

Program

International Workshop for Peace and Disarmament in the Asia–Pacific Region **for civilian control of the security sector**

Session 1. Security Policies and Civil Priorities in the Asia-Pacific Region

1:00	Welcoming Address	Hyun-Back Chung / President of PSPD
1:10	Moderator	Tai-Uk Chung / Inha University
1:15	Presenter 1	With a Lot of Help from Our Friends : U.S. Military Strategy in Asia John Feffer / IPS(Institute for Policy Studies)
1:30	Presenter 2	Can Japan Overcome Cold-War Thinking? Akira Kawasaki / Peace Boat
1:45	Presenter 3	Military and security strategy of South Korea and Civil Society Priorities before and after Chonan Incident Taeho Lee / PSPD
2:00	Presenter 4	Defensive but Active : Chinese Security Policy in Asia-Pacific region Hua Han / Beijing University
2:15	Discussion	
3:40	Break	

Session 2 Creating Civil Solidarity for NWF Disarmament and Prevention of Armed Conflict in the Asia-Pacific Region

4:00	Moderator	Francis Daehoon Lee / Center for Peace and Disarmament Executive Committee of PSPD, Centre for Peace Museum
4:05	Presenter 1	Civil society strategies for prevention of armed conflict in the Asia Pacific : setting the NE Asia campaigns in a global context Colin Archer / IPB(International Peace Bureau)
4:20	Presenter 2	Strategy for a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone as a step to "Common Security" Ichiro Yuasa / Peace Depot
4:35	Presenter 3	Northeast Asian Women's Peace Conference : Negotiating Regional Peace, Reconciliation, and Cooperation Gyung-Lan Jung / Women Making Peace
4:50	Presenter 4	Two Cases of Peace Movement in South Korea : Conscious Objection Movement and Peace & Disarmament Fair Yeo-ok Yang / The World Without War
5:05	Discussion	
6:30	Closing	

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International Workshop
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**Session 1.
Security Policies
and Civil Priorities
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With a Lot of Help from Our Friends U.S. Military Strategy in Asia

John Feffer / IPS(Institute for Policy Studies)

The Pentagon has reached, perhaps, its high-water mark. The huge budget increases of the George W. Bush era have been scaled down. The most ambitious plans to intervene abroad have been scaled back. The most aggressive rhetoric has been toned down. With the U.S. economy still reeling from the economic crisis, the Pentagon has entered an era of relative modesty.

I would like to stress the word “relative.” After all, the Pentagon budget request for 2011 was \$712 billion (which includes the \$159 billion request for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan). Add in the other military-related budget items from other departments, such as nuclear weapons spending at the Energy Department, and the overall military budget rises to \$861 billion. This represents a modest but still significant increase in spending from this year’s budget.

The term “relative modesty” applies to other aspects of military policy in the Obama era. The Obama administration has ended the “global war on terror” and begun the withdrawal of troops from Iraq. But it has also backed a surge of troops in Afghanistan, increased drone attacks in Pakistan, and spread counter-terrorism operations to Yemen and north Africa. And on the rhetorical front, the administration has removed many of the references to unilateral action, full-spectrum dominance, and the aggressive pursuit of U.S. military objectives. Nevertheless, the administration’s actions in the Middle East, Central Asia, and

Africa still adhere to many of the principles that the Bush administration introduced in the post-September 11 environment.

In Asia, meanwhile, the Obama administration has appeared to be somewhat more aggressive than its predecessor, in part because it has been trying to rectify a past error. Because the Bush administration was so focused on the Middle East and Central Asia, a perception emerged in the policy community in Washington that the United States during this period essentially outsourced Asia policy to China. Washington cooperated with China on terrorism, on North Korea, on global economic issues. And China took advantage of U.S. preoccupations to act more assertively in the region. But the Obama team has emphasized the importance of Asia to its broader foreign policy vision. Hillary Clinton has visited the region twice, and there have been several other high-level trips. “Under the Obama administration, the United States is back in the game of defending and promoting American interests in the region,” writes Douglas Paal at the Carnegie Endowment.

This renewed commitment to Asia has translated into a more vigorous military posture. The Obama administration played hardball with Japan on the Okinawa base relocation issue, responded in a hard-line fashion to North Korean provocations, and finalized a major arms deal for Taiwan. True, these policies are in many ways a legacy of earlier administrations. But the Obama team didn’t attempt to change the status quo. Moreover, in the wake of the sinking of the South Korean ship Cheonan in March, the United States ramped up a naval exercise near the Korean peninsula, turning out 20 warships, 200 planes, and 8,000 soldiers, in addition to throwing a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier George Washington into the mix. Even as it tightens the screws on Pyongyang - with new financial sanctions and monthly U.S.-South Korean military exercises - Washington has been turning up the heat on Beijing. At the most recent ASEAN summit, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton pressured China to “internationalize” the multi-party territorial dispute in the South China Sea. This maneuver, which required lining up the support of nearly a dozen countries in advance, caught China by surprise (Beijing prefers to handle the dispute bilaterally).

Still, despite all of its occasionally hard-line policies, the Obama administration has not played up the China “threat.” This is a result of both geopolitical calculation and a subtle shift in U.S. military doctrine. Current U.S. military strategy, as laid out in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), has shifted more toward current conflicts rather than “horizon” issues and toward multiple simultaneous conflicts rather than the traditional two-front posture. The Pentagon is focusing more on new threats such as climate change, cyberterrorism, and new and unexpected insurgencies rather than a hypothetical challenger 15 years hence. Still, this is only a relative shift in emphasis. After all, the United States continues to devote considerable resources to containing China. In the end, however, the administration has stressed the need to expand its position in Asia, not scale it back.

In other words, the Pentagon has more on its plate but, because of domestic factors, will have comparatively less money to deal with it all. The only way to solve this particular dilemma is to rely more on U.S. partners in the region. The United States has always emphasized its partnerships with Japan, South Korea, and (less so) Taiwan. At times of austerity, Washington has put more emphasis on burden-sharing.

Today, however, the United States will be pushing for more than just additional resources from its allies. More and more, these allies will have to do the heavy lifting themselves. The United States, in other words, is looking for more than just a little help from our friends.

The Evolving Pentagon Strategy

We are currently between Pentagon reviews. The QDR came out in February. And a global posture review is due at the end of this year. There weren’t any surprises in the QDR, and there won’t likely be any in the global posture review either. The Pentagon under Robert Gates has been quite transparent about shifts in strategy.

Gates has long emphasized the importance of focusing on short-term needs rather than long-term objectives. That emphasis has meant, for instance, dealing with China in the here and now rather than as a rising power that will someday challenge the United States for the position of top hegemon. The Quadrennial Defense Review outlines a slightly new way of handling China’s ability to deny U.S. military access to the region. The Air Force and the Navy are teaming up to pool their capabilities – the latest bombers, a new cruise missile, and drones launched from aircraft carriers – in order to launch long-range attacks that could counter China’s anti-submarine and anti-missile defenses. But this is largely a reconfiguring of existing capacities rather than the unveiling of something substantially new.

Such an approach, of course, does not satisfy congressional hardliners who would prefer that the administration bluntly identify China as a threat and spend considerably more money to counter that threat. “My fear is that we will downgrade the China threat in an attempt to justify last year’s and future cuts to key defense programs,” argues Buck McKeon (R-CA), the top Republican on the U.S. House Armed Services Committee. This is not an isolated concern. After the release of the 2010 QDR, a bipartisan panel of foreign policy experts chaired by former Bush administration national security advisor Stephen Hadley and former Clinton administration defense secretary William Perry released their own alternative version. A major recommendation was to prepare for the long term – and China’s growing maritime capabilities – by spending a great deal more on a larger U.S. navy.

Like the Bush administration, Obama is trying to have it both ways with China. The president has simultaneously courted China and pressured China. He has pushed through a large arms deal with Taipei but also restarted military dialogue with Beijing (China cancelled military exchanges in response to the Taiwan deal) and possibly space cooperation as well. The administration has intervened in the South China Sea dispute but also indicated that it might lift the 21-year-old arms embargo by selling C-130 transport planes to Beijing. The United States realizes that it needs China – to influence North Korea, to maintain economic growth, to

balance Russia and India and even Iran. China also needs the United States - to exert a measure of restraint on its allies in the region, to maintain economic growth, and to keep the many potential adversaries on China's borders preoccupied. At another level, however, the United States maintains a loose cordon around China, and China has steadily built up its military capabilities to poke holes in that cordon. The two powerful countries play a two-level game that balances short-term tactical convergences against this long-term strategic asymmetry.

Containing China and its "denial strategy" is only one of the U.S. military objectives in Asia. "The U.S. defense posture in Asia is shifting to one that is more geographically distributed, operationally resilient and politically sustainable," Gates has said. "Dispersed" and "resilient" are two words that come up time and again in Pentagon briefings. In other words, the Pentagon doesn't want to be tied down in any one location and wants to be able to respond rapidly to any contingency that might arise anywhere. So, for instance, the United States has drawn down troops on the Korean peninsula and largely eliminated their tripwire function, all so that they are more flexible and can respond to emergencies outside the peninsula. The United States has also negotiated a withdrawal of some Marines from Okinawa - to be relocated to Guam - and the building of a new base on the island that would focus on smaller but more flexible rapid deployment forces.

"Cooperation" is a third buzzword in Pentagon briefings. "As we go forward after the QDR, we're launching a new study - well, so that we can dig deeper into each of the regions to sort of operationalize, if you will, our philosophy for a cooperative and a tailored approach," argues Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Janine Davidson. The Pentagon is exploring "new avenues and new methods and ways to train together with our partners."

These are all benign words. But this "cooperative" approach has some important and quite negative consequences for peace and security in Northeast Asia.

The Perils of Cooperation

The United States has rationalized its military presence in Asia in part on the basis of restraining its Japanese ally and reducing great power competition in the region. Japan, in turn, has used its alliance with the United States to substitute for an offensive military capacity of its own. But this relationship has changed over the years.

Japan has gradually moved away from its Peace Constitution in what one scholar has called "salami tactics." Instead of changing the constitution, which requires a two-thirds majority in the Diet and a public referendum, Japanese hardliners have simply made small but important changes in the implementation of the constitution in military matters. Many of these changes have been made in order to facilitate alliance relations with the United States - allowing nuclear submarines to dock in Japanese ports, cooperating in out-of-area operations, participating in the U.S.-driven missile defense program. This latter change in Japanese military posture required an important but often-overlooked bending of the rule prohibiting Japanese military exports. Of course, this wasn't the first change in export policy. Earlier, Japan had issued exemptions for dual-use items and for exports to the United States.

Having rendered the ban nearly meaningless through these salami tactics, Tokyo is now considering abandoning the export ban altogether. The rationale for abandoning the ban is deliberately benign-sounding. Tokyo simply wants to participate in multi-nation technology projects. "The trend in the world today is for various countries participating in joint development to bring together their technology in order to develop better equipment at a cheaper cost," new Japanese Foreign Minister Seiji Maehara said.

But the real reason for abandoning the ban is to ensure that Japan has the most cutting-edge offensive weapons systems and can subsidize their development by selling them overseas. Japan can therefore put more money into its defense budget without diverting scarce government resources and risking public backlash. Perhaps

more importantly, it can accede to U.S. pressure to increase its military spending and its participation in various U.S. military ventures, including missile defense.

With money tight on the home front, the United States has been putting pressure on its allies to shoulder a greater share of the burden. The Democratic Party of Japan came into office looking for ways to cut government expenditures, including the hefty payments made to support U.S. troops and bases (more than \$4 billion a year in direct and indirect support). Washington not only insisted that Japan abide by a 2006 agreement to close the Futenma Marine Corps Air Force base, help relocate 8,000 Marines to Guam, and build a replacement facility in Henoko - over the objections of the vast majority of Okinawans - it actually asked Japan to pay more for the transfer. Japan had already agreed to cover \$6 billion of the \$10 billion estimated cost. Washington is now asking Tokyo to cover the expected cost overruns. These overruns caused a stir in the U.S. Congress over the summer when Kay Bailey Hutchinson (R-TX) raised a fuss in the Senate appropriations subcommittee.

The United States has similarly pressured South Korea to increase its share of expenses for U.S. forces stationed in the country. "Beginning in 1991 when it signed the Special Measures Agreement, South Korea has increased its share of the direct cost from 107.3 billion won to 741.5 billion won in 2008," writes Jae-Jung Suh. "If one adds the cost to relocate the USFK headquarters at Yongsan and consolidate other U.S. bases in Osan, Seoul's total burden quickly increases." These costs are projected to rise through 2013.

But sharing direct costs is only part, and perhaps the smallest part, of how South Korea and Japan end up increasing their military spending as part of their alliance obligations. In order for their forces to remain interoperable with the U.S. military, both South Korea and Japan must undergo substantial technological upgrades. South Korea imported nearly \$1 billion worth of arms in 2007, 95 percent from the United States (South Korea has shown the way for Japan in terms of arms exports by selling more than \$1 billion worth of arms in 2008). One particularly graphic example is South Korea's investments into building Aegis-equipped destroyers at a

price of about \$1 billion apiece. These form a key component of a sea-based ballistic missile defense system that the United States has urged on its allies.

South Korea has committed to a dramatic modernization of its military that originally projected 7-8 percent budget increases through at least 2020. Originally, under Roh Moo-Hyun, these increases resulted less from cooperation than lack of cooperation. The South Korean government believed at the time that Washington would gradually abandon the alliance, leaving Seoul to fend for itself. Budget shortfalls - and improved relations with Washington - led to a scaling back under Lee Myung-Bak so that the 2009 budget increased only by 3.6 percent. The sinking of the Cheonan, however, has opened the purse strings once again, with the Cabinet in May endorsing an additional \$29 million in supplemental funding to cover conventional military upgrades that address asymmetrical threats from North Korea. A presidential task force established in the wake of the Cheonan incident recommended defense spending from the current 2.76 percent of GDP to more than 3.5 percent, which would reverse the downward trend in the military share of GDP that started in the early 1980s.

Whether South Korea feels entrapped or abandoned in its alliance with the United States - and whether it feels threatened or not threatened by North Korea - it has responded in much the same way over the last few years: by increasing its military spending. It is not alone in the region. China and Russia continue to increase their military spending. There are voices within Japan to push military spending above the informal 1 percent of GDP that the country has traditionally observed. North Korean military expenditures, according to some estimates, have been gradually increasing as well.

The United States remains unconcerned that its own military budget increases and those of its allies are encouraging an arms race in the region. The United States, in its relatively reduced capacity, has recommitted to its military engagement in the region but wants to make sure that its allies are both shouldering more of the alliance costs and spending more overall on their own military capacities. If anything, these increased military expenditures in South Korea and Japan will have

an even greater reciprocal effect on China than U.S. military budget increases alone. After all, the United States can rightly argue that much of the Pentagon's increased budget goes to Afghanistan, Iraq, and other concerns far from East Asia. Japan and South Korea have much more difficulty in making such a case.

A Different Kind of Cooperation

Pentagon analysts are currently debating the relative merits of two different military doctrines. Some favor an emphasis on counter-insurgency, with its focus on fighting terrorism and other asymmetric threats. Others prefer a more traditional Cold War approach of combating largely symmetrical threats: a rising China, a revived Russia, a regional threat like Iran. The 2010 QDR represents a compromise between these two factions. Gates' willingness to cancel a few weapons systems like the F-17 fighter jet and his desire to focus on current conflicts suggest that his heart basically lies with counter-terrorism. But there are enough vested interests in maintaining production lines for Cold War weapons systems to ensure that the Pentagon will continue to invest heavily into preparations to fight a conventional war against some future adversary.

A truly progressive foreign policy is not in the cards for the United States any time soon. The Obama administration has maintained many of the facets of the post-September 11 Bush foreign policy, from the war in Afghanistan to the high expenditures on the military. There has been a modest improvement in rhetoric, a modest reduction in the increases in the Pentagon spending, and a modest shift away from the war in Iraq. But these are truly modest, and there will not likely be any radical shift in the final two years of the administration's term.

The current economic crisis might impose additional limits on Pentagon excesses and military interventions. The Deficit Commission will release its report on December 1, and several members have indicated that military cuts will be part of the recommended package. But economic austerity may simply lead to more of the

same: the reduction of overhead at the Pentagon to reallocate the money to on-the-ground operations and increased pressure on allies to share the burden.

A more promising alternative, which would represent an improvement over the QDR yet still fall short of a true progressive vision, would be offshore balancing. According to this scenario, the United States would withdraw troops and bases from Japan and South Korea and "balance" China and North Korea from bases on U.S. territory (Guam, Hawaii) and with submarines. One plan circulating in the Pentagon calls for a modest cut in U.S. naval capacity from 280 to 250 ships, a 15 percent reduction in the military budget, and a relocation of bases from East Asia to Oceania (building on the current plan to shift basing from Okinawa to Guam).

In civil movements, we must continue to raise the costs of U.S. military presence in East Asia and press for a coordinated freeze and then reduction in military spending among the countries that were involved in the Six Party Talks. This cooperation from below, combined with proposals for a regional security body and cooperative security mechanisms, will represent our "over the horizon" strategy. For the short term, however, we might find that the compromise of off-shore balancing a suitable tactic. ✨

Can Japan Overcome Cold-War Thinking?

Akira Kawasaki / Peace Boat

Introduction

This paper will first summarize the recent Japanese governmental and expert analysis about the security environment surrounding Japan and the general direction of its security policy, by reviewing its Defense White Paper and the most recent report by an advisory panel to the Prime Minister. It will then analyze the global contexts with which such developments in security policies are associated. Finally, it will recommend key priorities and shifts in Japanese policies, with the creation of a lasting peace mechanism in Northeast Asia in view. The key questions are: How can Japan overcome the remnant Cold-War thinking? How does the process relate to globalization and the global shift in power? How can the region create a peace mechanism which relies less on the US or Japan's hegemonic military powers?

Japan's 2010 Defense White Paper

Japan's Defense White Paper Defense of Japan 2010 starts with the analysis that the international security environment has become “complicated and uncertain” due to factors such as 1) the rise of nations against the backdrop of economic growth

in recent years; 2) the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; 3) activities by international terrorist organizations and other non-state actors; and 4) the danger of fragile nations becoming hotbeds for international terrorism.

Particular emphasis is given to the recent change in the international strategic balance, namely, the comparative decrease in US influence against the rise of growing new powers such as China, India and Russia. The White Paper reads:

It has been pointed out that in the future the comparative superiority of the United States will decline in terms of military and other areas, but it seems that it will continue to be the most influential nation in the international community. ... In the future, the relative international influence of these multi-polar-oriented countries [such as China, India and Russia] is expected increase.

It then lists “major security issues in the international community” as follows:

- The proliferation of nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC) and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as well as their delivery means, including ballistic missiles
- Globally dispersed cells of international and local terrorist organizations
- Outer space and cyber space, noting, “Cyber attacks on information and telecommunications networks can have a serious impact on people's lives.”
- Regional conflicts and UN peacekeeping operations (PKO)
- Safety of maritime transportation, in light of the recent increase in acts of piracy
- Large-scale disasters and outbreaks of epidemics

The White Paper summarizes that the international community now confronts a range of issues “from traditional inter-state relations to new threats and diverse contingencies.” It also states that the role of military forces are “diversifying.” It reads, “unified responses that incorporate military as well as diplomatic, police,

judicial, information, and economic measures are becoming necessary.” It also notes the importance of “international cooperation and partnership in security areas” in order to respond to the diversified roles of the military.

