTS.

BUSAN: Often referred to as the Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, held from 29 November to 1 December 2011, in Busan, Korea.

CLAIM: The entitlement of a creditor to repayment of a LOAN; by extension, the loan itself or the outstanding amount thereof.

COMMITMENT: A firm obligation, expressed in writing and backed by the necessary funds, undertaken by an official donor to provide specified assistance to a recipient country or a multilateral organisation. Bilateral commitments are recorded in the full amount of expected transfer, irrespective of the time required for the completion of DISBURSEMENTS. Commitments to multilateral organisations are reported as the sum of: *i*) any disbursements in the year in question which have not previously been notified as commitments; and *ii*) expected disbursements in the following year.

CONCESSIONALITY LEVEL: A measure of the “softness” of a credit reflecting the benefit to the borrower compared to a LOAN at market rate (see GRANT ELEMENT). Technically, it is calculated as the difference between the nominal value of a TIED AID credit and the present value of the debt service as of the date of DISBURSEMENT, calculated at a discount rate applicable to the currency of the transaction and expressed as a percentage of the nominal value.

COUNTRY PROGRAMMABLE AID (CPA): Tracks the portion of aid on which recipient countries have, or could have, a significant say and for which donors should be accountable for delivering “as programmed”. CPA reflects the amount of aid that is subjected to multiyear planning at country/regional level and is defined through exclusions, by subtracting from total gross ODA that is:

- unpredictable by nature (humanitarian aid and debt relief);
- entails no cross-border flows (administrative costs, imputed student costs, promotion of development awareness, and research and refugees in donor countries);
- does not form part of co-operation agreements between governments (food aid and aid from local governments, core funding to NGOs, aid through secondary agencies, and aid which is not allocable by country).
- CPA does not net out loan repayments, as these are not usually factored into aid allocation decisions.

DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE COMMITTEE (DAC): The committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) which deals with development co-operation matters. A description of its aims and a list of its members are available at www.oecd.org/dac.

DAC LIST OF ODA RECIPIENTS: For statistical purposes, the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) uses a list of official development assistance (ODA) recipients which it revises every three years. The “Notes on definitions and measurement” give details of revisions in recent years. As of 1 January 2011, the list is presented in the following categories (the word “countries” includes territories):

LDCs: Least developed countries, a group established by the United Nations (UN). To be classified as LDCs, countries must fall below thresholds established for income, economic diversification and social development. The DAC List of ODA Recipients is updated immediately to reflect any change in the LDCs group.

Other LICs: Other low-income countries; includes all non-LDCs with per capita gross national income (GNI) of USD 1 005 or less in 2010 (World Bank Atlas basis).

LMICs: Lower middle-income countries, *i.e.* those with GNI per capita (Atlas basis) between USD 1 006 and USD 3 975 in 2010. LDCs which are also LMICs are only shown as LDCs, not as LMICs.

UMICs: Upper middle-income countries, *i.e.* those with GNI per capita (Atlas basis) between USD 3 976 and USD 12 275 in 2010.

When a country is added to or removed from the LDCs group, totals for the income groups affected are adjusted retroactively to maximise comparability over time with reference to the current list.

DEBT REORGANISATION (also: RESTRUCTURING): Any action officially agreed between creditor and debtor that alters the terms previously established for repayment. This may include **forgiveness** (extinction of the LOAN) or **rescheduling**, which can be implemented either by revising the repayment schedule or extending a new **refinancing** loan. See also the “Notes on definitions and measurement” in the Statistical Annex.

DISAGGREGATED MONITORING: Breaking down results from statistical monitoring by sex, sub-national region, and ethnic and social groups.

DISBURSEMENT: The release of funds to – or the purchase of goods or services for – a recipient; by extension, the amount thus spent. Disbursements record the actual international transfer of financial resources, or of goods or services valued at the cost to the donor. In the case of activities carried out in donor countries, such as training,

administration or public awareness programmes, disbursement is taken to have occurred when the funds have been transferred to the service provider or the recipient. They may be recorded **gross** (the total amount disbursed over a given accounting period) or **net** (the gross amount less any repayments of LOAN principal or recoveries on GRANTS received during the same period).

EXPORT CREDITS: LOANS for the purpose of trade and which are not represented by a negotiable instrument. They may be extended by the official or the private sector. If extended by the private sector, they may be supported by official guarantees.

FRAGMENTATION OF AID: Describes aid that comes in too many small slices from too many donors, creating unnecessary and wasteful administrative costs and making it difficult to target aid where it is needed most.

GRACE PERIOD: See GRANT ELEMENT.

GRANTS: Transfers made in cash, goods or services for which no repayment is required.

GRANT ELEMENT: Reflects the **financial terms** of a COMMITMENT: interest rate, MATURITY and GRACE PERIOD (interval to first repayment of capital). It measures the concessionality of a LOAN, expressed as the percentage by which the present value of the expected stream of repayments falls short of the repayments that would have been generated at a given reference rate of interest. The reference rate is 10% in DAC statistics. This rate was selected as a proxy for the marginal efficiency of domestic investment, *i.e.* as an indication of the opportunity cost to the donor of making the funds available. Thus, the grant element is nil for a loan carrying an interest rate of 10%; it is 100% for a GRANT; and it lies between these two limits for a loan at less than 10% interest. If the face value of a loan is multiplied by its grant element, the result is referred to as the **grant equivalent** of that loan (see CONCESSIONALITY LEVEL). *Note:* In classifying receipts, the grant element concept is not applied to the operations of the multilateral development banks. Instead, these are classified as concessional if they include a subsidy (“soft window” operations) and non-concessional if they are unsubsidised (“hard window” operations).

GRANT-LIKE FLOW: A transaction in which the donor country retains formal title to repayment but has expressed its intention in the COMMITMENT to hold the proceeds of repayment in the borrowing country for the benefit of that country.

GREEN ECONOMY: Defined by UNEP, green economy results in improved human wellbeing and social equity, while significantly reducing environmental risks and ecological scarcities. In a green economy, growth in income and employment should be driven by public and private investments that reduce carbon emissions and pollution, enhance energy and resource efficiency, and prevent the loss of biodiversity and ecosystem services.

GREEN GROWTH: Defined by OECD, green growth means fostering economic growth and development while ensuring that natural assets continue to provide the resources and environmental services on which our well-being relies. To do this, it must catalyse investment and innovation which will underpin sustained growth and give rise to new economic opportunities.

HIGH-LEVEL FORA ON AID EFFECTIVENESS: A series of four high-level events held between 2003 and 2011. In the early 2000s, there was growing concern that

aid was not producing the development results that it should. These events led to the formulation and refinement of principles for effective aid with the aim of helping achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). See Rome Declaration on Harmonisation (2003), Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005), Accra Agenda for Action (2008). The most recent event, held in Busan in 2011 and attended by over 2 000 representatives of governments,

international organisations, parliaments, the private sector, civil society and other stakeholders, resulted in the endorsement of the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (2011).

IMPUTED MULTILATERAL FLOWS: Geographical distribution of donors' core contributions to multilateral agencies, based on the geographical breakdown of multilateral agencies' disbursements for the year of reference.

LOANS: Transfers for which repayment is required. Only loans with MATURITIES of over one year are included in DAC statistics. The data record actual flows throughout the lifetime of the loans, not the **grant equivalent** of the loans (see GRANT ELEMENT). Data on net loan flows include deductions for repayments of principal (but not payment of interest) on earlier loans. This means that when a loan has been fully repaid, its effect on total NET FLOWS over the life of the loan is zero.

LONG-TERM: Describes LOANS with an original or extended MATURITY of more than one year (see SHORT-TERM).

MATURITY: The date at which the final repayment of a LOAN is due; by extension, the duration of the loan.

MULTILATERAL AGENCIES: In DAC statistics, those international institutions with governmental membership that conduct all or a significant part of their activities in favour of development and aid recipient countries. They include multilateral development banks (*e.g.* the World Bank, regional development banks), United Nations agencies and regional groupings (*e.g.* certain European Union and Arab agencies). A contribution by a DAC member to such an agency is deemed to be multilateral if it is pooled with other contributions and disbursed at the discretion of the agency. Unless otherwise indicated, capital subscriptions to multilateral development banks are presented on a deposit basis, *i.e.* in the amount and as of the date of lodgement of the relevant letter of credit or other negotiable instrument. Limited data are available on an encashment basis, *i.e.* at the date and in the amount of each drawing made by the agency on letters or other instruments.

MULTILATERAL: See TOTAL RECEIPTS.

NET FLOW: The total amount disbursed over a given accounting period, less repayments of LOAN principal during the same period, no account being taken of interest.

NET TRANSFER: In DAC statistics, NET FLOW *minus* payments of interest.

OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE (ODA): GRANTS or LOANS to countries and territories on the DAC LIST OF ODA RECIPIENTS and MULTILATERAL AGENCIES that are undertaken by the official sector at concessional terms (*i.e.* with a GRANT ELEMENT of at least 25%) and that have the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as their main objective. In addition to financial flows, TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION is included in aid. Grants, loans and credits for military purposes are excluded. For treatment of the forgiveness of

loans originally extended for military purposes, see “Notes on definitions and measurement” in the Statistical Annex.

OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE (ODF): Used in measuring the inflow of resources to recipient countries and includes: *i*) bilateral ODA; *ii*) GRANTS, and concessional and nonconcessional development lending by MULTILATERAL AGENCIES; and *iii*) those OTHER OFFICIAL FLOWS which are considered developmental (including refinancing LOANS) but which have too low a GRANT ELEMENT to qualify as ODA.

OFFSHORE BANKING CENTRES: Countries or territories whose financial institutions deal primarily with non-residents.

OTHER OFFICIAL FLOWS (OOF): Transactions by the official sector with countries on the DAC LIST OF ODA RECIPIENTS which do not meet the conditions for eligibility as OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE, either because they are not primarily aimed at development or because they have a GRANT ELEMENT of less than 25%.

PARIS DECLARATION ON AID EFFECTIVENESS: The Paris Declaration (2005) – adhered to by over 100 countries – lays out a practical, action-oriented roadmap to improve the quality of aid and its impact on development by 2010. It puts in place a series of specific implementation measures and establishes an international monitoring system to ensure that donors and recipients hold each other accountable for their commitments – a feature that is unique among international agreements. The Paris Declaration’s 56 PARTNERSHIP COMMITMENTS are organised around five fundamental principles for making aid more

effective:

Ownership: Developing countries set their own strategies for development, improve their institutions and tackle corruption. In Accra (2008) it was widely recognised that “ownership” should also refer to the inclusion of a wide variety of country stakeholders in the process.

Alignment: Donor countries bring their support in line with the country’s objectives and use local systems.

Harmonisation: Donor countries co-ordinate their action, simplify procedures and share information to avoid duplication.

Managing for results: Developing countries and donors focus on producing and measuring results.

Mutual accountability: Donor and developing country partners are accountable for development results to each other and to their electorates.