With regard to the Asia-Pacific region, it recognizes that the rapid economic growth of China and India has brought “global attention” to the region and “enhanced coordination and cooperation” among countries. But at the same time, “conflicts between countries/regions remain, even after the end of the Cold War, unlike Europe,” the White Paper points out, and “long-standing issues of territorial rights and reunification continue to plague the region.”

North Korea, China and Russia

The White Paper pays particular attention to the three countries of North Korea, China and Russia. North Korea's nuclear and missile programs remain as top concerns. It reads, “This cannot be accepted as it is a notable hazard to the peace and stability of Northeast Asia and international community,” It also refers to the sinking of the Cheonan in March 2010 and various international responses. It made clear that Japan aligns itself with South Korea, by referring to the G8 summit statement of June and the UNSC Presidential Statement of July as “critical of North Korea for its attack and sinking,” as well as to the US-South Korea joint military exercises in this context.

As for China, the White Paper warns of the “further modernization of its military capabilities against the backdrop of the continuing rapid growth of its defense budget.” It also cautiously points out increased Chinese activities in waters closed to Japan. Against these developments, the White Paper views the “lack of transparency” of defense policies and military activities of China as “a matter of concern.” It calls for “further improvements to transparency regarding China's military” and proposes “promoting dialogues and exchanges with China” in order to build confidence.

Russian President Medvedev is, the White Paper analyzes, “developing its military posture in line with its resources against the backdrop of its economic development.” It notes that the country is “downsizing troops” but “modernizing its military,” including the development and introduction of new equipment. In the wake of its recent “global deployment” of the military, the White Paper warns, “Russia continues with active operations of its vessels and aircraft” in the Far East, too.

PM's Advisory Panel Report

In August 2010, the Council of Defense Capabilities in the New Era, an advisory panel to the Prime Minister, submitted to Naoto Kan after its half-year activity a report entitled “Japan's Vision for Future Defense Capabilities in the New Era.” The panel, chaired by Shigeo Sato and composed of business leaders and experts on security and international studies, was mandated to study for a revision of National Defense Program Guidelines. The present Guidelines were adopted by the Cabinet in 2004. A revision was planned under the PM Taro Aso of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in 2009. But then, as the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) took power, the process was postponed for a year. In early 2010, Yukio Hatoyama established the panel as the first advisory body on security policy to the PM under the DPJ government.

The panel's report pointed to recent trends in the global security environment as 1) economic and social globalization posing cross-border challenges and increased “conflicts in between peacetime and wartime,” 2) the shift in the international power balance with rising new powers against the decreased influence of the US, 3) the increased danger posed by WMDs and their delivery systems, and 4) continued threats of regional conflicts, failed states, terrorism and transnational crimes.

In responding to these challenges, the report recommended that Japan aims to become a “peace creation country” that is more actively engaged in fields such as international peace cooperation, non-traditional security and human security. It recommended, while ensuring the US extended deterrence, that Japan make efforts to employ diverse diplomatic means, engage with new growing powers and strengthen multilateral security frameworks in order to achieve its security goals.

Challenging the Article 9-Based Policies

The report made two notable recommendations. One was that Japan should go beyond the Basic Defense Force Concept that it has long held as the basis of security policy. The Basic Defense Force Concept is explained as a concept to focus on “preventing invasion by possessing adequate scale of defense force,” in addition to relying on the Japan-US security arrangement. This relates to the “exclusively-defense oriented policy” that Japan has been committed to under Article 9 of its Constitution. The report argues, however, that such “static” deterrence cannot meet today’s security challenges and that “dynamic” deterrence - with active surveillance and patrol, demonstrating high operational capability even in peacetime-- is increasingly needed. The report recommended, instead of sticking to the concept oriented to defend against invasion, that “multi-functional, flexible, and effective defense forces” should be pursued.

The other was that the report clearly recommended that Japan revise the arms-export-ban principle which it has committed since the late 1960s. This principle has been another unique policy of Japan under its Peace Constitution, despite being eased to exclude the transfer of military technologies to the US in the 1980s and, more recently, missile defense related exports to the US. The report represented the voices of business sectors which have been actively lobbying for a fundamental revision of the arms-export-ban principle. This report serves only as “one reference” for the government to revise formal national policy. However, a study process of “reviewing and re-establishing” the arms export policy started within the DPJ after the issuance of the report.

It is remarkable that the panel's report did not make any significant changes from the previous LDP government in its analysis of today's security agenda or the orientation of policy to be taken. Going away from the Basic Defense Force Concept towards more flexible and proactive forces is in line with the direction already taken by the 2004 revision of National Defense Program Guidelines. The change of the government from the LDP to the DPJ did not bring about any significant change in the composition of the expert group - or “brain” -- for security policy. Former high ranking foreign and defense officials also joined the panel as advisors. Thus the continuity of defense-policy-making is being ensured despite the governmental change.

Keeping the Old, Investing in the New

Japan's security policy today can be characterized as keeping the old approach but at the same time investing in new approaches. The old approach, which in essence is to prevent invasion by surrounding enemies - bearing Russia, China and North Korea in mind - was formed during the Cold War. A defensive approach against invasion has long been the decisive factor of the composition of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF). Indeed, Northeast Asia is the only region in the world with Cold War structures remaining, represented by the division on the Korean Peninsula and the problem of the Taiwan Strait. As the Defense White Paper points out, “unlike Europe,” where regional integration has prevailed and people are more concerned with intra-state conflicts and violence, traditional state-to-state tensions are still key for Japan and other Northeast Asian countries. Recent provocative news over territorial disputes between Japan and China and Russia recall that the region is still caught within Cold War divisions.

The Japan-US security arrangement is still seen as the most important base for Japan's security. The US extended deterrence is used as a pretense for almost anything within security discussions of Japan. PM Hatoyama tried to make a

difference in the US bases in Okinawa, by revisiting the 2006 agreement with the US on the relocation of the Futenma airbase to Henoko. However, he faced severe bashing by security experts both in Japan and the US, claiming he was doing harm to the Japan-US alliance. He was not talented enough to present a plan that could gain a public support, but rather lost trust from Okinawa. Thus he was cornered into quitting.

On the nuclear front, as the 2009 Prague speech of Barack Obama has generated a new global momentum for nuclear disarmament, Japan is actually slowing down the process by stressing the need of being protected by nuclear weapons. Recent international debates have made clear that the LDP government resisted the adoption of a no-first use policy of nuclear weapons or the retirement of Tomahawk missiles in US nuclear policy planning. The DPJ government, initiated by then Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada, disclosed in March 2010 the secret Japan-US agreement over the transit of nuclear-equipped vessels during the Cold War. It also signaled to the US that Japan would not oppose the US retirement of Tomahawk missiles from the region, which was then realized in the US Nuclear Posture Review Report of April 2010. Yet, even the DPJ leadership is not strong enough to change the government's traditional policy that Japan needs a first-use option of nuclear weapons by the US to make the extended deterrence "reliable" for Japan.

New Roles for the Military

While such Cold-War thinking still plays a vital role in Japan's policy-making, new changes are also emerging. First, the increasing dangers of regional conflicts and terrorism engaging non-state actors are driving Japanese security planners to think outside of the Cold-War box. Active participation in international peace operations, flexible and responsive forces, and a diversified role for the military, including operations in peacetime and the cooperation of civilians are, along with other similar trends described in the Defense White Paper and the experts' report above, understood in the same context.

It also should be noted that Japanese defense officials are increasingly referring to climate change and natural disasters as important security threats and reasons for the SDF to be well prepared. One is reminded of similar trends in the 2010 US Quadrennial Defense Review regarding the increased role of the military in dealing with climate change. Setting aside the cynical question of whether this represents a militar search for a *raison d'être* as the likelihood of state-to-state wars is decreasing, there is a clear sign of a cross-border integration of military forces in the wake of economic and social globalization. Distinctions between military activities in wartime and peacetime, and between national forces and international forces, are thus blurred.

A New Cold War?

Secondly, both Japanese government and experts focus on the shift in strategic balance, or the decrease of US influence in light of the rise of China, India, Russia etc. This trend is in line with the shift in world economy ruling from the G8 to G20. Against this trend, both Foreign and Defense Ministries first stress the need to "strengthen the ties with the countries that share values," meaning a strengthened relationship with South Korea, Australia and India. This poses the risk of constituting a "containment" strategy of China - or being interpreted by China as such - by forming a "liberal chain" of Japan-South Korea-Australia-India surrounding China. This leads to the risk of a new Cold War.

For example, in the ongoing debate over nuclear cooperation with India, proponents often refer to the "merit" of checking China by fueling India through nuclear cooperation. The government is also talking about broader dialogue with China and Russia, and strengthening East Asian frameworks including the ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN+3 and others. However, such arguments for creating a regional security mechanism engaging China are not as strong as the increased voice for strengthened cooperation among the "free and democratic" camp.

2010 marks the 50th anniversary of the present Japan-US Security Treaty. Both governments agreed to “deepen” the security arrangement on this historic occasion. How the governments define “deepening” of the security arrangement is still unclear. However, the above points constitute the background of the discussion.

Recommendations: Shifting Security Arrangements in the Region

The fact that the governments did not choose the word “strengthening” but rather chose “deepening” of the Japan-US security relations paved a way for engagement by civil society. With critical viewpoints, civil society can constructively present ideas in the process of redefining the Japan-US security relations, in search of a lasting peace in the region.

The first is to stop creating a new Cold War, and instead work for an East Asia Peace Community. The creation of new tensions with China, backed by an outdated Cold-War discourse, would not be constructive. A cautious approach is needed, because such a trend might also be driven by sentiment of rivalry against the Chinese economy by Japanese people affected by a long recession. Broader and deeper engagement with China should be pursued, so that the DPJ government's agenda of an East Asia Community will cover not only economic cooperation but also the creation of new confidence-building, arms control and disarmament mechanisms. The Six-Party Talks process on the Korean Peninsula is also encouraged to resume in view of working towards the creation of a lasting regional mechanism, as agreed to in the 2005 Joint Statement.

The second is to make a difference in nuclear disarmament. Japan's attachment to Cold-War type nuclear deterrence, which looks likely to be followed by South Korea, is counterproductive not only for the global nuclear disarmament process but also for the future of Northeast Asia security. Any “Deepening” of Japan-US

security arrangements should be designed to dramatically reduce, i the nuclear component from the bilateral security arrangement, with a view to eliminating it altogether. This would work constructively in pressuring North Korea to abandon its nuclear program, and in encouraging China to take further disarmament steps. A Northeast Asia nuclear-weapon-free zone should be made as a common policy objective in the region. Japan can and should take the initiative, as the country which experienced the suffering and devastation of nuclear weapons.

The third is to stop the militarization of the economy. As indicated above, the distinction between military and civilians is becoming more and more blurred, both in field operations and industries. Business leaders are pushing the agenda of lifting the ban on arms exports. They argue that promoting the “competitiveness” of high-tech industry is vital for the future of Japan's economy, suggesting that joint ventures with US and European companies in fields related to advanced military-civil integrated industries would benefit Japan.

The moral case against this must be clearly made, remembering that Japan's post-war “prosperity” was, in part, built upon the principle of economic development without relying on the military, in line with its Peace Constitution. (It is also true, though, that the “prosperity” was, in other part, build upon the sacrifices of those who suffered from the Korean War and Okinawan bases, off the Japanese mainland.) But critical examination should also be made as to whether such a leaning towards the military would really benefit Japan's economy, considering the very small ratio of military sectors within the whole economy of Japan and the potential loss of trust as a “peaceful nation” by the Middle East or other areas of the world.

And last but not least, civil society can seriously think of how to contribute to “non-traditional security,” relating to such issues as crime, piracy, pandemics, disasters and climate change, without relying on national military forces. The military is now searching for a renewed meaning for existence as global threats are becoming less and less military-oriented, but more and more socio-economic centered. Innovative civil society approaches should be developed and implemented,

crossing national borders. This will prevent the emergence of additional excuses for retaining large military spending and upgrading military forces with new missions. As globalization poses serious new threats of poverty and violence globally, there must not be any additional excuses for retaining remnants of the Cold War. East Asia should use its advanced economy and resources to contribute to the global common interest. ☼

Presenter 3

Military and security strategy of South Korea and Civil Society Priorities before and after Chonan Incident

Taeho Lee / PSPD

1. Prologue

The recent military strategy and arms build-up of South Korea go even beyond the rational level usually given by historical realist argument of 'no defense without might'. In recent years, South Korea's military strategy has gone from defense-oriented one to increasingly offensive one. Particularly after the Chonan Incident, its offensive nature has become even more acute.

The characteristics of the recent military and security strategies of South Korea can be summarized as exaggeration of North Korea's threat, more offensive military counter plans, extension of the ROK-US alliance, increase in overseas military interventions under the pretext of contributory diplomacy, more double-standards in nuclear policies, and expansion of export-oriented weapons industry. These are also geared to blind support and copy of the US's global hegemonic military strategy.

2. Military tension in Korea after the Chonan Incident

Until to date, there are more conjectures than facts in identifying the cause of the sinking of the naval ship Chonan on March 26 this year near the North Limit Line

of the West Sea (the Yellow Sea). The government of South Korea brought this case to the UN, but failed to get a UN judgment on North Korea responsibility in the sinking. The 'decisive evidences' claimed by the Ministry of Defense of South Korea as a proof of North Korea's attack on the ship has created decisive criticism and skepticism among experts here and abroad. Despite the unsettled debate on the unfounded cause, the government of South Korea has used this case as a proof of North Korea's military readiness to attack and her threat of asymmetrical warfare, in order to insist on the need of stronger deterrence capability.

Since July this year when ROK and US conducted a joint military exercise in the East and West Seas that included a nuclear carrier, the two governments have conducted altogether four joint military exercises, the last one being the PSI (Proliferation Security Initiative) exercise in October. Along with them, the two governments have openly indicated a number of military operation plans that are highly offensive such as landing operation into North Korea in case of an emergency and capture plan for the highest rank leaders of North Korea. Such approaches to North Korea are to invite a boomerang of new military conflicts. It is not only North Korea that reacts to it in a heated way, but also China showing a harsh reaction unlike in the past. During the joint exercise in the West Sea last August, China reacted to it with live ammunition gunshots.

At the same time, as the US showed full diplomatic and military support to the alleged findings of South Korean government on Chonan case, the ROK-US military alliance is stronger than ever before. This also serves as a stimulating and pushing factor for revitalizing the Japan-US alliance that recently showed some signs of minute cracks. Using the Chonan incident, the US succeeded in making the Democratic Party of Japan to change its electoral commitment of relocating Futenma Air Base out of Okinawa Prefecture. A closer military cooperation between Japan and South Korea is also under way. Four officers of the Self-Defense Force of Japan participated in the ROK-US joint naval exercise conducted in last July in the East Sea.

The Chonan incident is also being used as a turning point for a package deal over

accumulated, unsettled issues between South Korea and the US. For example, for the US 'accepting' South Korea's request to postpone the return of the wartime operation command authority (from the US to South Korea) to 2015, South Korea will extend the limit period of appropriation of South Korea's payment of defense expenses for the US. South Korea will also in return agree to 'revise' terms of negotiation for the free trade agreement between the two countries, send troops to Afghanistan, and impose a sanction against Iran. The US has expressed reservation only to the postponement of the return of the operation authority in view of the so-called security vacuum created by the Chonan incident.

The two governments adopted a joint statement in the 42nd ROK-US Annual Security Consultative Meeting in October this year, the first one since the Chonan incident. It reaffirms the recent keynote on fortified offensives. The two ministers of defense decided, (1) to solidify readiness for possible limited provocation by North Korea or an emergency situation in North Korea, by officially indicating 'unstable state' in North Korea, (2) to newly establish a 'policy committee for deterring diffusion' and strengthen deterrence by the existing nuclear umbrella, conventional destroy capability and missile defense capability, (3) reaffirm the summit agreement of the two countries to build the US-ROK alliance into a comprehensive strategic alliance of bilateral, regional and global scales, and to promote 'cooperation between the US and ROK to address a wide range of global security challenges'. Immediately after this meeting, defense minister Kim Tae-young made a row in the National Assembly by implying a decision to participate in the MD (the US's global missile defense) plan.

Since the Chonan incident, the governments of South Korea and the US are showing the closest military and diplomatic ties since the end of the Cold War. In parallel, North Korea and China are getting closer even beyond the traditionally close ties. On the other hand, the ROK-China relations are lowest in the opposite since opening the doors to each other. With possible resumption of the six-party talk as an exception, the overall military-security situation in Northeast Asia now resembles that during the Cold War period.

3. The So-called ‘North Korea’ s Asymmetrical Threat’ and South Korea’ s Offensive Arms Build-up

In May this year, President Lee Myongbak ordered to set up a comprehensive review council on national security situation. In July, the council gave the President a report of recommendations to improve the national security in the four directions; (1) from passive defense strategy (retaliation after an attack by enemy) to active deterrence strategy (identification of signs of attack and taking measures before actual attack), (2) from the military capability through the standing army and divided armed forces to that of integrated capability and utilizing private expertise, (3) from prioritizing augmentation of high-tech military capability to counter potential threat to parallel augmentation of military capability to counter immanent threats such as North Korea’s asymmetrical threat, and (4) to cancel the plan to reduce conscript service period to 18 months by 2015 and maintain 22 months in order to acquire an optimum level of military force.

Budget/Year	2007		2008		2009		2010		2011	
	억원	%	억원	%	억원	%	억원	%	억원	%
Total	244,972	8.8	266,490	8.8	285,326	7.1	295,627	3.6	312,795	5.8
Ordinary Operation	178,165	6.7	189,677	6.5	199,179	5.0	204,597	2.7	216,182	5.6
Improvement of defense capability	66,807	15.0	76,813	15.0	86,147	12.2	91,030	5.7	96,613	6.1

For 2011, the government submitted to the National Assembly a budget plan of USD 28.5 billion (KRW 3.1 trillion) for the defense. This is an increase of 5.8% from 2010, surpassing the expected growth rate of 5.0%. This is the first time ever to have a military budget over KRW 3 trillion. As a result, we will continue to see a rapid increase of military budget in South Korea, which was on the big rise from Roh Moo-hyon’s time (for “Cooperative Independent Defense”) and less so at the beginning of Lee Myongbak’s government.

The most prominent feature in the 2011 defense budget is reinforcement of the

military capability to counter infiltration and limited provocation, and enhancement of defense capability to counter asymmetrical threats. This is in the same line as what has been stressed since the Chonan incident. Many questions unanswered in the result of investigation of the case notwithstanding, the Ministry of Defense is lacking minimum justification or rational in trying to build up arms vis-à-vis North Korea’s asymmetrical threat.

An asymmetrical threat is usually understood to arise when the party lower in military power or defense budget acquires a capability to exert a military impact on the other party not on the whole but to a limited aspect in an asymmetrical ratio. Therefore, were North Korean threat to be seen as an asymmetrical one, it would mean that South Korea’s conventional military power and defense budget are assumed to be far above those of North Korea. This is in the same line with the fact that ROK-US joint military exercises began to assume, since the Chonan incident, collapse of North Korean regime or occupation of North Korea after a limited warfare. Thus, if the Ministry of Defense began to think that main threats were posed by North Korea’s provoking a limited warfare or its asymmetrical threat, it must have identified lessening of other kind of threats such as threat of total warfare and North Korea’s capability to launch such warfare. This means the ministry should have begun to reduce South Korea’s military capability to counter the other kind of threats. For examples, there must be possible arms reduction in the over-sized land forces, excessive number of officers and armored vehicles, and in the overwhelmingly superior naval and air power.