Designed to strengthen and deepen implementation of the Paris Declaration, the **Accra Agenda for Action** (AAA, 2008) takes stock of progress and sets the agenda for accelerated advancement towards the 2010 targets. The AAA represents an unprecedented alliance of more than 80 developing countries, DAC donors, some 3 000 civil society organisations, emerging economies, United Nations and multilateral institutions, and global funds.

PARTIALLY UNTIED AID: ODA for which the associated goods and services must be procured in the donor country or among a restricted group of other countries that

must, however, include substantially all recipient countries. Partially untied aid is subject to the same disciplines as TIED AID credits and ASSOCIATED FINANCING.

PARTNER COUNTRY: Refers to countries that receive development assistance provided by other countries to support their own development.

PARTNERSHIP PRINCIPLES: See PARIS DECLARATION ON AID EFFECTIVENESS.

PEER REVIEWS: Each DAC member country is reviewed by peers roughly every four years with two main aims: *i)* to help the country understand where it could improve its development strategy and structures so that it can increase the effectiveness of its

investment; *ii)* to identify and share good practice in development policy and strategy. The reviews are led by examiners from two DAC member states.

PRIVATE FLOWS: Consist of flows at market terms financed out of private sector resources (*i.e.* changes in holdings of private LONG-TERM assets held by residents of the reporting country) and private grants (*i.e.* grants by non-governmental organisations and other private bodies, net of subsidies received from the official sector). In presentations focusing on the receipts of recipient countries, flows at market terms are shown as follows:

Direct investment: Investment made to acquire or add to a lasting interest in an enterprise in a country on the DAC LIST OF ODA RECIPIENTS. “Lasting interest” implies a long-term relationship where the direct investor has a significant influence on the management of the enterprise, reflected by ownership of at least 10% of the shares, or equivalent voting power or other means of control. In practice it is recorded as the change in the net worth of a subsidiary in a recipient country to the parent company, as shown in the books of the latter.

International bank lending: Net lending to countries on the DAC List of ODA Recipients by banks in OECD countries. LOANS from central monetary authorities are excluded. Guaranteed bank loans and bonds are included under other private (see below) or bond lending (see below).

Bond lending: Net completed international bonds issued by countries on the DAC List of ODA Recipients.

Other private: Mainly reported holdings of equities issued by firms in aid recipient countries. In data presentations that focus on the outflow of funds from donors, private flows other than direct investment are restricted to credits with a MATURITY of more than one year and are usually divided into:

Private export credits: See EXPORT CREDITS.

Securities of multilateral agencies: This covers the transactions of the private, non-bank and bank sector in bonds, debentures, etc. issued by MULTILATERAL AGENCIES. **REDD:** Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries (REDD) is a set of steps designed to use market/financial incentives in order to reduce the emissions of greenhouse gases from deforestation and forest degradation.

RIO +20 CONFERENCE: The United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, on 20-22 June 2012. The first UN

Conference on Sustainable Development was the “Earth Summit”, held in 1992, and it spawned the three “Rio conventions” – the UNFCCC, the UNCCD and the UNCBD.

SCALING UP: This term, used with reference to aid, refers not only to increased aid flows, but also to an increase in the impact and effectiveness of aid through several measures: distributing aid better, based on partner country needs and priorities; widening

aid to include populations and geographic/thematic areas that receive proportionally too little; applying more broadly the lessons that have been learned on more effective aid delivery and management; following through on commitments (in terms of how much aid is given and how it is delivered and managed); investing greater efforts to overcome known and recognised obstacles to aid effectiveness.

SHORT-LIVED CLIMATE POLLUTANTS (SLCPs): Chemicals that remain in the atmosphere for only a few days or a few decades at the most. They include black carbon particles (or soot, emitted from wood fires, for example); methane (from oil and gas production and municipal waste); and tropospheric ozone (from motor vehicles). In addition to being powerful greenhouse gases, these are dangerous air pollutants, with various detrimental impacts on human health, agriculture and ecosystems.

SHORT-TERM: Describes LOANS with a MATURITY of one year or less (see LONGTERM).

TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION: Includes both: *i)* GRANTS to nationals of aid-recipient countries receiving education or training at home or abroad; and *ii)* payments to consultants, advisers and similar personnel, as well as teachers and administrators serving in recipient countries (including the cost of associated equipment). Assistance of this kind provided specifically to facilitate the implementation of a capital project is included indistinguishably among bilateral project and programme expenditures, and is omitted from technical co-operation in statistics of aggregate flows.

TIED AID: Official GRANTS or LOANS where procurement of the goods or services is limited to the donor country or to a group of countries, which does not include substantially all aid-recipient countries. Tied aid loans, credits and ASSOCIATED

FINANCING packages are subject to certain disciplines concerning their CONCESSIONALITY LEVELS, the countries to which they may be directed and their developmental relevance for the purpose of: avoiding the use of aid funds on projects that would be commercially viable with market finance and ensuring that recipient countries receive good value.

TOTAL RECEIPTS: The inflow of resources to aid-recipient countries includes, in addition to ODF, official and private EXPORT CREDITS and LONG-TERM private transactions (see PRIVATE FLOWS). Total receipts are measured net of AMORTISATION payments and repatriation of capital by private investors. **Bilateral** flows are provided directly by a donor country to an aid recipient country. **Multilateral** flows are channelled through MULTILATERAL AGENCIES. In tables showing total receipts of recipient countries, the outflows of multilateral agencies to those countries is shown, not the contributions which the agencies received from donors.

UNDISBURSED: Describes amounts committed but not yet spent (see COMMITMENT, DISBURSEMENT).

UNTIED AID: ODA for which the associated goods and services may be fully and freely procured in substantially all countries.

VOLUME (real terms): The flow data of DAC statistics are expressed in United States dollars (USD). To give a truer idea of the volume of flows over time, some data are presented in constant prices and exchange rates, with a reference year specified. This means that adjustment has been made to cover both inflation in the donor's currency between the year in question and the reference year, and changes in the exchange rate between that currency and the United States dollar over the same period. A table of combined conversion factors (deflators) is provided in the Statistical Annex which allows any DAC figure in current USD to be converted to dollars of the reference year ("constant prices").



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[참고자료2]

OECD Peer Review 결과보고서

비공식 국문 번역본

(외교통상부, Feb 2013)

한국의 개발협력정책 및 집행 평가(Peer Review)

개발원조위원회(DAC)의 핵심 관찰 및 권고사항

개요

1. 2010년 1월 개발원조위원회(DAC)에 가입한 이후 한국은 원조를 강화하고 국제 개발협력 활동에 기여하기 위해 많은 노력을 경주해 왔다. 한국은 복잡한 가입심사절차와 2009년 11월 25일 개최된 개발원조위원회(DAC) 특별 회의를 거쳐 개발원조위원회(DAC)에 가입하였다. 특별회의에서 DAC 회원국들은 한국이 이처럼 짧은 기간 내에 성공적으로 (1995년까지 원조 수혜국) 수원국에서 주요 공여국으로 전환한 것에 대해 경의를 표하였다. 한국은 이제 개발도상국들 - 특히 동아시아의 개발도상국들 - 사이에 실제 경험에서 우러난 지식과 아이디어의 원천으로 인식되고 있다. 이것은 다른 DAC 회원국들과 비교했을 때, 특히 한국이 비교우위를 가진 분야이다.

2. 본 평가는 한국에 대한 최초의 Peer Review(이하 'PR')로서 한국과 개발원조위원회(DAC) 모두에게 중요한 이정표이다. 본 PR은 한국이 얼마나 급속한 진전을 이루어 냈는지, 국제적 담론과 개발 활동의 장에 어떠한 교훈과 경험을 제공하고 있는지 설명하고 있다. 한국의 개발협력은 국무총리실, 외교부 및 기획재정부의 주관하에 실시되고 있다. 지난 2년 동안, 한국은 『국제개발협력기본법』 및 동 시행령의 제정을 통해 개발협력체계를 강화해 왔다. 『국제개발협력기본법』은 개도국의 빈곤감소라는 명확한 목표와 더불어 통합 원조추진체계에 대한 법적 근거를 제공한다. 한국은 개발원조체계를 강화하는 한편, 국제개발협력 논의와 프로세스에도 적극적으로 참여해왔다. 한국은 2011년 말 부산에서 개최된 4차 원조효과성 고위급 회의를 주최하였다. 또한 DAC 회원국과 BRICS 국가들(브라질, 러시아, 인도, 중국, 남아공)을 잇는 가교 역할을 통해 '효과적 개발협력을 위한 글로벌 파트너십'(Global Partnership for Effective Development)의 출범에 주도적 역할을 수행하였다. 한국의 중재를 통해 '효과적 개발협력을 위한 글로벌 파트너십'의 거버넌스 구조와 모니터링 체계에 대한 BRICS 국가들의 일관된 지지를

확보할 수 있었다. 한국은 또한 G20 개발의제의 채택 과정에서도 주도적인 역할을 수행하였다.

1. 개발협력의 전반적 체계

1.1. 한국의 개발협력 전략체계 완성

핵심 관찰사항: 새로운 기본법 제정과 전략계획의 수립은 유·무상 원조로 (나뉘어) 제공되는 한국의 개발 예산계획의 수립과 관리에 명확성을 부여하였다. 그러나 새로운 법적·전략적 원조체계는 아직 투명하고 충분한 의사결정 기준 또는 분야 및 국별 전략에 의해 뒷받침되지 않고 있다. 이는 원조 프로세스와 공적 책임성(accountability)을 제약하며 국회와 시민사회 등 주요 이해당사자들과의 논의를 제한하고 있다.

권고: 한국은 현재의 확고한 법적·정책적 기반 위에 전략적 체계를 완성하여 확대되는 개발협력을 관리할 필요가 있다. 구체적으로:

- 중점지원 분야별로 명확한 목적, 우선순위, 실행목표 및 의도하는 성과를 전략적 체계(전략문서)에 명시해야 한다
- 한국은 26개 중점협력국 각각에 대한 국가협력전략을 완성하여 공표하여야 한다. 동 전략들은 협력대상국의 개발전략과 일치를 이루어야 하고, 전정부적 지원 내용을 모두 포함하며, 유·무상 원조전략을 통합하고, 미래 지원 공약을 포함하며, 원조효과성 제고 계획과 달성목표를 반영하고, 각 협력국에 대한 한국의 지원목적을 계량화하여 정의해야 한다.
- 한국은 계획중인 종합적 다자원조전략을 완성하여 공표해야 한다.
- 한국의 모든 원조사업에 있어 양성평등, 여성권한 강화, 환경, 기후변화 등의 이슈를 주류화하기 위한 계획과 지침을 더욱 강화하여 전략체계에 포함시켜야 한다.

3. 법적 체계는 한국의 ‘국제개발협력 선진화 방안’과 ‘분야별 국제개발협력 기본계획(2011-2015)’에 의해 보완되었다. 한국이 법적·전략적 체계를 정비한 주요 목적은 특히 국제개발협력위원회를 강화함으로써 유·무상 원조의 관리(체계)를 개선하는 것이다. 동 체계는 또한 빈곤감소에 대한 명확한 초점, 인권 존중, 양성 평등, 지속가능 개발 및 국제사회의 평화와 번영에 대한 지지 등 한국의 개발협력체계의 기초를 이루는 기본 원칙들을 명시하고 있다.

이러한 원칙들은 한국 정부내 각 부처에 전파되었으며 한국 내 공적개발원조(ODA)의 위상을 제고하는데 기여하였다. 이제 이 원칙들은 한국의 모든 개발협력 전략과 사업형태에 온전히 반영되어야 한다.

4. 한국은 보다 소수의 분야, 다자기구 및 국가들에 원조를 집중하기 시작하였다. 개발협력에 대한 이러한 새로운 접근방식은 한국이 현재 수립 중인 분야별·다자원조 및 국가협력 전략들에 반영되어야 할 것이다. 이러한 보다 선택적인 접근방식은 명확한 분야별 목표와 통합된 국가협력전략 및 프로그램에도 적용되어야 하며 그 결과 유·무상 원조수단간 시너지가 제고될 수 있을 것이다. 한국은 무상원조의 경우 교육, 보건, 지배구조, 농업, 수산업, 산업 및 에너지 부문에 집중하고 있으며 양허성 차관지원은 경제성장을 위한 기초인프라 구축에 역점을 두고 있다. 이렇듯 중점 지원분야가 광범위하지만 한국은 개별 중점협력국내에서는 이중 2~3개 분야에만 초점을 맞출 계획이다. 무상원조 지원 대상을 위한 각각의 주제 분야별 우선순위에 관한 전략문서는 한국국제협력단(KOICA)이 작성하였다. 국제개발협력위원회는 기존의 전략문서를 발전시켜 각 주제에 대한 전정부적 목표를 도출, 승인할 수 있을 것이다. KOICA는 양성평등과 여성권한강화 주류화 지침도 수립한 바, 이 지침들 또한 한국의 개발협력체계 전반에 걸쳐 더욱 폭넓게 적용될 수 있을 것이다. 유상원조를 담당하고 있는 EDCF에서 작성한 환경과 기후 변화 관련 세이프가드 또한 KOICA 및 관계기관들에서 활용할 수 있을 것이다.

1.2 소통, 투명성 및 책임성 강화

핵심 관찰사항: 한국은 개발협력의 투명성과 책임성을 개선하기 위한 노력을 경주해왔다. 그러나 주요 이해당사자들이 손쉽게 접근할 수 있고, 각 국가 및 분야별 원조 지출을 명확하게 제시하는 예산자료 또는 참고 자료는 미비한 상황이다. 또한 ODA관련 외교부와 총리실의 국회 보고는 지나치게 상세하며 한국의 원조 성과와 직면한 도전과제들에 충분히 초점을 맞추고 있지 않다. 2012년 도입될 총리실의 ODA 백서는 이러한 미비점들을 개선할 수 있는 기회이다.

권고: 총리실, 외교부 및 기재부는 다음과 같이 투명성과 책임성을 지속적으로 제고해 나가야 한다.

- 한국의 개발협력에 관한 종합적인 정보를 - 특히, 개발협력정책, 전략, 절차, 예산(국별 및 분야별), 지원 프로그램 및 사업 관련 정보를 주요 이해당사자들(국회의원, 시민사회단체(CSO), 비정부기구(NGO), 민간부문, 연구소, 협력대상 개도국 및 일반 국민)이 - 접근하고 이해하기 용이한 방법으로 제공해야 한다.

5. 한국의 시민사회 및 연구소 관계자들에 따르면, 유·무상 원조에 대한 제한된 정보만이 일반인들에게 공개된다고 한다. 한국의 시민사회단체(CSO)와 비정부기구(NGO) 대표들은 또한 정부관계자들과의 정책협약이 『국제개발협력기본법』이 규정한 목적과 요구에 충족하지 못한다고 느끼고 있다. 이들은 정부와의 협의, 특히 정책관련 협의가 더욱 활성화되기를 희망하고 있다. 한국의 급격한 ODA 규모 확대 계획을 감안 시(하기 내용참고), 국회와 일반 국민들의 지지를 유지하기 위해 한국 정부는 개발협력의 가치를 설명할 필요가 있다. ‘연간 ODA 통합홍보계획’과 총리실이 주도하는 공동작업반과 관련하여, 한국은 빈곤감소와 새천년개발목표(MDGs) 달성 상황 등 최근의 성과들을 일관되게 부각시키는 홍보대상별 맞춤형 메시지를 제공할 필요가 있다.

2. 원조를 넘어서는 개발

2.1 ‘개발을 위한 정책일관성’의 전정부적 추진을 위한 정치적 의지 결집

핵심 관찰사항: 한국은 개발협력을 위한 정책조율 기제들을 확보하고 있다. 국제개발협력위원회는 개도국의 개발에 친화적인 여러 정책들을 증진할 수 있는 권한과 잠재력을 보유하고 있다. 그럼에도 불구하고, 다른 DAC 회원국들과 마찬가지로, 한국은 정부 정책 수립 시 개발에 대한 영향(잠재적 및 실제)을 고려하고 있음을 구체적으로 입증해야 한다.

권고: 한국은 의사결정과정에서 다음과 같이 ‘개발을 위한 정책일관성’을 강화할 필요가 있다.

- 국제개발협력위원회의 주관하에 범정부적인 의제를 수립한다. 개발친화적인 정책 달성을 위해 동 의제는 다음을 포함한다: (1) 가장 중요하게 처리해야 할 정책 비일관성들 (2) 이러한 비일관성 해소를 위한 조치사항과 담당자 (3) 실현해야 할 목표 (4) 이행시한 (5) 관계부처의 참여를 강화시키기 위한 절차
- 한국정부는 ‘개발을 위한 정책 일관성’ 제고와 조율을 위한 충분한 기술적 및 정치적 역량을 확보해야 한다.
- 한국의 대내외 정책이 개도국들에게 미치는 영향에 대한 기존의 분석과 보고를 활용한다. 현재까지 총리실과 외교부에서 진행해온 연구와 분석을 기반으로 현장으로부터의 환류와 분석, 부처간 원활한 정보교류, 대학·시민사회단체(CSO)·싱크탱크의 분석 정보 등을 수렴·활용해야 한다.

6. 한국은 정부의 모든 정책들이 개도국의 개발을 지원하도록 하는 노력을 시작하였다. 그 첫 단계로 정치적 의지, 정책 조율 기제, 모니터링·분석 및

보고 체계를 확립하였다. 다른 DAC 동료평가에서 얻은 주요 교훈에 따르면 한국은 개발친화적 정책들을 정부 전반으로 내재화 시켜야한다. 이를 위해 모든 관계 부처들로 하여금 범정부적인 목표와 실행계획을 담고 있으며 명확한 우선순위와 이행시한이 포함된 의제에 참여하도록 해야 한다. 다른 DAC 회원국들과 마찬가지로 한국 역시 이러한 의제 수립과정이 쉽지는 않지만 전정부적으로 추진중인 '녹색성장전략'에서 의제화가 가능한 일부 요소들을 찾아볼 수 있다. 녹색성장전략은 한국이 '국제사회의 구성원으로서 그 역할과 책임을 성실히 수행할 것'을 강조하고 있다. 외교부는 2011년 수행한 '개발을 위한 정책일관성' 연구와 분석을 통해 다수의 가능성이 있는 분야를 발굴한 바 있다. 이러한 연구 결과를 더욱 발전시키고 전파하는 것은 정부관계자들의 인식 제고를 위한 좋은 방안이 될 수 있으며 한국 정부 전체를 위한 일련의 목표 정립에 기여할 수 있다.(문단 36-40)

7. 정부 전반에 걸쳐 '개발을 위한 정책 일관성'을 촉진하는 책임은 국제개발협력위원회에 있으나, 위원회의 사무국인 국무총리실도 개발업무 수행에 있어 이 부문에 더욱 높은 우선순위를 부여할 수 있을 것이다. 예를 들어, 총리실에서는 관계부처들과의 협의, '녹색성장전략' 및 외교부의 연구결과를 발전시키는 등의 방법을 통해 개발친화적 정책 실현을 위한 계획을 수립할 수 있을 것이다. 총리실은 또한 다른 정부 부처들과의 협의를 통해 해당 부처의 정책들이 개발에 미치는 영향을 파악하고, 미비한 통계 및 분석 자료를 보완하고 실행 기회를 발굴하여 국제개발협력위원회에 보고할 수 있을 것이다. (문단41-43)

3. 원조규모와 배분

3.1 목표 ODA 규모 달성방안

핵심 관찰사항: 2006-2011년간, 한국의 ODA 지출 규모는 세 배 가까이 증가했다. 이러한 원조규모 확대를 통해 한국은 추가적인 지원을 저소득국가들, 특히 동아시아의 저소득국가들에게 제공할 수 있었으며 개발협력전반에 있어 한국의 역할을 강화할 수 있었다. 한국은 ODA/GNI 비율을 향후 3년간 현재 수준의 두 배로 확대하기로 공약했다. 한국의 ODA 확대 계획은 개발협력을 강화할 수 있는 기회이자 동시에 원조관리와 관련한 여러 도전을 의미한다.

권고: 한국은 최근의 원조규모 확대 추세를 계속 유지하여 2015년까지 GNI의 0.25%를 ODA로 제공하려는 목표를 달성하여야 한다. 동시에 한국은:

- 꾸준하고 예측 가능한 증가율을 유지할 수 있도록 원조규모 확대를 계획하고 관리하는 한편, 양·다자 채널과 유·무상 원조간 적절한 균형을 취하여야 한다.
- 취약국 및 고채무빈곤국에 제공하는 유상원조 대비 무상원조 비율을 면밀히 평가하고 유상원조를 지원할 경우, 이들 국가의 경제 상황과 재정 지배구조를 신중히 고려하여 부채 상환 능력을 확보할 수 있도록 한다
- 원조수단의 선택은 협력대상국의 개발 목표와 주인의식, 선호, 관리역량과 수요를 고려하여 결정 한다.

8. 지난 몇 년간 한국의 ODA는 꾸준한 증가세를 보인 결과, 2011년 GNI의 0.12%인 13억2천5백만 달러에 이르렀다. 2006년 원조 규모는 GNI의 0.05%인 4억5천5백만 달러였다. 한국의 원조가 처음으로 10억 달러를 돌파한 2010년 대비 2011년의 원조집행 규모는 6% 증가하였다. 그러나 2011년 한국의 ODA/GNI 비율은 2010년 대비 변화가 없었으며, 해당연도의 목표수준인 0.13%에는 미달했다. 한국은 원조규모를 확대해 2015년까지 ODA/GNI 비율 0.25%를 달성하겠다는 공약을 발표했다. 한국의 ODA 규모는 2011년 DAC 회원국 중 17위를 차지했으며 2010년에 비해 순위가 한 단계 상승했다. (문단 48)

9. 한국은 2015년까지 ODA/GNI 비율 0.25% 목표를 달성하는데 있어 두 가지 주요 도전에 직면해 있다.