On the contrary, the 2011 budget aims to add more offense in the existing deterrence strategy, build up high-tech military power against threats from neighboring countries, increase in parallel military power to counter ‘current North Korean threat’, and strengthen integrated operation of forces while maintaining the existing oversized land force. Though the recommendations of the Presidential security review council are not officially adopted yet, the 2011 budget plan largely corresponds to them.

2011 defense budget plan will allow introduction of all high-tech military

equipments and weapons that the military has been demanding so far - early warning radar system for ballistic missiles, next generation guided weapons, F-15K and FA-50 airplanes, next generation fighter jets, Aegis III ships, airborne early warning and control airplanes, and high-altitude UAVs, among others. This comes in addition to the purchase of weapons and investment under the heading of ‘military structural adjustment’ and ‘securing complete manifestation of the existing military power’, such as investment for the power of land force, introduction of various advanced armored vehicles. This would be a spending for total warfare readiness, long debated for its excess and uselessness.

4. The Actual Military Powers of North and South Korea and Plans for North Korea’s Emergency Situation

It is an open secret that South Korea stands overwhelmingly superior over North Korea in its defense budget and military power. According to SIPRI, South Korea’s defense budget has increase from USD 13.7 billion in 1990 to USD 27.1 billion in 2009, showing a 197 percent increase (at 2008 exchange rate). This is 66 percent higher than the 131 percent increase in the same period of the US defense budget albeit all the heat over the War on Terror since 2001. The cumulative total military spending from 1994 to 2007 is USD 200 billion for South Korea and USD 2.15 billion for North Korea, more than 9 to 1 in ratio. In 2009, South Korea’s military spending was almost the size of the total GDP of North Korea, USD 27.8 billion. It will surpass the total GDP of North Korea in 2011. GNI of South Korea is more than 36 times that of North Korea as of 2007.

In August 2009, the National Intelligence Agency asked KIDA (Korea Institute for Defense Analysis) to do an evaluation on military power by a presidential order. According to the evaluation, South Korean military power is about 10 percent superior to that of North Korea without the US forces taken into account. If the US forces are taken into consideration, South Korea was overwhelmingly superior over North Korea in military strengths. This was the first official recognition of South Korea’s superiority, but the military establishments and those in the

government have long been aware that even such an evaluation is too generous in overestimating North Korea’s military capability. This point is clearly shown in the course of change of military strategies towards North by South.

According to the Middle Phase Defense Plan of 1991, South Korea was to form independent defense strategy by 1996, and independent deterrence strategy by 2006, and in particular to acquire offense capability from 2002 that includes strategic retaliation capability. Therefore, it was not new when the presidential security review council recommended a shift from passive defense to active deterrence. This is adding a final push to or finalizing what the Ministry of Defense has pushed for since the mid-nineties.

<표> Target Goals for Long Term Military Capability Establishment

stage	1987-1991	1992-1996	1997-2001	2002-2006
Objective	Securing Defence Capability against N.K.	Establish the Foundation of Deterrence Capability against N.K.	Securing Deterrence Capability against N.K.	Securing Offensive Capability against N.K.
	Secure self-reliant defense capability		Secure self-reliant deterrence capability	
Target Goals	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Land Army: defence capability (mobile deployment, Army air corps) - Navy & Air Force: core capability (destroyer, F-16) - Build the foundation for tactical early warning system 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Establish core offensive capability - Secure retaliatory function capability (F-X, submarine, land-to-land guided missile) - Establish tactical early warning system 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Expand retaliatory function capability (submarine, F-15, land-to-land guided missile) - Secure early warning system 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Establish strategic retaliatory capability (strategic naval vessel, long distance land-to-land guided missile) - Establish independent strategic early warning system

<출처> Medium Term National Defence Plan, 1991-1996 (1991)

Under Lee Myongbak, the military strategy is becoming increasingly offensive. Since 2008 Autumn to 2009 Autumn, South Korea and the US have developed military intervention plans to North Korea in case of an emergency, developing the

conceptual plan of Operation Plan 5029 into an actual operation plan.

It is believed that such intervention plans have gained many details at this year's security consultation meeting of the two countries. The content of the newly formulated Operation Plan 5015 has not been disclosed yet. However, one can gather from various indications disclosed by the US-ROK Combined Command that this new plan will have integrated and augmented the existing intervention plans 5026 and 5027. It is anticipated that the new plan sets for direct military occupation of North Korea such as arrest of leaders, occupation of military and administrative institutions, and conduct of stabilization operations in North Korea after crossing the cease-fire line even in the absence of a total war or direct armed threat, but in the case of an 'emergency'.

In fact, a US special unit for elimination of weapons of mass destruction participated in the US-ROK joint exercise of March 2010, named Key Resolve/Eagle Exercise. This assumed that US would directly control such operations as WMD elimination while South Korea would do stabilization operations. Similarly, the Ulji Freedom Guardian Exercise, which was in the past usually a computerized command post exercise (CPX) to counter total warfare, was conducted to counter asymmetrical provocations of North Korea such as those using nuclear weapons and missiles, submarines and special forces at NLL (north limit line) and MDL (military demarcation line). In other words, CPX exercise was also conducted as a 'crisis management operation' in view of actual limited provocations by North Korea.

There is another emergency plan code-named 'Revival' that includes administrative measures to govern North Korea in case of its collapse. We deduce that the same or similar operation plan was indeed a part of the Ulji Freedom Guardian Exercise of last August as it mobilized some 400 thousands civil servants of South Korean central and local governments.

These highly offensive plans are not only in violation of the 'defense' purported

ROK-US Mutual Defense Agreement, but can also be taken as acts of aggression in the international law. They resonate with George W. Bush's aggressive, reconstruction plan for the so-called rogue states.

The frequented concepts in the new plans such as 'strategic retaliation capability' and 'active deterrence strategy' all assume absolute military superiority over North Korea. It assumes total defense and total offense at the same time. However, there is no such thing as absolute superiority. Military plans geared to absolute deterrence will trigger military insecurity in North Korea, rather than frustration, and eventually lead to other kinds of asymmetrical capabilities such as development of irregular, destructive capabilities. North Korea's efforts in nuclear and missile programmes and guerilla tactics fall into this category. And this is another typical, man-made security dilemma.

5. Regionalization and Globalization of the ROK-US Military Alliance

In April 2008, Presidents Lee Myongbak and George W. Bush announced in their first summit meeting in Washington, "we have come to a consensus to develop the current ROK-US alliance into a '21st Century Strategic Alliance' that contributes to global peace in accordance with the newly changed international situation and security demand." This agreement was later reconfirmed in Lee's meeting with Barrack Obama, and further developed in details by the joint statement issued at the ROK-US Annual Security Consultation Meeting in 2010. The ROK-US alliance is on the move to become a regional and global alliance.

In Autumn 2009, South Korean government announced its decision to re-dispatch a 400-strong troop to Afghanistan as a part of PRT (Provincial Reconstruction Team) under ISAF (International Security Assistance Force). Korean troops have been sent and stationed in Afghanistan from 2002 until their withdrawal in 2007. South Korea has also sent the third largest troop to Iraq. The PRT has been accused of

justifying the foreign occupation and militarizing aid in the name of reconstruction. South Korea also sent troops to the so-called anti-terror allied forces in the Arabian Sea. In 2009, South Korean military sent a destroyer to join CFMCC (Combined Forces Maritime Component Command) led by the US 5th Fleet. The troops of the destroyer, called the Blue Sea Unit, was officially given the objective of MSO (Maritime Security Operation) that included intercepting pirates and preventing terrorism. The CFMCC was the force organized as a part of the US-led War on Terror after the September 11th Incident.

In 2009, the National Assembly has passed a bill on peace keeping operation, agreeing to the government's claim on contribution to the international community. The key points of the law are to simplify the authorization procedures for PKO and establish a special forces specializing in PKO. However, since the legislation, the Ministry of Defense is not only operating PKO special forces but also designated existing forces to be in charge of overseas dispatch and operation. The PKO special forces is to be part of the regular forces in charge of overseas dispatch and operation. As in the cases of overseas dispatch in the past, the main rationale is to train the military in real battle situation.

The Korean military has been sent to areas directly related to the US interest such as Lebanon and Haiti. It also participates in the annual, massive landing exercise named Cobra Gold in Thailand, which is led by the US and participated by the US allies in the region such as Japan, Australia and the Republic of the Philippines. The rationale is to train the Korean military in overseas stabilization operations and PKO. The Cobra Gold Exercise is basically stabilization training despite some elements of disaster relief and humanitarian aid in it.

On the other hand, the Ministry of Defense and the Navy are constructing a giant naval base in the southwestern part of Jeju Island. The given rationale is to secure marine transport route and provide marine security. The base, when completed, will be used as the home port for the 7th Mobile Fleet, a pride of the South Korean Navy for its 'oceanic naval capability'. Formed at the beginning of 2010, the 7th Fleet has a newest Aegis ship, six destroyers, a transport ship of a semi-carrier

size and submarines. By 2012, an additional Aegis ship will join the fleet. According to the Navy, this fleet will be in charge of guarding oil imports and export routes. However, the concept of 'oceanic navy' indicates capability to control and rule the deep sea. An interest in the sea control in the West Pacific region implies running into the regional hegemonic game between China and the US. It is anticipated that the US nuclear submarines, carriers and ships equipped with missile defense weapons will also anchor and embark in the Jeju naval base. China has given sensitive reaction to the construction of this base.

Overseas dispatches and long-distance military projections mentioned so far all converge to a crucial development, that the 'strategic flexibility' employed by the US forces in Korea is not confined to US forces but already extends to the whole ROK-US allied forces. South Korean troops are drawn to overseas operations and to deep sea along with the US military strategy to draw more allies into supplementing the weakening global hegemony of the US today. This move has implicated peoples in Northeast Asia and many other peoples of the world into the global hegemonic competition and related armed conflicts.

The ROK-US Mutual Defense Agreement limits its mandate to the defense against threats arising in the Pacific to the territory of either of the countries. Any activity of military nature that goes beyond this mandate is in violation of the agreement. More fundamentally, it violates the peace clause in Article 5 of the Constitution of ROK that stipulates, "The Republic of Korea shall endeavor to maintain international peace and shall renounce any war of aggression. The national Armed Forces shall be charged with the sacred mission of national security and the defense of the land and their political neutrality shall be observed."

6. Arms Exports and Army Exports

Pressed by massive state-led construction projects and social pressure for expanded welfare, Lee' government wanted to remove bubbles in the military spending by

reforming corruption and inefficiency in the defense sectors. The overinvested defense industries of South Korea have already shown lax and insolvent operations, being dependent on the preferential treatment given by the government for long. The weapons and equipments they produce have shown frequent breakdowns and defects as well as poor export rates.

On October 19th, the Presidential Future Planning Committee submitted its report 'Strategy for Industrial Development and Job Creation towards Defense Advancement', in which it recommended a main goal and strategy of making South Korea one of the 7th largest defense export countries of the world by transforming the defense industry from domestic market orientation to export orientation and from state operation to privatization. The aim was to "achieve an annual production of USD 10 billion and an annual export of 4 billion in defense industry by 2020 so that at least 10 defense corporations will fall in the class of world top 100 defense corporations." In other words, the defense industry is to become a major export sector.

There is not very much new in this repeated aspiration in the government. But, with the President self-claiming to be a CEO of the country, this new plan is much more economically oriented. Instead of the wild idea of developing high-tech weapons by domestic technology, the new plan aims to have state support for development of core technologies only, and open the acquisition of other equipments and weapons from overseas market. At the same time, the government will support the defense sector to focus on price competitiveness and to privatize and expand the size of production so that they can succeed in the export market. The Future Planning Committee states, "the Government will diversify defense industrial export market to Africa and Asia, beyond the current concentration in the US and Middle East... and consider sending troops to the countries importing our defense products in order to enhance the export."

Such policy orientation has been already identified in 2009 when South Korea made a deal to export a nuclear power plan to the United Arab Emirates. President Lee led the negotiations himself and included in the deal a promise to send

Korean troops to the country in order to provide training to the military owned by the hereditary royal power of UAE and to protect the power plant. The bill to send a 150-strong unit special forces is now submitted to the National Assembly as of November 2010. This is the first time to plan to send a troop to a non-conflict region.

In summary, the South Korean government plans to export solid and cheap weapons to any conflict zones in the world according to local needs and to send troops to a foreign country when needed for arms sales or military support. And this is publicly publicized as 'attractive job' creation. It is not known at all if the government has given any due ethical considerations in the policy making. South Korea is already known as a major production and export base for one of the most inhumane weapons, cluster bombs. It is neither a party to the International Mine Ban Treaty. Such inhumane weapons along with other conventional small weapons kill and damage civilians on the ground more than high-tech weapons. It is surprising to see all this and to see at the same time that South Korea is the presiding country in G20 that proposed poverty eradication and support for economic development of underdeveloped countries as a main agenda of the meeting. Sending troops comprised of national conscripts for economic benefits or for profit making of private corporations is not only unethical but also in violation of the Constitution.

7. Double Standards in Nuclear Policies

After the second nuclear weapon test, the six-party talk has not resumed. Since the Chonan incident, Lee Myongbak's government has stressed that North Korea policies should responsibility of the attack and highlighted readiness to emergency situations in North Korea, in line with the so-called 'strategic patience'. Along the way, it seems that even the existing priority of 'denuclearization first' has been abandoned. Despite the recent, slight opening of the talk between two Koreas through sending rice to north and holding family reunions, it is still unclear if South Korean government can easily escape from its own trap after having

trumpeted instability and aggressiveness of North Korea.

The attitudes of neighboring governments are not in favor of talks either. The military mistrust and issues of tension are still running deep between ROK-US and China-DPRK since the incident of Chonanham. The US may feel it could gain more by having immediate honey-moon with Lee's South Korea than by engaging in a difficult and uncertain negotiation with North Korea. China and North Korea may be thinking in the same way.

It is a burden to the other member states of the six-party talk that North Korea considers itself a nuclear power state since the second test and demands other states to consider North Korea in that manner. North Korea disclosed its memorandum on nuclear policy on 21st April, which well outlines the terms of negotiations it wants in details. The key point is that it will negotiate on nuclear disarmament as a nuclear power state. The memorandum also stated no-strike policy to non-nuclear states and no-preemptive nuclear attack policy. The memorandum seems to justify the view that North Korea never wanted to abandon its nuclear arsenal in the first place, and will never do either. No matter which countries recognize North Korea as a nuclear power or not, it is becoming increasingly clear that we need new terms of negotiations if we want North Korea back to the table.

A careful reading of the memorandum, however, will show that it is not easy to refute any of the points in it except the claim that North Korea should be treated as a nuclear power. This is because the unilateral, double-standard nuclear policy employed by the US and South Korea did, to a certain extent, provide rational for North Korea's 'nuclear deterrence.' During the nineties, the overall stance of the government and citizens in South Korea was to promote reconciliation and reform relationship with neighboring countries. Relationship became normalized between South Korea and China, and later with Russia. By 2002, comprehensive agreement has been made between North and South Koreas, North Korea and Japan, and North Korea and the US to improve relationship. The inter-Korea summit of 2000, the DPRK-US communiqué of 2000, and the DPRK-Japan summit of 2002 were cornerstones for the change. However, Bush Administration broke its commitment

of 2000 agreements, and began to label North Korea as an axis of evil and declared a policy of pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons. This opened the gate for military deterrence and nuclear deterrence, to nullifying previous efforts to improve relationship.

The six-party talks bore some progress despite such a set-back, such as September 19th Joint Statement (2005) and February 13th Agreement (2007), but eventually to be discarded in total. The responsibility for non-fulfillment of the agreements lies not only on North Korea, but also substantially on South Korea and the US. The contradictory actions of the two governments served as obstacles to diplomatic solution of the North Korea's nuclear issue, such as the freeze measure taken by the US right after the September 19th agreement, the freeze of North Korea's assets in a bank (BDA) in Macao, and rumors spread by South Korean government indicating health crisis of Kim Jong-il while North Korea was conducting nuclear disablement work. The latter action resulted in passive turn in the North Korea policies in South Korea, Japan and the US.

At the moment, South Korean government demands disablement of the North Korea's nuclear fuel processing while working towards building a nuclear fuel processing facilities in South Korea, thereby, towards having a complete nuclear fuel cycle. For this end, Lee Myongbak's government has already signed with India for reaching an agreement and is working to revise the ROK-US agreement with regard to nuclear energy. India is a nuclear power state but not a member of NPT. In addition, Lee's government acted upon the US request to impose an independent sanction against Iran, which was beyond the scope of the relevant UN Security Council resolutions. Of course, South Korea has never imposed any sanctions against Israel. Such double standards make it even more difficult to find a solution to the North Korea's nuclear problem.

As rightly acknowledged in the joint statement of PNND (Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament) members of South Korea and Japan last February, policies based on nuclear deterrence are bound to invite more nuclear threats. It is not just North Korea but all of its neighboring, militarily much

mightier countries that are not ready to abandon policies dependent on nuclear deterrence. One has to remember that the US nuclear umbrella has been long open much before North Korea started its nuclear programme. The governments in South Korea, Japan and the US still hold the view that the nuclear umbrella of the US and North Korea's nuclear programme cannot be traded.

In the last decade, what has justified South Korea, Japan and the US's dependence on nuclear deterrence and double-standard nuclear weapons policy was the mistrust and fear cast upon North Korea's nuclear programme. The reaction of the three governments, however, has resulted in the self-contradictory turn-out, two nuclear weapons tests by North Korea. They were the actual result of a failed strategy made of exaggerated fear, mistrust, double standards, neglect and coercion. Such a failure should not repeat itself. What we need is more active, mutual measures that have not been employed so far. The six-party talk should not confine its agenda to the abandonment of North Korea's nuclear programme, but to relate itself also to envisioning a peace regime in Korea, establishing arms controls on conventional weapons, and strengthening efforts to eliminate nuclear threat throughout Northeast Asia. Efforts to create nuclear-free Northeast Asia will be an alternative and breakthrough to the narrow, North-Korea-nuclear-issue-oriented six-party talk. ☀

■ Who Defines Threat? Who decides Priority of Policies for People's Safety?¹⁾

Taeho Lee

Today, we're discussing how to end the arms racing in the Asia-Pacific Region. Why do we have to reduce military spending, and how can it make it possible then?

The government officials argue that a certain level of military spending is necessary for the security. However, the issue here is who defines a threat, and who defines the "certain" level and means enough to keep the country secure.

It is critical not only because military spending is just too much, but also because the actor who defines a threat can easily control the rest. We've well known throughout history that manipulated fear could control a community to make a irrational decision. The latest and most popular case is the Iraqi War.

As you know well, Asia-Pacific region, where we're living, is showing the highest level of military spending in the world. At this point, we should doubt. Firstly, we should ask if the eminent threat really exists. Secondly, even assuming a certain level of threat exists, we need to consider whether the threat can be resolved only by military means or military preparations. It must be doubted whether depending on the exaggerated fear and military means is deteriorating the matter or not.

Let's take the North Korea's nuclear issue.

As Hussein became described as a demon before the Iraqi War, now North Korea

1) This paper was presented at the Conference for the Military spending in Northeast Asia and Pacific Freeze Campaign (7:00pm-9:00pm, May3, 403 Kent Hall Columbia University)

and Iran are also frequently demonized. So, they are considered as an unpredictable dictator. Especially, they are accused of frequently violating the promise not to develop nuclear weapons. Is this really true?