- 향후 3년간 ODA/GNI비율을 현재의 두 배 이상 끌어올려야 하며
- 급격한 원조확대를 효과적으로 관리해야 한다.

한국의 중기 경제성장전망(3-3.5%) 감안 시, 원조규모를 확대할 수 있는 충분한 재정적 여력이 있는 것으로 평가된다. 동료평가팀에 따르면 ODA/GNI 비율 0.25%를 달성하기 위해서는 2015년 한국의 ODA 규모가 32억 달러 수준에 이르러야 할 것으로 추정한다. 즉, 한국은 2012년, 2013년, 2014년, 2015년까지 원조 규모를 매년 25%씩 꾸준히 증액할 필요가 있다. 이는 2006년 이후 한국의 원조 증가율보다 다소 높은 수준이며 한국 정부가 2009년 해당기간에 대해 예상한 증가율보다는 더 급격한 확대를 요하는 것이다. (문단 49-51)

10. 한국의 양·다자 채널간 원조 배분비율은 2006년 83:17 (양자:다자)에서 2011년 75:25로 변화되었다. 한국의 목표 배분비율은 70:30으로 2012년부터 달성될 계획이다. 이러한 배분비율의 목표는 DAC의 평균 다자원조비율에 최대한 근접하는 것이다. 2011년도 DAC 평균 다자원조 비율은 28%였다. 그러나 향후 3년간 ODA 규모의 대폭 확대 계획을 고려하면, 이러한 배분을 보다 탄력적으로 검토하는 것이 필요할 수 있다. 일부 DAC 회원국들은 지난 10년간 다자채널에 대한 기여를 늘리는 것이 ODA 규모 확대를 더욱 용이하게 한다는 것을 발견했다. 한국은 다자지원의 70%를 비지정기여(core funding)로 제공한 점에 대해 높은 평가를 받고 있다.

11. DAC 회원국중 한국의 국별 프로그램화가능 원조(CPA, Country Programmable Aid) 비율은 91%로 가장 높다(DAC 평균은 55%). 그러나 한국의 전반적인 양자원조와 마찬가지로 국별 프로그램화가능 원조(CPA) 역시 26개 중점협력국에 충분히 집중되지 못하고 있다. 그럼에도 불구하고, 한국은 양자원조 재원을 중점협력국에 집중해 나가고 있다: 2009년도에는 전체 양자원조의 47%를 24개 중점협력국에 배분했으며 2010년에는 동일한 24개국에 55%를 배분하였다. 2012년부터는 양자 재원(유·무상 모두 포함)의 70%를 현 26개 중점협력국에 배분할 계획인바, 이러한 집중화는 앞으로 더욱 강화될 예정이다. 다른 공여국들과의 효과적 조율을 통해 한국 ODA가 추가적으로 합리화될 경우, 공여국간 원조분업에도 기여할 수 있을 것이다.(문단 58-59)

12. 원조규모 확대와 파리선언 원칙에 대한 실행의지의 일환으로 한국은 양자원조 프로그램 (유·무상 모두 포함)에 새로운 원조방식들을 도입할 계획을 갖고 있다. 이러한 새로운 원조방식들의 도입과 더불어, 외교부와 기재

부, KOICA에서는 부산선언에 입각하여 시민사회단체(CSO) 및 민간부문과의 파트너십 강화방안을 모색하고 있다. 2010년 한국의 ODA중 불과 2%만이 CSO와 민간부문을 통해 지원된 점을 감안하면 이들과의 파트너십을 발전시킬 수 있는 상당한 여지가 있다. (문단 58-62, 64-65, 75)

13. 유·무상원조간 배분문제는 외교부, 기재부 및 총리실간 논의의 대상이 되어왔다. 현재 정책적으로 한국의 양자 ODA(순지출 기준)의 목표 배분비율은 60:40(무상:유상)으로 설정되어 있다. 2010년의 배분비율은 61:39(무상:유상)였다. 실질적으로 유상 차관을 비중있게 사용하는 DAC 회원국들은 소수에 불과하다. 한국이 다른 회원국들보다 유상 차관을 더 중시하는 이유는 과거 유상원조 수원을 통한 긍정적 개발경험에 근거한다. 일부 한국의 정치지도자들과 원조 관리자들은 유상 차관이 개도국에 필수적인 건전한 재정운용을 촉진한다는 확고한 신념을 가지고 있다. (문단 66).

14. 유상원조는 적절한 상황 하에서는 유효한 개발재원이지만 한국은 유상 차관 프로그램이 개도국, 특히 최빈국(LDC), 취약국, 그리고 부도위기에 처했거나 처할 위험이 있는 국가들의 부채 수준에 미치는 영향에 대해 앞으로도 계속 유의해야 한다. 지속가능한 수준의 부채는 개발의 선행조건이기 때문에 DAC 회원국들은 양허성 차관을 최빈국(LDC) 혹은 취약국보다 주로 중소득국(MICs)에 제공하고 있다. 한국도 이러한 정책을 취하고 있으나 2010년 유상 차관 공여현황을 보면, 중소득국(전체 유상원조의 38%), 최빈국(39%), 그리고 취약국(41%)간 실질적인 차이가 거의 없었다. 한국정부는 2011년도 중소득국(MICs)에 지원된 전체 원조 가운데 61%가 유상 차관의 형태로 제공되었다고 DAC에 보고하였다. 고채무빈곤국(HIPC)에 대한 한국의 무상 대비 유상 원조 비율을 보면 82:18로 여타 다른 국가군에 비해 현저히 높았다. 한국은 'OECD DAC 원조조건에 관한 권고(OECD DAC Recommendation on the Terms and Conditions of Aid)'에 명시된 기준을 충족하고 있으나, 차관 공여시 1)특정 협력국의 개발 수요에 대응하는 가장 적합한 수단인 경우, 2)유상 차관이 협력국 개발전략의 특정 목적에 부합하는 경우에 한하여 제공할 필요가 있다. (문단 67-70)

4. 조직과 관리

4.1 한국 ODA의 통합, 조율과 관리 개선

핵심 관찰사항: 한국의 개발협력체계는 무상과 유상 원조의 양대 축에 기초하고 있다. 무상원조는 외교부와 산하기관인 KOICA에서 담당하고 있으며 유상원조는 기재부와 산하기관인 EDCF에서 담당한다. 이에 더하여, 30여개 정부 부처와 기관들이 ODA 활동에 참여하고 있다. 한국의 ODA 규모가 증가하면서 이러한 조직적 배경으로부터 세 가지 주요 도전과제가 제기된다: (1) 모든 무상원조(모든 정부기관에서 시행하는)와 유상원조를 단일한 전략으로 통합, (2) 원조의- 특히 협력국 내에서- 효과적 조율 (3) 효과적인 전략 이행을 위한 역량 확보

권고: 개발협력전략을 성공적으로 실행하기 위해 한국은:

- (i) 국제개발협력위원회가 기획과 예산과정에서 최상위 의사결정기구로서 기능할 수 있도록 위임된 권한을 충분히 활용하도록 해야 하며, (ii) 관계기관 협의회 (Inter-Agency Committee)는 협력국 내 ODA 협의체와 더불어 모든 원조활동을 처리 하는데 필요한 권한을 가져야 한다.
- 총리실, 외교부, 기재부 및 양대 시행기관(KOICA, EDCF)의 인적자원강화를 위해 적절한 개발협력 경험을 보유한 우수한 인력을 채용·확보해야하며, 중점협력국 내 한국인직원과 현지직원의 역량 배양을 통해 프로그램 원조방식(PBA)과 같은 새로운 원조방식을 지원할 수 있는 능력을 갖추도록 해야 한다.

15. 한국은 지난 5년간 ODA 관리 체계 개선을 위한 각고의 노력을 경주해 왔다. 특히 DAC 가입 이후 ODA 정책 조율과 통합을 개선하기 위한 견고한 기반을 확립하였다. 『국제개발협력기본법』은 한국 ODA의 법적·정치적 근간을 제공하고 관계기관의 책임과 역할을 분명히 하고 있다. 한국적 업무 방식의 일환인 부처간 긴밀한 협의에 더하여 기본법이 제정됨으로써 ODA 정책조율과 의사결정을 위한 공식적 구조와 절차가 마련됨으로써 분절화 해소의 계기가 마련되었다. 이러한 구조와 절차는 추가적 개선이 가능하다. (문단 85-86).

16. 한국 원조체계의 중심에는 권한이 강화된 고위급 협의체인 국제개발협력위원회가 있다. 위원회는 2006년 한국의 최상위 ODA 의사결정기구로 설치되어 ODA 정책조율과 전략을 감독하고 강화하는 ‘ODA 사령탑’(ODA control tower)이다. 위원회는 총리가 주재하고 총리실이 사무국 기능을 수

행하며, 15개 부처 장관, KOICA와 수출입은행 대표, 총리가 임명하는 민간 전문가 7명으로 구성되어 있다. 기본법은 위원회의 책임권한을 확인해주고 있다. 총리가 주재하는 국제개발협력위원회는 대통령령이 정하는 바에 따라 모든 정부부처를 지휘할 수 있는 사실상의(de facto) 권한을 보유하고 있다. 두 개의 협의회 - 유·무상원조관계기관협의회-가 정부의 무상 및 양허성 차관 활동을 조율·승인하여 국제개발협력위원회에 보고한다. 한국은 각각의 중점협력국에 ODA 협의체를 설치해 현장에서의 개발협력을 조율하고 있다. ODA 협의체는 해당국가의 한국 대사가 주재한다. (문단 87-88)

17. 한국은 원조 조율을 강화하기 위한 일련의 조치를 취했으나, 여전히 많은 과제들이 남아 있다. 특히 조율기제들이 의도한 대로 작동하도록 하고, 이를 뒷받침할 충분한 역량을 확보하는 것이 중요한 과제이다. 외교부와 기재부는 각각 무상원조관계기관협의회와 유상원조관계기관협의회의 사무국 역할을 수행한다. 정부 전체적으로 일관성을 확보하기 위해 원칙적으로 모든 정부부처 및 기관들은 자체 ODA 활동 추진에 대해 양대 관계기관 협의회와 협의 및 승인을 거치도록 되어있다. 그러나 일부 부처들은 협력국의 ODA 협의체나, 양대 관계기관협의회 및 국제개발협력위원회의 승인이나 보고 없이 ODA 지원을 기획하고 집행할 수 있었다. ODA 프로그램들의 일관성 개선, 원조의 효과적 전달, 유·무상 원조간 통합 강화를 위해 한국의 원조조율 기제들은 더욱 강화되어야 한다. (문단 89-92)

18. 한국의 ODA 사업이 확대되면서 인력증원이 중요한 이슈로 부상할 것이다. 한국은 3개의 주요 관계부처와 시행기관이 개발업무에 헌신적인 인력을 안정적으로 확보하고 있으나 이들은 더욱 복잡해진 방식과 환경에서 확대되는 ODA 규모 관리와 관련 가중되는 압박을 받고 있다. DAC에 보고된 바에 따르면 2015년까지 KOICA는 105명, EDCF는 50% 수준의 인력 증원 계획을 가지고 있다. 한국이 새로운 방식의 원조사업을 계획하고 있는 점을 감안하면, 질적·양적으로 팽창하는 프로그램 관리를 위한 기술, 교육훈련, 소요자원 등에 대한 정밀한 평가가 수반되어야 할 것이다. 이러한 상황은 분명히 갈등을 초래할 것이나 한국은 이를 다음과 같이 관리할 수 있다: 원조절차의 간소화; 더욱 적은 수의 개도국에 재원을 집중 (특히 KOICA와 EDCF의 현지사무소를 중점협력국에 집중); 최근 해외자원봉사프로그램의 통합사례와 같이 ODA 관리 체계의 지속적 통합; 보다 소수의, 대단위 프로그램을 지원할 필요가 있으며 특히 프로그램 원조(PBA), 분야별 예산지원, 다른 공여국 또는 국제기구와 협조융자 방식 활용 등

4.2 한국의 평가 절차 강화

핵심 관찰사항: 계획-전파-환류 등 일련의 평가절차는 국제개발협력위원회 산하 평가소위원회에서 감독하고 있다(2009년 12월 설치). 평가소위는 충분한 수단과 권위를 보유하지 못하고 있으며 위원회의 독립성이 강화될 필요가 있다. 평가를 위한 예산배분의 확실성 제고와 더불어 평가업무 및 인력소요 계획 수립이 가능할 것이다.