The critical thing we need to recall is that there had been a thousand nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea even before North Korea's attempted to built nuclear reprocessing plant and had nuclear tests.

The other critical thing is that even now South Korea and Japan are under the US nuclear umbrella while the US is still adhering to preemptive nuclear attack option now at the moment we're talking about threat from North Korea..

Let take another look on the implementation of the promise. After the end of the Cold War, in Northeast Asia, South Korea restored and improved the relations with China and Russia in the 1980s. And between 1991 and 2002, North Korea and Japan, and North Korea and the US concluded to comprehensive agreements to restore and improve the relations, the South-North Korea Summit in 2000, US-DPRK Joint Communiqué in 2000, and the North Korea-Japan Summit in 2002. Then, who broke such compromise? Was it only North Korea?

In case of the US-DPRK Joint Communiqué, Bush administration did break it. The implementation of the agreement between North Korea and Japan has been long delayed because of the liquidation of the past. Whose past? It was not the liquidation of the past of Japanese imperialism, but the liquidation of the North Korea's kidnapping of Japanese. Even from our viewpoint, it is out of balance and politically exaggerated within the Japanese society/(government).

Let's take another case then. In 2001, South Korea purchased 40 F-15K planes which cost 100 million dollars per plane. The reason for such huge spending is surprising. At that time, the Ministry of Defense argued that it was necessary to have high-tech fighters with long journey capability. So, PSPD officially inquired the Ministry of Defense that South Korea was really preparing for the threat from

Japan that was one of the US alliances. Then, the Ministry of Defense answered it was for the threat from North Korea. But, at the same time, the Ministry of Defense still publicized that the purchase was for preparing the potential threat from surrounding countries including Japan to the public.

In fact, F-15 was sufficient to attack North Korea, but the same time, it was pretty outdated. Nevertheless, the South Korean government purchased F-15 from the US, instead of better one from France or the EU. Why? That is because the Bush administration wanted not to close down the F-15 plant of Boeing by selling F-15 to South Korea.

In other words, the South Korean government promoted fear from the exaggerated Japanese threat to purchase F-15 to let Boeing get moneys. And the South Korean government actually deployed the purchased F-15 for the purpose of preemptive attacks.

As it is well known, North Korea is neither able to buy nor produce weapons like F-15. That's because North Korea couldn't afford it. As a result, North Korea is highly likely to prefer affordable and destructive weapons to expensive conventional weapons. And then, the US, South Korea and Japan purchase expensive missile defense weapons and weapons for precise targeting as insisting the threat of the North Korea's WMD (weapons for massive destruction). Moreover, they adhere to the nuclear umbrella and nuclear preemptive attacks.

Similar thing is happening in Jeju Island in South Korea, where is located near Shanghai and Taiwan. South Korea is building a huge naval base in Jeju, which nuclear submarines and AEGIS destroyers of the US might utilize.

What's the reason for building a new naval base in Jeju then? Reported by the Ministry of Defense, it is for to protect crude oil protection from the pirate. Then, when it was asked "the reason is just that?", then the Ministry of Defense said vaguely that China might be a threat potentially.

But, it is not hard to imagine that the Chinese threat can become created when the US missile defense weapons transit Jeju Naval Base, even though now we can't figure out if it really exists.

I'd like to highlight my points and recommend a few things as concluding.

Firstly, there is too high social cost because of the exaggerated threat, the manipulated fear and bias which is promoted by the each government. Such cost must be reduced. We can save such social cost a lot by just questioning on the threat interpretation and the security policies. It also means that we take back our right about safety issues. We should not allow a few so called 'security specialists' or officials to have too much influence on security policy-making process. For example, we, people can and must decide the priority and opt spending money for invading Iraq or for defending us against hurricanes Katrina.

Secondly, we should look for diplomatic means, not military means, and look for reconciliation and cooperation, not hostile relations. By the way, if citizen's perception were limited to the border, we could be more prejudiced and more rely on military means. You know the saying "Put yourself in my shoes", meaning it is necessary to think in terms of other's point of view. Namely, the civil society is required to put efforts to be beyond the border. In that point, the Pacific Freeze campaign is a critical means.

Thirdly, we should initiate preemptive peace activities, not attack. When we look reflect the process of the arms racing in the Asia-Pacific region in the 1980s after the Cold War, what we have to do is apparent. In a broad sense, in the 1990s, people sought for improving international relations and reconciliations. However, the Bush administration encouraged arms conflict and arms racing in this region, and maximized the military industry and war profiteers. The US alliances including South Korea and Japan are also responsible for this. It's time to make an action plan for the preemptive peace attacks.

Preemptive reduction of military spending is necessary and possible. When the civil society talks about military spending cut, the military specialists reject it saying that's too ideal. They say confidence-building comes first, control of armaments is next, and disarmament is the last. They also try to persuade the civil society that it's useless if the opponent is not complying with. However, there is no such case of disarmament as they mentioned.

Let me specify my recommendation. We should initiate a campaign, urgently and directly requesting that South Korea, Japan and the US should start disarmament without mentioning the abolition of North Korean Nukes first. I believe this is the solution for the current situation and the strategy for the Pacific Freeze. And, this is our answer for the question that "can we believe North Korea?".

Lastly, I'd like to propose a project. For the success of the Pacific Freeze campaign, we should regularize our efforts to present alternative civil interpretation on contemporary situations and alternative peace strategies as challenging the state threat interpretation and security policies. The civil peace white paper should be produced as an alternative to the defense white papers written by the state (QDR for the US). To initiate the project, this October 2010, the year for the 60th year for the Korean War, I propose to have a conference by inviting civil societies in the Asia-Pacific Region for sharing and discussing civil alternatives and strategies.

Thank you for listening!

Defensive but Active : Chinese Security Policy in Asia-Pacific region

Hua Han / Beijing University

Introduction

Derived from three-decade economic growth and two-decade defense modernization, China has apparently mounted debates among security analysts and policy makers in Asia Pacific region over the implications of the rise of China for the future regional security configuration and strategic landscape. Optimists believe that a strong China is not necessarily a threat to its neighbors and to regional stability and security as a whole because Beijing has not behaved as a revisionist state. Rather China has presented to this region an opportunity as China's export-oriented economy has, to a great extent, relied on good relations with outside world and the profound interdependence between China and the world has fostered regional cooperation and integrity. Pessimists, however, insist that a rising China is likely to pose a challenge, more likely a threat, to Asian status quo and security. They believe that a strong China is deemed to bring change in the balance of power and power transition will happen sooner or later, conflict, therefore, is hard to be prevented. If China's aggregate power continues to grow, Beijing will seek to resolve its territory disputes with its neighbors through a more disruptive approach; to push US, the established power, out of Asia, and to seize the recourses and control the sea-lanes that many countries in this region heavily rely on.

Put it in a simply way, which scenario between the two that optimists or pessimists predict would unfold in the future largely depends on what the established power, the US does, but also depends on what the rising power, China does. More specifically, what approach China has followed and will follow in its efforts to safeguard its security is vital for the better off in Asia Pacific region. Over the last decades, China has taken a defensive and cooperative approach in making and implementing its security policy. In addition to its sovereignty and integrity objective, creating a peaceful environment conceived to its huge economic programs has been a key priority in Chinese security calculus. To reach these objectives, China has either signed border agreements with most of all countries that have boundary disputes on its land borders or tranquilized the land and maritime disputed boundaries; practiced economic diplomacy aiming at cultivating sustainable and substantial relations with countries in this region; participated and played a proactive role in multilateral and regional forums and security regimes, and upgraded its limited deterrence. China's pragmatism and non-coercive posture have earned certain credits, and China's deeds in wake of 1997 Asian financial crisis make its neighbors start to treat China as a responsible power.

However, the recent events—Beijing's resolute opposition to US arms transfer to Taiwan and to Obama's meeting with Da Lai, the leader of Tibetan exile-government, and to the US-ROK joint naval exercises in the Yellow Sea, adjoining to China's territory, after the Cheonan tragedy, Beijing's open criticism of Secretary Clinton's speech over South China Sea in Hanoi, which is seen as a response to Chinese growing naval capability and Beijing's assertion of the South China Sea as one of its "core national interests", and Sino-Japanese wrangling after Japanese authorities to seize Chinese fishing ships in waters around the Diaoyu Islands, which China has its territorial claim—lead to an impression that China is now becoming more "assertive" and "arrogant" in its dealing with outside world, and even to aggressively exercise its fledged muscle in pursuing dominance in Asia-Pacific region. Security policy is one way to show one's strategic intention, which as mentioned above, determines the future in Asia-Pacific region. Does China's assertiveness mean a primary change of its security policy?

White paper and China's security policy

This paper argues while China's security policy and posture, which characterized by defensive and cooperative in nature has not changed, China has taken steps to develop a capability to defuse tension and "crises before they escalate into a conflict" should they occur. On the one hand, China's National Defense 2004 and 2008 White Papers reiterate that China's "military strategy of active defense" is defensive in nature. According to Chen Zhou, a military officer at the PLA Military Science Academy who was involved in drafting the country's defense white papers, "The defensive nature of China's defense policy has not changed, regardless of the country's national strength and military power." Indeed, 2008 White Paper declares that China would "advocate the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means and oppose aggression, expansion and enlargement of military alliances." And, China would stick to the road of peaceful development, pursue an open-up strategy for mutual benefit, and promote the building of a harmonious world with enduring peace.

On the other hand, the scope and priority on which China's national security based have witnessed changes. In specific, with China's economic growth increasingly depends on oil and other resources in the Middle East and Africa, the security of the sea lane, from Arabian Sea to Pacific ocean, where more than 50% of energy import comes through, has emerged as a present challenge for China, particular for Chinese Navy (PLAN). Moreover, conventional and nonconventional security threat to the free navigation in international waters have driven Beijing to upgrade its capability to ensure its sea-route security. China has joined in multilateral compiongn against pivacy. As a result, the area in which China national security rests on, has broadened. However, if this is a indicator to conclude the Chinese have given up the defensiveness in its policy is too early to tell. To be sure, changing its security policy and posture by engaging in a "blue water" naval strategy that reflecting an ambitious global power projection plan, and by showing its stronger will to safeguard its territorial integrity would take risks to confront US, the global hegemony, let alone other neighboring countries. The risks are too high and too costly for China to afford. To date, Chinese leadership has taken

efforts, such as diversifing energy resourse, to cope with the "Malucca Dilemma".

Furthermore, a notion of "defusing tension and crisis escalation" has featured in Chinese security policy debates over the last years even though it has not appeared literally in the White Paper. The idea seeks essentially to prevent escalation of tensions and crises, especially in the areas that are vital for China's security. To reach that goal, defense capability, confidence building measures and diplomacy are all of tools to be used. Defense capability includes a robust/credible and deterrent/retaliation. The 2008 White Paper elaborates China's nuclear deterrence with an unprecedented length making China's strategic intention and operation more transparent. Confidence building consigns to exchange of port visits, joint military exercises, and so forth. And diplomacy stands for crisis management, institutional building of regional cooperative security.

Defensiveness in Chinese security policy

China's security environment and its capability to defense its sovereignty and integrity have significantly improved. Indeed, it is not facing any imminent threat of invasion across its long land border as it has resolved most of border disputes with its neighbors; with reconciliation across the Taiwan Straits, the possibility that the west Pacific becomes a flashpoint has been mitigated. However, China is still facing challenges to its security and the challenges, and the security environment has more complicated, as the White Paper states.

First, the core threat and security challenges are more internal rather than external. The new White Paper puts a list of threats/challenges that China is facing, the top three are all about the integrity of China as a sovereign state. The separatism in Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang are the present threat to China's national security. The problems have been there for six decades since the PRC was established. It is new that they are appearing on the top agenda for Chinese leadership.

Second, some claim that the “blue water navy” program has shown China’s aggressiveness and expansionism in its pursuit of security based on an assumption that navy is more offensive than army, and China has emphasized on navy buildup in last two decades. They plainly rule out the tradition in China’s security culture. China has not a strong Naval culture through its entire history. The increase of allocation to Navy and other military sectors are more a make-up than a strategically calculated plan. And the Navy buildup is driven by economic ambition rather than a expansionist agenda. In the history tells us, the naval powers which derived by economic intention are more sustainable and successful than those driven by expansionist ambition. As one says, while it is widely accepted that China has been strengthening its military capabilities, observers can hardly agree on Chinese intentions and what China has achieved. It is difficult to tell what is myth and what is reality. Generally speaking, those who narrowly focus on defense issues tend to be more alarmist while those who look at Chinese defense policy in a broader context are more sanguine about Chinese military modernization.

Third, China has consistently looked for cooperative security in the course of its rise. Take an example, the South China Sea issue, Beijing remains a key security issue to Southeast Asian nations. China’s soft approach has contributed to the quietness of the issue for over a decade. Bitzinger noted in 2007 that China had made “a concerted effort not to let the South China Sea issue become a major domestic political football and that it had not seized or occupied additional islands in the Spratlys since 1995. However, with China’s soft approach under increasing pressure, China’s legislature in December 2007 ratified plans for a new city administration called Sansha, with headquarters in Hainan Island to manage the three archipelagos of Paracel, Spratly and Macclessfield Bank. Nevertheless, a regional bloc against China on the issue may well harden the Chinese position and make the issue more complicated. ☼

International Workshop
for Peace and Disarmament in the Asia-Pacific Region
: for civilian control of the security sector

**Creating Civil Solidarity for
NWF Disarmament and
Prevention of Armed Conflict
in the Asia-Pacific Region**

Presenter 1

Civil society strategies for prevention of armed conflict in the Asia Pacific : setting the NE Asia campaigns in a global context

Colin Archer / IPB(International Peace Bureau)

Many thanks to PSPD for inviting me to this conference. It is only my second visit to Korea so I have much to learn of your country and indeed of this region. I have been asked to talk about campaigning and to set the anti-military struggles of this region in a global context. First let me tell you a little about my own background and that of my organisation the IPB.

Personal Background

I have been a peace and human rights activist in many different fields since the early 1970s. That was a good period to learn about politics! During my university studies I worked for a year in Latin America and the Caribbean, then directed a Third World Centre in northern England for several years, involving myself in projects in development education and North-South solidarity work. Later I taught in adult education for 10 years. I became especially active on nuclear issues in the UK during late 1980s, with the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and the Institute for Law and Peace, and this experience led on to being appointed Secretary-General of the International Peace Bureau in 1990. Since then I have been heavily involved in the work on nuclear disarmament, the Hague Appeal for

Peace (a major World Congress held in 1999), and the Global Campaign for Peace Education. All this work involves intensive global networking and a fair bit of travelling. But I have found time to write a couple of books, which form the basis for our **Disarmament for Development** campaign. These are *Warfare or Welfare?* and *Whose Priorities?* A guide for campaigners on military and social spending. I have copies available for those who may be interested.

International Peace Bureau

The IPB has a long and very interesting history. Here is the short version! It was opened back in 1892 at the request of national peace societies who felt the need for a coordination system and a bureau to organise their annual congresses. For most of its long life IPB has been run from Switzerland, though the conferences have been held in many parts of Europe and beyond. In the early years IPB concentrated mainly on promoting disarmament and arbitration, as well as other means of solving conflicts—including peace education. Later on, being a very broad movement, many other themes were tackled by IPB and its members. IPB received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1910, and in the pre-1914 period many of its leaders also became Nobel laureates in their own right. But the ‘golden age’ of IPB was over already by the 1st World War. Frequently encountering financial difficulties, the Secretariat was isolated. It had to face a very challenging period with the two World Wars and the rise of fascism. The Secretariat moved to Geneva in 1924. Although IPB had encouraged the creation of a League of Nations, the result proved disappointing. IPB was overshadowed by the League and its supporters, and by the creation of other peace organizations.

After World War II, IPB went through a major restructuring. It was re-established with a new office in 1964. It launched a project on UN peacekeeping operations; opposed the Vietnam War; and prepared a major report to the UN on conscientious objection. Subsequently, the number of member organizations increased and IPB became engaged in the challenges of the Cold War: nuclear disarmament, and East-West dialogue, especially at the UN level. Since 1990 the IPB has had to

adjust to many challenges. Peace movements have worked to re-position themselves in relation to the end of the Cold War, the intensification of economic globalisation, and the War on Terrorism. IPB members have responded in diverse ways to regional and civil wars - notably in the Middle East, the Balkans, and various parts of Asia and Africa. They have contributed to the transformation of the disarmament field via new campaigns against landmines/cluster munitions, and small arms/arms trade. And they have joined hands with progressive movements in opposing US military bases, building support for the International Criminal Court, banning the use of child soldiers, and supporting human rights. All this during the most intense period of technological change.

Nuclear weapons remain a major threat to world security, and they have been at the centre of IPB's work since at least 1985. Our main programmes have included the World Court Project, the international Test Ban campaign, the Abolition 2000 network, and support for the movements of mayors, parliamentarians and other professionals, most of which are focussed on achieving the goal of a Nuclear Weapons Convention.

Disarmament for Development and Military Spending

Soon after 9-11, IPB launched a new project on human security, through which we aimed to amplify the voices of dissent against the Bush-led national-security doctrine and the new rounds of warmaking. This project then led on to a major long-term programme, entitled **Disarmament for Development**. This focuses on three main areas of work:

1. The struggle to reduce spending on the military sector in favour of increased investment in sustainable development - including climate change mitigation and adaptation.
2. Efforts to demonstrate, and to lessen, the effects of weapons of many types on poor communities, esp. in conflict zones. In this work we

co-operate with a range of coalitions working to abolish or limit different weapons systems.

3. A set of additional issues, such as the militarisation of aid, the spread of military bases, gender perspectives, and above all, the new justifications for militarism that flow from intensified resource competition in a multi-polar world.

Civil society leaders frequently express concern on the issue of military expenditure and the need to transfer these resources to social spending. However, for several reasons it is hard to tackle. The biggest difficulty is that there are no binding treaties on military expenditure as there are in other areas of disarmament. UN General Assembly resolutions have no legal power here, because military spending is decided at the national level of political decision making. For this reason IPB is keen to encourage the building of national coalitions and campaigns. In addition, we believe it is vital to engage in broad public education on this issue, since so much of this data is either secret or inaccessible to the media or the public.

The focus of lobbying efforts and pressure group work is normally on parliamentarians and the political parties who set the agendas and approve policies. Despite the growth of personality-driven politics, positions relating to fundamental issues such as national security and the disposition of the armed forces are usually the subject of firmly established party positions. It must be said that there is often a bi-party or multi-party consensus on matters relating to 'national security', which means that critical views have to be channelled through minor political figures or media outlets outside the mainstream. But the situation is now changing. What is interesting is that as a result of the economic crisis, several Western governments are reducing their military budgets for the first time in 15 years or more. All the more reason to push for the re-allocation of this money to sustainable development programmes.

On 12th April 2011 a **Global Day of Action on Military Spending** will be held to coincide with the release of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's

annual statistics on military expenditures. On this day, coordinated by IPB and the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington, people all over the world will join together in actions to focus public, political, and media attention on the costs of military spending and the need for new priorities. Such events will help us to build the international network around this issue. I encourage all of you to join in this coordinated action, which we hope will give a new visibility to the need to reverse the pattern of over-investment in militarism and instead fund social and ecological needs.