권고: 평가소위원회의 독립성과 절차 강화, 시행중인 사업에 대한 모니터링 개선, 사후 평가 개선, 평가역량강화 및 중요 평가 지원 권한의 현장조직(field units) 위임, 미래사업에 대한 평가의 교훈의 체계적 반영

19. 한국은 개발사업 평가를 위한 정책, 지침 및 역량을 확립하는데 진전을 보이고 있으나 추가적인 노력이 필요하다. 2009년 12월 국제개발협력위원회 산하에 설치된 평가소위는 총리실의 국정운영1실장이 주재하며, ODA 시행기관별 연간 평가계획을 심의·승인하는 것이 주요 기능이다. 평가소위 위원은 13명으로 주요 ODA 관계기관 대표 4명과 민간 전문가들로 구성되어 있다. 사무국 역할은 총리실에서 담당하고 있다. 평가가 수준 높은 관리와 학습 기제로 작동하기 위해서는 소위원회가 적절한 수단과 권위, 독립성을 보유할 필요가 있다. (문단 107)

20. 소위는 연평균 20건의 자체평가를 검토하고 3건의 주제별 평가를 실시(외부의뢰)한다. 그러나 평가의 품질을 담보하는 것이 도전과제이다. 특히 각 부처별로 진행하는 자체평가는 편차가 크고, 종종 품질이 낮으며, 국제개발협력위원회에서 확립한 공동평가지침과 기준을 준수하지 않는 것으로 나타났다. 평가소위에서는 한국 ODA체계에 대한 메타평가를 진행해 평가체계의 질을 개선할 수 있는 방안을 모색하고 있다. 평가기능의 개선을 위한 한국정부의 비판적 모색 노력은 높이 평가할 만하다. 또한, KOICA에서는 ‘DAC 개발평가품질기준(DAC Quality Standards for Development Evaluation)’을 한국어로 번역했다. 대다수의 ODA관련 평가는 KOICA와 EDCF에서 수행하고 있으며, 각 시행기관은 자체 평가 매뉴얼을 보유하고 있다. 양대 시행기관의 매뉴얼에는 DAC의 5대 평가기준(즉, 적절성, 효율성, 효과성, 파급영향과 지속가능성)이 반영되어 있다. 평가결과를 향후 정책 및 사업관련 의사결정에 체계적으로 적용하기 위해 한국은 내부적인 환류 기제를 각 관계기관별로 마련하였다. 그러나 이러한 기제들의 존재가 사

업수행의 교훈들이 새로운 정책과 전략에 반드시 반영되도록 보장하지는 않는다. 원활한 환류를 위해서는 원조 시행기관들도 정책과 전략 수립과정에 일정 부분 참여할 필요가 있다.

5. 개발협력의 성과 제고

5.1 원조효과성에 대한 한국의 의지를 관행개선으로 실천

핵심 관찰사항: 한국은 협력국과의 공동협약, 공동조사 등을 통한 원조를 제공함으로써 우선순위와 원조를 일치시키는데 진전을 보이고 있다. 2005년 이후 공여국들의 파리선언 이행성과를 조사한 결과, 한국은 (여타 DAC 회원국들과 마찬가지로) 원조효과성 원칙들, 특히 개도국 예측가능성과 개도국 공공 재정 체계 활용 이행 등에 있어 큰 진전을 보이지 못하고 있다. 이는 부분적으로 이러한 원칙들이 한국의 원조절차와 전략에 충분히 내재화되어 있지 않은 데 기인한다.

권고: 원조 효과성을 지속적으로 개선하기 위해 한국은:

- 원조 효과성 원칙들과 국제적으로 합의된 목표들을 국가협력전략을 포함한 모든 개발협력 전략과 원조관리절차에 반영하고
- 한국은 다음과 같이 미비한 부문들에 대한 성과부터 집중적으로 개선해야 한다: 원조의 비구속화, 프로그램 원조(PBA), 중기 원조계획 예측가능성, 개도국 공공 재정 관리체계 활용

21. 한국은 개도국 우선순위에 따른 원조 제공, 다른 공여국과의 공동조사 및 공동평가 진행 등을 통해 원조효과성 관련 주요 부문들에서 진전을 보였다. 그러나 ‘원조효과성에 관한 파리선언’과 ‘아크라 행동계획’에 따른 공약사항을 이행하기 위해서는 추가적인 개선이 필요하다. KOICA에서 관련 원칙들을 이행하기 위해 일부 작업을 진행했지만, 전반적으로 이러한 원칙들이 아직 한국의 원조관리 절차 전반에 폭넓게 반영되지 않고 있다. 대부분의 양자원조는 다른 공여국들이 참여하는 포괄적인 프로그램의 일환이 아닌 전통적인 유·무상 단독사업이나 기술협력사업의 형태로 제공되고 있다. KOICA와 EDCF는 향후 더 적은 수의, 단위규모가 크고 잘 조화된 프로그램을 지원해야 할 필요성을 인지하고 프로그램 원조방식, 섹터예산지원, 협조융자방식을 위한 지침과 원조수단들을 마련하고 있다. 한국 원조의 두드러진 취약점은 예측가능성의 결여로서, 이는 개도국의 기획 및 예산시스템을 활용하는데 제약요인이 될 수 있다. 한국은 최소한 KOICA와 EDCF

의 기여부문에 대해서는 단년도 및 중기 단위로 양자 국별 지원계획 추정치를 공표해야 할 것이다. 이를 통해 특히 중점협력국가들은 어느 정도 확신을 가지고 사업계획을 수립할 수 있게 될 것이다.

5.2 2015년까지 양자원조의 75% 비구속화를 위한 로드맵 이행

핵심 관찰사항: DAC 가입과 파리선언 원칙 및 아크라 행동계획에 대한 의지의 일환으로 한국은 2009년 양자 ODA의 75%를 2015년까지 비구속화한다는 일정을 제시하였다. 그러나 한국은 동 목표 달성을 위한 별다른 진전을 보이지 못했다. 한국의 전체 ODA에서 비구속성 원조가 차지하는 비중은 2009년(44%) 대비 2010년에는 오히려 더 하락하였다(32%).

권고: 한국 납세자들과 협력국의 관점에서 제공된 원조가 가치 있게 사용되도록 하기 위해서는:

- 2015년까지 전체 양자 ODA의 75% 비구속화 공약을 연도별 로드맵으로 전환하여 목표달성을 추진한다.
- 비구속성 원조의 최대화를 규정한 『OECD DAC 원조 비구속화 권고』, 아크라 행동계획 및 부산 공약 이행에 집중한다.
- 기술협력을 포함한 한국의 모든 ODA 구속화 현황을 보고한다.

22. 2009년도에 DAC는 한국정부의 2015년까지 양자원조의 75% 비구속화 공약을 높이 평가한 바 있다. 한국의 비구속성 원조 비중은(‘OECD DAC 최빈국 대상 ODA 비구속화 권고’ 기준) 2009년 37%에서 2010년 27%로 하락했다. 이는 2010년 DAC 평균 88%과 비교 현저히 낮은 수준이다. 최빈국을 비롯한 모든 개도국에 대한 전체 원조를 보면, 총 비구속성 원조의 비중은 2009년 44% 대비 2010년에는 32%를 차지했다. 이러한 성과 하락은 한국의 DAC 권고, 아크라·부산 및 DAC 가입 공약 이행 능력을 제약할 것이다. 한국은 원조 비구속화 노력에 박차를 가해야 하며 가능한 모든 기회를 활용해 잃어버린 모멘텀을 회복하고 수립한 목표를 달성해야 할 것이다. 한국은 2011년 비구속성 원조의 비중이 증가했다고 DAC에 보고하였으며 이는 환영할만한 진전이다.

6. 인도적 지원 제고

6.1 인도적 지원 확대 진전

핵심 관찰사항: 한국은 현재 인도적 지원을 위한 법적 근거를 마련하였으나, 인도적 지원에 주안점을 두고 지침을 제공하는 범정부적 정책을 아직 마련하지 못하였다. 재난대응에 대한 풍부한 과거 경험을 토대로 관련 정책을 수립하되 인도적 지원예산 확대 공약을 정책에 반영해야 한다. 상기 정책이 확정되면 인도주의적 이슈와 관련하여 여타 공여국 및 부처간 협의와 협력 기회가 증대되고, 미래 원조재원 예측가능성을 제고하며, 모범적 인도적 지원원칙(Good Humanitarian Donorship)의 일관된 적용을 촉진하게 될 것이다.

권고: 인도적 지원에 대한 명확한 전략적 비전을 제시하고, 인도주의적 원칙들의 일관된 적용과, 책임성·효율성 및 효과성 제고를 위해 한국은:

- 새로운 인도적 지원 정책을 완성하되, 재난복구와 같이 한국이 확실하게 영향력을 행사할 수 있는 소수 분야 및 목적에 집중하고 전정부적으로 이를 적용한다.
- 누구에게, 무엇을, 어디에 지원할 것인지에 대한 명확한 기준을 마련하고 전파한다.
- 양자(현물)원조가 항상 가장 효과적이며 적절한 대응임을 확인할 수 있는 세이프가드를 도입한다.
- 결과 보고 및 학습 과정의 체계화를 위한 관련 계획을 수립, 실행한다.

23. 한국은 향후 3년간 인도적 지원예산의 대폭 확대를 공약했으며 현재의 낮은 수준을 감안했을 경우, 이는 800% 수준의 예산 증액을 의미한다. 인도적 지원을 확대하면서 한국은 효과적인 추가 자원 활용 방안을 검토해야 할 것이다. 특히, 인도적 지원의 전반적인 목표와 기대 결과, 양자원조의 역할과 개발 동반자의 역할에 대한 정의를 내려야 할 것이다. 한국은 또한 현행 체계와 자원, 인력에 대한 수정 사항을 파악함으로써 변화된 새로운 환경 하에서도 이들이 목적에 충실하게 활용될 수 있도록 해야 한다.