Campaigning Examples

Here are a couple of examples of successful campaigning in our field. This material comes from the second 'D for D' book: *Whose Priorities?* which showcases 18 different projects and campaigns from various regions, all related to military spending, arms trade and similar issues.

1. Guatemala

The Guatemalan Peace Accords of 1996 recommended a 33% reduction of military personnel and a military budget which should not exceed 0.67% of GDP, a level which was achieved in 2000. The UN mission to Guatemala, however, found out that, because of budget manipulations, no real reduction of the armed forces, nor of the military budget had taken place. From 2002 onward, the challenge of promoting the implementation and follow-up of the peace accords was taken by civil society and in particular by the human rights organization Grupo de Apoyo Mutuo (GAM) and Centro Internacional para la Investigacion en Derechos Humanos (CIIDH). With support from UNDP, a project was set up to monitor and analyze the defense spending in Guatemala with the aim of questioning the implementation of the peace accords in this aspect and to promote a re-orientation of the nation's budget in favor of social development. The project was made viable by the availability of a web-based access to the national budget launched by the Ministry of Finance and by

the involvement of journalists, local media and critical members of the Congress.

The project to monitor defense spending has revealed important information on how questionable transfers took place. The findings from the analysis were used in Congress to demand explanations from the Minister of Defense. Finally, the press made the analysis available to the broader public. In 2005 the monitoring team admitted that the Ministry of Defense had become aware of its obligation to inform the population and that the national budget was definitely on the correct course as social budgets were on the increase while the military budget was being reduced. The Guatemalan case clearly illustrates how civil society organizations, using new democratic and transparent mechanisms, can be powerful actors, especially in alliance with elected officials and investigative journalists. <http://www.gam.org.gt/>

2. Belgium

Netwerk Vlaanderen, a Belgian NGO for sustainable investments, shows the financial world what its responsibilities are. Banks work with our money. They invest that money in various companies, including companies in the military sector. We demand that banks are open about which companies they finance, and we oppose their investments in the arms industry. The campaign 'My money. Clear Conscience?' has led to substantial changes in the investment policy of banks, and to groundbreaking legislation against investments in arms. The campaign model has been taken on in other European countries too. Netwerk Vlaanderen regularly publishes a report revealing the financial links between banks and arms producers. The research is based on financial databases and developed in cooperation with a specialised research bureau in the Netherlands. These reports provoke a strong reaction in the press and amongst clients, as they are mostly unaware of what banks do with their money. This in turn puts pressure on the banks to change their investment policy. The information about the investments is made public through documentaries, debates, press conferences, websites, newsletters, and actions at bank branches. We developed a wide range of creative action methods and imagery, ranging from ad-busting through petitions, street theatre, art projects and critical questions at Annual General Meetings of the banks -- to setting up a fake

bank which is honest and open about investments in the arms industry and broadcasting television ads about controversial investments. Network also goes into direct discussion with the management and talks to interested politicians about legislation against investments in the arms industry. Towards bank clients, we offer a critical analysis of all financial products which are marketed as 'sustainable', pointing out which funds effectively stay out of the arms industry.

Some financial institutions have, under the pressure of campaigns and new legislation, severed their investment relationships concerning weapons producers. The extent to which they exclude arms producers differs greatly, but the general trend is the realisation this topic can no longer be avoided. It is not just banks, but also institutional investors, who are facing up to their responsibility. After a revealing documentary about their investments, several Dutch pension funds have decided to no longer invest in cluster munitions producers. The Norwegian Government Pension Fund also excludes these weapons producers.

<http://www.netwerkvlaanderen.be/en/>

Campaigning Methods

In the final section I would like to offer some thoughts about campaigning methods. I am very conscious that civil society movements in Asia have a rather different history from those in Europe or North America; in particular since they often grow out of the soil of nationalist/anti-colonial struggles and in many cases reflect very recent campaigns for basic rights: the right to organise, to demonstrate or even to vote in elections. There is a tradition of large-scale mass mobilisation in this region that for various reasons is being lost in the West. Having said that, many of our campaigning contexts are similar: we all have to find ways to engage with the mass media and use the internet effectively; we all need to build political alliances and lobby politicians; we all need to do basic education and outreach with the general public.

The section that follows is quoted directly from the work of Chris Rose, a former Greenpeace campaigner, who has done a lot of thinking about How to Win Campaigns, which is fact the title of his book.

(<http://www.campaignstrategy.org/index.php>.)

I have put his basic ideas into 7 concepts, many of which may be obvious but together they make up a coherent approach.

1. **Campaigning** lowers the barriers against action and increases the incentives to take action until the battle is won. **Education**, in contrast, is a broadening exercise. It uses examples to reveal layers of complexity, leading to lower certainty but higher understanding. Campaigning maximises the motivation of the audience, not their knowledge. Try using education to campaign, and you will end up circling and exploring your issue but not changing it. Of course all campaigns have some 'educational' effect but it is mainly education by doing, through experience, not through being given information. Moreover, information is not power until it leads to mobilisation. If information truly were power, the world would be run by librarians!
2. **Analyse the forces** : You know what you are concerned about. You know what needs to change. So you ask: 'why hasn't it happened already?' Try mapping out the forces for and against what you want to happen. Draw a map of the problem - the people involved, the organisations, the institutions - and work out exactly what the mechanisms are for the decisions you want to change. From this, identify potential allies and opponents. From that, work out who your target audience is for each step. Look at it from their point of view. Check - how will you now change the balance of forces for and against action in order to overcome the obstacle? If you don't know the answer to this, how can you specify an objective to be achieved?
3. **Right components... right order.** The campaign involves a deliberate series of revelations or communication exercises to take the 'audience' from ignorance, through interest and then awareness, into anger and engagement, and finally into

a state of satisfaction or reward. If that happens, the campaign participants or supporters will be ready for more. Take the Greenpeace occupation of the Brent Spar oil installation²⁾. A struggle between activists and Shell went on over months and was covered daily by television, radio and the press. The drama, which was only resolved hours from the intended sinking, was simple - would it be sunk or not? Showing a problem may lead to concern, but in itself that won't lead to action. Show concerned people that there is a solution and they can become angry. Show them that now is the opportunity to force a change, to implement the solution, and give them a way to act - and you have the conditions for engagement. Campaigns are not about knowing something - such as knowing a solution, they are about involving people in changing events so that solution becomes attainable.

4. **Complexity** de-motivates, it makes people feel confused - and if they feel confused, they will think you are confused, and not worth listening to. This doesn't mean over simplifying. Your campaign has to be like a red thread, the important line that runs through a complex picture, text or process. It cannot be the 'whole picture'. Communicate your campaign - what you think, the problem / solution / opportunity as you see it - and only that.

5. **Events** are the stuff of politics - whether formal politics, business politics, or personal politics. News is not about ideas or concepts, it is about things that happen. Ask yourself every day, what is this campaign doing? What's the verb? Is it starting something, publishing, blocking, rescuing, occupying, marching, lobbying, painting News connects with politics through events. Events are also the things that change our views. Sometimes campaigns achieve a decisive instant where society, or someone in it, struggles with a choice between two opposing options, and chooses the new one. When one talks of 'forcing an issue to a head' or when people say 'I remember the first time I realised that ...', this is what they are talking about. A campaign is about forcing a change to the status quo. Conflict is therefore built into it, indeed it almost defines campaigning.

2) FYI http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brent_Spar

6. **Pictures** : Why? Because pictures are far more powerful than words. Good ones tell the story and the best need no caption. Pictures cannot be interrogated or argued with. Your campaign can communicate emotions with pictures that will be filtered out of a written report. TV needs people doing things that tell the story, and preferably in a few seconds. Think of opera not theatre. Make your campaign speak in characters and symbols that are larger-than-life. The only things stronger than images are face to face contact and direct engagement in doing the campaign. I hear and I forget. I see and I remember. I do and I understand - said Confucius.

7. **Communication** : Communication occurs when your ideas get into the head of someone else and it is understood - not just when your message is sent, not even just when it arrives at 'their end'. Useful communication occurs when their ideas also get into your head. Many campaigns fail because they are communicating only with their existing supporters, and not with the audiences who can bring about change. Others fail because campaigners are more concerned with getting 'coverage' than they are in looking for signs of the effect of the campaign. Remember that your ears are as important as your mouth is.

Well...I have found this approach very helpful. Is it applicable in your contexts ? That is for us to discuss. I hope this talk has been of interest, and I look forward to hearing about your struggles and campaigns. We have much to share together. And there is much at stake. ✨

■ Global Day of Action on Military Spending

GLOBAL DAY OF ACTION ON MILITARY SPENDING :



JUNE 2011

Washington DC/Geneva, 8th November 2010

Dear colleagues,

Advance notice: GLOBAL DAY OF ACTION ON MILITARY SPENDING: APRIL 2011

In 2009, global military spending surged to an all-time high of US \$1.53 trillion. Given the numerous crises facing the planet -- economic, environmental, health, diplomatic -- we must create a global movement to shift this money to human needs. Thousands of organizations and millions of individuals support this point of view. Because of the global economic crisis, governments are even beginning to talk about cutting military spending. But they won't make these cuts unless we pressure them to do so. We need to begin a serious mobilizing effort on a global scale to make visible our demands to feed people not the military-industrial complex.

As part of this campaign, we propose a Global Day of Action on Military Spending for 12th April 2011 (NOTE NEW DATE) to coincide with the release of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's annual report, which will

include new figures on military expenditures. On this day, people all over the world will join together in actions to focus public, political, and media attention on the costs of military spending and the need for new priorities. Such events will help us to build the international network around this issue.

While each location will craft its own approach, we hope there will be a common focus on calling attention to the overall size of global military spending. This would need in most cases to be linked to a related national (or local) issue, such as the Afghanistan war/arms trade deals/work against small arms/resources for nonviolent conflict resolution/Article 9 campaign etc. We very much hope that peace groups will use this as an opportunity to connect up with anti-poverty, environmental, pro-democracy organizations and others who share our perspective.

As for types of actions: a whole range is possible -- from street theatre/demonstrations and erecting banners to seminars, signature collection and much more. Many slogans come to mind: What Would You Do With \$1.5 Trillion? \$1.5 Trillion Is Insane! Trillions for War or Trillions for Peace? etc. We plan to issue a Toolkit before long to assist organizers. A key aspect is the visual side. By generating some captivating images, we plan to attract widespread media coverage and make available photos of our rallies and events. We will compile an album of pictures from around the world and post them online to document the global movement and to use to accompany stories about the SIPRI report and our own actions.

We hope you agree that this is an exciting and important project. As a leader in peace activism, we would like you/your organization to join us by (co-)sponsoring an event in your city. We will work with you to identify other people in your area to collaborate with.

You will see below a list of organisations who have already committed to organising some kind of action. What we now need is to extend this list much further, in order to inspire us all to go forward with the planning. We are keen to

show that this issue is indeed a worldwide one, requiring creativity and commitment.

Please write to us if you are interested in participating. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact us.

We look forward to hearing from you, please reply to both emails.

Sincerely,

John Feffer / Institute for Policy Studies Washington, DC / johnfeffer@gmail.com / <http://www.ips-dc.org/>

Colin Archer / International Peace Bureau Geneva / secgen@ipb.org / <http://www.ipb.org>

✱ PARTICIPATING ORGANISATIONS: (INITIAL LISTING)

INTERNATIONAL

Global Action to Prevent War
Global Network Against Weapons & Nuclear
Power in Space
International Network of Engineers and Scientists
for Global Responsibility
International Peace Bureau
Pax Christi International
Peace Boat/Global Article 9 Campaign
Religions for Peace
War Resisters International

SPAIN
Fundacio per la Pau

USA
Bay Area:
Fellowship of Reconciliation
Code Pink

Boston:
Resist Africom

GREECE

European Bureau for Conscientious Objection

Honolulu:
American Friends Service Committee

INDIA

All India Peace & Solidarity Organisation,
Maharashtra State Committee, Nagpur

Maine:
Bring Our War \$\$ Home campaign

IRELAND

Peace and Neutrality Alliance PANA

New York
Arms and Security Initiative, New America
Foundation

PHILIPPINES

Stop the War Coalition

Washington DC:
Institute for Policy Studies

SOUTH KOREA

People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy
Peace Network

Western Mass.:
National Priorities Project

Presenter 2

Strategy for a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone as a step to "Common Security"

Ichiro Yuasa / Peace Depot

1. Cold-War structure still exists in Northeast Asia

There are many countries in Northeast Asia whose military expenditure is relatively large. China, Japan, and South Korea (ROK) are one of such examples. A large number of U.S. military bases are also concentrated in Japan and ROK. In addition, it is considered that DPRK spends as much as 30% of its annual budget for the military. Northeast Asia is, therefore, one of the regions where large financial resources are wasted as military expenses. A historical background of this situation is that Northeast Asia is the only region in the world where the cold war structure still exists. Even 20 years after the end of cold war, the Korean War, which broke out in 1950, has never ended. The military demarcation line of 38 degrees north managed under the armistice pact symbolizes this situation. As a result, the structure of a vicious circle - "security dilemma" - is still maintained in Northeast Asia, and military tension has not ceased to exist.

The ROK patrol combat corvette (PCC) Cheonan sank near the NLL (Northern Limit Line) in the West Sea on March 26, 2010. This incident most signifies continuing military tension in Northeast Asia. The final report by the Joint Civilian-Military Investigation Group (JIG) released on May 20, 2010 concluded

that the PCC was sunk because of a non-contact explosion caused by a DPRK torpedo presumably fired by its submarine. Afterwards, the U.S. and ROK are repeating large-scale joint military exercises in the Sea of Japan and Yellow Sea. At the time of the accident; however, the ROK and the U.S. forces were jointly conducting their annual military exercise, Foal Eagle. Moreover, ROK's refusal to disclose all the basic information such as Cheonan's wake record and communication record has made many of us still suspicious of the explanation offered by the ROK government. I would like to stress here that this incident occurred, whatever its true cause is, against the background under which the Korean War has not ended, and military confrontation centered on the military demarcation line has continued.

This "security dilemma" is partly led by a strong belief that the military force can secure peace. Needless to say, the U.S. military is the most notable representation of this belief. The U.S. military maintains more than 700 military bases in the world, and deploys about 200,000 soldiers overseas. Five countries (Japan, ROK, Germany, Italy, and UK) are now playing a major part by offering large bases. More than 90 percent of the U.S. overseas bases are concentrated in these countries. Eighty thousands U.S. soldiers are now stationing in Japan and ROK. The presence has put great pressure on DPRK, which indulged in military brinkmanship such as a test launching of Taep'o-dong missiles and nuclear explosion tests in 2006 and 2009. This in turn gives Japan pretext for the buildup of a more intense missile defense system and search for the use of right to collective defense.

Under the context of increasingly globalized economy, the realignment of the U.S. military is ongoing to sustain it as a global force whose main mission is to respond to threats and defend American national interests in any region of the world. This move is often called a "Lily Pad Strategy." Flexibility and mobility are its leading principles. Just imagine a frog hopping around lily pads freely and promptly, and moving to any place of a pond. U.S. bases in ROK and Japan are regarded as main operating bases with substantial infrastructure set in place. The relocation of U.S. Marine Corps units to Guam and the relocation of Futenma air

station to Nago are a major requirement for the global realignment of the U.S. military.

In addition, China's military expenditure grows about 15% per year on average for past 20 years. Especially, the reinforcement of its sea power is remarkable, and China has strengthened an "anti-access strategy" in the East China Sea and the South China Sea. The U.S. military has countered this move by doubling the number of minesweepers deployed in a naval base at Sasebo and ordering more frequent patrols of its attack nuclear submarines around Okinawa.

All of this shows a "security dilemma." The nuclear development of DPRK continues, the US-Japan-ROK military bond becomes tighter, and China and Russia do not stop the modernization of their military forces. This is a vicious circle under which mutual mistrust generates regional nuclear arms race. This scenario gives us no other choice anything but a never-ending military tension. We cannot even imagine a road to the reduction of military expenditure unless we overcome this structure.

2. Road to "Common Security"

It is time to shape our own "common security," a comprehensive framework of multilateral dialogue and cooperation to help us overcome this "security dilemma" which only encourages reprisal.

It is by the Palme Committee (Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues) in 1982 that the concept of "common security" was introduced. Its assumption is that all the countries are guaranteed the right to security, for which "common security" must be formed through multilateral dialogues. Its main principles are as followed.

- The military force is not a right tool to solve disputes among nations.

- When a policy of a country is announced, self-control must be imposed.
- Security cannot be achieved by military supremacy.
- Arms reduction in both quantitative and qualitative sense is necessary for common security.

This idea opened a path to the end of cold war. The Berlin Wall was struck down and the EU was formed. It also gave birth to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 1995. To our regret, we have not seen anything like this in Northeast Asia. On our part, we had to reconsider the rationale for U.S.-Japan Security Pact and the Japan's Self-Defense Forces since both of them had been formed to deal with the cold war. However, the Japanese government distracted our attention from this fundamental question by capitalizing on shockwaves made by the U.S.-led Gulf War to punish Iraq that had invaded Kuwait in August 1990. Helping the U.S. wage war on Iraq was wrongly alleged as an "international contribution" for which overseas deployment of the Self-Defense Forces was justified. To make things worse, both U.S. and Japanese governments redefined the Security Pact in the mid-90s to turn it into a "global alliance."

It is now time to make efforts to shape our "common security" through multilateral dialogue and cooperation in Northeast Asia. The fact can be a starting point that the history of Japanese pacifism for past 65 years after the WWII has raised Japan's international reputation. This helps Japan advance its diplomacy on the basis of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. The Japanese government can and should declare a demilitarized diplomatic policy under the cooperation with international organizations such as the United Nations. This is a large task that Japan's civil society must take on.

Next, I would like to explain a model Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (NEA-NWFZ) with a verification system. This can be a step to "common security" in this region.

3. Issues over denuclearization in Northeast Asia

In the beginning of the 1990s, the end of Cold War offered a great opportunity to change the existing military configuration and nuclear strategy in Northeast Asia. Against this background, the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula was released on February 20, 1992. This epoch-making declaration commits both countries not to test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons. Although this is not regarded as one of NWFZs, it was de facto fourth NWFZ in the world. However, we have seen only a little progress since then. A verification system has not been established, and a protocol for the negative security assurance by surrounding nuclear weapon states (China, Russia, and U.S.) has not been negotiated. Only two years after the declaration, the US-DPRK relations became extremely critical. It is really regrettable that there are almost no actors in this region to iron out the practical details to achieve the spirit of the declaration.

Twists and turns have continued for 20 years afterwards. In order to denuclearize DPRK, Six-party talks started in 2003 and reached a joint statement in September 2005, which is really valuable. However, the U.S. and DPRK no sooner come close to the solution of the problem than put emphasis on the difference of their respective recognition when they reach the final phase of the negotiation. We have not yet found a path to the solution.

The collapse of financial institutions in the U.S. led to the economic slump on the world scale in 2009, and hunger and poverty became pressing problems. It was under such situation that American constituents gave birth to a new administration. President Obama's speech in Prague in April 2009, and a resolution calling for a "world without nuclear weapons" adopted in a world summit for nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation held for the first time by the U.N. Security Council has created a very strong political momentum toward the abolition of nuclear weapons. Also in Japan, an administration that advocated the creation of an "East Asian Community" came into power. The then Prime Minister Hatoyama said

in the UNSC summit in September 2009, "the creation of a nuclear weapon-free zone, when coordinated between the five nuclear-weapon States (P5) and non-nuclear-weapon States in the region, would also contribute to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and consequently to global and regional peace and security as stated in today's resolution." Though this remark is still too general, it is significant that the head of Japanese government emphasized a case for NWFZ in such an international forum. We must seize this opportunity to facilitate the move towards a NEA-NWFZ and thus contribute to global nuclear abolition.

4. Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NEA-NWFZ)

The NWFZ is a system of international law that aims to create the situation under which nuclear weapons are excluded in a geographic zone. There are two requirements. The first is that nations in the zone are prohibited to develop, manufacture, and deploy nuclear weapons. The merit of such an arrangement is that it can be based on existing policies that three countries in Northeast Asia - Japan, ROK and DPRK - have already advocated. "Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula" in 1992 is still effective, which was confirmed in a recent Six-party Talk meeting. Japan has the "Three Non-nuclear Principles," which commit Japan not to manufacture, possess, or allow the introduction of nuclear weapons. Also, Japan's Atomic Energy Basic Law in 1955 prohibits the use of nuclear energy for military purposes. The new administration in Japan that emerged in September 2009 has sworn to preserve the non-nuclear principles and conducted an investigation on secret agreements between Japan and the U.S. concerning the introduction of nuclear weapons. The first requirement would be met if these policies are followed.

Another requirement is Negative Security Assurance (NSA), which is a guarantee given by surrounding nuclear weapon states not to attack (or threaten to attack) non-nuclear states by nuclear weapons. In the context of a NEA-NWFZ, it is necessary that China, Russia, and the U.S. (though its soil is located far from Northeast Asia region) provide NSA. When these two requirements are met, the

NWFZ can be established. Citizens are assured to live under "non-nuclear umbrella," not under "nuclear umbrella."

Even though the governments have never proposed a concrete plan regarding this initiative, non-governmental organizations have made various proposals. In 1995, Dr. Hiromichi Umebayashi (special advisor to Peace Depot) proposed a NEA-NWFZ with "three-plus-three" configuration. The first three is non-nuclear weapon states (Japan, the ROK, and DPRK), while the last three is nuclear weapon states (China, Russia, and the U.S.). A model treaty was also introduced in 2004 through joint works with Korean NGOs, notably Peace Network. Nuclear weapons states are included in this three-plus-three framework from the outset. Thus, this model is considered to be most realistic, given the current political situation in this region. It is no coincidence that these six nations are also participants of the Six Party Talks on the denuclearization of DPRK. For instance, the Japan and ROK government can put the "three-plus-three" proposal on the table of the fifth working group of six-party talks as an agenda.

Japan and the ROK have thus far maintained their military alliance with the U.S. and depended on U.S. nuclear umbrella by capitalizing on DPRK's alleged nuclear possession and military tension in Northeast Asia. However, at the time when five nuclear weapon states (P5) have begun to declare their intention to aim at a "world without nuclear weapons," the non-nuclear weapon states that actually depend on nuclear weapons for their security (Japan and the ROK) should strengthen this momentum by materializing security policy without nuclear weapons. The establishment of a NEA-NWFZ is the most adequate answer to this question. Only through this, we can make a radical step towards the global abolition of nuclear weapons. Japan's new administration led by the Democratic Party has advocated a diplomatic policy one of the cores of which is the creation of an East Asian Community. Thus it is very logical to propose a NEA-NWFZ plan as a way to step out from the U.S. nuclear umbrella.

DPRK carried out nuclear tests twice in 2006 and 2009, and has declared a de facto nuclear possession to defend its political regime. Therefore, it is reasonable to

predict that the country will stick to nuclear possession until the last minute. However, nobody has confirmed that DPRK has already acquired the technology to deploy nuclear warheads as a working weapon. Six-party talks will resume sometime in the future, but DPRK will understandably consider it is unfair that only the country is asked to abandon its nuclear arsenal while nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states which depend on nuclear umbrella (Japan and ROK) stick to nuclear weapons. Japan and the ROK should propose a NEA-NWFZ to overcome this mutual mistrust and make DPRK feel like dismantling its nuclear arsenal at ease. If a NEA-NWFZ is established, DPRK does not need to rely on nuclear weapons. I would like to note the following remark made by a North Korean official at the first committee of the U.N. General Assembly on October 12, 2009: "The DPRK is of the position to replace the present unstable armistice status with durable peace arrangement on the Korean peninsula, liquidate the remnants of the Cold War, the last of its kind in the world, and eventually denuclearize the whole Korean peninsula."

So far, there have been five NWFZs established in the world. Especially, almost all of the land in the Southern Hemisphere is covered with NWFZs. The number of nuclear weapons on the earth is still exceeding 23,000. However, citizens living in the Southern Hemisphere are liberated from the threat of nuclear weapons. The Central Asia NWFZ treaty was signed in September 2006 and entered into force in 2009. Next, Northeast Asia should follow this path.

5. International cooperation among Parliamentarians, Mayors and Citizens

In order to achieve a NWFZ, a stronger public opinion to take initiatives toward a "Common Security" to overcome a security dilemma is needed. Such public sentiment would influence on the governments of concerned nations. Thus, the first thing to do for the civil society is to stir up the public opinion among the parliamentarians, political parties, mayors and citizens of each nation.

First, it is vital to build a wider support among parliamentarians, who could directly influence their government. In August 2008, the Disarmament Study Group of the Democratic Party of Japan released a draft NEA-NWFZ Treaty. Such initiatives should be bipartisan, and establishing a Japan-ROK parliamentary network is also crucial. In November 2009, MP Hideo Hiraoka (Democratic Party of Japan) visited Seoul and meet ROK parliamentarians from various parties. It was not only the first meeting of the parliamentarians of two nations on a particular theme of NEA-NWFZ, but also the first conference organized by the PNND (Parliamentarians for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament) Korea. Bipartisan parliamentarians of four parties including the ruling Grand National Party participated.

I was impressed by the following remarks by one parliamentarian of Grand National Party: "I have had preconceptions that the nuclear issue was one of the left-wing people's concerns. However, the situation has been changed now due to the coming into power of Obama administration and then, the Democratic Party of Japan. DPRK would not give up their nuclear arsenals if other nations rely solely on tough measures. I have been insisting at every opportunity that the approach toward DPRK should involve more flexible measures such as a humanitarian aid."

In February 2010, four ROK parliamentarians visited Tokyo to participate in an international conference on a NEA-NWFZ. Their Japanese counterpart and NGOs were also attended the conference. This conference was co-organized by PNND Japan and PNND Korea. It was confirmed that such cooperation would continue in the future.

The issues of disarmament and security are closely related to the lives of people living in local communities. Therefore, it is also vital to gain a support from local authorities who are obliged to protect their residents' lives and safety. In Japan, 1510 out of 1831 local authorities have declared its nuclear-free status. One of the major objectives of National Council of Japan Nuclear Free Local Authorities

(JNFLA), a network of 260 local authorities, has been a promotion of the NEA-NWFZ initiative. Resolutions to call for an establishment of a NEA-NWFZ have been repeatedly adopted by its General Assembly and submitted to the Government of Japan, the UN Secretary-General, heads of the P5 and so on.

On May 6, 2010, six Japanese and Korean NGOs jointly held a workshop entitled “A Northeast Asia NWFZ Can Boost a ‘World without Nuclear Weapons’ —Joint Call by Parliamentarians, Mayors and Citizens” as a side event of the NPT Review Conference in New York. The co-sponsoring organizations other than Peace Depot Japan are Peace Boat (Japan), SAY-Peace Project (Japan), Peace Network (ROK), People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (ROK), and Nautilus ARI (ROK). One of the highlights of this workshop was appeals by mayors as the delegation of JNFLA.

In the workshop, the idea to utilize sister cities relationship was proposed as part of grassroots diplomacy by local authorities to promote the idea of a NEA-NWFZ. As of today, 129 local authorities in Japan have entered a sister city agreement with ROK local authorities. In order to take advantages of such cooperative relationships, the first step could be a joint declaration by mayors in Japan and ROK which calls for the promotion of a NEA-NWFZ. I would also like to propose to hold an international conference with a view to strengthen cooperation among local authorities of two countries next year. The city of Daegu in South Korea, which is a sister city of Hiroshima, could be a venue.

It’s been more than 10 years since we, Peace Depot, proposed an idea of NEA-NWFZ. Since then, we organized successfully many workshops and symposiums in Seoul, Tokyo, Shanghai, New York, and Geneva, with cooperation of a number of Japanese and Korean NGOs. In 2004, we released a Model NEA-NWFZ Treaty drafted by activists and scholars of both countries. We believe these efforts have successfully nurtured a common understanding in civil societies both in Japan and ROK about the significance of a NEA-NWFZ. Nevertheless, in order to move a step forward towards the establishment of a NEA-NWFZ, either of the two countries, hopefully Japan, must build its political will to achieve the goal

and put the issue onto the table of a diplomatic negotiation. In March 2009, Peace Depot and Peace Boat from Japan, and Peace Network and People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy from ROK had launched a campaign calling for endorsements to the “Statement of Support for a NEA-NWFZ”. This campaign aims at expressing the worldwide civil society’s common will to support an establishment of a NEA-NWFZ. Please see the list of the endorsements including individuals and groups from various arenas who we believe to have a great influence on this issue.

Among the endorsers, you will find names such as Douglas Roche, Former Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament; Tadatoshi Akiba, Mayor of Hiroshima; Tomihisa Taue, Mayor of Nagasaki. Organizational endorsers include IPB (International Peace Bureau), Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (UK), NIHONHIDANKYO, Mayors for peace, and JNFLA.

In addition, it is also important to obtain support from China to a NEA-NWFZ. China has affirmed the negative security assurance and has enormous influence on North Korea

It is now vitally important to construct a multi-layered cooperation in various areas between Japan and ROK. There are five existing NWFZs in the world; however, none of them was established easily. It took as short as nine years from the time a government introduced the idea of NWFZ until the resolution to support it was adopted by the United Nations. In case of the African NWFZ Treaty, it took indeed as long as 35 years. Countries in a region almost surely have some difficult problems originated in their history. Existing NWFZ treaties would not have been established without tenacious efforts to continue dialogue among concerned nations to resolve such problems one by one, and to cultivate the soil of mutual cooperation. In this context, both Japanese and South Korean governments are now requested to declare their willingness to pursue a NEA-NWFZ Treaty publicly at the earliest possible date. In the NPT Review Conference 2010, the Japanese delegation never touched upon the issue of NEA-NWFZ, even though the government has expressed an eagerness to fulfill its responsibilities as the

atomic-bombed nation. It is necessary to enhance our efforts to gain more public support and to appeal to our governments.

The formation of a NEA-NWFZ will be a significant initial step to establish a non-military security in Northeast Asia. Through the multilateral treaty talks, confidence among concerned nations will be built. It could also be an opportunity to pave the way to an agreement of no attack and renunciation of war. This is indeed a process toward a "Common security" in the region and I strongly believe that the cooperation of citizens in the Asia-Pacific area to this end would contribute greatly to reduce the military expense. Thank you. ☀

■ Statement of Support for a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone

We, the undersigned, express our support for the efforts to establish a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in Northeast Asia (NEA-NWFZ). We believe it is an urgent and timely initiative both for strengthening the global tide toward a Nuclear Weapon Free World and for achieving regional stability and peace in Northeast Asia.

Setting the goal of achieving a NEA-NWFZ will create a new positive dimension in the on-going Six Party Talks among the Republic of Korea (ROK), Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK), Japan, China, Russia and the United States, by incorporating its goal of "verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula" (Six-nation Statement, 19 September 2005) within the broader regional vision.

Achieving a world free of nuclear weapons is an obligation not only of nuclear armed nations but of all nations, especially those whose security policy relies on a so-called nuclear umbrella. In this regards, all nations have the responsibility to find a path toward a security polity without nuclear weapons. A NEA-NWFZ will provide such a path for relevant nations in the region, including Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK).

A realistic scheme for a NEA-NWFZ would be a 3+3 arrangement, in which the ROK, the DPRK and Japan would form the central parties of the zone and the neighboring nuclear weapon states (China, Russia and the US) would support it through the provision of security assurances, as this would build upon the 1992 Inter-Korean Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of Korean Peninsula and Japan's Three Non-Nuclear Principles.

We call upon political leaders, both national and local, citizen groups, and individuals throughout the world, to express their support for a NEA NWFZ and to work together to realize it.

✱ Endorser Organizations include (as of September 20, 2010):

Japan:

Gensuikin (Japan Congress Against A- and H-Bombs)
 Gensuikyo (Japan Council Against A- and H-Bombs)
 Hiroshima Alliance for Nuclear Weapons Abolition
 Nagasaki Global Citizens' Assembly for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons Executive committee
 National Council of Japan Nuclear Free Local Authorities
 Nihon Hidankyo (Japan Confederation of A- and H-Bomb Sufferers Organizations)
 Peace Boat
 Peace Depot, Inc
 Physicians Against Nuclear War

Overseas (including International):

Blue Banner (Mongolia)
 Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (UK)
 Chinese People's Association for Peace and Disarmament
 Disarmament and Security Centre (New Zealand)
 Global Network Against Weapons & Nuclear Power in Space
 International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation
 International Peace Bureau
 Mayors for peace
 Nautilus ARI (ROK)
 Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (USA)
 Peace Action (USA)
 Peace Network (ROK)
 People for Nuclear Disarmament, Western Australia
 People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (ROK)
 PND NSW Nuclear Flashpoints Project (Australia)
 Hon. Tomoko Abe, Member of the House of Representatives (Japan)
 Tadatashi Akiba, Mayor of Hiroshima (Japan)
 John Burroughs, Executive Director, Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy
 Prof. Hyunback Chung, Sungkyunkwan University (ROK)
 Dr Kate Dewes, Disarmament and Security Centre, Christchurch (NZ)
 Prof. Seiji Endo, President, Japan Association of Peace Studies
 Hon. Kenzo Fujisue, Member of the House of Councilors (Japan)
 Commander Robert Green, RN (Ret'd)
 Xanthe Hall, IPPNW (Germany)
 Hon. Hideo Hiraoka, Member of the House of Representatives (Japan)
 Wade L. Huntley, Director, Simons Centre for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Research
 Hon. Satoshi Inoue, Member of the House of Councilors (Japan)
 Hon. Tadashi Inuzuka, Member of the House of Councilors (Japan)
 Prof. Katsuko Kataoka, Secretary General, JPPNW
 Hon. Shoichi Kondo, Member of the House of Representatives (Japan)
 David Krieger, President, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation
 Prof. Kaneko Kumao, Former director of the Nuclear Energy Division of the Foreign Ministry of Japan
 Mikyung Lee, Member of the South Korean National Assembly (ROK)
 Suktae Lee, Former President of the Lawyers for a Democratic Society (ROK)
 John Loretz, Program Director, IPPNW
 Greg Mello, Los Alamos Study Group
 Dr. Zia Man, Princeton University
 Prof. Kazumi Mizumoto, Hiroshima Peace Institute
 Dr. Dovchin Myagmar, Director, Blue Banner (Mongolia)
 Hon. Katsuya Okada, Member of the House of Representatives (Japan)
 Prof. Sun-song Park, Dongguk University (ROK)
 Hon. Douglas Roche, O.C., Former Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament
 Prof. Dingli Shen, Director of Center for American Studies, Fudan University (China)

Alice Slater, Director, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, NY
 Prof. Tatsujiro Suzuki, Tokyo University, Peace Pledge Japan
 Prof. Terumi Tanaka, Secretary General, Hidankyo (Japan Confederation of A- and H-Bomb Sufferers Organizations)
 Tomihisa Taue, Mayor of Nagasaki (Japan)
 Hon. Minoru Terada, Member of the House of Representatives (Japan)
 Hideo Tsuchiyama, Chair, Organizing Committee of the Nagasaki Global Citizens' Assembly for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons
 Rhianna Tyson, Senior Officer, Global Security Institute
 Senator Jo Vallentine (Australia)
 Achin Vanaik, Member of the National Coordinating Committee of the CNDP (India)
 Alyn Ware, Vice-President, International Peace Bureau
 Patricia Willis, Coordinator, Pacific Peace Working Group

Convened by:

Peace Depot, Inc (Japan)
 Peace Boat (Japan)
 Peace Network (ROK)
 People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (ROK)

For more information, please contact:

Peace Depot
 E-mail: office@peacedepot.org
 TEL:+81-45-563-5101 FAX:+81-45-563-9907

Northeast Asian Women's Peace Conference : Negotiating Regional Peace, Reconciliation, and Cooperation

Gyung-Lan Jung / Women Making Peace

"We Believe Peace Is Coming!"

*- Chant shouted near DMZ by participants of Northeast Asian Women's
Peace Conference*

1. Critical Questions of the Northeast Asian Women's Peace Conference

What we initially had in mind when we were designing this conference in 2007 was a "Women's Six-Party Talks". At the time, there was apparently no woman in the intergovernmental Six-Party Talks' scene. The negotiation table which can make or break peace and the destiny of the Korean Peninsula was occupied solely by men.

Where is women's presence in the formal peace and security talks? Why are women not represented at the peace negotiation table? What can we women do to change the situation? How can we create an environment that would enable women's involvement? All these critical questions led us to the idea of the Women's Six-Party Talks.

The Six-Party Talks aims to realize the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,

normalization of the North Korea-US diplomatic relations, creation of a forum for building a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, and peace and stability in Northeast Asia. If the Six-Party Talks moves forward, it will translate into the creation of a new environment on the Korean Peninsula that can bring about the dismantlement of the Cold War structure and establishment of peace on the last frontier of the Cold War. In addition, it would present Northeast Asia an opportunity to form a new framework of peace and cooperation.

Peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia is not an issue just for the government or men, because sustainable peace cannot be achieved by the government or men alone. Indeed, sustainable peace is attainable only when the very parties suffering from the conflict take the peace process as their own issue, instead of taking it as an externally-driven one. Also, it can be made possible when people living in different countries in Northeast Asia come together in the spirit of community to build a regional framework where they can meet and share concerns through dialogue to rise from the ashes of the past history and restore sound relationships.

2. Women's Participation in Peace-building and Women's Six-Party Talks as a Process

1) Women's Participation in Peace Process

The status of women in Korea is mind-boggling. The World Economic Forum's "2010 Gender Gap Index" released on 12 October provides a good snapshot of where women stand relative to men. Korea ranked 104th out of 134 countries. Women are underrepresented in the field of peace and security as well.

Conflicts exert different impacts to men and women. The conflict situation and military culture provoke sex trafficking and sexual violence. Although we are not in hot war right now, the militarism is prevalent on the Korean Peninsula as a

result of the continued Cold War structure. The division of the Korean Peninsula led to the division of Northeast Asia, driving nations to strive for strengthened military power, increased military spending and expanded military exercises in order to counter the "enemy". Northeast Asia's military spending increased by 55% for the past decade. Such spending should rather be used to reduce the gender gap by providing financial supports, education, medical services and psychological stability. The Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia are in desperate need of investment in this regard.

Recently, women's peace movement has come to recognize women not only as the victims of conflict but also as the solution makers. Led by the United Nations, activities promoting women's equal participation and active involvement in conflict resolution and peace-building have gained steam in the international community. Especially, UN made multi-faceted efforts for the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 adopted in 2000. Major indicators were developed to assess whether the action plans are drawn up for implementation by the UN organizations and how the UN and member countries are implementing the resolution. The indicators demonstrate what women's peace movement strives towards in the conflict-stricken areas; that is, 3Ps and R&R. First, "Prevention" - given that conflicts affect men and women in different ways, ensure that conflict prevention activities and strategies are gender sensitive taking into account different needs of men and women. Second, "Participation" - promote women's involvement in decision-making and equal participation in peace process. Third, "Protection" - safeguard the human rights of women and girls, protect them from physical damages and ensure their economic security. Also, address how to realize the integration of a gender perspective into legal and institutional reforms. Fourth, "Relief and Recovery" - ensure women and girls have equal access to all relief and recovery efforts.