24. 먼저, 인도적 지원 프로그램이 확대되는 상황에서 자원배분의 우선순위 결정을 위한 명확한 전략적 방향을 설정해야 한다. 이를 위해 향후 한국의 인도적 지원 사업에 있어 양자원조, UN 기구 및 NGO의 비중이 최적의 조합을 이룰 수 있도록 해야 한다. 특히 한국은 자금지원이 공여국의 가시성 제고를 위한 것이 아닌 대상국가의 수요에 기반 하도록 유의해야 한다. 이는

인간에, 중립성 그리고 독립성이라는 인도주의 원칙들에도 부합한다. 양자(현물)재난구호가 가장 적절한 형태의 대응인지, 그리고 가장 절실한 대상들에게 지원이 실제로 도달하는지 여부를 한국이 어떻게 확인하고 있는지는 아직 명확하지 않다. (문단 145, 150-153, 157-159)

25. 둘째, 한국은 인도적 지원의 범위를 정해야 하며 특히 어떻게 위기 이후 복구를 지원할 것인지(혹은 지원여부), 협력국과 위험 지역 사회의 대비와 복원력을 어떻게 구축할 것인가를 규정해야 한다. 지금까지 한국은 UN 기구들의 재난복구 활동과 취약국 및 분쟁 이후 국가들의 개발사업을 지원함으로써 위기 이후 복구 및 체제전환에 대해 실용주의적 접근법을 취해왔다. 그러나 (재난)복구와 대비는 아직 한국의 인도적 지원프로그램의 일부로 체계화 되어 있지 않다

26. 세번째, 한국은 지금까지 인도적 파트너십을 강화하는데 이론 진전을 활용할 수 있게 되었다. UN 기구들에 기여하는 인도적 지원예산은 2006년 전체 인도적 지원 예산의 7%에서 2010년 63%로 증가했으며, 한국은 UN 기구들의 이사회에서 적극적인 역할을 지속적으로 수행하고 있다. NGO들과의 보다 전략적인 파트너십을 구축하는데 있어서도 의미있는 진전이 있었다. 이러한 관점에서, 한국이 이 중요한 그룹과의 협의를 개선하고자 하는 것은 환영할만한 일이다. 이러한 협의는 개발 파트너, 특히 NGO의 행정 부담을 경감하는데 활용될 수도 있을 것이다.

27. 마지막으로, 한국은 학습과 평가절차를 보다 체계화함으로써 향후 프로그램의 설계와 시행을 개선할 수 있음을 인지하고 있다. 한국은 이를 향후 우선순위로 정할 계획이다. 인도적 지원 프로그램의 성과 공표도 또한 중요한데, 이는 납세자들과 국회의원들에게 국민의 세금을 가치 있게 사용했음을 입증해주기 때문이다. (문단 163-4)

[참고자료3]

**국내 시민단체
OECD Peer Review 성명서**

(KCOC, KoFID, 참여연대, ODA Watch)

국제개발협력민간협의회(KCOC) 성명서

1. KCOC 는 OECD 개발원조위원회(DAC: Development Assistance Committee)가 지난 1 월 30 일 발표한, 한국의 개발협력 정책과 집행 현황에 대한 평가 및 개선을 위한 권고사항이 담긴 동료검토 결과보고서(Peer Review Report)를 긍정적으로 평가합니다.
2. 2009 년 DAC 가입 이후 처음으로 받은 정기평가 보고서는 향후 한국의 개발원조 정책을 국제기준에 부합하도록 개선하는데 필요한 청사진과 이정표, 그리고 가이드라인을 제공하고 있습니다. 보고서는 구체적으로 ODA 의 양적 증대와 법적 토대 정비 등 지난 몇 년 동안의 변화에 대해 긍정적인 평가를 내리면서 동시에 개발원조 정책의 이념과 목표 및 방향을 다룬 ‘전략적 오리엔테이션’ (제 1 장), 정책일관성과 개발효과성을 강조한 ‘원조를 넘어선 개발’ (제 2 장), 개발원조의 양과 분배 방식(제 3 장), 개발원조 정책 수행 체계 및 조직과 관리(제 4 장), 원조효과성과 개발효과성에 대한 기여와 평가(제 5 장) 그리고 인도적지원(제 6 장) 등 한국의 개발원조 정책과 관행 거의 모든 분야에 대한 체계적 진단을 바탕으로 정책적 개선 방향과 방안을 제시하고 있습니다.
3. 한국의 무상원조 분야 98 개 빈곤퇴치와 인도적 지원 사업 민간단체의 협의체인 KCOC 는 이번 보고서 발간이 단순한 ‘통과의례’ 식 행사가 아니라 한국의 개발원조 정책과 관행을 국제수준에 부합하도록 획기적으로 개선하는 계기가 되기를 바라며 시민사회와 관련된 분야에 대한 의견을 제시하고자 합니다.
4. 첫째, 한국정부는 시민사회와의 협력과 파트너십을 현장사업 ‘대행’ 또는 의례적 협의가 아니라 부산파트너십 문서 22 항에서 강조하듯이 정책 수립과 이행 및 평가 등 전 과정에 보다 실질적으로 시민사회의 참여를 보장하고 의견을 반영하는 방식으로 개선해야 합니다. 이 과정에는 한국의 시민사회단체뿐만 아니라 개도국의 시민사회의 참여가 보장되어야 합니다. (영문 보고서 66 쪽)
5. 둘째, 한국정부는 시민사회를 통한 개발원조 증대와 효과성과 효율성 증대를 위한 개별 지원사업 금액 규모 증대를 체계적으로 실행할 것을 촉구합니다. 보고서에서 지적하고 있듯이 현재 2%에도 못 미치는 시민사회를 통한 지원을 OECD DAC 평균인 8% 정도로 조속히 높일 것을 촉구합니다. 이 과정에서 개별 단체의 역량 강화는 물론 협의체와의 중장기 전략적 파트너십이 매우 중요하며, OECD DAC 동료평가의 시민사회 파트너십 12 가지 교훈 (*12 Lessons from DAC Peer Reviews on Partnering with Civil Society* (OECD, 2012) 에 담긴 권고안을 구체적으로 이행할 것을 촉구합니다. 특히 교훈 7 에서 강조하듯이 시민사회단체에 대한 다년간 및 핵심 자금(core funding) 지원, 부산 세계개발원조총회에서 인정한 시민사회 개발효과성을 위한 이스탄불원칙 (Istanbul Principles)의 자발적 이행과 및 이를 위한 우호적 환경(enabling environment)를 제공하는데 보다 많은 노력을 기울여야 합니다. (영문 보고서 56 쪽)

6. 셋째, 한국정부는 지식공유프로그램(KSP)에 사회개발 특히 민주화, 민주적 거버넌스 및 시민사회의 역할을 포함하여 기존의 경제개발 편향을 극복하고 보다 균형 있는 한국의 발전경험을 소개해야 합니다. 특히 한국의 발전경험에서 사회개발 분야에 대한 조사연구를 강화하고 기존의 개도국 공무원 위주의 국내 초청연수 프로그램을 다양화하여 시민사회 지도자 연수를 대폭 강화해야 합니다. (영문 보고서 30 쪽)
7. 넷째, 한국정부는 원조효과성에 대한 파리원칙(2005)과 효과적인 개발협력을 위한 부산파트너십(2011)을 구체적으로 실현하기 위한 10 개의 지표(indicator) 개발에 적극 기여해야 합니다. 특히 시민사회의 개발효과성을 위한 우호적 환경(enabling environment)에 대한 국제 및 국내적 지표 (지표 2 번)와 성평등과 여성의 권한강화(지표 8 번)을 시민사회와 공동으로 개발 및 실천하는데 보다 많은 노력을 기울여야 합니다. (영문 보고서 76-77 쪽)
8. 다섯째, 한국정부는 인도주의지원 분야에서 시민사회와의 상시적 파트너십을 강화하여 권고안을 체계적으로 실천해야 합니다. 특히 재난 대응에 국한된 기존의 협력 관계를 재난위험 경감을 포함한 재난 예방 및 재난대응 역량 향상까지 확대해야 합니다. (영문 보고서 85-92 쪽)
9. 여섯째, 한국정부는 ODA 규모 증액과 함께 국제개발협력 분야 공무원뿐만 아니라 시민사회의 정책 및 사업수행 역량과 전문성을 강화를 동시에 추진해야 합니다. 이 과정에서 한국의 시민사회의 국제적 리더십 역량 강화는 물론 개도국과 개도국에 기반한 국제 시민사회의 역량 강화 또한 적극적으로 지원해야 합니다. 시민사회의 활성화와 파트너십 강화는 한국의 개도국 개발원조의 투명성, 책무성 및 효과성을 높이는데 중요한 수단이기 때문입니다. (영문 보고서 66-68 쪽)
10. 한국정부는 2010 년 G20 정상회의를 계기로 개도국을 돕기 위한 개발의제를 주도하였고 2011 년 부산 세계개발원조총회 주최국으로 부산 파트너십을 기반으로 출범한 효과적인 개발협력을 위한 글로벌 파트너십(GPEDC)에서 리더십 역할을 수행하고 있습니다. 이를 계기로 한국의 국제적 위상과 국제사회의 기대가 매우 높아졌지만 이번 동료평가 권고안에서 드러났듯이 한국정부는 개발원조의 질과 효과성을 높이기 위해 보다 많은 노력을 기울여야 합니다. 동시에 한국정부는 반기문 유엔총장이 주도하고 있는 MDGs 가 기한 만료되는 2015 년 이후 유엔의 개발 프레임워크를 만들기 위한 Post 2015 개발의제 과정에 보다 적극적으로 참여하고 기여해야 합니다.
11. 한국의 시민사회 또한 이에 발 맞추어 국제적으로 다양한 활동을 전개해 왔고, 지난 2 월 2 일 방콕에서 아시아 15 개 개발 단체 협의체와 20 여개 국제 시민사회단체의 협력체인 아시아개발연대(Asia Development Alliance, ADA)가 출범하는데 KCOC 는 주도적 역할을 수행하였습니다. 이를 계기로 한국의 KCOC 는 이번 권고안의 국내적 이행뿐만 아니라 아시아에서 부산파트너십의 후속 이행과 Post 2015 과정에서 적극적인 국제적 리더십 역할을 수행할 것을 다짐하며 Post 2015 과정에서 한국정부와 시민사회의 건설적인 파트너십을 기대합니다.

한국정부의 국제개발협력정책 담보하고 있다

-OECD의 동료평가결과에 따라 개선책마련에 더욱 노력해야

-새 정부의 개발협력정책 청사진은 어디에 있는가

1. 지난 달 30일 정부는 관계부처 합동으로 OECD 개발원조위원회(DAC : Development Assistance Committee)의 한국정부에 대한 개발협력 정책.집행 평가(Peer Review) 보고서발표 결과에 대한 요약 보도자료를 발표했다. OECD의 동료평가보고서는 정부의 보도자료처럼 국제개발협력의 증진을 위해 신속한 대응을 하고 노력을 했다고 평가한 내용은 서문에 불과하고 실제의 보고서는 6개 항목으로 나누어 조목조목 구체적인 조사결과를 발표하고 권고사항을 덧붙이고 있다. 지적받은 내용들이 실제로 2008년 개발원조위원회 가입 전에 받았던 특별동료검토에서 지적되었던 사항중 기본법 제정을 통한 법제 마련을 제외한 거의 모든 부분이 반복 지적되고 있다는 점에서 시민사회단체는 심각한 우려를 전달하고자 한다.

국제개발협력시민사회포럼을 위시한 시민사회는 지속적으로 원조효과성 제고를 위한 ODA 정책의 개선을 촉구해왔으나 이번 국제사회의 냉정한 평가에서 드러나듯, 지난 5년간 한국의 ODA 정책은 담보하고 있었다는 것이 드러났기 때문이다.

2. 기본법제정과 개발원조위원회 가입, 2011년 부산 세계개발원조총회 개최 등의 형식적 진전과 달리 분절화 극복과 원조통합성 제고, 투명성 제고, 여성과 환경 등 범분야 주류화에 대한 미흡한 진행 등은 화려한 홍보와는 달리 한국 ODA가 국제기준의 국내적 실천에서 매우 소극적으로 임했다는 것을 반증하고 있다. 특히 총리실 국제개발협력위원회의 강화에 대해 중첩적으로 권고하며, 기본법과 선진화 방안을 구체적으로 실천하는 정책과 전략수립에 실패한 것을 지적하고 있다. 위원회의 설치에도 불구하고 30여개 부처에서 제각기 진행되는 개발협력 사업에 대한 조정기능이 취약해 정책일관성을 가져오지 못했다는 점은 제 18대 대통령직 인수위원회에 시민사회가 가장 주요한 선결과제로 제안한 내용과 부합한다.

3. 국제사회의 기준이 되고 있었던 원조효과성 제고를 위한 파리원칙의 미준수는 다양한 곳에서 지적되고 있다. 보고서에서는 투명성의 문제가 OECD회원국의 수준에 비해 현격하게 개선해야할 점이 많이 지적되고 있으며, 평가와 모니터링 체계가 매우 취약하다고 비판하고 있다. 이에 독립적

평가와 모니터링이 가능할 수 있도록 평가기능강화를 위해 노력할 것을 주문하고 있다. 또 최빈국(39%)과 취약국(41%)에 대한 차관공여에 대해 부채문제와 관련 심각한 수준의 우려를 했으며 DAC 가이드라인을 참조할 것을 권고했다. 이는 두 번째로 집중지원했던 아프간에 집중된 차관공여에 대해 취약국에 대한 OECD 가이드라인과 별개의 사업을 진행한 것에 대한 비판적 평가이다.

4. 원조의 양적, 질적 개선문제에 대해서 동 보고서는 많은 지적을 하고 있다. 2015년까지 GNI대비 0.25%달성과 비구속성 비율을 높이는 것에 대해 연간계획을 세울 것을 구체적으로 권고하고 있다. 한편 한국의 ODA가 양자 간 비율이 높으며 이것이 26개 중점협력국에 집중되고 있다고는 하나 아직 14개 중점협력국의 국별협력전략(CPS)만이 완성된바 미흡한 전략수립에 대해 시정을 권고하고 있다.

보고서는 총체적으로 수행체계의 부실을 지적하고 있으며, 전략부재에 대해 여러 곳에서 언급하고 있다. 원조효과성 제고를 위해 맹목적 목표치 설정과 발표가 아닌 구체적 연간실천 목표를 재수립할 것과 중기 예측가능성을 제고할 방안 수립, 프로그램에 기반한 목표설정, 비구속화방안 수립, 수원국의 시스템을 이용하라는 원칙적 권고를 반복하는 것은 한국정부의 ODA 정책과 수행체계, 전략에 대한 상당한 수준의 비판이라고 받아들여야 한다.

실제로 2012년 KOICA와 수출입은행은 동료평가를 앞두고 형식적인 권고사항을 채워넣기 위해 분주했지만, 심사결과는 실망스럽게도 그것이 그저 형식적일뿐 아직 정책과 전략화하지 않았다고 지적하고 있는 것이다.

5. 제 18대 대통령직인수위원회는 새해 들어 정부조직개편안을 발표했다. 이 발표에 따르면 외교통상부의 통상기능을 떼어 산업통상자원부에 주고 외교부로 부처명을 개칭한다는 1월 15일의 발표에 이어 22일 발표된 2차 개편안에서는 외교부에 다자·양자 경제외교 및 국제경제협력 기능을 존치한다는 것이다. 시민사회는 이에 앞서 대통령직 인수위원회에 전달했던 제안서에서 존치된 사업에 거론되지 않은 국제개발협력의 현재의 분절화를 극복하고 지속적 발전을 위해 현행 총리실의 국제개발협력위원회를 대통령실로 이관하고 외교부가 주관부처로 되는 조직개편안을 제안한 바 있다.

6. 2010년 OECD 개발원조위원회(DAC) 가입과 국제개발협력기본법의 제정으로 한 단계 업그레이드된 ODA정책을 기대하던 시민사회는 이번 동료평가의 결과와 인수위원회의 조직 개편안에 대해 큰 실망과 우려를 감출 수 없다. 알려진 바대로 한국의 ODA 예산은 국제사회와의 약정에 따라 지난 수년 동안 매년 20% 이상 증액되어 2013년에는 2조 411억에 이르렀으며 ODA 사업예산을 확보하기 위한 부처 간의 경쟁이 가속화되어 원조행정의 분절화(fragmentation)가 점차 심화되어 왔다. 한국의 ODA는 양적증가에도 불구하고, 질적으로는 아직 국제사회의 기준에 미치지 못하고 있다는 것이 이번 동료평가에도 지적을 받은 것이다.

7. 국제개발협력은 일반적인 국익을 위한 행정의 영역이 아닌 지구촌의 가난한 사람들과의 연대의 약속이자 실천이며 높아진 한국정부의 위상과 책무를 실천하는 길이다. 지구촌의 상생을 경제적 관점으로 바라보는 것은 국제사회가 오래전부터 지양해온 바, 이번 동료평가에서 지적받은 사항들에 대한 겸허한 수용과 더불어 제 18대 정부에게 국제개발협력정책의 중장기 청사진을 기대한다. 국제개발협력시민사회포럼을 포함한 시민사회는 2013년 출범하는 새 정부가 국제사회가 오래전부터 합의해온 원칙과 기준에 따라 한국의 ODA 정책 5개년 청사진을 새롭게 고민할 것을 촉구한다. 또한 박근혜 당선인이 제시한 효율적, 통합적 국가개발협력 체제를 구축하겠다는 공약을 지킬 것을 촉구한다. (끝).



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제 목 OECD DAC 동료평가 권고안 이행계획 조속히 마련하라

날 짜 2012. 2. 4. (총 2 쪽)

논 평

OECD DAC 동료평가 권고안 이행계획 조속히 마련하라 개도국 부담 가중시키는 유상원조, 구속성원조 비율 대폭 줄여야 원조 전략 마련하고 정보공개 대폭 확대해야

1. 지난 1/30(수), OECD 개발원조위원회(DAC: Development Assistance Committee)는 한국의 개발협력 정책과 집행 개선을 위한 권고사항을 담은 동료검토 결과보고서(Peer Review Report)를 발표했다. 이번 보고서는 한국 원조가 유상원조 및 구속성 원조의 높은 비중, 전략적 체계 미비, 정보 접근성 취약, 원조기관 분절화, 평가절차 미흡 등 여러 문제점을 가지고 있다고 지적하고 국제사회 기준에 맞게 개선하라고 권고하고 있다. 지적받은 문제들이 국제기준은 물론 지난 2008년 평가 권고안 중 미준수 사항에 대한 재권고를 포함한 비판적 내용을 담고 있으므로 정부는 이번 동료검토 권고사항을 실현시키기 위한 이행계획을 조속히 마련해야 한다.
2. 보고서는 한국이 국제사회에 약속한 원조금액을 차질 없이 이행할 수 있을지 시험대에 올랐다고 평하고 있다. 2010년 개발원조위원회에 가입한 이래 한국의 원조액은 상당히 증가하여 왔지만 2010년 이래 ODA/GNI 비율은 정체되고 있다. 이는 더 많은 양적 증가가 필요하다는 것을 보여준다. 앞으로 2015년까지 3년 새에 ODA/GNI 비율을 지금의 2배에 가까운 0.25%로 끌어올려야 하는데 이에 대한 상세한 이행계획이 필요하다.
3. 무엇보다 중요한 것은 한국 정부의 개발정책의 질적 향상이 미흡하다는 점이다. 유상원조 비중이 높다. 한국 정부는 고채무국(18%)은 물론 취약국(41%)에도 상당한 양의 유상원조를 제공하고 있다. 대부분의 DAC 회원국들이 유상원조가 고채무국과 취약국에 과도한 부채 부담을 지워 빈곤퇴치에 악영향을 미칠 수 있어 이를 지양하는 것과 대조적이다. 뿐만 아니라 한국정부의 ODA에서 양자원조비율이 높은 것도 국제사회 추세와 상반된 것이다. 한국의 다자원조 비율은 DAC 회원국 평균인 28%에 훨씬 못 미치는 17%밖에 안된다. 보고서에서 권고한대로 다자원조 비율을 확대하는 방식으로 원조 규모를 확대하고 질적 성



장도 함께 도모하려는 강력한 의지가 필요하다.