In addition, at the individual country level, the National Action Plan for the Implementation of Resolution 1325 is developed and implemented. To date, 23 governments including the Philippines have completed their own National Action Plan. While South Korea was one of the members in support of Resolution 1325

in 2000, efforts for implementation of the resolution is hardly seen at the moment.

Women's participation in peace-building in conflict areas like the Korean Peninsula is absolutely significant. How women are involved in the peace process will make a difference in women's post-conflict status. Peace on the Korean Peninsula will be attainable when the three key elements - North-South civilian groups, North-South governments and the international society - work in harmony. But, above all, the strong commitment of the two Koreas, their people and governments, is key to realizing peace. Unless women comprising half of the Korean Peninsula take part in the peace process, lasting peace cannot be realized, and without peace, there is no path forward for women.

2) Women's Six-Party Talks as a Process

The following three perspectives argued by civic groups for conflict prevention and realization of peace may help you better understand the concept of "Women's Six-Party Talks as a Process".

First, participation of civic groups is critical to conflict prevention and peacemaking, and in this regard a new partnership needs to be formed. To bring resolution to armed conflicts that are taking place in many parts of the world, active participation of civic and social groups rather than a single government or organization is required. Thus, we should seek a new framework of cooperation in which NGOs, activists, scholars, government representatives and international organizations work together to resolve conflicts all around the world.

Second, a paradigm shift is imperative - from reaction to conflict prevention. Up to now, international NGOs and governments have been focusing on responding to conflicts after they break out, instead of fending them off in advance. In other words, they have familiarized themselves with the culture of reaction. We must turn it around into the culture of prevention. Conflict prevention means that proactive measures are taken to mitigate a dispute before it escalates into a violent

conflict. For peace to take a firm root, a comprehensive mechanism that encompasses political issues, development issues, humanitarian measures and human rights programs should be created and put in place in order to prevent violent conflicts from occurring, recurring and continuing.

Third, conflict resolution and conflict prevention are a process of transformation. The culture of conflict resolution and prevention takes the dynamics of process importantly. In other words, if conflicts are prolonged, human relationships are destroyed and communities are broken down, leaving enormous consequences. That is why individuals and communities should work together to overcome the pains they suffered during the conflicts and to transform the violent and destructive social structure into a peaceful one to realize coexistence and reconciliation. It is an on-going process, a process of continuous transformation. The concept of Women's Six-Party Talks is to allow women to take a leading role in this transformation process.

After all, the Women's Six-Party Talks is a process of participation for women to enhance their capability of responding to conflicts in a constructive way and to learn lessons together while women from the Northeast Asian countries including North Korea and the US representing various fields gather together to seek ways to make the very much divided Northeast Asia affected by the Cold War a community of peace and solidarity, thereby building up mutual understanding. This process allows women from Korea and other countries in the region with the common vision of peace to go beyond the current role of simply assisting the intergovernmental Six-Party Talks to think and act independently to build peace on and around the Korean Peninsula, expanding their partnership to a new horizon that surpasses territorial boundaries.

The boundless solidarity of the Northeast Asian women will serve as the process of building up positive common memories to form a new identity that can transcend the identity gap between the two Koreas and among different countries in the region. It can also be called a process of developing a driving force to cultivate the culture of peace and co-existence that fosters tolerance and

appreciation of the differences of Northeast Asian countries and at the same time seek the universal value of humanity, overcoming the regional division through women's solidarity.

3. History of Northeast Asian Women's Peace Conference

In 2007, Women Making Peace organized a "South Korean Women's Peace Delegation" comprised of women leaders and lawmakers involved in the Women's Six Party Talks. Later that year, the Women's Peace Delegation visited the five other countries participating in the Six Party Talks on the DPRK's (North Korea) nuclear program: China, the DPRK, Japan, Russia, and the U.S.A. The delegation articulated the importance of gender empowerment in fostering reconciliation, cooperation, and peace in Korea and Northeast Asia, and urged the normalization of relations between the DPRK and United States, as well as the DPRK and Japan.

In 2008, Women Making Peace, Korean Women's Association United and the Women's Committee of The Korean Council for Reconciliation and Cooperation organized the "2008 Northeast Asia Women's Peace Conference." The conference was held in Seoul, South Korea in September 2008. Participants of the Conference primarily came from China, Japan, Russia and the U.S. with representatives from international women's associations and Congresswomen from Japan and South Korea. All participants broadened their understanding through dialogue with NGO representatives, as well as unofficial talks with two participating Congresswomen from Japan and South Korea. The Women's Conference focused on building common ground to reduce misunderstandings and mistrust caused by colonial and Cold War experiences, as well as differences amongst the diverse political-economic systems and cultures of Northeast Asia. Representatives from five countries gave presentations about their experiences and viewpoints for fostering peace in Northeast Asia.

In 2009, the "Organizing Committee of the Northeast Asia Women's Peace Conference" co-hosted the "2009 Northeast Asia Women's Peace Conference"

entitled "Negotiating Regional Peace, Reconciliation and Cooperation" with the Sigur Center for Asian Studies at The George Washington University in Washington, DC. Participants at the 2009 conference were women from China, Japan, Russia, South Korea, the U.K., and the U.S.A. Former Prime Minister Myung Sook Han of the Republic of Korea and Ambassador Melanne S. Verveer, the U.S.A. Ambassador at Large for Global Women's Issues, delivered keynote speeches at the conference. The goals of this conference were to strengthen relations among women and women's participation in the peace process (Track II diplomacy) and to seek ways to coordinate Track I and Track II through dialogue for building peace in the Northeast Asian region. Women representing the Six Parties visited the U.S.A. Congress and State Department (Sung Kim, the special envoy for the Six-Party Talks); and shared their experiences and thoughts on issues facing the Korean Peninsula. Participants emphasized the importance of a comprehensive approach to fostering peace on the Korean Peninsula, and urged the U.S.A. Government to include women's Track II initiatives in support of the official Six-Party Talks.

In 2010, the organizing committee of the Northeast Asian Women's Peace Conference held its international conference in Seoul. Following the Cheonan warship sinking incident, tension is rising in the region with the ROK, the US and Japan on one side and the DPRK, China and Russia on the other side, which has triggered keen attention to the peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. This year's conference was attended by women representatives from China, Russia, the US, Japan, Korea and Northern Ireland.

4. Goals of Women's Meetings in Seoul in 2010

1) Search for Common Ground

The Conference will invite women representatives from countries of the Six-Party Talks to discuss the DPRK's nuclear program and suggestions regarding the

"Women's Initiative for Creating Korean Peace Regime." The Northeast Asian Women's Peace Conference will view peace not only from each country's perspective but also from a regional viewpoint. The main objective is to seek common ground for fostering peace on the Korean Peninsula, the focal point of the Northeast Asian crisis, and to express women's views on relations between peace and women's development.

2) Delivery of Policy Recommendations

Participants of the conference will visit the South Korean Government and Embassies of the Six-Party Talk countries, such as China, Japan, Russia, and the U.S.A.; listen to each country's policies towards the Korean Peninsula (including issues related to the DPRK's nuclear program and the peace process on the Korean Peninsula), and deliver policy recommendations discussed at the peace conference.

3) Empowerment of Track II diplomacy and Track I and Track II cooperation

This conference will reinforce women's Track II activities and seek ways to cooperate with Track I activities for reducing tensions and fostering peace in the Northeast Asia. The true end of the Korean War on the Korean Peninsula and establishment of a peace process will only be obtained not just by the peace agreement between the concerned governments, but also by civilian participation in the peace process.

4) Implementation of UNSCR 1325

the peace conference is a process to implement the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (1995) and the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security (2000). As of May 2010, eighteen countries established National Action Plans in order to implement the UN SCR 1325. Needless to say, decision-making in the Northeast Asia regional security dialogue has heretofore been monopolized by men. Bringing women's voices to the table is

in keeping with UN SCR 1325, which recognized "the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peace-building and stressing the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security."

5) Development of Women's Global Leadership

Through various programs such as an open symposium with women from Northern Ireland and Northeast Asia, visits to the National Assembly and embassies, a strategic meeting and a field trip, the conference will help participants to improve communication skills, broaden expertise and perspectives on international issues, build the international conference organizing skills and develop foreign language competence as well as other required qualifications for global leaders.

5. 2010 Northeast Asian Women's Peace Conference Programs

■ October 5, 2009 <Public Session>

10:00-10:20 Introductory Remarks

Welcoming Remarks : Honorable Ms. Young Hee Choi, Chairperson, Gender Equality and Family Committee, National Assembly of the Republic of Korea

10:20-12:00 Session I: Keynote Speeches (30 minutes each)

- 1) Peace in Northeast Asia and Korean Peace Regime / Ms. Insoon NamYoon, Representative, Korean Women's Associations United
- 2) Peace Negotiation Process and Women - Experiences and Lessons of the Northern Ireland Women's Coalition / Ms. Bronagh Hinds, Co-founder of the Women's Coalition

Questions and Answers

12:00-1:30 Lunch

1:30-4:30 Session II: Country Reports on Fostering Peace in Northeast Asia

- 1) Russia : Ms. LebeMsMsdeva Nina Boresovna, Member of the Women's Union of Russia, Leading Scholar at the Institute of Eastern Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences
- 2) United States : Ms. Linda J.Yarr, Director, Program for International Studies in Asia, George Washington University
- 3) China : Ms. Sun Jisheng, Dean of the Department of English and International Studies, China Foreign Affairs University
- 4) Japan: Ms. Chie Yoshimura, Vice President, YWCA of Japan
- 5) ROK: Ms. Young Hee Cho, Representative, Women Making Peace

Questions and Answers

Evening : Welcoming Dinner / Sponsored by Honorable Ms. Young Hee Choi, Chairperson, Gender Equality and Family Committee, National Assembly of the Republic of Korea

■ October 6th

<Morning> Strategic Meeting: Discussion regarding policy recommendations to Six party talks countries

<Afternoon> Visit to the US Embassy

- Meeting with Honorable Mr. Hyeyoung Won, Foreign Affairs, Trade and Unification Committee, National Assembly of the Republic of Korea
- Meeting with Honorable Ms. Mikyung Lee, General Secretary of the Democratic Party

<Evening> Networking Dinner

■ October 7th

Field Trip: DMZ and meeting with a victim of anti-personal landmines

Farewell dinner

6. Accomplishments and Limits

1) Expansion of Women's Network and Its Limits

- Seeking a New Partnership: Activists from women's groups, scholars, representatives of international bodies, government officials and many other women leaders were invited to heighten the interest in peace on the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia and to reinforce empowerment of women.
- Networking Level : Not a routine network but a conference-based network. Participants expressed hopes for maintaining the Northeast Asian Women's Peace Conference to build relationship and trust. Follow-up meetings were held in some participating countries(The US).
- The issue of Women's capacity in peace and security of Northeast Asia: As years go by, we find it more and more difficult to invite overseas women participants to the conference. China and Russia has just few women's groups specializing in peace and security; women's peace groups in the US have little interest in Northeast Asia; and Japanese women's groups are highly interested in issues on the Korean Peninsula but feel reluctant to work with North Korea. Moreover, there are only a small number of female experts or decision-makers in this subject matter. Even if they have interest in the issue, they feel hesitant to take part in the conference due to political concerns.
- Challenges to secure the primary vehicle of each nation to carry Northeast Asian Women's Peace Conference forward

2) Discussion on Women's Collective Agenda regarding Peace on the Korean Peninsula and Lobbying Activities

- Seeking the common ground for fostering peace on the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia and lobbying concerned governments. Conference participants visited the US Congress, the Department of State, the US Embassy in Korea and members of the Korean National Assembly, and delivered recommendations to the Six-Party-Talks countries.
- Released joint statements every year since the first conference held in 2008

- 2008 Northeast Asian Women's Peace Conference Joint Statement of the Participants
- 2009 Recommendations to the US Government and Congress
Statement of the 2009 Northeast Asian Women's Peace Conference
“Negotiating Regional Peace, Reconciliation, and Cooperation”
- 2010 Recommendations to the Six-Party-Talks Countries

- Main points: △Humanitarian assistance to North Korea △Promotion of dialogue and cooperation; Resumption of the Six-Party Talks; Implementation of the agreement in the 9.19 Joint Communiqué; Taking steps to move on from the Armistice Agreement to a Peace Agreement for the Korean Peninsula △Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security △Establishment of a Women's Council for the Six-Party Talks △Reinforcement of female personnel in assistance programs for North Korea to account for 30 percent of the staff.
- Bringing UN SCR 1325 into limelight

3) Raising Awareness on the Division of the Korean Peninsula

- Visits to Gaeseong and DMZ, and meeting with a victim of anti-personal landmines provided an opportunity to further realize the stark reality faced by the divided Korean Peninsula.

4) Government-Civilian Cooperation (Track I-Track II cooperation)

- 4Cs for government-civilian cooperation : Communication (information sharing, analysis sharing), Coordination (joint planning), Cooperation (resource sharing, maximizing effects of their respective programs), Collaboration (working together, maximizing effects of joint programs)
- Cooperation with the government has been pursued to promote women's involvement in peace process on the Korean Peninsula, however, Northeast Asian governments have paid little attention. Not a single government in this

region has the National Action Plan for the Implementation of UN SCR 1325.

cf. The National Action Plan for Implementation of UN SCR 1325 - NGOs, women's groups, etc. are included in the National Action Plan.

- A cooperation mechanism between Track I and Track II in the field of peace and security needs to be developed.
- Since the Cheonan warship incident, the government-civilian relations have further weakened amidst rising tensions among Northeast Asian nations.
- There is a lack of communication channels with the government of each country.

5) Conference without North Korea

- The Women's Six-Party Talks is incomplete without North Korea's participation
- The lack of North Korea's presence is reflective of the unstable situation of the Korean Peninsula and the inter-Korean relationship.
- How to induce North Korea's participation - political and military approach; humanitarian assistance, development cooperation

6) Weak human and financial infrastructure

- Limits in terms of finance, organization, publicity and policy

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■ Northeast Asian Women's Peace Conference's Recommendations : to the Six-Party-Talks Countries

Women at the 2010 Northeast Asian Women's Peace Conference express our concern with the reappearing tensions, military conflicts and dangers of war in Northeast Asia, especially after the Cheonan Incident. Military exercises have increased on and around the Korean Peninsula. We oppose any kind of war and other threatening actions. We strongly believe that with mutual trust we can achieve peace through reconciliation, economic cooperation, social and cultural exchanges, and diplomatic normalization.

We applaud the recent humanitarian assistance and efforts to promote dialogue between the two Koreas. We hope such activity will not cease but develop into dialogue to build sustainable peace. This year is the 60th anniversary of the Korean War, the 10th anniversary of 6.15 Joint Declaration, and the 10th anniversary of UN Security Council Resolution 1325. We call on the Six-Party-Talks countries to increase efforts to make the Korean Peninsula a home of peace.

We recommend to the Six-Party-Talks countries:

1. Increase humanitarian assistance including food and medical supplies to North Korea, which will assist towards the realization of peace.
2. Promote dialogue and cooperation instead of economic sanctions and military exercises. Resume inter-Korean, US-North Korean, Japan-North Korean dialogues and the Six-Party-Talks as soon as possible. Implement the agreement in the 9.19 Joint Communiqué, including pursuing denuclearization and a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula and normalizing the US-North Korean and Japan-North Korean relations. Take concrete steps to move on from the Armistice Agreement to a Peace Agreement for the Korean Peninsula.
3. Implement UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and

Security, which calls for the full participation of women at all levels in peace processes, peacekeeping and peace building. Adopt National Action Plans and include women as chief negotiators, representatives of working groups, and observers in the process of multi-national negotiations in Northeast Asia.

4. Establish a Women's Council for the Six-Party Talks. Recognize the importance of women's Track II efforts and women NGOs' activities in supporting the official process of bilateral talks, including inter-Korean, US-North Korean, Japan-North Korean dialogues, and the Six-Party-Talks. Resource women's efforts and incorporate their views in decision-making.

5. Reinforce the number of qualified female personnel in all assistance programs for North Korea, so that at least 30 percent of the management and program staff are women.

We will seek ways to cooperate with the Six-Party-Talks countries to build peace on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia. We recommend the respective countries to accept and act on our proposal.

October 6th, 2010

Participants of the 2010 Northeast Asian Women's Peace Conference

Presenter 4

Two Cases of Peace Movement in South Korea : Conscientious Objection Movement and Peace & Disarmament Fair

Yeo-ok Yang / The World Without War

Two Cases of Peace Movements in South Korea - Conscientious Objection Movement and Peace & Disarmament Fair.

It is commonly thought that the development of peace movements in South Korea was relatively slow due to the strong militarism ingrained in Korean society, yet the situation has gradually been changing, and nowadays there are a variety of peace movements taking place in South Korea. In this presentation, I would like to introduce two particular cases of Korean peace movements: Conscientious Objection movement and 2010 Peace & Disarmament Fair, the latter of which was prepared by a number of peace organizations.

Conscientious Objection movement

For the past several decades, conscientious objectors against military service have been going to prison, yet it was only after 2000 that the issue became known to the public. That the cumulative number of conscientious objectors who served prison sentences exceeded ten thousands at the time profoundly shocked the Korean society. It has been considered as an issue for Jehovah's Witnesses only, however, conscientious objection became a matter of social 'movement' with the public declaration of the first non-Jehovah's Witness conscientious objector, the pacifist and buddhist Oh Tae-yang in December 2001. In early 2002, "Korea Solidarity for Conscientious Objection" (KSCO)

was formed by 36 civil and social organizations and began to raise public awareness about conscientious objection through various forms of activities such as discussion forums, lectures, public hearings, campaigns, and written articles.

The criticisms and scoldings against the conscientious objection movement were tremendous at first. The idea of national security was so absolute in the anti-communist Republic of Korea that where more armament was considered socially 'good', while any kind of counter-argument was severely oppressed. In South Korean society, which went through a series of militarist regimes where the 100% enlistment rate was set as a social objective and the conscription-based military system was sanctified, it was not even possible to bring up discussions on possible changes in the military system. Under these circumstances, it was difficult to expect not only any reflections on the military as a state-monopolized violence but also different points of view based on democracy and tolerance. A movement of changes, however, was slowly created by the tremendous amount of time and pain that conscientious objectors endured, along with the efforts made by both recent conscientious objectors who publicly announced their objection and their supporters.

Afterwards, the duration of the usual prison term sentenced to conscientious objectors was cut down from three years to one and a half years. In 2002, a case of conscientious objection was appealed to the Constitutional Court for review for the first time, and in 2004, a conscientious objector received a verdict of not guilty for the first time.

In late 2004, assemblymen Im Joing-In and Roh Hoe-Chan each submitted a Military Service Act Amendment Bill to the South Korean National Assembly. In late 2005, National Human Rights Commission of Korea, for the first time among Korean national institutes, announced a recommendation to introduce alternative service. In addition, the international community, upon recognizing the situation for Korean conscientious objectors, began to apply pressure to the Korean government; for example, UN Human Rights Committee repeatedly ruled that the Korean government should consider alternate service for Korean conscientious objectors.