4. 보고서는 개발협력 전반을 규정하는 정책결정 기준과 전략적 체계가 없어 원조 집행과정은 물론 이해당사자들과의 의사소통에 제약을 가져온다고 지적하고 이를 개선할 것을 제안했다. 그동안 시민사회는 26개 중점협력국 결정 기준과 국가협력전략(Country Partnership Strategy, CPS)을 공개하라고 요구해왔다. 그러나 정부는 당초 2012년까지 중점협력국 전체에 대한 CPS를 마련하겠다는 약속과는 달리 2012년에서야 명단을 공개하고 일부 국가들의 CPS만을 공개한 상황이다. 이 외에도 개발협력 전반에 관한 자세한 자료를 시민들이 쉽게 접근할 수 있고 이해할 수 있도록 공개하라는 OECD DAC 권고를 정부는 귀담아 들어야 한다.
5. 원조효과성 제고를 위한 한국 정부의 노력도 아직 미진하다는 평가를 받았다. 보고서는 수원국에 한국 제품과 서비스를 사용하도록 하는 '구속성 원조(tying aid)' 비중이 여전히 높다고 지적하고 2015년까지 75%(DAC 평균은 88%) 비구속화 할 수 있도록 로드맵을 세울 것을 권고했다. 이 외에도 수원국 시스템 사용, 중기 예측성 강화, 프로그램에 기반한 접근법 등에서도 한국이 국제 기준에 못 미치고 있음을 꼬집고 이를 개선하라고 권고했다. 원조효과성을 주제로 한 부산세계개발총회를 주최하고 주도한 당사국이 아직까지 원조효과성 원칙을 충분히 수용하지 못하고 있다는 것은 부끄러운 일이다.
6. 이 외에도 통합적인 원조 추진체계를 이루기 위해 국무총리실 산하의 국제개발협력위원회의 권한을 강화할 것을 권고하고 있다. 국제개발협력위원회는 일 년에 세 차례 진행되는 데 그치므로 유·무상 원조기관 및 서른 개가 넘는 부처들의 정책을 일일이 조정하는 역할을 기대하기 어렵다. 정책조정 역할을 담당하는 국제개발협력위원회가 제 역할을 하지 않고서는 업무 중복과 자원낭비는 물론 일관된 원칙과 정책을 기대하기 어려워 통합적인 원조 집행은 불가능하다. 보고서의 권고 취지대로 국제개발협력위원회의 조정 권한을 강화해야 하며 국무총리실 산하 평가소위원회 역시 독립성과 평가 역량, 과정을 개선해 원조에 대한 평가 기능을 강화해야 한다.
7. 이번 동료평가는 2010년 한국이 OECD DAC 회원국이 된 이후 처음으로 실시된 것으로 국제사회로부터 한국 정부의 개발협력 정책과 집행 전반에 대해 종합적인 평가를 받을 수 있었다. 그러나 권고사항 대개가 지난 2008년 DAC 가입 이전에 이뤄진 특별검토(Special Review) 내용을 반복하고 있어 국제행사 개최 등 가시적 성과 이외의 한국 정부가 원조효과성 원칙의 국내적 실천노력은 부족했다고 평가할 수 있다. 새롭게 들어서는 박근혜 정부는 지난 정부의 부족한 점을 반면교사 삼아 이번 동료평가 권고안을 실현시킬 구체적인 이행계획을 조속히 마련해 그동안 국내외 시민사회가 누차 지적해 왔던 한국 원조의 문제점들을 해소해야 할 것이다. 끝.

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날 짜	2013년 01월 30일(수), (총 1쪽)

[논 평]

한국 ODA, 규모만 키우지 말고 질적 성장 꾀하라!

- 유상원조 비율 축소 및 비구속성 원조 비중 늘리고
투명하고 책임 있는 소통과 정보제공 확대해야
- 국제개발협력위원회 조정 권한 강화하여 통합적인 추진체계 구축해야

- 한국의 개발협력 정책과 집행에 대한 국제사회의 종합 평가 결과가 발표됐다. OECD 개발원조위원회(DAC: Development Assistance Committee)는 1월 30일(수) 한국 개발협력에 대한 동료검토 결과 보고서를 발표하고 한국의 개발협력 정책과 집행을 개선하기 위한 권고사항을 제시했다.
- 보고서는 한국이 원조를 받던 나라에서 주는 나라로 빠른 시일 내에 성장한 하여 최근 ODA 규모를 지속적으로 확대하고 있음을 긍정적으로 평가하고 있다. 또한 「국제개발협력기본법」 제정 및 「국제개발협력 선진화 방안」을 수립하는 등 추진체계 구축을 위해 노력했다고 평가했다.
- 그러나 한국의 개발협력이 질적 측면으로는 DAC 회원국들과 비교했을 때 현저히 저조하다. 보고서에 따르면 DAC 회원국들 중 유상원조(양허성 차관)을 지원하는 국가는 소수에 불과함에도 불구하고 한국은 그 비율이 40%로 매우 높다. 또한 고채무빈국에 대한 유상원조 비율이 18%에 이르고 최빈국에 39%, 취약국에 41%나 달하는 등, 수원국의 경제상황과 부채상환 능력을 고려하지 않는 것에 대한 위험성을 지적했다. 최빈국에 대한 비구속성 원조 비율이 27%에 불과해 다른 회원국 평균 88%보다 훨씬 낮은 점도 주요 지적사항이다.
- 한국 정부는 2013년 국제개발협력 종합시행계획에서 한국 ODA의 새로운 도약을 위해 동 보고서 권고사항을 주요한 정책권고로 적극 활용할 것을 밝힌 바 있다. 보고서가 제시한 권고사항에 따라, 정부는 한국의 개발협력 정책과 집행이 보다 효과적으로 이루어질 수 있도록 다음과 같은 사항을 적극적으로 개선해나가야 할 것이다.

- 개발협력 정책, 전략, 집행 및 예산 운영과 프로그램 수행 전반에 있어 이해관계자들에게 투명하고 책임있는 정보를 제공하고 파트너십에 기반한 소통을 강화해야 한다.
- 국제개발협력위원회에 기획 및 예산 배분, 집행 과정에서 최상위 의사결정 기구로 강력한 권한을 부여하여 통합적인 추진체계를 구축해야 한다.
- 취약국 및 고채무빈국에 대한 유상원조는 지양해야 하며 원조 제공시 수원국의 오피십과 우선순위, 운영관리 역량과 수요를 최우선으로 반영해야 한다.
- 2015년까지 양자 ODA의 비구속성 비율을 75%로 확대하기 위해 박차를 가해야 한다.
- 급격히 증가하는 예산을 효율적으로 관리하기 위해 본부와 개도국 현지의 업무 수행 역량을 강화해야 한다.

(끝)

[참고자료4]

정부 보도자료 제13-32호

관계부처합동

(국무총리실, 기획재정부, 외교통상부 30 Jan 2013)



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제 목 : OECD DAC 개발협력 정책, 집행 평가 결과 발표

□ OECD 개발원조위원회(DAC : Development Assistance Committee)의 우리나라에 대한 개발협력 정책, 집행 평가(Peer Review) 보고서가 1.30(수) 발표되었다.

○ 우리나라는 1995년까지 원조 수혜를 받던 수원국이었으나 2010년 1월 선진 공여국 클럽인 OECD DAC에 가입하였다.

○ 금번 평가는 우리나라의 OECD DAC 가입 이후 최초로 받은 정기 평가로서, 그간 우리의 개발협력 정책 및 집행 개선노력 전반에 관해 종합적으로 평가를 받았다는 점에서 이정표의 의미를 가진다.

□ 동 평가보고서는 우리나라가 DAC에 가입한 이후 ▲원조규모를 지속 확대하고, ▲개발협력 추진체계를 신속히 강화하는 한편, ▲국제적 개발협력 증진을 위해 노력한 결과, 개발협력에 있어 우리나라의 국제적 영향력이 확대되고 있다고 다음과 같이 평가하였다.

○ 한국은 과거 5년(2006년에서 2011년 사이)이라는 짧은 기간 내에 ODA 지출규모를 세 배 수준 확대하였다.

○ 국내적으로 「국제개발협력기본법」 및 「동법 시행령」 제정(2010년)을 통해 추진체계를 정비하였으며, 「국제개발협력 선진화 방안」 등 개발협력 전략을 수립(2010년)하는 등 원조 통합과 조정을 개선하기 위한 견고한 기반을 구축하였다.

○ 대외적으로는 G20 서울정상회의(2010년) 의장국으로 개발의제 채택을 주도하였고, 부산세계개발원조총회(2011년)를 주최, DAC 회원국과 BRICS 국가들을 잇는 가교 역할을 수행함으로써 '개발효과성을 위한 글로벌 파트너십' 출범을 주도하는 등 국제적 논의에 적극적으로 참여하였다.

○ 특히, 한국은 짧은 기간 내에 수원국에서 주요 공여국으로 성공적으로 전환한 사례로서, 개도국들 사이에 실제 경험에 기초한 개발지식과 아이디어의 원천으로 인식되고 있으며, 이러한 개발경험은 한국이 다른 DAC 공여국에 비해 비교우위를 가지고 있는 영역이다.

□ 또한 보고서는 우리나라 개발원조 정책 및 집행을 추가적인 개선을 위한 정책 권고를 포함하고 있다.

주요 권고 내용으로는,

○ 현재의 견고한 법적, 제도적 기반위에서 개발협력전략을 보완하여 공표하고,
○ 지속적으로 원조규모를 확대해 나가는 동시에, 급속히 증가하는 원조예산을 효율적으로 관리하기 위해 인력을 확충하고, 사업수행 역량을 강화하며, 원조사업을 규모화 하는 등의 방안을 조연하였다.

○ 양자, 다자원조, 무상, 유상원조간 적절한 균형을 유지해 나가는 한편, 취약국, 고채무빈곤국에 대한 유상원조는 이들 국가의 경제상황과 부채 부담능력을 고려하여 지원할 필요가 있고,

○ 국제개발협력위원회 및 유.무상원조관계기관협의회 등의 역할을 더욱 강화하여 통합된 개발협력 정책 및 집행을 추진하며,

○ 원조효과성을 제고하기 위해 원조 비구속화 비율을 꾸준히 개선해 나갈 필요가 있다고 하였다.

○ 또한, 국회, 시민사회, 일반국민 등 이해관계자들이 손쉽게 접근하고 이해할 수 있도록 개발협력 정책 및 집행에 관한 종합적 정보를 제공하여 투명성과 책임성을 더욱 제고할 것을 권고하였다.

□ 참고로, 개발협력 정책, 집행 평가는 DAC 운영의 핵심 메커니즘 가운데 하나로, DAC은 매년 4-5개의 회원국을 대상으로 ODA 정책, 집행 체계에 대한 상호 검토를 통해 회원국간의 정책, 제도 개선을 도모하고 있다.

- 동 평가를 받는 것과 다른 회원국의 평가에 평가자로 참여하는 것은 모든 DAC 회원국의 의무이다.
- 정부는 OECD의 개발협력 정책·집행 평가 수검을 위해 2012년 1월 국무총리실을 중심으로 관계부처(기획재정부, 외교통상부 등) 및 집행기관(KOICA, 한국수출입은행)이 참여하는 'DAC Peer Review 수검준비반'(반장: 국무총리실 개발협력정책관)을 구성하여 2012년 12월 OECD 최종회의까지 1년간 운영하며, 평가에 대응해 왔다.
 - * 주요 수검일정: 메모랜덤 제출(5.7) → 평가실사단 방한(6.11~15) → 수원국(캄보디아) 현지 실사 방문(6.18~22) → 검토보고서 작성(10~11월) → 최종회의(12.11, 파리)
- 정부는 금번 평가결과를 이해당사자들과 공유하고, DAC의 권고사항을 우리 ODA의 개선을 위한 정책제언으로 활용할 계획이다.
 - * 보고서 원문(영문)은 ODA 통합홈페이지(www.odakorea.go.kr) 및 OECD 홈페이지(www.oecd.org)에 1.30일 게시, 국문 번역본은 번역작업을 거쳐 2월중 발간. 게시 예정.

첨부 : OECD DAC 개발협력 정책·집행 평가 결과 발표. 끝.

관 계 부 처 합 동