Thanks to these social changes, it appeared that the imprisonment of conscientious which had continued for more than 50 years after liberation might end in the very near future. In September 2007, the Ministry of National Defense (MND) announced plans to allow conscientious objectors to perform alternative civilian service. According to their

plan, conscientious objectors should have had options to perform alternative service instead of going to jail since 2009. But once the conservative Lee Myung-Bak government took office, MND suddenly changed its position. Having made little efforts to prepare for alternative service with an excuse of 'national consensus,' MND publicly announced to 'nullify' the introduction of alternative service for conscientious objectors in December 24, 2008. The reason for the decision was an opinion survey which occupied a very small part of the research commissioned by Military Manpower Administration where there were more responses against alternative service. While the more-than-500-page-long research paper concludes that alternative service must be introduced, MND arbitrarily chose to use only part of survey data. The hard-fought changes by the civilian society were so easily overturned by the regime change.

Yet it was not only the CO movement participants who thought that the situation was unjust, as the militaristic and nationalistic Korean society has slowly been changing over the course of time and as CO movement has continued.

In the summer of 2008, National Human Rights Commission of Korea officially expressed concern and sent a statement to MND, urging it to quickly introduce alternative service for conscientious objectors. This issue has been continuously raised in the judicial branch as well. There have been a series of requests with the Constitutional Court for a determination of constitutionality of the Homeland Army Reserve Act. In the current situation where legislative solutions are very unlikely, the Constitutional Court's possible decision for conscientious objectors remains one of the possibilities. In 2010, UN Human Rights Committee pressed the Korean government once again by having its second ruling on individual CO cases. WRI, an anti-war organization which undertakes CO activities internationally, spread the news about Korea's situation throughout the world. Korea boasts being the current UN Secretary General's home country and shouts phrases such as 'National Status' and 'Global Standards,' while continuously ignoring criticisms from the international community and sending conscientious objectors to prison.

While social movements on conscientious objectors focused on alternative service, conscientious objection raises an issue that goes beyond alternative service. First of all, conscientious objection socially reminds what the military and soldiers mean in Korean society. The military is the place where people get ready to go to the battleground and fight anytime. This system's objective is to go to war and win the war. To win, you have to kill somebody who is supposed to be 'our enemy.' In the end, the military is

where killing is practiced. Even if you might argue that the military is a necessary evil and that war is a reality, it is clear that ultimately any war or military should not exist. Yet these uncomfortable truths about the essence of the military have been neglected, hidden, beautified, and sanctified. Any discussions about the military was a taboo because of "Korea's unique security situation." It was conscientious objection movements that fundamentally questioned this situation. Conscientious objectors, who refuse murder training, automatically reveal that the military is a device for war and organization for murders. The meaning of "becoming a soldier," which conscientious objectors realized, was that we can be a victimizer and that the unacceptable violence may originate from ourselves. Therefore, their resolve and practice against becoming a soldier were primitive and strong methods against war. "Reflections on violence" caused by conscientious objection is now expanding into the movement to monitor Korea's military weapon industry. If you face the reality that the weapons sold by Korea are being used in the regions of conflicts to suppress ethnic minorities, you will be able to realize what the money collected from the weapon exports means.

Peace & Disarmament Fair

South Korea is one of the world's largest arms importer and exporter. For the past 5 years, Korea has been the world's third largest arms importer, and the defense industry export sales continues to rise every year, as it recorded 1.17 billion dollars in 2009 and is expected to exceed 1.5 billion dollars.

Under the export-driven national policy to overcome economic crises and secure US dollars, the Korean government considers arms production and exports to be a major growth industry, so the scales of the arms industry and business are expected to increase even further. But arms should not be simple products of economic exchange. Arms are made to hurt or kill people. While the government and corporations advertise made-in-Korea weapons, there has never been any social discussion or consensus as to whether we need to spend a huge amount of taxes to develop those weapons or any knowledge on where those arms are sold and actually used.

The Defense Industry Fair previously held in October began to expand as the Aerospace-centered 'Seoul Air Show' and the ground weapon-focused 'Defense Asia' united into the biannual 'Seoul International Aerospace & Defense Exhibition' (ADEX). This year, 60th Korean War anniversary memorial events have been held throughout the

country all year along. In particular, the Armed Forces Day event was held in a bigger scale as it united with '9.28 Seoul Capture' memorial events, and '10 Best Weapons' were displayed at the Gwanghwamun Plaza and Seoul City Hall Plaza.

While it is easy to think vaguely that powerful weapons may protect peace, the reason that weapons are produced and exported is because of profits. And when we look into the situation more closely, we realize that the situation is even more complicated than the simple 'making profits by selling weapons,' because situations requiring weapons are necessary to sell weapons. Those exported weapons become the cause of conflicts themselves, and in the end have no choice but to function as the medium of armed conflicts. This point has not been raised since a long time ago over the world, but not in Korea. Yet the volume of arms business increases every year, and the number of people killed by this overflowing amount of weaponry is growing. The powerful arms we produce threaten someone else's peace and life. And some other people who feel threatened feel the need for even stronger weapons. A vicious cycle of the arms races still continues to date.

Disarmament interests and activities have long existed within the Korean peace movements, yet it took a considerable amount of time to set disarmament as the common goal of peace movements in general. At the 2009 Peace Activist Convention, activists who had interests in war profiteering held a related workshop, and there the need for a joint response towards arms issues was discussed. Peace activists who had since considered the form of such a response decided to organize an alternative exhibition and began to prepare since late March in 2010. The 2010 Peace and Disarmament Fair Preparatory Committee was officially established in June after a series of preparatory meetings and internal workshops. The committee so far consists of 14 organizations: Amnesty International Korea, Nanum Munwha, Nautilus ARI, the Weapon Zero Team, the Buddhist practice group, the Korean Sharing Movement, World Without War, Jeju Solidarity for Participation and Environment, People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy, Pyongtaek Peace Centre, Peace Network, Peace Ground, Peace Museum, Hansin University Peace and Public Centre. Between the 2nd and 3rd of October, coinciding with the South Korean Armed Forces Day, the Peace and Disarmament Fair Preparatory Committee organized 「2010 Peace & Disarmament Fair: Let's Talk Peace, Now」. In this fair, citizens shared their concern about military conflicts and arms expansion over the world, as well as civilian alternatives and imaginations towards peaceful co-existence.

In the <Exhibition Area> of 2010 Peace & Disarmament Fair, 7 Korean weapons and 7 related issues were selected which cause military tensions and war expenditure competition, and a total of 60 panels were shown to point out the impact of the South Korean arms trade and its possible solutions. In addition, there were Peace <Lecture Area> on the street, <Video Area> where short videos and related films about international peace movements were shown, and <Experience Area>, where peace sensibilities were stimulated by drawing, making, and reading. At the evening <Concert Area> was a cultural festival with films from the human rights film festival, conversations with 2nd generation nuclear bomb victims, and peace songs so that people could think of peace in multiple dimensions.

The detailed program was as follows:

	Content
Exhibition Area	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▷ Wicked Weapon, Bad Weapon, Expensive Weapon Exhibition - Nuclear Weapon / No Nuclear Weapon Yes Nuclear-Free Zone - Cluster Bombs / Death Rain - Weapons Ordinance/ No More Irresponsible Weapon Deal - Next-Generation Tank K2 / Unnecessary High-Performance Tank - Korean Style Helicopter / Dinosaur eating away the largest ever budget - Aegis / The oceanic marine's anti-peace dream - Next-generation Fighter Plane / National Budget Wasting Fighter Project
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▷ Exhibition of Civilian Suggestions for Peace and Disarmament in Korean Peninsula - Realizable Dream, Disarmament / Military Budget Cut - "We oppose overseas dispatch of armed forces" / No War, No Overseas Dispatch - Doubts after doubts / Find Out Cheonan Ship Truth - 21st Century "Contradiction" War / No for MD Introduction - Share for Peace / Expand Support for North Korea - Don't Covet the Island of Peace / Against Jeju Marine Base - Several Trillion Won for Base Cleaning / Report US Army Base's Environmental Pollution
Video Area	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Activities of Overseas Organizations opposing against the production and exchange of weapons since a long time ago - A war that has not ended, cluster bombs (MBC W) - 4th Human Rights Film Festival Film <Spotlights on a massacre : Landmines>(France/40 min)
Lecture Area	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Monitor Dangerous Weapons / Lee Si-Woo (Sat., 1PM) Citizens' Peace-making : Against Security-Militarism / Lee Dae-Hoon (Sat., 5PM) Middle East Bloody Conflict Story / Kim Jae-Myung (Sun., 1PM) Ask Cheonan Ship / Lee Tae-Ho (Sun., 5PM)
Experience Area	Mosquito Net Library (Exhibition and reading of books that were chosen as '2010 Children's peace book'), Drawing Peace Tiles (Drawing about their idea of peace), Make a wooden pole wishing for peace
Concert Area	Film Screening with Visiting Human Rights Film Festival 'Firefly' (Sat., 6PM) <Nuclear Bomb>(USA, Japan/Carey Schonegevel/57min) +Conversations with 2nd-generation Nuclear Bomb Victims

	<Boisterous Cultural Festival>(Sun., 6PM) Star : Peace Ground(Joyakgol, Byulemjaripyo, Mungoo), Bomroya, Yasal (SOUND SMITH Vicak), Yamagata Tweakster, etc
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
While 2010 Peace & Disarmament Fair was held outdoors under rainy and windy conditions, a lot of people wishing for peace nonetheless got together and shared their thoughts about peace and disarmament. It was pointed out that, due to each organization's busy schedules and limited resources, there were not enough preparations on how to interact with citizens, and we plan to make efforts to improve the condition. We plan to produce policy kits for policy suggestions, along with an exhibition in the National Assembly, and directly give them to congressmen. In addition, we plan to hold street and regional exhibitions to meet more citizens. 2010 Peace and Disarmament Fair is over, yet it is still not over in the sense that it is a meaningful beginning.

Security issues are not something that should be left up to the so-called professionals; everyone should be able to talk about their idea of peace. Instead of fantasizing about powerful weapons as defenders for peace, we must be able to think that the existence of weapons itself destructs peace. Instead of having the anti-peace defense industry as the nation's future, peace movements should make efforts for discussions on much more valuable social investments. ✨

■ Biographies of the Presenters ■

○ Colin ARCHER / UK


Born 1952, UK. Degrees in European languages and Development Studies. **Peace and human rights activist in many different fields since early 1970s.** Worked in Latin America and Caribbean 1973-4, then directed a Third World Centre in Manchester from 1976-83, and involved in many local and national projects in development education and North-South solidarity work. Later taught in community (adult) education for 10 years. Especially active on nuclear issues in UK during late 1980s, with the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. Co-founder of the Institute for Law and Peace. **Secretary-General of the International Peace Bureau** since 1990. Organiser of a wide variety of projects, publications and events for, and with, the international peace movement. Heavily involved in the World Court Project and Abolition 2000 (coalitions against nuclear weapons), Hague Appeal for Peace (World Congress 1999), and Global Campaign for Peace Education. Co-organiser of the major 5-day conference 'Towards a World Without Violence', part of the Barcelona Forum of Cultures 2004. Has edited/co-published many books, newsletters, reports etc. Author of *Warfare or Welfare? Disarmament for Development in the 21st Century*, published by IPB in 2005. and *Whose Priorities? A guide for campaigners on military and social spending*, published in 2007. These texts form the basis for IPB's principal programme: **Sustainable Disarmament for Sustainable Development**. Main administrator and fundraiser for the organisation. Languages: English, French, Spanish.



○ Akira KAWASAKI / Japan

Akira Kawasaki is an Executive Committee member of the Tokyo-based NGO Peace Boat <www.peaceboat.org>. Having worked with a Japanese NGO Peace Depot in 1998-2002, he advocates for nuclear disarmament currently as a Vice

Chair of International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) and a Global Council member of Abolition 2000. Since 2008, Kawasaki coordinates "Global Voyage for a Nuclear-Free World: Peace Boat Hibakusha Project" that the atomic-bomb survivors travel around the world to raise public awareness on nuclear danger. In 2009 he served as an NGO Advisor to Co-Chairs of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (ICNND). He plays an active role in facilitating policy dialogue between Japanese government and civil society on disarmament. His book *Kaku Kakusan (Nuclear Proliferation)*, Iwanami Shoten, 2003, Tokyo, received the First Peace Promotion Prize of the Peace Studies Association of Japan (PSAJ) in June 2006. He was a principal translator of the Japanese version of the 2006 Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission (WMDC) Report *Weapons of Terror*. kawasaki@peaceboat.gr.jp.



○ John FEFER / US

John Feffer is the co-director of Foreign Policy in Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies. He is the author of several books, including *North Korea, South Korea: U.S. Policy at a Time of Crisis (Seven Stories, 2003)* and numerous articles in *The New York Times*, *Boston Globe*, *Salon*, *The American Prospect*, *The Nation*, *TomDispatch*, and other publications. He has been a Writing Fellow at Provisions Library in Washington, DC and a PanTech fellow in Korean Studies at Stanford University. He is a former associate editor of *World Policy Journal*. He has worked as an international affairs representative in Eastern Europe and East Asia for the American Friends Service Committee. He has been interviewed widely on television and radio, including CNN, MSNBC, al-Jazeera, Democracy Now, and elsewhere. He serves on the advisory committees of the Alliance of Scholars Concerned about Korea. He is a recipient of the Herbert W. Scoville fellowship and has been a writer in residence at Blue Mountain Center and the Wurlitzer Foundation.



○ Ichiro YUASA / Japan

Ichiro Yuasa has served as President of Peace Depot since 2008. Peace Depot is a Japanese non-profit, independent peace research, education and information institution which aims to build a security system that does not rely on military power. It has published bi-weekly periodical, "Nuclear Weapon and Nuclear Test Monitor," since 1995. In an effort to achieve a global nuclear abolition, he has been taking a leading role in advocating Northeast Asia nuclear weapon-free zone and promoting mutual cooperation among parliamentarians, mayors and NGOs. He is the author of several books, including "What is Peaceful city, Hiroshima" (Technology and Human being, 1995), and numerous articles on issues such as nuclear disarmament, US bases and base pollution. He holds a Doctor of Science, specializing in Physical Oceanography. He has conducted researches on environmental problems in the Seto Inland Sea as a member of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry in Kure, Hiroshima Prefecture, since 1975. Reconsidering the meaning of an advancement of science and technology, he became concerned on environmental issues relating nuclear power plants and oceanic pollution. Since 1984, he has involved himself in the movement to oppose a deployment of US Tomahawk missiles. In 1989, he involved himself in founding "Peace-link Hiroshima, Kure, and Iwakuni"



○ Hua HAN / China

Hua HAN is Associate Professor and Director of the Center for Arms Control and Disarmament at the School of International Studies (SIS), Peking University, China. She teaches courses in International Relations in South Asia, International Arms Control, Disarmament and Nonproliferation, and US Politics and Foreign Policy. Her research interests cover South Asia and arms control and nonproliferation. Han Hua has been a visiting researcher at School of International Affairs, Georgia Institute of Technology, USA, The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute(SIPRI), Sweden, The Stimson Center and Monterey Center for Nonproliferation in Washington DC and Monterey, The Victoria University, Canada,



and the Peace and Conflict Institute, Uppsala University, Sweden. She is Director for Arms Control and Disarmament, SIS and has led programs and projects on regional nuclear nonproliferation, confidence building measures and nuclear deep-cut. She has also written extensively on Arms Control, nonproliferation and South Asia for journals and newspapers in China and abroad. Co-authored books are Li Liangguang, Ye Zhengjia and Han Hua: China Relations with South Asian Countries, Social Science Literature Press, China, 2001, and Eric Arnett, edited, Arms Control in South South Asia after the Test Ban treaty, Oxford University Press, 1997

○ Gyung-Lan JUNG / Korea

Gyung Lan JUNG is Chairperson, Policy Committee, Women Making Peace (Seoul) and coordinator of the Organizing Committee of Northeast Asian Women's Peace Conference. She is Co-Executive Director, Women's Division, South Korean Committee for the Implementation of 6. 15th South-North Joint Declaration. Prior to taking this position, she was the Chairperson of the Women Making Peace Center for Peaceful Future of Korea and International Solidarity Committee. Formerly a researcher at the Christian Institute for the Study of Justice and Development, she has studied reunification and the role of women in North and South Korea. She was a visiting scholar at the George Washington University and finished a Ph D. course at the University of North Korean Studies and holds a Certificate of completion in Advanced Conflict Resolution from the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University. Her peace-building efforts include: attending the North and South Korean Women's Rally in Mt. Kumgang, North Korea; organizing the North and South Korean Women's meetings at the North-South Korean Joint Event in Seoul; She joined the delegate for a South Korean speaking tour to the US in June 2003 regarding the dangers of war on the Korean peninsula; authoring "The Present Situation of Northern and Southern Women" in The Structure and Reality of 50 Years of Division of Korea(Minjungsa), Peace Movement after 9.11 in South Korean Human Rights Situation and Tasks(South Korean Human Rights Foundation), Civil Cooperation:



US-DPRK Exchanges (POSCO PTJ Foundation) and coauthoring "South Korean women's peace movement and International Solidarity" in South Korean Women's Peace Movement History(Hangilsa) Women Making Peace www.peacewomen.or.kr

○ Yeo-ok YANG / Korea

Yeo-ok YANG is a peace activist, working in a group called 'World Without War' and 'Weapon Zero Team'. Not only supporting Conscientious Objectors in jail or under trial/investigation, she participate in various peace movement. 2009 International Conscientious Objectors' day in Korea Preparatory Committee hosted by WRI(War Resisters' International) and KSCO(Korea Solidarity for Conscientious Objection), 2010 Peace and Disarmament Fair Preparatory Committee.



○ Taeho LEE / Korea

Taeho Lee is the Co-Deputy Secretary General of PSPD and a member for Executive Committee of the Center for Peace and Disarmament of PSPD. He is a policy committee member of the South Korean Committee for the Implementation of the June 15 South- North Joint Declaration since 2005. He was a visiting researcher at the Columbia University. As becoming a coordinator of PSPD in 1995, he was responsible for anti-corruption movement and especially protection of whistle blowers who disclosed corruption of the arms contract. With establishing the Center for Peace and Disarmament of PSPD in 2003, he has organized various projects concerning disarmament and the democratic control of the security power. His efforts for peace and disarmament are campaign against War on Iraq and Afghanistan(2003-), campaign against development of the Korean helicopter, movement against the establishment of the naval base in Jeju Island, and movement against the legislation of the anti-terrorism and anti-money laundry for terrorism while proposing civil alternatives for the military reform and raising questions on the sinking of the Cheonan warship investigation. He is the author of several books including '2008



Civil White Paper of Peace'(co-author, 2008), '2010 Civil White Paper of Peace'(co-author, 2010), 'Raise Questions on the Cheonan Warship'(co-author, 2010), 'The Sealed Truth of the Cheonan Warship'(co-author, 2010). He also wrote many articles including 'Movement against War on Iraq and the Civil Society of Korea'(2006, 世界), 'The Major Six Problems of the Military Reform'(parliamentary report, 2006), 'The Problems of the legislations of anti-money laundry for terrorism'(parliamentary report, 2007), 'Making a Peace State and Civil movement'(Citizen and the World, 2007), 'War against terrorism and US civil movement'(research paper for the POSCO Foundation, 2009).